

History of France



Jacques Bainville

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
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HISTORY OF FRANCE



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
HISTORY OF FRANCE



BY

JACQUES BAINVILLE

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
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INTRODUCTION

M. Jacques Bainville begins his *History of France* with the confession that while at school and college, he had no love for history. It bored him. When he later became interested in this subject, he sought for the reasons of his previous antipathy and he found that what had repelled him was the mere stringing out of facts, one after the other. He felt that it had not been sufficiently borne in upon him, "why men fought, killed each other or became reconciled. History was a collection of footless dramas, a mêlée, a chaos, in which the intelligence could discern nothing." He came to the conclusion that there must be another way to write and teach history. To make it really interesting there must be some guiding thread; one must assume that the men of the past were like the men of the present and that their actions were governed by motives not unlike our own. If the merely chronological account is insipid or incoherent, all this disappears when the student begins to seek out the reasons for what has been done in the past.

It was to gratify this curiosity that he undertook to write the history of his country. First of all he wished to satisfy himself and to set forth, as clearly as possible, causes and effects. It is in this spirit then that his history was written.

M. Bainville's work is original in the sense that it is an independent critique of the facts of history and that it makes them intelligible. Its success in France, where within a year it has passed through one hundred and twenty-five editions, is little less than astounding. He has evidently interpreted the history of France in a way to arouse the interest and to meet with the approval of a large number of intelligent Frenchmen. M. Bainville has already established his reputation as an able critic and man of letters; to the interest of his method he has added the further attraction of an accomplished style.

When M. Bainville insists that he has maintained no thesis the statement should be taken as true in the sense that his inter-

pretation of the facts of French history was undertaken in evident good faith and sincerity. It should not be assumed that in its results it is unpartisan. What he has really done is to disengage, to show in operation the forces which in his opinion have made for the greatness of France. The reader is left in no doubt as to what these forces were. M. Bainville is a conservative, a traditionalist and, as he sees it, the two forces which have made for the greatness of France are the Monarchy and the Church.

CHRISTIAN GAUSS.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

Where in his exposition the author has assumed on the part of his French public a knowledge of facts not possessed by the ordinary American reader, occasional brief explanations have been added to the text, and occasional discussions of points in controversy have been abbreviated to keep the work within the same compass. In no respect, however, has the spirit of M. Bainville's text been altered. The interpretation of French history, therefore, as given in the body of this work is M. Bainville's and in no sense that of his translator.

In so brief a work, for the author has succeeded in telling his story in a single volume, there is necessarily much foreshortening. In attempting to disengage the rôle of traditional forces, M. Bainville occasionally neglects to mention facts which other French historians have regarded as important and which are at variance with his conclusions. In order to make it possible for the American reader to reach his own conclusions, the most important of these facts are indicated in footnotes by the translator. He has not, however, even where he disagrees, attempted to enter into controversy with the author, believing that his volume is not only an interesting history of the France of the past, but a highly significant presentation of the political philosophy which may not inconceivably become a force in the France of the future. Whether or not the forces which M. Bainville sees as the dominant and valuable element in French life are correctly diagnosed it is not our purpose to discuss. M. Bainville belongs to the school of Charles Maurras and the views here advanced have been held to a greater or less degree by Frenchmen as representative and as distinguished as M. Paul Bourget and the late Maurice Barres.



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HISTORY OF FRANCE

CHAPTER I

DURING 500 YEARS GAUL SHARES THE LIFE OF ROME

MEN have probably lived upon the earth for hundreds of centuries. But beyond twenty-five hundred years ago, the origins of France are lost in conjecture and obscurity. A long shadowy period precedes her history. On the soil of France migrations and conquests had followed each other up to the time when the Gaels or Gauls became her masters, either driving out the occupants they found there, or merging with them. These earlier inhabitants were Ligurians and Iberians, dark and of medium stature, and they still constitute the basis of the French population. The tradition of the Druids would have it, that part of the Gauls was indigenous while the rest came from the north and beyond the Rhine; for the Rhine has always seemed to be the frontier of Gaul. Thus the fusion of races began in prehistoric time. The French people are a composite; they are more than a race, they are a nation.

Unique in Europe, the conformation of France was such that it lent itself to all shifting currents, both of blood and of ideas. France is an isthmus, a highway of communication between the north and south. Before the Roman conquest there were remarkable differences between the Greek colony of Marseilles and the Celts between the Seine and the Loire and the Belgae between the Meuse and the Seine. Other elements in large number have, in the course of the centuries, been added to these. The fusion took place little by little, leaving only a fortunate diversity. It is to this that France owes her moral and intellectual riches, her equilibrium and her genius.

It is commonly said that in this fertile country, upon this fortunately shaped land, there was destined to be a great people.

This is merely taking the effect for the cause. We are accustomed to see on this part of the map a state whose unity and solidarity are almost unparalleled. This state did not grow up by itself, nor did it come into being without a struggle. It is the work of the hand of man. It has several times collapsed but it has been rebuilt. The combination, France, seems natural to us. There have been and there might have been many other combinations.

Harmonious to the eye, the shape of this country is seriously defective in other respects. On the north and east, France has weak land frontiers which expose her to the invasions of a dangerous enemy. Furthermore, Flanders, Germany, Italy, Spain have ever made her uneasy, distracted her attention, tended to pull her apart. If she possesses the unique advantage of access to all the European seas, on the other hand, her maritime frontiers are too extensive, are difficult to defend and demand either a considerable effort or involve difficult decisions of policy. For the ocean calls for one fleet and the Mediterranean for another. If France is not directed by men of very great common sense, she risks neglecting the sea for the land or inversely; or she may even allow herself to be carried too far in either direction, a situation in which she will repeatedly find herself. If she takes no pains to be strong at sea, she is at the mercy of a maritime power which then places obstacles in the way of her other designs. If she wishes to be strong at sea, the same maritime power takes umbrage at her progress and a new kind of conflict results. Nearly a thousand years of an era not yet concluded will be divided between sea and land, between England and Germany. Thus the history of France is that of the elaboration and conservation of a country through accidents, difficulties and storms, both from within and without; a score of times they have all but overthrown her house, and after them she has been forced to rebuild it. France is the product of will and intelligence.

To what does she owe her civilization? To what does she owe the fact that she is what she is? To the Roman conquest. This conquest would have failed; it would have taken place

much later, under different conditions, possibly less favorable, if the Gauls had not been divided among themselves and lost in their own anarchy. Cæsar's campaigns were greatly facilitated by tribal jealousies and rivalries. These Gallic tribes were numerous; the administration of Augustus later recognized not less than sixty nations or cities. At no time, not even under the noble Vercingetorix did Gaul succeed in presenting a truly united front. There were merely coalitions. Rome always found some among the tribes who were ready to espouse her cause either directly or by connivance; as, for example, the Remi (of Rheims) and the Aeduians of the Saône. Civil war, the great Gallic vice, delivered the country to the Romans. (A formless, unstable government, a primitive political organization hesitating between democracy and oligarchy, was what frustrated the efforts of Gaul to defend her independence.)

The French are still proud of the national uprising of which Vercingetorix was the soul. The Gauls were military by temperament and their expeditions and migrations have, in ancient times, carried them across Europe and into Asia Minor. Rome trembled when they entered that city as conquerors. A people cannot exist without military virtues, and these the Gauls transmitted to their descendants; but military virtues alone do not suffice to make a people. The heroism of Vercingetorix and of his allies has not been lost; it was a seed which was later to bear fruit. But it was impossible for Vercingetorix to triumph definitively and it would have been a misfortune if he had.

At the time when the Gallic chief was put to death after the conquest of Cæsar (51 B.C.), no comparison was possible between the Roman and that poor Gallic civilization which knew nothing of writing and whose religion had not yet advanced beyond the stage of human sacrifices. France owes everything to that conquest. It was harsh; Cæsar had been cruel and pitiless. Civilization was imposed upon the ancestors of the French by fire and sword, and bought at the price of blood. But they have become highly civilized and if they have enjoyed a considerable advantage over other peoples, they owe it to this violence.

The Gauls themselves were not slow to recognize that this

force had been beneficial. They had the gift of assimilation, a natural aptitude which made it easy for them to accept the Greco-Latin civilization which had already begun to penetrate by way of Marseilles and the Narbonne country. Never has colonization been more fortunate or brought forth finer fruit than that of the Romans in Gaul. Other colonizing races have destroyed the conquered peoples; or, the vanquished, forced back upon themselves, have lived apart from their conquerors. One hundred years after Cæsar, the fusion was almost complete and Gauls were already sitting in the Roman senate.

Up to 472, until the downfall of the Western Empire, the history of Gaul is merged with that of Rome. We are apt to overlook the fact that France lived through one fourth of her entire history since the beginning of the Christian era, in that close association with the Roman world; four or five centuries, a period of time nearly as long as from the reign of Louis XII to our own day, a period filled with as many events and revolutions. The details, if we paused to deal with them, would be wearisome. Yet what are the main lines which a study of the time reveals to us? The permanent characteristics of France are in process of formation.

It is probable that but for the Romans, Gaul would have been Teutonized. There seemed to be beyond the Rhine an inexhaustible reservoir of men; again and again tribes set forth driven by want, by a thirst for pillage, or forced out by other migrations behind them. After having been invaders, the Gauls in their turn were invaded. It is doubtful if, left to themselves, they could have resisted. Even in 102 B.C. it had taken the legions of Marius to deliver Gaul from the Teutons who had advanced as far as the Rhone. This coming of Marius rendered immense service to Gaul, not only in that it made it possible for her to drive out these Teutons, barbarians, as they were called at that time, but in that it greatly aided the Roman penetration of the country. The occasion of Cæsar's first campaign, in 58 B.C., was likewise an invasion by the Germans. He came in the rôle of protector and his conquest began by what we should call an armed intervention.

That conquest once completed, we find Rome allied with the Gauls for defense against Germany. This bond, strengthened by the attraction of the Greco-Latin civilization, served as nothing else could to cement the friendship of the Romans and the Gauls. They became two nations united in the defense of the common good. This is the significance of that famous discourse to the Gauls which Tacitus puts into the mouth of Cerialis after the latter's victory over the Batavians: "We have not established ourselves on the Rhine to protect Italy, but to prevent a new Ariovistus from conquering the Gauls. The Germans have ever had the same reason for entering your territory: restlessness, greed and a passion for change, a natural enough passion when instead of their marshes and deserts they hope not only to gain a soil of unusual fertility but also to become your masters."

The Roman policy was so farseeing and the Roman Empire realized so well the rôle she was playing in the world, that Tacitus also attributes these further words to Cerialis: "Suppose the Romans should be driven from their conquests, what would result except a general mingling of all the peoples of the earth?"

That day was to come and the Roman Empire was to fall; the dam would be broken and the prophecy fulfilled. This catastrophe which long made Europeans look back so wistfully upon the last "Roman peace" teaches us that progress is neither inevitable nor continuous. More than that it teaches us how fragile is civilization, destined as it is to undergo long eclipses or even to perish when it loses its foundations—order, authority and the political institutions on which it is established.

Until that fatal century when the barbarians overwhelmed them both, Gaul and Rome had to repel numerous attacks by the Teutons; a significant premonition of struggles to come. In 275, the emperor, Probus, drove back and severely punished the Germans who had advanced far into Gaul and who in their retreat left behind them ruins and a desert. They had even, as in 1918, cut down the fruit trees. Eighty years later Emperor Julian, who had so loved life in Paris, was besieged

by the Germans deep within Gaul, in the city of Sens, before he drove them back across the Rhine and imposed on them a tribute as "reparation" (even then it was the same thing and the same word), for the devastation of which they had again been guilty.

In proportion as the Empire grew weaker, sapped by internal dissensions and anarchy, these invasions became more frequent and at her gates the number of insistent barbarians increased. New tribes were ever coming to the fore; fortunately they were always rivals, and one drove the other out as the Goths drove out the Vandals. However in the fifth century the collaboration of Gaul and Rome was shown once more in a manner not to be forgotten, in Ætius, the conqueror of Attila. The King of the Huns, the "Scourge of God," was at the head of an empire which might be compared to that of the Mongolians. He himself was like a Genghis Khan or a Tamerlaine and commanded peoples who until that time had been unknown. Ætius with the aid of the Visigoths and the Franks conquered him near Châlons and this victory has ever remained a proud memory for the Western peoples (451).

This is the first time that we have mentioned the name of the Franks, a people destined to play so great a rôle in this country of the Gauls and from whom France was to take her name. For many years they had been established along the Meuse and the Rhine and, like other barbarians, had served as auxiliaries in the Roman armies. They were Rhinelanders and one of their tribes was called the Ripuarians, "people of the river banks," because they inhabited the left bank of the Rhine in the region of Cologne and Treves.

How was it that so great a rôle was reserved for the Franks? Known by Rome since the first century they had given her not only soldiers, but from time to time generals and even a consul and an empress. It was not this however which distinguished them from the other barbarians Rome had undertaken to attract, assimilate and use against the Germans across the Rhine. The Franks were in general rather backward as compared to the peoples of Germanic origin in-

stalled like themselves within the natural boundaries of Gaul. The Goths and the Burgundians, granted the title of "guests" long before, were more advanced and polished. This circumstance was one day to be to their disadvantage as against the hardier Franks.

At the time when the Empire of the West disappeared, the Franks established in the Rhine countries and in Belgium were still rude warriors whom no contacts had softened. They were soldiers and their government was military. The members of the Merovingian family, from which the later Merovingian dynasty was named, were, like their fellows, leaders of tribes only, but they were leaders. That is why the tradition which refers the foundation of the French monarchy back to these petty kings is not absurd; although in reality the Frankish kings before Clovis had counted for much less with the Gallo-Romans than Gothic chiefs like Alaric.

These Franks, few in number but irresistible in war, held in their power the points of vantage from which France could be dominated, the points which commanded the routes of invasion and from which an enemy could penetrate to the heart of the country, in other words, to Paris. They thus held the strategic positions. Another circumstance was perhaps even more favorable to them: the Franks were not Christians. This reason for their success seems rather surprising at first, but we shall see by what a natural chain of events it was to serve to their advantage.

At a very early date Gaul had become Christian and had had her martyrs. The Church at Lyons was the center of propaganda. Very early, this Gallo-Roman Christianity took on an orthodox character. As soon as it had begun to spread, the Christian religion found many heretics and nowhere were the dissenters attacked with more zeal than in Gaul. Saint Irenæus took up the defense of dogma against the Gnostics; Saint Hilary struggled against a graver heresy and one which almost conquered him—Arianism. The barbarians already established in Gaul, having been converted, immediately became Arians. When the Franks appeared in their turn, there was a rôle for

them to play. Gaul herself had called them and the Church saw that these newcomers, these pagans, natural rivals of the Burgundians and of the Goths, could be drawn into the true faith. This was the secret of the success of Clovis and it is one of the reasons why it cannot be said that there was ever a Frankish conquest.

For a long time the Roman Empire had been in its death agony. In dying it was overwhelmed with a terrifying confusion. Since there was no secular authority, such authority as existed fell naturally into the hands of those who possessed the moral ascendancy, that is of the priests. People grouped themselves about these "defenders of the cities," but the Church understood that her mission was not the exercise of temporal power. She held to the traditional distinction between the temporal and the spiritual, and cherished an admiration for Roman order. To reëstablish some authority among the Gauls, and to make that authority Christian and orthodox, such was the idea and the work of the clergy. Two men of great intelligence, King Clovis and the Archbishop of Rheims, Saint Remigius, united to achieve this end. But it would be difficult to understand their success without first realizing the anguish, the terror for the future which seized the Gallo-Roman peoples when once Rome had fallen and her beneficent protection had ceased.

This fertile country, covered with rich monuments and supporting an industrious population, in which a middle class, like the products of the soil, tended to spring up after every tempest, was by natural instinct, conservative. It had a horror of anarchy. The communists of the time, called the *Bagaudæ*, whose attempts at revolutions had always been suppressed, were not less dreaded than the barbarians from without the boundaries. Roman Gaul desired a vigorous ruler, and it was at this juncture that Clovis appeared.

Hardly had Clovis succeeded his father Childeric than he set his warriors on the march from Tournai, his residence, towards the center of the country. He was setting out to conquer the Gauls. Soissons was governed by a kind of patriarch,

Syagrius, surviving relic of the disappearing Empire. Saint Remigius saw there was no salvation in that quarter. What other force was there then but this barbarian from the north? What would be gained by resisting him? Clovis would destroy everything, leave other ruins and bring another anarchy. There was a wiser course than to combat him; it was to welcome him as conqueror, aid him, surround him, in order to convert him to the true faith. Manifestly his coming was inevitable. It remained to make the best of it both for the present and for the future.

Clovis on his side had certainly pondered and thought out his plans. He was well informed concerning the moral state of Gaul. This barbarian had a taste for glory and his enterprise had no chance of succeeding, of lasting and developing unless he respected catholicism which had entered so profoundly into Gallo-Roman life. The famous incident of the Soissons vase proves how clear was his vision. The summary execution of a soldier guilty of sacrilege did more than all else for the triumph of Clovis. It was one of those acts which reveal the great statesman.

But Clovis was yet to be converted. His conversion was admirably staged. This barbarian was intelligent: he re-enacted the conversion of the Emperor Constantine on the field of battle. Only, when at Tolbiac (496), he made a vow that he would receive baptism if he was victorious, the enemy was Germanic. Not only had Clovis become a Christian but he had put to flight the traditional invader, he had chased to the other side of the Rhine the hereditary enemy of France. From that time on, his power over Romanized Gaul was irresistible.

It may be said that it was at this moment that France began. She already possessed her principal characteristics. Her civilization was strong enough to withstand the influx of the Franks and to leave the material power in their hands. And she had great need of this Frankish strength. She would assimilate these men, she would polish them. Like her civilization, her religion was Roman and that religion was saved: henceforth, throughout the centuries, the basis of religious France will be

orthodox catholicism. In short, anarchy had been avoided, a governing power, rude though it was, had been recreated, and France could afford to wait for it to pass into better hands. This power will be monarchic and will tend to realize the Roman idea of the unity of the state. Nothing of all this will be lost. Through the vicissitudes of the ages these traits will ever be reappearing.

However France was far from being securely founded and sure of her destiny. The Frankish monarchy had only been a last resort in the minds of the men of the Church who had welcomed it. In spite of its imperfections, it was to serve through nearly three hundred years to preserve the Gauls from the total ruin which had threatened them at the fall of the Roman Empire.

CHAPTER II

THE MEROVINGIAN ATTEMPT

THE early career of Clovis was so full of promise that one might have expected him to leave some lasting work. In a few years, and after a few expeditions, he became master of Gaul. His campaigns were both political and military. Everywhere he appeared as the liberator and protector of Catholics in the countries controlled by the Arian barbarians. Gundibald, King of Burgundy (and Burgundy comprised all the valley of the Rhone), became tributary to him and gave guaranties to these Gallo-Romans. Aquitaine and the valley of the Garonne was delivered from the Goths. It was at this time that Clovis received the consecration which he still lacked. Having received the approval of the Church he still needed that of the emperor. The Empire, far off at Constantinople, had no more authority in the West, but still kept its prestige. When Clovis received from Anastasius the insignia and dignity of consul, a thing which no other barbarian had yet obtained, he found his power increased. For the Merovingian dynasty thus became a part of the Roman Empire and seemed to continue it, having now become "legitimate." That is one of the reasons why it managed to endure for two centuries and a half.

Yet all this time Clovis was not so powerful in his native country as in his new domains. The Frankish tribes who had remained pagan had as chiefs men who were not disposed to obey this converted upstart. These petty chiefs, some of whom were his relatives, could become dangerous. Clovis saw no other means but to do away with them. He struck at the head and executed a series of political crimes by a ruse of which the good Gregory of Tours has left a naïve account. If Clovis had not wiped out these minor kings he would have been exposed to their coalition, and in a civil war between Frankish tribes,

it is not at all certain that his warriors would have remained loyal to him. In fact, by these rather unscrupulous means, he achieved unity in the north of his kingdom; and he had public opinion with him. For it mattered not at all to the Gallo-Roman population if barbarian chiefs were treated in a manner more than barbarous, so long as they themselves retained their customs, their laws, and their religion of which Clovis was the instrument. In killing pagans such as Ragnachaire and Sigibert—or in having them killed, he opened a new field to Christianity. These murders were political operations whose success proves that Clovis now had the firm support of Gaul.

It is not proper, therefore, to speak of a conquest or of a subjugation of Gaul by the Franks, but rather of a protection and an alliance, followed by a rapid fusion of the races. The very manner in which these things took place, as we have just seen, shows that the Gallo-Roman element had summoned the authority of Clovis, and that Clovis, on his side, had understood very well that this unsettled people, fearing the worst, desired a strong authority. If it had been otherwise, if the Gallo-Romans had been happy in government under other barbarian chiefs, Clovis would not have succeeded. In addition, the Frankish tribes were not numerous enough to subjugate all Gaul, any more than they were capable of ruling her. For these reasons one suddenly finds the Merovingians surrounded by high functionaries with Latin names, who sprung from the old senatorial families, while Gallo-Roman generals commanded the Frankish armies. The laws and the taxes were the same for all. The population quite naturally intermarried and Latin became the official language of the Franks who forgot their own, while that vulgar tongue, the Romance language, which was later to give birth to the French, was slowly being formed.

The greater part of the offices remained in the hands of the Gallo-Romans and far from being "enslaved" they continued the imperial administration. And it was the Franks who protested, in the name of their customs, against the new regulations made for them. They had a notion of right and liberty that

was Germanic and anarchical and against this the Merovingian kings had to contend. Their "free men" had been used to ruling the chief through their assemblies. The civil discipline of Rome was hateful to them and it was difficult to mold them to it. But in the end they were the conquered rather than the conquerors. What has been said about the distribution of lands among the Frankish warriors is only fable, and Fustel de Coulanges has shown that the Gallo-Roman property changed neither in character nor ownership.

How does it happen that the work of Clovis was not more enduring, that France was not established from that time on? Perhaps his Frankish monarchy succeeded too quickly and was not the result of patience and of time. But it possessed within itself one outstanding vice which nothing could correct. It was the Frankish custom that the royal domain should be divided, to the exclusion of the daughters, among the sons of the dead king. Applied to Gaul and to the recent conquests of Clovis, this barbarous and primitive law was even more absurd. It was nevertheless observed, and on this point at least the Frankish custom did not yield. The four sons of Clovis shared in the succession (511). Not until the Capetians (987) would monarchy and unity become synonymous.

The Roman idea of unity and of a state persisted in the minds of men. One might have thought that the four sons of Clovis would unite to continue the task of their father. They themselves probably believed it, but it was contrary to the nature of things. The dividing of the kingdom brought about dissensions and from this moment dates a fatal opposition between Neustria and Austrasia; an opposition in which peoples counted for nothing, since it was a struggle between Paris and Metz, and Rouen and Verdun. It was a deplorable consequence of a political error. And this error should not allow us to forget that the Merovingian rule, imperfect as it was, was better than chaos. In Italy, in the very cradle of Roman power, in spite of Theodoric, whose work was not continued, we find no equivalent to the Merovingians, and Italy, disintegrated, will be thirteen hundred years in recovering her unity.

Such is the service that the Clovises, Lothaires, and Chilperichs rendered France. After them, the Carolingians will hold off for a time the inevitable crisis which will come when the disruptive tendencies of feudalism will make themselves felt. During these four centuries the idea of the state will, however, not perish and the Capetians will be able once more to reëstablish it. The Roman tradition will not be altogether broken. But for the Merovingians, all that was done later to build up France would not have been possible, or at least, would have met with greater difficulties.

The eldest son of Clovis, Theuderich, received with Austrasia, or the eastern country, the greater part of the Frankish Empire. Metz was his capital. It was also that part most exposed to the attacks of the Germans, the Burgundians and the Goths, and it was given to Theuderich because, being the eldest, he was most capable of defending it. His young brothers shared Neustria or the western country, a country entirely Gallo-Roman. It is immediately evident that the King of Austrasia was to be the most influential as he had the support of the Franks themselves and lived in the native country of the Merovingians. Having a foot on each bank of the Rhine, he protected Gaul against Germanic invasions.

If we pass over certain family difficulties, the heirs of Clovis for the most part continued the work of their father. And there followed almost forty years of brilliant campaigns carried even into Italy and Spain, to defend the frontiers of the Merovingian kingdom, an epitome of future history; a military epic which like the Napoleonic epic was repeated in story until it should finally sink into oblivion. But at the death of Theudebald, son of Theuderich, terrible dissensions broke out among the descendants of Clovis. Austrasians and Neustrians struggled for preëminence. It was a matter of determining who should rule. The dramatic struggles between Chilperich and Sigibert, the interminable rivalry between Fredegund and Brunhild, all had this same origin. Thus ambitious parties were struggling with each other for supremacy and all idea of nationality was absent from these conflicts.

After this long civil war, the Empire of the Franks was once more united under a single hand, that of Clotaire II. But Austrasia, Burgundy and Neustria had each kept a distinct administration and as a result of these disorders, the royal power was considerably broken up and enfeebled. Great and small, laymen and clergy, all had wrested immunities from it. The power was dwindling and the territory was being divided up. In addition, during this troubled time, when violent deaths were frequent, there had been minorities as a result of which a new power had sprung up—that of the mayor of the palace. He was virtually prime minister and became viceroy when the king was a minor or incapable of ruling. With these mayors of the palace appeared a new force. One of them, Pippin, of Landen, in Austrasia, was to give birth to a second dynasty.

The Merovingians had two more periods of brilliancy and strength under Clotaire II and Dagobert. The former, a great scholar, a great builder, a true artist, has become famous, as has his minister, Saint Eloi. It is perhaps he, of all the princes of his race who carried out most fully the imitation of the Roman emperors. The Franks had become entirely Romanized.

After Dagobert (683) came decadence. The kingdom was again parceled out and the result of this division was all the more serious as some of his descendants were minors. The mayors of the palace became the real masters. A few Merovingians, when they became of age, tried to regain and re-establish the royal authority but none was strong enough to make headway against the current. People had lost the habit of obeying. The nobles made conspiracy after conspiracy and were defending something that they already called liberty. Chilperich II was thought a despot and a reactionary. He was assassinated. For years civil war ensued between rival parties who exploited the old competition between Neustrians and Austrasians and who, according to the needs of the day, crowned or dethroned the youthful kings. The great conflict which set Ebroin, mayor of Neustria, against Saint Léger, all powerful in Burgundy, would make an intricate history of coups d'état and political revolutions. When this anarchy into

which France was sinking began to show itself, contemporaries looked on in terror.

Something was lacking. The Merovingian experiment, so well begun, was ending badly. There was need of a new Clovis. Where was he to be found? It is not easy to lay the foundations of a dynasty. There was indeed, in Austrasia, a family whose influence kept increasing, and it was Austrasia, in spite of the efforts of the statesmen of Neustria, who possessed the greatest material means for the direction of the Frankish empire. This family, that of the dukes of Héristal, which was to be the source of the Carolingian dynasty and which was connected with the mayor of the palace, took almost a hundred years to secure the crown. It was a long wearisome task till the day when circumstances permitted its substitution for the previously reigning house.

The Héristals, or the Pippins, succeeded because they had sufficient time and because they rendered the services which people expected. Rich and powerful in Austrasia where they bore the title of duke, they represented at the frontiers of the Germanic world a civilization both Catholic and Roman which it required great political strength to maintain. Also they had with them both the Church and those sentiments which had previously assured the success of Clovis. It was this which gave promise of allowing them to reëstablish the unity of Gaul, supported as they were by Austrasia which was the seat of their power. In fact, the ancestors of Charlemagne rose by that same process which in our time had carried the electors of Brandenburg to the imperial throne of Germany, and the dukes of Savoy to the throne of Italy.

The first stage consisted in overcoming the opposition of the political leaders of Neustria. This was the work of Pippin of Héristal. By 687, after the battle of Tertry (near Péronne), Pippin, having overcome the Neustrian mayors like Ebroin and his weaker successors, dealt the death blow to the Merovingian dynasty. If the latter still existed at all it was only in the use which one party made of it against another. Beginning at this moment, the Merovingians, holding but a meaningless

title, were no more than "*rois fainéants*," do-nothing-kings, paraded in their oxcarts. The real power lay in other hands; in short, with the prince and duke of Austrasia.

Yet at the same time, Pippin of Héristal did not feel himself strong enough to create a new dynasty, while the other was slowly dying. He did not wish to hurry things unduly. Neustria and Burgundy were not yet ready. There were difficulties here and there. At times ancient parties came to life again. Pippin died in 714 without having found an opportunity to take the crown. After his death all his work came near going for naught. Civil war broke out again, aggravated by foreign war; for the Neustrian party did not hesitate to ally itself with the German tribes which had revolted against the Austrasians. It was a serious error on the part of Ragenfrid, mayor of Neustria. It gave to Pippin's heir the opportunity to appear before Christian and Roman France as the true defender of civilization and nationality.

The heir was Charles Martel. The Héristals were certainly a gifted race. Charles had character and talent. Circumstances played into his hands and he excelled in making the most of them. It is always through services rendered that leaders impose themselves upon a people and Charles will represent order and security. He had already conquered the Neustrian agitators; law and order were reëstablished and he conquered the Saxons, who were ever ready to invade. But an opportunity even more favorable than the others was about to offer itself in the form of a new invasion, that of the Arabs. It was not only a race, but a religion, a hostile people which had appeared. Coming from farthest Arabia, Islam advanced toward the west. It had rendered powerless the Empire of Constantinople, had conquered northern Africa and Spain as far as the valleys of the Garonne and the Rhone. This menace made once more for unity among the Gauls. Aquitaine, always jealous of her independence even under the powerful Merovingians, became alarmed and turned her eyes toward the great military commander of the north. There was need of a savior and there was no one but the Duke of Austrasia. It is impossible

to say whether Charles bided his time in order to have his services the more appreciated, or whether his delay was caused by the need of assembling and training his troops. In any case, he did not begin his campaign until after the capture of Bordeaux by the Arabs. They were continuing their invasion when Charles met and defeated them near Poitiers in 732, and received the name of Charles Martel, the Hammer.

The Austrasian had delivered the country and he continued, in the south, to wipe out the Arabs. After such a service to the nation, the Héristals appeared as saviors. Conqueror of the "infidels," Charles was at the same time a national and a Christian hero. Pope Gregory III solicited his help and Charles answered in haste: this opportunity was not to be lost. After this who should prevent his becoming king? He had no wish to ruin his chances by being over-hasty. He secured his power by merely failing to appoint a successor to an obscure Merovingian, Theuderich IV, who had died in 737.

Charles was so far sovereign, without ever having the title, that he fell into the custom of the Franks—the error of Clovis. Before he died he divided his states between his two sons Carloman and Pippin. But everything worked for the success of the Héristals. Pippin and Carloman, by a miracle, were agreed. The old parties had raised their heads again, troubles had broken out. The two brothers brought from a cloister a last scion of the Merovingians, in order to give themselves the character of legitimate rulers. They put down the rebellions. That done, Carloman had the generosity to abdicate and leave the power to his brother, the energetic Pippin. The last obstacles were overcome, the Carolingian dynasty now succeeded the Merovingian which had become a mere shadow. The *de facto* status was consecrated not only by the consent of the nobles and of the nation, but also by a consultation with the Pope who was of the opinion that the true king was he who held the power; thus Zacharias made recompense for the service rendered to Gregory III by the father of Pippin.

The change of dynasty occurred without any upheaval. It had been admirably brought about. Every precaution had been

taken. The last Merovingian had disappeared, public opinion approved. The consecration by the papacy rendered the rights of the new dynasty incontestable and created a new legitimate line. The substitution was so natural that it passed almost unnoticed. The mayor of the palace had become king. Authority was reëstablished, and power was exercised by its holders. A new era had begun, that of the descendants of Charles Martel, the Carolingians.

CHAPTER III

GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF THE CAROLINGIANS

POLITICS has always been carried on with sentiments and with ideas. At all times it has been necessary that peoples should give their consent if they were to be governed. This consent was not lacking in the case of the second dynasty any more than in the case of the first. There was no more conquest in the one case than in the other. Under the Merovingians the Franks had been assimilated. When the Carolingians came the assimilation was complete, and the character of the dynasty gives proof of this fact. We find in the genealogy of the new kings marks of all the races and provinces, of Aquitaine and Narbonne, as well as of Austrasia. They were the highest expression of the spirit of their time, and it was their task to satisfy the aspirations of their period.

The splendor which the name of Charlemagne has left in history is sufficient to show how far they succeeded. For his contemporaries this reign was a renaissance. France flourished in the reaction which ended the anarchy of the last Merovingian period. Order was reëstablished and power restored. The idea of Rome and of the Roman peace had become inseparable in men's minds and ever since the fall of the Roman Empire so strong had been the yearning for them that the new régime was readily accepted. It meant a return of Roman orderliness, which was the source of civilization and security, and it meant also the Christian religion, which in its turn had been Romanized. The Carolingians began again what Clovis had attempted before them, but with more resources and under better conditions. They wished to reconstitute the unforgettable Empire of the West, which in spite of its weaknesses and convulsions had left imperishable regrets.

The beginnings of the new monarchy were fortunate indeed,

and bore a singular resemblance, though on a larger scale, to the beginnings of Clovis. The Carolingians knew what they wanted. There was no hesitation or misstep in their progress. At his death in 768, Pippin had pacified and reunited all of Gaul, including intractable Aquitaine. The last Arabs left in Provence and in Narbonne recrossed the Pyrenees. Instead of the country being exposed to invasion, the barbarians and infidels now put themselves on the defensive. The Pope, threatened in Rome by the Lombards, was abandoned by the Emperor of Constantinople, who was tending to side with the schismatics. The head of the Church, therefore, asked for protection from the King of the Franks. This is the origin of that close bond between the papacy and France. Pippin constituted and guaranteed the temporal power of the popes. Thereby he assured the liberty of the spiritual power which thus escaped subjection to the Germanic Empire, and France will have a breathing spell while the quarrels of the priesthood and the empire are taking place. If Pippin was not able to foresee the consequences of his act upon European history, he at least knew that through this alliance with the Church he was strengthening his dynasty within his own country. Outside, France was becoming the first of the Catholic powers, "the eldest daughter of the Church," and this was a promise of influence and expansion. The new dynasty was supported by the Church as the Church was supported by it. Stephen II, the Pope, had renewed the consecration which he had given to Pippin. In person he had crowned the new king, and this coronation was a consecration. Furthermore the Pope had saluted Pippin with the title of Patrician, and this with the consent of the Emperor of the East, who seemed no longer interested in Italy. The union of the Church and the Carolingians was to restore the Empire of the West which had become the Empire of Christendom. The title of emperor indicates the importance of the rôle of Charles, son of Pippin, Charles the Great, Carolus Magnus, Charlemagne. It was fortunate for the greatness of Charles that his brother Carloman, with whom he had divided the domains of Pippin, should have died almost immediately (771). The

other Carloman, their uncle, had already stepped down into obscurity in favor of Pippin, his older brother. But for these fortunate circumstances at the beginning of the two reigns, things would have lapsed back again into the divisions of Merovingian times, for at the beginning there was dissension between Charles and Carloman. The French state will be solidly established only after the time when power shall be transmitted from male to male in the order of primogeniture. For this it will have to wait until the day of the Capetians.

However, it was of great advantage to Charlemagne that causes of dissension had disappeared after the death of his brother. He enjoyed the further advantage of a very long reign (771-814). Not only were the intelligence and the will of the sovereign of a very high order, but he was able to exercise them over a period of nearly forty-four years.

As soon as he became the undisputed master, in 771, Charlemagne set himself to his task. His aim was to continue Rome, to reconstitute the Empire.

In Italy he defeats the King of the Lombards and wrests from him the Iron Crown (774). He enters Spain (778). This is his only check, for the Spanish invasion was a failure and ended in the disaster of Roncevaux. Yet the story of this disaster and the heroic death of his peer, Roland, are in the popular mind to become transglorified. Reshaped in the popular imagination, they will furnish the material for the national epic of France, *The Song of Roland*. However, his great idea was to force Germany to terms, to overcome and to civilize these barbarians and to impose upon them the Roman peace. Of the fifty-three campaigns of his reign, eighteen were undertaken with the purpose of bringing the Saxons to submission. Charlemagne went further than the legions, the consuls, and the emperors of Rome had ever gone. He reached the Elbe. "We have," he proudly said, "reduced the country to a province according to the ancient Roman custom." He was for Germany what Cæsar had been for Gaul, but the temperaments with which he had to reckon were of a very different sort. Wittekind was perhaps the hero of Germanic independence, as Vercinge-



a Paris chez M. Benigne rue du Theatre Francais N. 14.

torix had been the hero of Gallic independence. The result was very different. Among the Germans there was none of that eagerness to adopt the customs of the conqueror which had made Gaul Roman. Their idols were broken, but they kept their language, and with their language their attitude of mind. It was necessary to impose civilization and baptism upon the Saxons under penalty of death, whereas the Gauls had a taste for Latin civilization and took kindly to Christianity. Germany has been civilized and Christianized against her will, and the success of Charlemagne was immediate and apparent rather than lasting and profound. For "Francia," as France was called, the peoples from beyond the Rhine, who never took kindly to Latin civilization, remained dangerous neighbors. Germany claims Charlemagne as the first of her great national sovereigns. To the French this is an enormous bit of nonsense. Their so-called Roman Emperors never followed the Roman ideal of Charlemagne, that of a united Christendom.

Charlemagne's contemporaries surrendered to the illusion that Germany had ceased to be dangerous for her neighbors of the West. Charlemagne was trying to do what Marcus Aurelius and Trajan had done before him: he was protecting Europe against the barbarians, including the Slavs and Mongolians, and his power was extended as far as the Danube. The Empire of the West had been restored as he had willed it. He lacked only the imperial crown. When he received it at the hands of the Pope in the year 800, the people believed that this new Augustus had linked up the ages. This restoration, however, was not lasting, though the title of emperor will still retain such prestige that a thousand years later Napoleon will take it to himself as his chief glory.

To the reconstituted Empire, Charlemagne also wished to be the lawgiver. He organized society and government. Feudalism had sprung up more or less spontaneously in the anarchy of the earlier centuries, though how or why we do not know. In any case it was not, as many historians believe, something which had been invented and brought in by the Germanic invaders. Charlemagne was the first to give it a definite form.

When the Roman state, and later the Merovingian state, had been unable to maintain order, the weak and the poor had sought aid and protection from the richer and stronger, who in exchange had demanded an oath of fidelity. "I shall feed and defend you, but you must serve and obey me." This contract of lord and vassal had sprung from the nature of things, from the distress of a country deprived of authority and administration and racked by civil wars. The Carolingians themselves owed their success to the fact that they were powerful patrons who possessed a large following. Charlemagne's idea was to regularize these engagements and to form an administrative, non-hereditary hierarchy which men of plebeian origin could enter with the understanding that the supreme lord would be the emperor. Charlemagne was keen enough to see that feudalism had already struck root too deeply to be suppressed by decree. He also saw that it might become dangerous and beget a parceling out of authority and of the state. He wished to dominate what he could not destroy. The sovereign himself, in exchange for civil and military services, ceded with revocable titles, by way of *bénéfice*, portions of his domain, thus lightening the task of administration and attaching to himself another category of vassals. This was the origin of the fief, and this entire system, founded upon mutual assistance, was very well conceived. But its founders assumed that it would remain beneficent, that it would not provoke another period of anarchy, that the central power would not become weakened, and that the holders of the fiefs would not render themselves independent and hereditary. This hope was soon to be proved fallacious.

Furthermore, we must not believe that the reign of Charlemagne was a golden age in which men joyously obeyed. The need of order and the imperial prestige conferred a dictatorship upon Charles. He made use of it. His military expeditions, more than one a year, were expensive. They were not always followed with enthusiasm. Charlemagne had a heavy hand, and he had to deal with more than one traitor like the Ganelon of *The Song of Roland*. When the emperor died, his

prisons were full of great personages whom he had distrusted or against whom he had had grievances. His government resulted in good because it was authoritative. The intellectual renaissance which took place under the protection of this vigorous power has left a lasting memory. Civilization, an inheritance from the antique world, was again rescued. But the disintegrating forces will soon threaten it once more. At bottom the Empire of Charlemagne was fragile because it was too vast. It depended too much upon the genius of a single man. In a Europe in which nations were beginning to differentiate themselves, it was an anachronism to reëstablish the Roman Empire. Charlemagne had had to fix his residence at Aix-la-Chapelle, that is to say, half way between the Elbe and the Loire, in such a way that he might not be too far from any of the points where uprisings might occur. It was not a capital, it was a watchtower. A little before his death, which occurred in 814, Charlemagne had unhappy presentiments about the future. These did not deceive him. After four generations of great men, the vigor and good fortune of the house of Pippin were both exhausted. The Emperor Louis was a weakling. The people were conscious of all that the heir of Charlemagne lacked to continue the work of his ancestors, and Louis "the Pious" was ironically dubbed "the Debonair." As soon as he comes to power, the beautiful machine constructed by his father ceases to function properly. Revolts and conspiracies break out, parties are formed, the bishops themselves take a hand. The imperial majesty is no longer respected. On two occasions the Debonair is deposed after having undergone the humiliation of public penances. Twice restored, his reign ends in impotence in the face of his three rebellious sons, who, even before his death, take up arms and fight for shares in his heritage. Lothaire, the eldest, wished to maintain the unity of the Empire. Charles the Bald and Louis the German joined forces against him. It was already more than a civil war; it was a war of nations. The peace made in the celebrated treaty of Verdun, dismembered the Empire (843). It was a strange division, since Louis had Germany, Lothaire a long strip of

country which extended from the North Sea as far as Italy with the Rhone as its limit on the west, while Charles the Bald received the rest of Gaul.

The unity of the Carolingian Empire was broken. Because of this rupture it was to die even more quickly than the Merovingian monarchy had died. To parcel out kingdoms was the incurable error of these dynasties of Frankish origin. The division made at Verdun had furthermore a most disastrous result in that it created between France and Germany a debatable land and the line of the Rhine was lost for Gaul. From that day forth the old struggle of the two peoples took on a new form. France would have to reconquer her former frontiers and force back the Germanic pressure. After more than a thousand years and numberless wars she has not yet succeeded.

We owe something to that one of the grandsons of Charlemagne who received Gaul as his share. Just as Louis the German immediately became a German king, his brother, Charles the Bald, likewise was nationalized and became a French king. He was earnest in his attempts to bring into his domain the eastern provinces. Lothaire's kingdom was not viable. Although Charles was unable to keep all of Lotharingia, or Lorraine, he held off the German king as far as possible. Unhappily he lost himself in a dream of the impossible empire and wasted his strength in seeking to reconstitute the domains of Charlemagne. But he had not allowed any foreign power to establish claims upon France. If therefore he did not succeed in reëstablishing the unity of the Empire, he did strengthen French unity. This was a nationalistic idea. In order that it might thrive, it was well that it had been proclaimed before the disappearance of the Carolingian state. This idea was to live and later men were to build upon it.

CHAPTER IV

THE REVOLUTION OF 987 AND THE COMING OF THE CAPETIANS

THE tenth century is probably the most atrocious in French history. It was worse than anything that had been seen in the time of the fall of Rome or during the dying years of the Merovingians. The daily struggle for existence, the sheer necessity of keeping alive, which does not allow us too much time for regret, was the only thing that kept men from falling into hopeless despair. A period of calamities began with the decadence of Carolingian authority. The Saracens had appeared again in the south. And then another scourge had come. The Normans, or Northmen, after having pillaged the coasts, grew bolder, mounted the rivers, burned cities and devastated the country. The inability of the Carolingians to force back these invaders hastened the general dissolution. Henceforth the people ceased to count upon the king. Royal power became a fiction; the state was bankrupt; no one obeyed it any longer, and men sought protection where and as best they could.

It was then that the great functionaries made themselves independent. The feudal system which Charlemagne had regularized and disciplined freed itself from control and produced a throng of sovereignties. Public authority vanished. It is an age of social and political chaos and there is no longer any Francia or France. A hundred, a thousand local authorities, as occasion offered, seized the power. The governor of a province, the governor of a canton, the duke, the count, the slightest personages established themselves in their functions, bequeathed them to their children, and acted like veritable sovereigns. It is as if in our days commanders of army corps, prefects, and subprefects became hereditary. Furthermore, bishops and priests took over rights of the state, which had fallen into

desuetude. This was the origin of the ecclesiastical seigneuries.

It is an error to believe that the people were hostile to this parceling out of sovereignty. All that they asked was that some one should protect them. Feudalism, which had been born of the old system of patrons and was founded upon reciprocal service, grew up as a result of the anarchy and need of government just as in the times of primitive humanity. Let us picture to ourselves men whose lives were threatened every day, fleeing before the piratical Northmen and bandits of every sort, whose houses were burned and whose lands were ravaged. As soon as a powerful, enterprising individual presented himself and offered to protect lives and property, these men were only too happy to give themselves over to him, sometimes even on conditions of serfdom which were preferable to the life of a hunted beast. What was liberty worth when ruin and death were continually threatening everywhere? By rendering services, the most highly appreciated of which was the defense of public safety, the feudal lord legitimatized his usurpation. Sometimes he even promised special guaranties to those who recognized his authority. It was in this way that the spirit of the provincial and municipal franchises, destined soon to revive, was kept alive.

All this took place little by little, spontaneously, without method and with the greatest diversity. Thus there sprang up a multitude of local monarchies founded upon a consent given by distress. These abuses of feudalism were only felt later on when conditions had changed, when order began to be restored. They developed only as time wore on, when the value of the service rendered had diminished and the price that men paid for it still remained the same. An aristocracy of power will gradually become an aristocracy of privilege. It is what we see in our day in connection with the capitalistic régime. Who remembers the first stockholders who risked their money in order to build the first railways? At that time these men were indispensable. Since that time, either by inheritance or purchase, their rights have passed to others who have the air of

parasites. It was the same with the rights of the feudal lords and the obligations of vassalage. Transformed and worn down by the centuries, feudal rights only disappeared in 1789, which would seem to indicate that capitalism has still a considerable time to run. But just as the creation of railways by private companies was hailed as an advantage and a sign of progress, so also in the tenth century it was an advantage to live under the shelter of the lord's stronghold. The keeps which were later destroyed with rage were in the first instance built with much the same zeal that is shown in constructing fortifications against the enemy.

However, feudalism was to have two consequences, and one of these was a very serious danger to the future of France. Unity was destroyed. On every hand states were being formed. From the greatest to the smallest every one installed himself in his domain as upon private property. From this arose countless neighborhood wars. And then by inheritance or marriage, entire provinces might fall to the lot of strangers. This was the cause, the occasion, or the pretext of many other wars, and in particular of the later Hundred Years' War. On the other hand, states had formed themselves more or less naturally at the places indicated by the character of the country, places where men had community of interest, the habit of visiting or living together, and sometimes even old traditions inherited from the Gallic tribes. For these reasons, in certain of the new provinces some of the dynasties struck deep root. It was this fact which was to provide a remedy for the evil. One of these families would one day become strong enough to raise itself above the others and to reconstitute that French unity the idea of which, though obscured, had never been entirely lost.

During this frightful chaos of the tenth century, it is interesting to observe how difficult it is for institutions to die and how slowly new ones grow up to replace them. The Carolingians outwardly maintained the fiction that they held their power by virtue of having been elected. They went through a pretense of election. Pippin the Short, however, had been elected prince, and although the Carolingians had lost public esteem to the

point of being deposed for incapacity and cowardice, as happened to Charles the Fat (884-887), they nevertheless retained that prestige of legitimacy by which the Merovingians had prolonged their sway. On the other hand the progress of the family which was destined to replace them was slow. Among the local sovereignties which had sprung up everywhere, some were more important than others. Dukes of France and of Burgundy, Counts of Flanders and of Toulouse—these are the great feudal lords. They hold Carolingian royalty in check. When brought into contact with it, they act like great intractable electors. They speak a republican language. They tell the Carolingians that “the law is made by the constitution of the king and the consent of the people.” Right, justice, and liberty are invoked against the monarchy. However, the cleverest and most powerful of these leaders founded states in order to insure their personal domination, and they perceived the possibility of putting themselves in the place of the Carolingians. It is for this reason that the principle of election triumphed. It weakened royalty and authorized ambition. Later, German royalty will remain submissive to this electoral régime, while the new French monarchy will gain strength through heredity.

It is impossible to explain the success of the Capetian house if one does not keep in mind these political conditions. But, like the Carolingians, the Capetians will owe their fortune to the services which they rendered. Robert the Strong, the true founder of the house, in this time of Charles the Bold, fought for ten years against the Normans and died upon the field of battle. Robert the Strong was certainly a *novus homo*, a new man of modest origin, for legend asserts that his father was a butcher. His son Eudes, while Charles the Fat is covering himself with shame, heroically defends Paris against these same adversaries. When Charles the Fat is deposed (887) Eudes is a candidate for a sort of consulate for life. As Duke of France he was elected to this dignity at Compiègne in 888. It will, however, be another hundred years before another descendant of Robert, another Duke of France, will really become king. After having tried to extend his authority, Eudes realized that

the time was not ripe. A legitimist opposition existed in the eastern provinces. One of Charlemagne's descendants was fostering it, and the little princes who were alarmed at the recent greatness of the Duke of France, yesterday their equal, supported the Carolingians in order to consolidate their own powers. Eudes thought it wisest not to persist. He was waiting for the future. He became reconciled with Charles the Simple (898-921) and made terms with him. At Eudes' death this Carolingian was to take over his inheritance and reëstablish his throne. This restoration took place as a matter of fact, and proved a clever political move. But for the prudence and the perspicacity of Eudes, it is probable that the dukes of France would have been crushed by a coalition. For nearly a century they continued to prepare their accession to the throne. We are not sufficiently accustomed to think how much time and how many junctures of circumstances are necessary to bring about the great events of history. Almost none of these great transformations take place quickly. They must overcome traditions and interests. They must also give proof of persistence. If the descendants of Robert the Strong had not maintained themselves solidly in their dominions, and if death had caused gaps in their family and left unprotected minors, as for instance in the family of Louis XIV, there would have been no Capetian monarchy. The contemporaries of the long rivalry between the Robertinians and the Carolingians could not have told to which side the balance was to swing. At one moment it looked as if the heir of Charlemagne would win. By dint of showing too much patience, of waiting too long for the psychological moment, the Robertinians came near ruining their chances. Hugh the Great was content to protect the Carolingians, as the Pippin family formerly had hidden itself behind the Do-Nothing Merovingians. When this maker of kings died in 956, the Carolingian Lothaire was a child, but this child was to become an ambitious and active man.

Hugh the Great left his duchy to Hugh Capet. It was no easy matter for him to take over the royal crown. The old dynasty seemed to be coming into new life with Lothaire, who

wished to take over authority again and reconquer his kingdom. He reëstablished his prestige by delivering Paris from a German invasion. If he had lived longer he might have cut off the chance of the Capetians. But he died, some say from poison, in 986. His son Louis reigned for only a year, and met death by accident in a hunt. There was no Carolingian left except a distant collateral descendant, Charles of Lorraine. The family of Hugh Capet had been waiting for their opportunity ever since the death of Eudes (898). Hugh Capet himself had been waiting for thirty years and his opportunity had now arrived.

Things, however, did not go of themselves. Hugh fortunately found an ally. Lothaire had had serious difficulties with Adalbéron, Archbishop of Rheims, and had accused him of treason. The trial was still in progress. Hugh had the innocence of the archbishop proclaimed at the Assembly of Senlis, and while the Assembly was still sitting, Adalbéron, acquitted, proposed that the Duke of France be proclaimed king with a provisional title. Another assembly was called at Senlis for the definitive election. Adalbéron held that Charles of Lorraine had no rights to the throne for various reasons, the most important of which was that he was a vassal of the King of Germany. Hugh Capet was thus elected by virtue of his being a national prince (987).

It was, after all, an election. Hugh had made sure of the votes and Adalbéron had presented him as the best candidate, the one who would be "the defender of the public good and of private property." Hugh neglected no opportunity and no argument. Furthermore, for a hundred years past the crown had become elective not only in France but in Lotharingia, in Italy, and in Germany where it was to remain so. These elections had become a habit; that of Hugh, however, was far from being unanimous. Several of the great feudal lords, the Counts of Flanders, of Troyes, of Toulouse, the Duke of Aquitaine, and several archbishops refused to recognize him. It was plain that the new dynasty would have to undergo a long struggle before reconstituting the unity of the kingdom.

Born of the feudal régime, the Capetian royalty had its strength and its weaknesses. The weakness lay in the fact that

France remained divided into numerous sovereignties; the strength in the fact that the Capetians, hereditary dukes in their domains of l'Île-de-France, suzerains in Maine, Touraine, Anjou, were solidly established in the heart of the country. In order that they should extend and develop their power it was only necessary that they should do away with the election; this was to come about in the simplest possible manner. As Hugh Capet had associated his eldest son with him in the government, the election of his successor took place in the lifetime of the king. It was a perfunctory ceremony which involved no risk. One hundred years had therefore been necessary before the absurd custom of dividing the kingdom had been abandoned, and many years were still to be necessary before the hereditary principle entirely triumphed over the elective principle. The succession from male to male in order of primogeniture, a step which was unnoticed by their contemporaries, was to permit the new house to reconstitute France.

The good sense of the Capetians, which with rare exceptions was to be the dominant quality of their race, was to be very useful in this long task. "Render service": this had been the motto of the house since the time of Robert the Strong. To advance prudently, step by step; to consolidate their acquisitions; to keep careful accounts; to refuse to listen to the promptings of excessive ambition in chimerical enterprises, this was another trait. They also possessed a bourgeois sense of honor not common among princes, and a taste for administration. The common sense of France found itself reflected in this well-balanced family which loved its task and was willing to learn from experience. It appeared as if the Capetians were ever mindful of the faults of their predecessors. The descendants of Charlemagne from Charles the Bald to Lothaire had ruined themselves in attempting to reconstitute the Empire. The Germanic emperors likewise possessed this mania. The Capetians were realists; they knew exactly what they could do, and at the beginning were careful not to arouse unnecessary hostility.

The race of Hugh Capet, after having spent three generations

in winning the crown, will rule for eight centuries. The future of France is assured by the coming of a national monarchy. More than a thousand years have passed since Cæsar conquered Gaul before we come to this date of 987, one of the most important in French history.

The new dynasty was still very far from strong. When Hugh died (996) he had with difficulty succeeded in having his title recognized by the great feudal lords, and this title gave him only a moral superiority. He had even been forced to defend his domain against his neighbors. These wars of province against province and town against town were one of the unhappy results of feudal anarchy. When the Count of Périgord had captured the city of Tours, Hugh had a herald call out to him, "Who made you Count?" and he received the reply, "Who made you King?" In addition to the hundred years which the Robertinians spent in winning the throne, it will take them a hundred more before they are entirely established thereupon. If among the descendants of Hugh there had been unforeseen and premature deaths which would have made the risk of election necessary, and if there had been long reigns which ended in senile weakness, with an old man losing contact with his contemporaries, the Capetian house would have disappeared.

France had now found the political instrument for her regeneration, but it was to be a very long task. The Capetians had no magic wand with which they could cure the effects of anarchy. The national territory had been parceled out, and it will take centuries to win it back from local sovereignties. The absence of any regular government had furthermore caused other evils which could not be cured in a day. The collapse of the Carolingian monarchy had produced the effects of a revolution. All capital had been swallowed up; famines and epidemics would be prolonged into the following century. The conditions of life had become so terrible that they gave birth to a legend according to which it is said that the men of this time were looking for the end of the world and that, believing that the year 1000 would never be passed, in a kind of general madness they renounced effort and work. This is an

exaggeration based on an unwarranted generalization from certain passages in old chronicles. Life was nowhere interrupted, though men had suffered greatly. The result was a great mystical movement, a revival of the religious spirit. The Church profited thereby in order to impose rules which restricted private wars and brigandage. Such was the so-called Truce of God. At the same time chivalry had grown up. The duties of the man of arms and the honor of the soldier, the germ of these ideas existed in feudalism which was founded upon the idea of protection. The Church exalted and codified them. This revival of religious life will soon give birth to the Crusades, which is to be a movement of the very first importance. The West had lived in a state of isolation, shut in by the narrow confines of its material and political misfortunes. The Crusades will give it new life by reëstablishing contact with the Mediterranean and Oriental worlds, with the remains of antiquity and another civilization which were not to be forgotten.

CHAPTER V

FROM THE DEATH OF HUGH CAPET TO THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

THE Capetian house made slow progress. For a hundred years it is to cut but a small figure. Its domain was limited. With Paris as a center, its principal cities were Orléans, Etampes, Melun, Dreux, Poissy, Compiègne and Montreuil-sur-Mer. This is about all that the king possessed in his own right, and there were many castles even within these lines which housed lords who refused to submit. As feudal chief and Duke of France, the king had as direct vassals the Counts of Blois, of Anjou and of Maine, and as indirect vassals the Breton Counts of Mans and of Rennes. Eight great fiefs nominally dependent upon the crown, but in fact independent, divided the rest of the territory, which was so closely hemmed in on the east by the Germanic Empire that it did not everywhere even reach the Rhone, so that neither Lyons nor Bar-le-Duc nor Cambrai, to mention but these cities, were included.

The eight great fiefs were those of Flanders, Normandy, Burgundy, Guyenne, Gascony, Toulouse, Gothia (Narbonne, Nîmes), and Barcelona. The Capetian suzerainty over these duchies and marches was the result of the inheritance from the Carolingians. It was a juridical title which had still to be made good and which was not to be made good in all cases. As a matter of fact the great vassals were masters in their own domains.

The entire superiority of the Capetians consisted in the royal dignity, the anointment at consecration which brought about alliance with the Church, and a vague tradition of unity personified by the king. To this they added the advantage, which will only be perceived in the long run, of residence in the center of the country. In short, the king counted for but

little, even for his direct vassals as for instance the counts of Anjou, from whose house was to spring the ill-fated dynasty of the Plantagenets, which will one day endanger France.

The authority of the earlier Capetians was, therefore, largely a moral authority. It was raised to a high degree in the successor of Hugh. Robert the Pious (996-1031) was deeply conscious of the religious character of royalty. His political task was simplified by rivalries which brought the provincial sovereigns into conflict with each other, and Robert, priest and king, did not end as had done that son of Charlemagne, Louis the Pious, surnamed the Debonair. After Robert, the first Henry (1031-1060) and the first Philip (1060-1108) succeeded in maintaining themselves and even in somewhat increasing their domain. A modest expansion was taking place. They seem already to have developed a European consciousness. Henry I married the daughter of the Grand Duke of Kief, who claimed descent from the kings of Macedonia. It was in this way that the name of Philip entered into the house of France. But Philip the First had so little power that the lord of Montlhéry caused him many sleepless nights.

During these first three undistinguished reigns there were to occur two events of immense importance, the conquest of England by the Duke of Normandy and the Crusades.

In order to simplify our narrative, we have not yet mentioned what happened in 911, the time of the great calamities in the Neustrian region, which was the most exposed to invasion by sea. Incapable of resisting the Normans, the Carolingian emperor had ceded to their chief, Rollo, the province which became Normandy. We see taking place there a phenomenon which was repeated many times during this period of French history. The conqueror was assimilated by the conquered. In a short time the new dukes of Normandy and their companions ceased to be pirates. They became Christians, married wives in the country, spoke its language, and as they had the habit of authority and discipline, governed very well. The new duchy became vigorous and prosperous. The Normans added a new element, an active principle to the national character.

Always inclined to distant adventure, they set out to found a kingdom in Southern Italy and Sicily, bearing afar the name of France. But nearer to them, another conquest tempted the Normans—that of England into which their influence had already penetrated. The single battle of Hastings delivered the island to William the Conqueror in 1066. England, which up to that time had counted for but little, and was regarded as a poor, still primitive country, sparsely inhabited, now entered into history and was singularly to complicate that of France. Against these two forces, Germany and England, it will be necessary for France to defend herself, to maintain her independence and her equilibrium. This is still the case to-day.

One can readily imagine that the King of France must have been somewhat worried to see the Duke of Normandy increase his power to this formidable degree and having become a king in England, have a base at London and another at Rouen. England at first was like a colony of France. William, with the barons, soldiers, and adventurers who from all the provinces had come in answer to his call, had carried over into the island the French language and customs. However, a new danger was to begin with his Conquest. The Capetians were to have peace only on the day when they were to take Normandy back again. In the meantime they profited by every occasion to intervene in the quarrels of the Normans and to cause their dukes as many difficulties as possible.

The other event was favorable. The Crusades acted as a counterirritant to the conquest of England. They relieved the feudal congestion. By directing energies and combative instincts toward a religious and idealistic enterprise, Pope Urban II and Peter the Hermit, the monk who preached the Crusades, rendered an immense service to the young royal house. If the Pope had any political idea, it was probably directed against Germany with which he was in conflict. As all Christendom, including even the most faithful partisans of the Germanic Emperor, obeyed the voice of the Pope, it was a victory for the Church over the Empire. In the meantime the Capetian, whose modesty kept him apart from these major quarrels, profited by

this displacement of forces which the delivery of the Holy Land was to cause.

It happened that at the moment of the First Crusade, the most important of them all (1096), Philip, the King of France, was having difficulties with the Church because of an irregular second marriage. He did not, therefore, in any way participate in the expedition, while all of French chivalry was setting forth. Nowhere in Christendom had the enthusiasm for the Holy War been greater than in France. This was so true that the Crusade appeared to the peoples of the Orient as a French enterprise. As a result there came to France a new prestige which was to last through the succeeding centuries. Furthermore, many of the crusaders disappeared. Others, who in order to equip themselves had mortgaged their lands, were ruined. This weakened the feudal seigneuries, and there were two classes who profited thereby: the bourgeoisie of the towns and the royal house.

Since the destruction and desolation of the tenth century, wealth had been restored and society had tended to become more fixed. In the preceding centuries the disappearance of order and safety had driven the small and the weak to give themselves over to powerful or energetic personages in exchange for protection. Circumstances had changed. That the feudal régime had its beneficent side is shown by the fact that it was in the shelter of the castles that a middle class had sprung up again through its industry and thrift. This middle class later became keenly conscious of the abuses of feudalism. A position of dependence was quite as irksome to it as were the little wars, the brigandage, and the exactions. These townsmen had sought the protection of the lords in order to be safe from brigands and pirates. As soon as this protection was less necessary they sought civil and political rights. Prosperity brought with it the taste for liberty and the means for acquiring it. What is called the communal revolution was, like all revolutions, a result of the increase of wealth; for wealth creates force, and it is only when men begin to be sure of the morrow that liberty begins to have value for them.

From this fact were to result new relationships between the protectors and their protégés. The bourgeoisie of the towns had formed associations according to their trades. By a natural law which we see repeating itself in our time, these syndicates or guilds came to play a political rôle. These corporations, joined together, constituted the commune which obtained its liberty sometimes by violence, sometimes by agreement or purchase. The lord being away at the Crusades, the bourgeois became bolder. This movement came near begetting another sort of anarchy, that of the feudal bourgeoisie, for the communes naturally had the same idea of independent authority as the lords whose places they took. But for the royal house, one would have seen a host of little republican seigneuries, and the parceling out of sovereignty which characterizes the feudal régime would have persisted in another form. This is what happened in Flanders, in Germany, and in Italy, where free cities and republics began to swarm. In France the intervention of the king prevented the communal movement from taking an anarchical turn.

This movement, furthermore, took on various aspects, and differed in various parts of the country as did the world of those days in which everything possessed a local character, where conditions changed from province to province and from town to town. The communes were founded peacefully in the south where the municipal customs of Roman Gaul survived. There was more difficulty in the north. According to the times and circumstances, they either succeeded or failed or resulted in compromises. There was no unity or doctrine in the movement. The inhabitants of the commune formed alliances wherever they could, sometimes with veritable feudal brigands. The Capetian at the beginning followed only the policy of opportunism. He supported the commune at Amiens because there his adversary, Enguerrand de Coucy, was the same as theirs. He repressed it at Laon because the commune of this city was allied with his enemy, Thomas de Marle, against the bishop who was a friend of the king.

This king, the first of the Capetians who had borne the name

of Louis, had been careful to attach himself to the Carolingian tradition by significantly calling himself Louis VI. With him the active period of the Capetian monarchy begins (1108). The time had come. If an apathetic prince had allowed it to pass, the future of France would have suffered seriously. Louis VI, surnamed the Fat, was energetic and had one simple guiding principle: he wished to be master in his own domains. He employed his military police to clear out the country. This was the program which his father had indicated to him when he pointed out the castle of Montlhéry as the first obstacle to be overthrown. The ambition of the King of France in the beginning of the twelfth century was to be able to travel without molestation from Paris to Orléans.

These unambitious operations nevertheless cost him great effort, and in the process of carrying them out, Louis the Fat came gradually to ally himself with the communal movement. In his own cities, when there was disorder, he repressed it or kept it within careful limits. He also began to organize the administration of the kingdom, being careful to keep authority within his own hands. The lessons of experience were not lost upon him, and he was unwilling to risk creating a new feudalism. For this reason he chose as officials people of undistinguished birth who were devoted to him, and he frequently shifted them about. Following his example the kings of France were to surround themselves with non-nobles who kept good accounts and were good lawyers. His confidential man of affairs, Suger, a simple monk, will be the typical minister of royalty.

It is in this manner, as a result of circumstances, that the Capetians, sprung from the feudal régime, became its destroyers. They were forced either to dominate it or be dominated by it. But all this happened without a doctrine or a system. If the King of France was unwilling to have great independent feudal lords within his own domain, he nevertheless strongly insisted upon his suzerainty even over the great lords outside his narrow kingdom. A feudal right was there at stake. If the vassals of the king violated their obligation,

the vassals of these same feudal lords could, in turn, violate their obligations. That is why the Capetians were able to summon before their court of justice princes more powerful than themselves, like the Plantagenets. In short, the King of France retained that part of feudalism which was advantageous to himself. It was a commodity for export only. In the interior, he relied upon the great moral force of the time, the Church, whose invincibly Roman tradition led it to support monarchy, that is to say, unity. He also relied upon public opinion, upon the people who found protection in his authority. In this way the Capetian policy became clearer and better defined. Its aim was the nation and the state. Above all, this policy was national and the king already personified France. This became apparent when the German emperor in 1124 attempted another invasion. From all parts of the country vassals and militia came and took their stand about the king and the standard of Saint Denis. The German emperor was not expecting any such resistance. Although he had already started towards Rheims he turned back and abandoned the expedition.

With the return of order and the intellectual stimulus of the Crusades, the taste for knowledge and for ideas had been revived. It is a great error to believe that this century was one of docile faith and obedience to the master. It was the century of Abelard and his fabulous celebrity, of philosophic controversies, of intellectual audacity. Heresies reappeared and found Saint Bernard to combat them. The crusade against the Albigenses was near at hand. There were also movements of revolt and, during the early part of the reign, Suger had to use a heavy hand. The men of that time were moved by the same passions that move us.

Under Louis the Fat, the kingdom had grown considerably. The reign of his successor came near ruining everything. Louis VII (1137-1180) had made a very good marriage. His wife, Eleanor of Guyenne, had brought him as a dowry all of the southwest. By this marriage, France at a single step was extended to the Pyrenees. Husband and wife, however, could

not agree, and Louis VII seems to have had serious grievances against his queen. However, this stormy union was annulled only fifteen years later when Suger, the good counselor, had disappeared. The divorce was a catastrophe. Although Eleanor was no longer young, suitors were not lacking, and she brought her dowry to Henry Plantagenet, Count of Anjou. It was one of the worst consequences of the dismemberment of the state through the feudal régime that a territory, like property, followed the titular holder of the fief, whether man or woman. In this case the result was unusually serious. As chance would have it, the Count of Anjou soon fell heir also to the crown of England (1154). The Plantagenet found himself at the head of a kingdom which with his Angevine domains included Great Britain and Normandy, and as a result of the marriage with Eleanor, included also Guyenne, Auvergne, and Aquitaine. Compressed between this state and the Germanic Empire, what would become of the Kingdom of France? It is surprising that it was not crushed. The end of the reign of Louis VII was spent in an attempt to keep the pincers open and to defend the provinces of the south against an Anglo-Norman invasion. A great struggle, the Hundred Years' War, had begun. A truce was to come only with Saint Louis.

During these hundred years they did, of course, not fight every day, and other events, like crusades, for example, interrupted the war. A very small number of men sufficed to carry on campaigns in which the taking of a castle decided the fate of a province. Furthermore, the fighting was carried on only by the knights, who were more or less the professional soldiers of feudalism. When levies of communal militia were raised they were only partial and local and for a very short time. There was nothing which remotely resembled even modern conscription and mobilization. The men of that time would have been very much surprised to learn that their successors of the twentieth century would believe themselves free when by millions they were to be constrained to make war for five years. When militia were raised in the twelfth and thirteenth cen-

turies, it was for a limited period beyond which it was impossible to hold them.

To carry on this struggle against the Anglo-Norman state there appeared a very great prince, the greatest that the Capetian stock had produced since Hugh Capet. Philip Augustus (1180-1223) was extraordinarily precocious, and he became king before reaching man's estate, for he was born late of the second marriage of Louis VII. He possessed to an unusual degree powers of will, shrewdness, good sense, and moderation. As opposed to those two extravagant adventurers, Richard the Lion-hearted and Jean sans Terre (Lackland), the sons of Eleanor and Henry Plantagenet, Philip Augustus represents realism, patience, opportunism. If he went to the Crusades, it was only because it was proper that he should. He came back at the earliest possible moment to his own kingdom, which interested him far more, leaving the pursuit of adventure to others and, in order to advance his own affairs, profiting by the absence and captivity of Richard the Lion-hearted. In Philip Augustus we already find some of the traits of Louis XI. It was, in short, a reign of astute policy and sound administration. This is why the imagination took refuge in legend. Literature carried men's minds back to more poetic times. The Middle Age itself was homesick for a past which did not seem to be prosaic but which in its own time had been so. This seemingly more poetic age was the period celebrated by the *chansons de gestes* and the romances of chivalry. The century of the Crusades, of Saladin and Lusignan, which saw Baldwin Emperor of Constantinople, this age of Philip Augustus seemed flat to its contemporaries. They took refuge in dreams of Lancelot of the Lake and the Knights of the Round Table. It will be four hundred years before in another age, the Renaissance, Tasso, trying to escape from his own time, will discover the poetry of the Crusades.

Philip Augustus had only one idea: to drive the Plantagenets out of the country. It would be necessary to succeed before the German emperor, who was busy in Italy, could turn his attention against France. The Capetian saw the storm coming.

However, the struggle against the Plantagenets was long drawn out. It made no progress; it dragged on into sieges and skirmishes in which the King of France was far from always having the advantage. Henry, whom the marriage with Eleanor of Guyenne had rendered so powerful, was dead. Richard the Lion-hearted, after so many romantic adventures, had been struck by an arrow before the Chateau of Châlus; but neither on one side nor the other had there so far been any definite result. John Lackland came upon the scene. His madness and cruelty offered Philip Augustus the opportunity for a bold stroke. John was accused of several crimes, and especially of having assassinated his nephew, Arthur of Brittany. Insane cruelty seemed to disqualify this member of the English royal house. Philip Augustus stepped in as defender of right and justice. John was his vassal. It was decreed that John's domains had been confiscated because of his immorality and unworthiness. Feudal law and public opinion were with Philip Augustus. He rapidly took possession of the confiscated lands and encountered only a feeble resistance. As a result of this important fact, Normandy ceased to be English, France could breathe freely, and in turn Maine, Anjou, Touraine and Poitou fell into the hands of the king. These were great steps toward French unity. The results of the divorce of Henry VII were being neutralized.

Philip Augustus was pressing for a decision with the allies whom John Lackland had found in Flanders, when unfortunately the German Emperor Otho came to the conclusion that France was growing too rapidly. A coalition was formed among the dissatisfied and the greedy. The Plantagenet, the German emperor, and feudal lords jealous of the Capetian power united to constitute a terrible national danger. If we could reconstitute the thought of the French in the year 1214, we would undoubtedly find a state of mind quite like that which existed in the French wars of liberation. The invasion of the foreigners produced the same electrical effect which will be seen later in 1792 and the mobilization of 1914. In his hour of danger, Philip Augustus did not fail to align moral force upon his

side. He already had that of the Church. Pope Innocent III, the adversary of the German emperor, was his best European ally. The agreement made in an earlier time between Pippin and Charlemagne, continued to work for the good of France. Philip Augustus also made an appeal to other sentiments. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that he called upon Frenchmen to take up the struggle against autocracy and the feudal reactionaries who were in league with the foreigner. This is more than indicated in the words which legend assigns to him on the eve of the battle of Bouvines (1214): "I wear the crown, but I am a man like yourselves," and furthermore, "All of you ought to be kings, and you are so in fact, for without you I am unable to govern." The militia had therefore followed him with enthusiasm, and after the victory which delivered France there was rejoicing throughout the country. If it is impossible to assign a date for the birth of national sentiment in France, it seems in any case to have been strikingly evident on this occasion.

This reign ended in a period of prosperity. Philip Augustus loved order, economy, good administration. He was satisfied with having broken the Anglo-Norman power, with having added to French territory the provinces of the west, and with the restitution of Normandy. He was careful not to go too fast or to abuse the victory of Bouvines. His son, Louis VIII, had already set out for the conquest of England. Philip Augustus allowed him to leave, without himself taking part in this adventure, which, though it began well, was to end badly. He preferred to organize his domains prudently and methodically, strengthening the royal authority and developing through his system of *baillis* (bailiffs) an administrative order which up to that time had existed only in embryo. He established a system of finance, and in short provided the state with its principal organs of administration. The society of the Middle Age, which was to develop under Saint Louis, was already formed under Philip Augustus. Some of the characteristics which will mark the French state up to the present time and which were present in germ under the first Capetians begin to



A Paris chez F. Bonneville rue du Theatre Francois N^o 4

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be more clearly evident. It is plain that Philip Augustus, the ally of the Church,¹ cared no more for theocracy than for feudalism. If he is quite willing that the Pope should make and unmake emperors in Germany, he refuses to allow any interference with the independence of his own crown. In the interior he defends himself against what we would call the encroachments of the clergy. In this grandfather of Saint Louis we already see some of the traits of Philip the Fair. The greatest stigma which is usually attached to this great reign is the crusade against the Albigenses. What was the Albigensian heresy? It was a political movement. It is possible to see in it what will appear in Protestantism, a manifestation of the revolutionary spirit. There have always been anarchical elements in France. From age to age, there will always be found these violent revolutionary uprisings, followed sooner or later by equally strong reactions. The revolution and reaction have always taken the form of a religious war, of a struggle between conflicting ideas.

Like the Protestants, the Albigenses held that they were purifying Christianity. They were in revolt against the ecclesiastical hierarchy and against society. If their contemporaries may be believed, their heresy came from the Bulgarian Bogomiles who might almost be called the Bolsheviks of the Middle Age. It is not impossible that ideas circulated then as rapidly as they do in our own time. It is also to be noticed that Languedoc and the Cévennes, strongholds in which Protestantism will later find missionary workers, were the seats of the Albigensian sect.

The Albigensian heresy sprang up under the toleration of local feudalism and continued to increase to the time when the crusade against it was preached throughout France in the name of order as much as in the name of the faith. As soon as Simon de Montfort and his crusaders set out, the movement changed its character. It became the struggle of the north against southern feudalism and the Toulousan dynasty. The enemy was the Count of Toulouse quite as much as the heresy, and the north triumphed. With his marked political

¹ His kingdom was, however, twice laid under interdict in 1193 and 1203.

sagacity, Philip Augustus refused to intervene in person and assume the odium of repression. He had little taste for crusades, and had he taken part in this one, it would have ruined the chances of the monarchy in southern France. Feudalism in the south never recovered from the results of this struggle. However, the bitterness engendered did not affect the Capetians or interfere with their task of unification.

At his death in 1223, Philip Augustus left not only an enlarged France freed from danger without, but he had also re-established the finances and given the country a more orderly administration. The monarchy had become so strong that he could neglect the precaution which had been observed by his predecessors: he did not take the trouble to associate his eldest son on the throne with him. This son, Louis VIII, succeeded him quite naturally, and no one called for an election. That the monarchy had been elective at the beginning seemed to have been forgotten. From consuls for life, the Capetians had become hereditary kings. It had taken two centuries and a half, since the time of Hugh Capet, to bring about the triumph of the principle of heredity which was to be of immense importance. France had a regular government at a time when the emperors of Germany were falling one after another and at a time when the authority of the King of England was held in check by the Magna Charta of the barons.

The time had come when the French monarchy no longer had to take thought about the successor to the throne. The reign of Louis VIII was short (1223-1226) and was spent in continuing the work of his father against the Toulousan dynasty powerful in the south and the English who were still installed in the southwest. When Louis died in 1226, his eldest son was eleven years old, and minorities have always been a source of danger to an hereditary house. This one was to prove no exception. The reign of Saint Louis, Louis IX, began with a conspiracy much like the Fronde under Louis XIV, but it was all the more dangerous since its leaders were still powerful feudal lords. The malcontents who had been defeated at Bouvines by Philip Augustus were eager to take their revenge and

get rid of the Capetian unifier. Blanche of Castile, the widow of Louis VIII, had been appointed regent, and they contested her regency. They sought to dishonor her; they not only reproached her with being a stranger, but accused her of infidelity to her consort. They were even ready to place the crown upon another head. Fortunately, this conspiracy found no support outside of France, and the energy and ability of Blanche of Castile were sufficient to dissolve it. But the difficulties and the dangers had been serious. On two occasions attempts to abduct the young king had nearly succeeded. It was the fidelity of the bourgeoisie of Paris that saved him and spared France from again falling into anarchy. This was the first victory of the idea of legitimacy, an idea which already had strong opponents. It had also been called, with little exaggeration, the First Restoration.

The regency of the mother of Saint Louis was as difficult and as brilliant as was to be that later regency of Anne of Austria, mother of Louis XIV. She not only defended the crown against the malcontents, but added the southern province of Languedoc to the kingdom, thus gathering in, thanks to the prudent abstention of Philip Augustus, the results of the war against the Albigenses. In the west, however, Pierre Maucler, Count of Brittany, a renegade Capetian who had turned conspirator, had called in the English to assist him. He was likewise defeated, and royal garrisons occupied the principal strongholds of Brittany. The making of France was to be a long and difficult task.

Louis IX reached his majority in 1236. He had already married Marguerite of Provence. This marriage had had a political purpose and had united another province to France. It was, however, to be much more than a mere marriage of policy. The sentiments of husband and wife were much the same, and the saintly king was to have at his side a veritable saint. If this incomparable phenomenon is unique, it nevertheless follows a sort of rule. With but slight exaggeration it might be said that the reign of Saint Louis comes in as a reaction after the rationalism of Philip Augustus. In the

story of the Capetian house we have already seen Robert the Pious succeed Hugh Capet. Saint Louis represents a return to the idea of the priest-king. He is in harmony with his time, which is that of Saint Thomas Aquinas, and characterized by a revival of the Christian faith. In somewhat the same way it might be said that after the rationalistic encyclopedists of the eighteenth century we shall see a religious revival with Chateaubriand and the young Romantics.

But Louis IX is no longer merely a pious Robert who spends his time in his chapel. The monarchy has acquired duties, traditions and momentum, and Saint Louis will continue the work of his predecessors. He will however add something which it had never possessed before. Up to his time the Capetian house had been prosaic and matter-of-fact. He will glorify that house and give it spiritual grandeur. Though none of his successors will equal him, the spiritual elevation of his life and work will leave an aureole about the family of the Capetians. Most of the other royal or imperial houses of Europe had eagles, lions, leopards, or some sort of carnivorous animal as their emblem, while the house of France had chosen three modest flowers. Saint Louis was the justification of the lilies.

The religious fervor which drew him into the Crusades was something new among the Capetians. In his case, however, it did not exclude courage or finesse or the sense for politics. He knew when to strike and how to hit hard. At the battle of Taillebourg in 1242, he broke the last offensive attempt of the Plantagenets, and it has often been commented upon that when he set out to deliver Jerusalem, like Bonaparte, he first went straight to Egypt, the key to Palestine and Syria.

This expedition was unsuccessful. It was the end of the Crusades, and the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem could no longer be saved. Saint Louis was captured by the Mamelukes after knightly combats and was forced to pay a ransom to recover his freedom. His aged mother, who was alarmed by the anarchy of the Shepherds, one of those mystical religious revolutions which seem to return periodically, was calling him back to France. However, the bourgeoisie of the towns took

over responsibility for stamping out the movement, and at the return of Louis IX order had been restored.

His vow, his crusade and his defeat had purified his soul. He was to make justice and morality the basis of his government. This has not always been understood. Even in his own time there were not lacking people who regarded him as somewhat fanatical. When, after the victory of Taillebourg, he decided to give back to the King of England magnificent French provinces in the southwest, there was much indignation. Even posterity has wondered at this. Louis IX himself explained this restitution by quite natural reasons: he wished to put an end to the state of war between himself and his cousin of England and to bring about a true pacification. As a matter of fact, Louis IX was making a compromise with Henry III. If he restored provinces to Henry, Henry renounced his claims upon those which he had lost, notably Normandy, which was important, as the Plantagenets had, up to this time, refused to consider as definitive the annexations of Philip Augustus. Furthermore, Henry III recognized the overlordship of the King of France to Guyenne and the retroceded territories. In other words it was a bargain, an arrangement, which was better than a war. The thinking of Saint Louis was political and not mystic. He merely carried to a higher degree than the other Capetians the tendency to have the rights of the matter on their side. He was certainly mistaken if he believed that this would forever insure peace with England, but nothing allows us to attribute this thought to him. It was a truce, a provisional arrangement. By taking care to demand from Henry III the homage of a vassal, Saint Louis indicated that he was taking thought for the future. He was renouncing no rights, and it would be all the better if France could some day peacefully free herself from the English.

In internal affairs also, the reign of Saint Louis was one of justice and not of weakness. He was a just judge, but he knew very well how to send even barons to the gallows. Order is heaven's first law, and Louis sought law and order. He had friends in the legal profession and carried on their work of

attempting to temper law with Christianity and humanity. "A battle is not a way of establishing a right," he said in refusing to sanction trials by combat, the so-called Judgments of God. He will be remembered by his people as a royal judge seated under his oak tree at Vincennes, meting out justice. But he was not content merely to provide an example; he also organized tribunals and procedure. He gave the "parliament" a higher jurisdiction than the other courts possessed, and it is under his reign that this court of appeals and of justice takes on its principal functions, and the parliament is to play a most important rôle in French history. By bringing unity into the law, Louis will unite the nation. He will give added strength to the state by eliminating, little by little, the rights of feudal justice, and this process of unification will continue up to the time when the parliament, having become a political power, will be a danger for the monarchy.

If Saint Louis reformed judicial procedure, he also sought to reform society. He urged the liberation of the serfs and extended the rights of the bourgeoisie. Perhaps his most important work in this line was his organizing of the "*corporations*," the guilds. In the celebrated *Livre des métiers*, or Book of the Trades, the existence and the rights of the working man are to receive protection in a "Christian social order." If the figure of Saint Louis was so soon to be idealized in story and legend, it is not only because the king was good, just and charitable; it is because, as his chronicler Joinville says, under his rule through righteous administration France had become more prosperous and the way of life easier and more humane. He will bequeath to the Capetian monarchy and to France enduring renown.

This pious king must not, however, be mistaken for a clericist. His monarchy was not a theocracy any more than was that of Philip Augustus. Neither the king nor the nobility allowed themselves to be enslaved by the clergy, for this would have shown a lack of common sense. Their interests differ continually, and conflicts and competition are bound to arise. The piety and even the saintliness of Louis IX made him more

independent than another might have been in his relations with the Church, because his faith was above suspicion. Michelet notes with reason that, if there had been no Saint Louis, the later Philip the Fair would never have dared to enter into controversy with the Pope. The death of Louis IX was like what we might expect to find in some illuminated religious manuscript or some stained glass window. The news from the East was bad. The Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem was going to pieces. Louis did not wish to see this work of two centuries abolished. But the time of enthusiasm for crusades was past. This time his old chronicler and admirer, Joinville, did not go with him, and thanked God that he had been allowed to remain at home. But with Saint Louis, the Crusades were to come to an end. His brother, Charles of Anjou, who had conquered Sicily and who had purely political ends in view, directed him toward Tunis, opposite the Sicilian coast. On his arrival at the site of ancient Carthage, he fell ill with the plague, and died repeating the name of Jerusalem.

At his death (1270) the Capetians had been reigning for nearly three hundred years. There has been much progress, but the most important fact is, perhaps, that the French state, whose principal characteristics are now established, has begun to be of importance outside. It has come forth victorious from its struggle with the Plantagenets, the German menace has been dispelled, and both England and Germany are now in the throes of revolution. When he died, Saint Louis left to his son, besides some characteristic "teachings," an excellent political situation which was, however, to undergo some unforeseen developments.

History is complex, since events are continually emerging one from another. The last crusade of Louis IX had cost the lives of many princes and princesses. Many domains had, therefore, been inherited by his successor, Philip III. The monarchy, since the time of Louis VIII, had applied a system which, if it possessed advantages, possessed also an element of danger. When provinces had recently been reunited to France, they were given as appanages, independent domains, to Cape-

tian princes in order to make some compensation to the younger sons and to avoid those jealousies and family quarrels which had ruined the dynasty of the Plantagenets. It was thought that this method of transition would somewhat appease populations who were proud of their positions as more or less independent districts and accustom them gradually to royal administration, at the same time constituting about the kingdom, properly so called, confederated principalities which sooner or later would revert to the crown when the male line of the princely house became extinct. This plan was successful only in part, as often happens in politics, and a few of those who received appanages were ungrateful and intractable. But in any case, the son of Saint Louis immediately came into several inheritances, including that of Toulouse. However, the Count of Toulouse had vassals who refused to recognize the suzerainty of the King of France and they called in the King of Aragon to assist them. Philip III, who in his campaigns was to win the name of the Bold, was called upon to defend the frontier of the Pyrenees, and Spain became a factor in French national history. A little later the succession to Navarre again set the King of France at odds with Spain. The southern frontiers of France could not be reached without conflict with Castile and Aragon.

At the same time other circumstances had been calling Philip III into Italy. We have already seen that Charles of Anjou, the brother of Saint Louis, had become interested in Mediterranean politics and had conquered Sicily. He had now been made king of Naples and Sicily. He had been called in by a French Pope, who was eager to put an end to the Ghibelline, that is to say, the German influence in Italy. Charles of Anjou had accepted, after long hesitation on the part of Louis IX, and his success seemed to be complete. To end German intrigues, he had young Conrad, the heir of the Hohenstaufens, condemned to death. Heine was to say six hundred years later that the Germans had not yet forgiven France for this execution.

The revolt of the Sicilians, known in history as the Sicilian

Vespers (1282) started the decline of the French Kingdom of Naples. France believed herself involved and Philip III felt called upon to come to the help of his uncle, Charles of Anjou. The King of Aragon took a hand, and we thus have the first example of the future Italian wars with their Germanic and Spanish complications. In order to be at peace along the Pyrenees and to keep the Mediterranean open, France had overreached herself, and it was going to be necessary to withdraw.

Philip the Bold died in 1285 on his return from a second expedition into Catalonia. His singularly precocious son, Philip the Fair, was only seventeen years old. He decided that the Sicilian affair would amount to nothing and sought to settle it with advantage and honor. He already began to apply his maxim: "We who always wish to be sensible." It was unreasonable to be chasing foreign will-of-the-wisps when France was not finished. Furthermore, the last crusades followed by these Italian and Spanish embroglios had been expensive. It was necessary to create taxes which aroused the discontent of the taxpayers, and it was necessary to exact money from everybody, even the clergy, which was the origin of the struggles between the new king and the Pope. For the first time France is confronted with a financial crisis. The monarchy, however, had created a financial system and had organized the administration. The former expedients for raising funds by more or less voluntary gifts were now being regularized. The machinery of the state was beginning to function, but it was expensive. These difficulties, with which France is again confronted to-day, will last for centuries.

In many ways there is a strange resemblance between the reign of Philip the Fair and that of Louis XIV. Both were in conflict with Rome. Philip IV destroyed the money powers in the state, especially those of the Templars, as Louis XIV was to rid himself of the financier Fouquet. Philip the Fair finally had been drawn into Flanders as Louis XIV will be, and this province, which it will be so difficult to acquire, will bring about serious complications. There seems to be a regu-

lar rhythm in French history according to which the same situations are reproduced at intervals of several centuries.

However, the effect of the amicable arrangement concluded with England by Louis IX had worn off and the conflict was bound to be resumed. The English were still established in Guyenne and were masters of Bordeaux and this was a cause of continual friction. The question will soon be sharply defined and either there must be no English enclave in France or else the English must be masters of the country. There are those who feel that if England had been wise she would have evacuated territories which were clearly French, but England, an island and a sea power, has always needed possessions outside. In this time when the world was much smaller, she regarded French provinces as colonies. It then seemed as natural to be at Bordeaux as it does to-day to be at Bombay. Both governments had for a long time temporized with this question, but the people had less patience than their kings. Edward I and Philip the Fair did not declare war; it broke out spontaneously between sailors from French Normandy and the English of Bordeaux. The governments became involved and Philip the Fair attempted to judge and condemn Edward as Philip Augustus had condemned John Lackland. However, this juridical method did not succeed. The conflict had become one between two nations, and the English king, naturally, was obstinate. Philip the Fair understood that a serious conflict was impending, and he was the first to conceive the idea that in order to combat England she must be attacked on the seas. France was beginning to have a navy. The Crusades and the expeditions to Sicily and Spain had created a body of sailors. Philip the Fair sent the ships which had been in the Mediterranean into the Channel. The Genoese built an arsenal at Rouen, built a squadron and provided an admiral. Edward I, alarmed at this growing maritime force, raised a European coalition against France with much the same elements we have seen at Bouvines. Philip the Fair likewise sought for allies and replied by a continental blockade in which Sweden and Norway, the Hanseatic towns and the Iberian states, took part.

The Flemish, who needed the English wool for their looms, refused to participate in this blockade, the purpose of which was to throttle England. Either this economic war would have to be given up or, as Philip saw it, Flanders would be forced to pursue the French policy. What was really at stake between the two belligerents was the control of the Flemish country, the future Belgium. It will readily be seen that this war upon which Philip the Fair was entering was essentially modern in its character and fraught with grave dangers. The German emperor, Adolph of Nassau, had entered the coalition and in an insolent manifesto claimed in the name of the empire rights and territories, especially that of Valenciennes. Philip replied to these demands with two words written on an enormous piece of parchment, "Too German." These two words, which certainly the king's councilors found rude and impolitic, had a magical effect. Adolph felt that France was ready to offer resistance and did not insist. Furthermore, Philip the Fair assured himself of German assistance and he also had the support of the papacy. In this conflict we already see all the elements of future European wars.

When at the end of five years, in 1299, peace was signed with England, the object of the struggle, as often happens, had been lost sight of. With regard to Guyenne, an arrangement was made by which Edward I married Marguerite of France. Hereafter Philip the Fair directed his principal attention to Flanders. In his attempt to conquer this country, however, he was far from successful. This nation of weavers defeated French chivalry at Courtrai on the famous Day of the Spurs, 1302. It was necessary to organize a veritable expedition to end the revolt. It was evident that on this side France had reached the limit of her expansion. Whereas nearly everywhere else the new provinces had come into France willingly and sometimes enthusiastically, it was manifest that in Flanders there was a new nation which was one day to become Belgium. Philip, with customary good judgment, recognized this. He was content to reaffirm his suzerainty over Flanders and to keep as pledges the parts nearest to France,

Lille and Douai, which were more accessible to French influence. No one was to be made French by force.

These difficulties were one of the causes for the celebrated dispute which was to break out between the Pope and Philip the Fair. Pope Boniface VIII had espoused the cause of the Count of Flanders and his daughter, whom the king had treated as rebels and whom he was keeping in captivity. The Pope, victorious in his long struggle with the Germanic emperors, was trying to lay a controlling hand upon governments. This Philip the Fair refused to accept.

Boniface VIII had attempted to interfere in matters which were not his concern. He was entirely within his rights when he reproached Philip the Fair with having seized and withheld revenues of the Church; for while Philip was involved in the European difficulties, he was careful to see to it that no money was allowed to leave France. The Pope, however, criticized the government of Philip the Fair, accused him of oppression and tyranny, and intervened in financial matters. One of his grievances was the debasing of the currency which had likewise been one of the measures necessitated by the war, for in those days it was not easy to print banknotes and, instead, less precious metals and more alloy were used in the supposedly gold and silver coins. This was the former method of inflating the currency.

Neither Philip the Fair nor France took kindly to these remonstrances. Just as the press would do to-day to strike the popular imagination, the king published a résumé of the papal bull which exaggerated the Pope's pretensions. He furthermore sent broadcast in the facetious style of his "Too German," an insolent reply in which Boniface was called "His Very Great Fatuity" and in which Philip claimed that the Pope had little or no hope of salvation. To make it quite clear that France was behind him, the king called the States General. It has sometimes been held in our day that this was an innovation and that the States General of 1302 was the beginning of an institution and the origin of public liberty. As a matter of fact, there had always been assemblies. One

of them, as we have seen, had elected Hugh Capet. The bourgeoisie of the towns and the guilds had been in the habit of deliberating on economic questions, especially that of the currency. The convocation of 1302 did not surprise them, nor was it regarded as a great event, for the election of the representatives of the Third Estate started no tradition, and everything passed off naturally when in April the delegates, who had been summoned in March, met in Paris at the Church of Notre Dame. The nobles, the bourgeoisie, even the clergy, approved Philip's resistance to the Pope. The King of France "recognized no superior upon earth." A tradition of monarchy and the French state had been formed.

Boniface VIII, who possessed great force of character, was not a man to give in. He maintained his pretension of convoking a council at Rome in order to judge the Capetian and to consider the reform of the kingdom. Philip the Fair was threatened with excommunication if he refused to allow the French prelates to set out for Rome. He sought to negotiate. It was only when Philip saw that the Pope was resolved to excommunicate him and to use all the power of his spiritual office against him that he decided to forestall the attack and to strike a great blow. It was time, for the Pope's action, if uncombated, might have brought about a division in France and the influence of the Pope was already beginning to make itself felt upon the clergy; and the religious orders, especially the Templars, were hesitating to follow the king. It was at this point that the chancellor, William of Nogaret, went to Rome, found Boniface VIII at Anagni, and made him prisoner. The Pope died in 1303, a few days after his release, it is said as the result of shock.

This audacity and violence astonished Europe, which in an earlier age had seen a Germanic emperor humiliate himself at Canossa before Gregory VII. The King of France, however, in spite of the age-long alliance between his kingdom and the papacy, had dared do violence to the Pope. The bulls of Boniface VIII were annulled and the King of France was the master in his own house. In order to save his authority and

the moral unity of his kingdom, he had decided to play for high stakes. That he had won was evident, when Clement V, the former Archbishop of Bordeaux, took up his residence at Avignon in 1308. For three quarters of a century the popes will remain there under the protection of the French monarchy.

Philip the Fair had not worked for these results. They came about as the outcome of circumstances. To understand them we must remember Flanders and Courtrai. If the annexation of Flanders was superfluous, its submission was necessary to the nationalistic purposes of the king. It was indispensable that Flanders should submit if France was to be safe against England. The defeat of Courtrai had been a terrible blow. This defeat took place in 1302. The brutal action of Nogaret took place a year later. The King of France felt that he had to act in order to defend his European prestige. Defeated in Flanders, excommunicated at Rome, and possibly abandoned by a part of his subjects, he would have lost everything. The Flemish affair must therefore be regarded as the key to the policy of Philip the Fair.

In order to raise money he had exacted it from those who had it and whom public opinion allowed him to strike. He had also imposed taxes which were as unpopular in his day as modern taxes on income and profits. He laid heavy charges upon foreign merchants and upon the Jews who were doing the banking of those days. As a result of his debasing the currency, there were riots in Paris and the "counterfeiting King" was in real danger. Was it in order to procure funds that he destroyed the order of the Templars? Yes and no. The trial of the Templars is a part of the conflict with Boniface VIII. The order was not only rich, it was also powerful and was furthermore a state within the state. In addition, it was international. In taking the part of Boniface VIII it had threatened the unity of the kingdom. The notorious trial of the Templars, which has caused so much discussion, was above all a political trial. Philip the Fair went to the length of burning numerous knights and their grand master, Jacques de Molay, as heretics only in order that he might cover this

act of internal politics with the pretext of religion and morality. That private interests should have suffered need not surprise us. What have often been stigmatized as the crimes of Philip the Fair were committed in the name of public safety. It is perhaps not an accident that on the coins of this time we find the motto, *Salus populi*. It should not be forgotten that Philip the Fair, however, reunited with France Champagne, La Marche, Angoulême, Lyons and the surrounding country, that he married his second son, Philip the Tall, to the heiress of Burgundy, and that as a result of the long conflicts with Flanders, Lille, Douai and Orchies remained permanently French.

We have already noticed that the men of this time were more difficult to govern than those of to-day. Uniformity of administration has rendered the task of government relatively easy. In the Middle Ages, individuals were still able to defy the state, and conspiracies of malcontents to set its power at naught. Such conspiracies were formed at the end of the reign of Philip the Fair and included nobles and churchmen as well as the bourgeoisie. When at the early age of forty-six Philip the Fourth died in 1314, the kingdom was in turmoil and disorders were general.

Louis X was surnamed *Hutin*, the Rioter, not, as has sometimes been believed, because he was quarrelsome and combative, but because he came to the throne at a time of disorder and riotings. Historians are wrong to overlook his reign, for in it are to be found the keys to later events. The taxpayer is in a state of revolt and refuses to pay. It is necessary to cut down expenses, to save money on the navy which has always been costly and which had been fostered by Philip the Fair as a condition of French success. The young king is besieged by insolent requests, and the political and administrative achievements of the earlier reigns are endangered. In order to save them, Louis feels called upon to appease the malcontents and to take in sail before the storm. He even resorts to demagogism and sacrifices the man who represented the previous government, Le Portier, who is recognized as the strong right

arm of Philip the Fair. He had become fiercely unpopular, for in this time of poverty he had become extremely rich. But by many of the bourgeoisie and barons and princes of the blood, the hanging of this minister who had sprung from the people was regarded as an act of personal vengeance. Le Portier, who is also to be known in history as Enguerrand de Marigny, will later be recognized as one of the great benefactors of his country, for in this troubled time he provided royalty with some of its most powerful instruments and the people with institutions which, however unpopular at the time, were to make for order and peace.

Poor Louis Hutin, condemned to ungrateful tasks, left little beyond his old name and a celebrated ordinance for the freeing of the serfs of his domain. The two years of his reign were however, not negligible, though the circumstances of his early death were to be more important than his life. For the first time in three hundred years a Capetian died leaving no son. There were no laws to govern the case. Having arisen in an earlier election from a sort of consulate for life which had become hereditary, the monarchy had no statute. Good sense supplied the deficiency. It would have been absurd that a woman should wear the crown of France and give it as a dowry to a stranger. It was already a rule, and an exception to feudal practice, that all appanages on the extinction of the male line should return to the crown. That is why instead of passing to Louis Hutin's daughter, it went to his brother, Philip the Tall (1316-1322), the second son of Philip the Fair. The opposition of a few great feudal lords and princes of Valois was overcome by the assembly of notables held in Paris. It is a curious fact that, to legalize this succession in the male line, they had recourse to the same law of the Salic Franks, whence the odd name of Salic law.

No one can tell what might have happened if the idea of heredity had not been so well established. The strange thing is that no one thought it worth while to mention the elective origin of royalty. The idea of the hereditary principle in the male line had taken deep root. Philip V reigned only a little

longer than his older brother. Like him he wished to end the riotings. He seemed to distrust his hold upon his brother's throne, though it had been uncontested. He wanted order everywhere; he broke up the leagues by relying upon his "good cities" and upon the University of Paris, and put down a new uprising of "Shepherds." He also died young, in 1322, leaving no son. This time the crown passed without difficulty to his brother Charles, like his father, surnamed the Fair. As the first Capetian who was called Charles, he was careful to take the number IV in order to attach himself to Charlemagne's line, just as the first Capetian Louis had taken the number VI. Charles the Fair, like his brother, was occupied in policing the kingdom and did so with a heavy hand. He hanged several financiers. The people after every reign call for holocausts. Some feudal brigands were also condemned to death. While these things were taking place, England and Germany were in revolution. Regicide is nothing new in England. Edward II, the deposed king, was killed in prison. Charles profited by this disorder to sequester Guyenne.

In Germany, the emperor, a Bavarian, had been excommunicated, and his right to the throne contested. His adversaries sought the aid of the King of France and offered him the imperial crown. These divisions were necessary for France's security but, unfortunately for her, were not to last.

Charles the Fair in his turn died in 1328, after a short reign. Like his brothers, he left only a daughter though the queen was expecting a second child. Charles designated his cousin, Philip of Valois, as regent, but the queen gave birth to another daughter. By that fact the regent became king. The Salic law was applied of itself.

An assembly like that which had elected Hugh Capet approved the concurring opinion of the jurists. The accession of the younger branch had, therefore, occurred without much confusion. There was, to be sure, some discussion at this time, in which the French were not too strongly given to respecting authority. There was also the claim of Edward III, grandson of Philip the Fair, brought forward by his mother, Isabel.

The claim was disregarded for many reasons, the most important of which was "that in France they did not wish to be subjects of the King of England." The claims of Edward were soon to serve as a pretext for English expansion. In this conflict, France will be nearly extinguished and the enemy will not fail to attack the titles of Philip VI whom the Flemish will call "the raked-up king," and the English, "the usurper." Something of all this will remain, a certain discredit, which will show itself in the so-called revolution of Etienne Marcel. Charles the Bad could not have been a possible pretender in the preceding century. In these unfortunate circumstances in which, for the first time, fortune abandons the Capetians are to be sought the germs of the approaching calamities.

CHAPTER VI

THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR AND THE PARIS REVOLUTIONS

At this point in French history, let us pause to cast a glance backward. After three centuries and a half, the Capetians, whose beginnings had been insignificant, had attained results worthy of consideration. The France which they had formed had already become a power to be reckoned with, and their task had not been an easy one. Regard for the general good was no more widespread than in our own day and special interests did not sacrifice themselves more willingly then, than now.

A combination of circumstances fortunate for France had dispelled the danger threatening from Germany and England. These countries had suffered division, and been rendered harmless by internal conflicts beside which those of France were as nothing. For a long time, there would be no question of German interference. It was not to be the same, however, with England. The mad folly of the Plantagenets, the agitation of the barons to obtain the Magna Charta, and the discontent against Edward II which ended so tragically—all these circumstances had weakened the power of the English king. In the southwest of France, they had also enabled the Capetians to push back the English-Norman state, which had fallen from its former glory. But the English monarchy rose stronger than ever from this last crisis. One would have said that she had tempered herself again in regicide. England under Edward III had a strong government. Moreover, she had become a country of industry and commerce which needed both markets and colonies. France was close at hand and France was rich. An irresistible instinct goaded on to conquest an England, once freed from her dissensions.

France was prosperous; the booty of Edward's army was to

bear witness to that fact. Long years of organization and peace had permitted the French to accumulate riches. Michelet says: "The flourishing condition in which the English found this country ought to make us discount much of all that the historians have said concerning the royal administration in the fourteenth century." Industrious and economical, the peasantry and bourgeoisie of France were what they have always been. They did not suspect that their land was envied; that their riches would not take care of themselves or that their gold would invite conquest. They did not understand that certain sacrifices are necessary and that it is not wise to be niggardly in paying premiums to secure national safety. In this rich country there was nevertheless great unwillingness to pay taxes. There was almost a revolution at the end of the reign of Philip the Fair, and his sons were forced to yield on the question of money. For all that, Philip of Valois found himself in a most fortunate situation: he had allies on the continent; cousins who reigned in Naples and in Hungary; and three kings at his own court, among whom was the King of Bohemia. Indeed, it seemed that France had nothing to fear. When Edward again took up the old English policy and tried to league the princes of Germany and the Low Countries against France, Philip VI dispersed this coalition with a gesture. He had them all so well in hand that he even found a means of acquiring Montpellier and Dauphiné, from the latter of which the eldest sons of the kings of France were afterwards to take the title of Dauphins. For once the Count of Flanders was a good Frenchman, and his rebellious Flemings were beaten at Cassel in 1328. England had no allies. If the English woolen merchants wished to enter France, they would have to buckle on their armor and fight their way in. They could not enter by Flanders.

It is easy to understand the course of events after Philip the Fair. The great conflict centered always around Flanders. Through this country the English sought to attack France and France to attack England. It does not help to explain the causes of the disaster which was soon to come upon the French,

to accuse Philip of Valois of having been a feudalist and a reactionary carried away by chivalry. Edward III also followed the symbols and customs of chivalry; he was "presented with the heron" before his departure for France and we know his remark at Crécy about the spurs ¹ of the little Black Prince. He, too, was following the feudal fashion.

If Philip VI had but a feudal force to oppose to the English army, it was only because he had been unable to provide himself with any other. In this matter of military organization, France was considerably behind England. Edward III had succeeded in raising a virtually modern army, provided with artillery and all the latest war material. He had an army of yeomen who owed obligatory service and who wore a uniform. In France the case stood far otherwise. The people rebelled against taxation. Philip VI was attempting to raise money through the Pope and the promise of a crusade, methods of doubtful efficacy. The crews of his ships were untrained and the ships themselves were in poor condition. As for military service, the communes bought themselves off and the nobility who owed service demanded indemnities.

Several years passed before any decisive engagement. The adversaries were feeling each other out. Edward III was meddling in French affairs, seeking to control the succession in Artois and in Brittany, and the French were lending aid against him to the Scotch king. Finally Flanders, after hesitating a long time, took sides with the English. Edward here found a man made to his hand, the famous brewer of Ghent, Jacques Arteveld, who became the veritable master of Flanders. Hostilities opened upon the sea, and the French fleet paid for its years of neglect. It was destroyed in 1340 at the fatal battle of Sluys: the Hundred Years' War began with this disaster, the equivalent of Trafalgar. From that time on England was mistress of the sea. She was to invade France where and when she wished.

¹ When the Black Prince was hard pressed in the battle, his father was urged to send troops to his aid. He replied that the boy should be left to win his spurs.

However, this Flemish campaign took a sudden turn. Edward III feared to become too deeply involved in France and Philip VI wisely refused to give battle. A popular uprising in which Jacques Arteveld perished, made Flemish loyalty to England less sure. The English then tried a diversion by way of Brittany where John of Montfort was struggling to maintain his right to the duchy against Charles of Blois who was supported by France. This had all the marks of a dynastic war in which the Breton particularism was to show itself. The King of England took the side of Montfort but his intervention led to nothing. The attacks against France, both through Flanders and Brittany, had failed. Edward III had finished his preparation, reacquainted his army and with no danger threatening him from the sea, landed in the Cotentin.

It was the invasion of a defenseless country. At one stroke the English army overran Normandy, pillaging the open towns. It proceeded up the Seine and threatened Paris. Philip VI, during this time, was harassing the enemy in Guyenne. He hastened up from the south with his army and his approach decided Edward, who felt uncertain of himself when threatened by an attack, to hurry away as fast as possible to the north. Several times his retreat was almost cut off, but finally, thinking that everything was lost, he determined to give battle. As a matter of fact, he was afraid of the French army and had little confidence in his own superiority. He had, however, the advantage in tactics and in war material. His foresight and organization won over rashness and reckless bravery on the fatal day at Crécy. The principal military force of France was there destroyed in 1346 and Edward III was free to besiege and take Calais. For two centuries England was to hold this "bridge-head."

Edward III did not follow up his advantage. War was expensive and armies not numerous. A truce, several times renewed, was signed with France. It lasted until the death of Philip VI in 1350. The defeat at Crécy, the first great defeat of French royalty, had a disastrous effect. It came at an unfortunate moment. One historian had said that at the acces-

sion of John the Good, "treason was everywhere," and obedience was nowhere. The Count d'Harcourt, a traitor, had already called Edward III to the Cotentin; and there were understandings with England elsewhere than in Brittany. King John was sure of no one, least of all of his feudal nobles. He tried to attach them to him by the sentiment of honor and took advantage of the fashion to create an order of chivalry; thus what was taken for medieval fantasy had a political object. This John, who is represented as a madman, a restless and vainglorious romanticist, knew what he was doing. His authority was compromised. He did not hesitate to have a constable, the Count d'Eu who had sold the stronghold of Guines to the English, beheaded without trial. But he was to find a traitor in his own family. Charles the Bad, King of Navarre, grandson of Louis Hutin, thought himself unjustly deprived of the throne of France. He and his followers were arousing the country by their intrigues and their quarrels. John tried in vain to win them over by generosity. But Charles was powerful; he had fiefs, domains and followers almost everywhere in France. The party of Navarre did not fear to take vengeance by assassinating the new constable appointed by John. It was the beginning of political crimes and civil war. John resolved to go further and sequestered the domains of the King of Navarre, who then allied himself openly with England. This was the signal for the renewal of hostilities with the English (1355).

The struggle began badly for France. The king had to reckon with Charles the Bad who, for a long time, eluded him; and when finally by a bold stroke he did succeed in capturing him, it was only to see one part of the realm rise up in Charles' favor. John proceeded to summary execution, and subdued the rebels, but he did not wish to shed the blood of his family and contented himself by imprisoning the King of Navarre who begged for pardon on his knees. The latter was soon to reappear, the worse for his humbled pride. In the meantime, the English troops had set forth. They invaded and ravaged France, this time in the south, and advanced

through the southwest. A new encounter, inevitable since Crécy, was at hand. Edward III was again prepared for it. He was short of money but industrial and commercial England borrowed from the Florentine bankers on the basis of their woolen interests. For France, which was above all an agricultural country, this resource was lacking. Taxes alone could refill her treasury but less than ever were the French in a humor to pay; while at the same time they complained of the financial expedients to which the crown had been reduced, John had to turn to the provincial assemblies to obtain his subsidies, and in 1355 he convoked the States General. There, Etienne Marcel, provost of the merchants of Paris, came upon the scene. Warned by the chancellor of the dangers to which France was exposed, the assembly voted the taxes but on condition that they should be collected by their agents and dispensed under their own control. They rebuked the government severely for its administration of the public finances. It was a good principle that taxes should be voted and collected by the representatives of those who paid them. The king accepted it. He was having trouble enough to collect money and was glad to leave the task to others. But the States had no success. They were no more fortunate than the king. One part of France was in rebellion. Normandy, Artois, and Picardy had not wished to send deputies to the States General and refused to pay the taxes. The Assembly of 1355 had outlined a representative government: it was no better obeyed than the other and anarchy was all the worse. The States, in the face of the refusal of the taxpayers, replaced the duty on salt and on sales by a kind of income tax, which was received with the same protests. In the meantime, the enemy was ravaging France. "Resistance to the taxes voted by the States," says Michelet, "delivered the kingdom to the English."

John the Good had to meet the invader with troops no better armed and no better disciplined than those of Crécy. These ten years had been lost in discontent and dissensions. France had made no military progress. Her only army, the feudal army of knights, fought according to tactics which were worth-

less, and repeated the faults of Crécy. This time her disaster was complete. At Poitiers, King John who had fought in person, battle-ax in hand, was taken prisoner and carried to London by the English (1356).

The true color of these events has been falsified by an exquisite but stupid story-teller. Froissart is interested only in the knightly strokes and the fine points of chivalry, with which he "illuminates" his tale. The reality was not so romantic. In a country where disorder had been increasing for fifty years, the disappearance of the king created a revolutionary situation. The dauphin, Charles, named lieutenant of the realm, remained alone at Paris. He was later to become an able king but he was then a very young man, cold, timid, weakly in appearance, and precociously prudent. He had no authority in Paris, already a big, tumultuous town where all the phenomena of the debacle were seen. At the news of the catastrophe of Poitiers, a search was begun for those responsible for it. The nobles, that is the army, were accused. The cry of treason was raised. The dauphin having convoked the States General, the assembly began, as all such assemblies do in similar circumstances, by naming a committee of investigation which demanded a council to keep watch of the dauphin and the public officials, as well as a committee from the army to make the necessary dispositions in matters of war. It was an attempt at parliamentary government, and politics immediately appeared. There was a Navarre party in the States. One of the requests presented by the commission was directed towards securing the liberty of the King of Navarre, illegally imprisoned.

Things, having taken this turn, became rapidly worse. To the requests of the States the dauphin replied in a dilatory fashion, and asked to refer them to his father. In the meantime, the confusion throughout the country was increasing. The English and the party of Navarre were devastating the countryside. Armed bands in great companies gave themselves over to brigandage. Paris, which had been hastily surrounded by walls, was filled with refugees who spread alarm and disease. Several riots warned the dauphin that he would

have to yield to the wishes of the States General. As he said later, "To dissimulate in the presence of the fury of perverse people, when it is necessary, is common sense." He had just given an order which satisfied the deputies on several points when King John sent word from London that, a truce having been signed with England, there was no further need of voting the taxes proposed by the States, nor consequently, of holding the Easter session. The agitation at Paris only increased and from that time on, Etienne Marcel acted like a veritable revolutionary. He needed to have the support of a party and a name. A bold stroke liberated Charles the Bad who through the complicity of the provost of the merchants, came to Paris and harangued the people. In the meantime, Etienne Marcel made his followers take the red and blue cockade. His plan was to humiliate the dauphin, to destroy his prestige and what remained of his authority. He went to the Louvre one day, with armed troops, followed by a great crowd, and in a speech he severely rebuked the dauphin. Then, upon a sign from the provost, the two marshals, councilors of the young prince, who were standing near him, were assassinated before his eyes. Upon the dauphin himself, covered with their blood, Etienne Marcel set the red and blue cap, as at a later date another mob was to set the red bonnet on the head of Louis XVI.

These revolutionary scenes, which were so strikingly repeated four hundred years later, scarcely accord with the picture we ordinarily imagine of the man of the Middle Ages, piously submissive to his kings. We do not know how the dauphin, prisoner of Etienne Marcel after the bloody day of the Louvre, succeeded in escaping from Paris. Having reached the age of eighteen, he assumed the title of regent, and took refuge in the Champagne country, receiving the support of the States of that province. This was the beginning of the counter resistance. Many of the deputies of the States General, thoroughly frightened, had fled from Paris. They held an assembly at Compiègne which pronounced itself for the regent and, under his promise of certain reforms, accorded him the resources necessary for the raising of troops. The dauphin

immediately began the siege of Paris, Etienne Marcel having refused to submit.

It was civil war, a contest for power. It awakened the dormant evil instincts, and "spontaneous anarchy" broke out. In all the region that surrounded the capital in Laon, Amiens, Beauvais and Soissons, where the communal movement had formerly taken the most violent forms, there was a terrible Jacquerie.² Etienne Marcel welcomed with joy, if he did not indeed provoke it, this revolt of the peasants and allied himself with its chiefs. But the rebellious peasants to whom he had lent his hand were beaten almost by chance at Meaux. Charles the Bad himself, in order not to alienate the nobles of his party, aided in suppressing the revolt and there was a great massacre of the rebels. With the Jacquerie, Etienne Marcel lost his chief hope. He counted now only upon Charles the Bad to whom he gave the title of Captain General of Paris, but who having become prudent, was already negotiating with the dauphin. In fact, the terror which the Jacquerie had spread was reëstablishing the prestige of the royalists. Paris, hard pressed, was short of provisions, and began to murmur. The people complained even more bitterly when the provost of the merchants invited the English into the town. The royalist party, terrorized by the massacre after the flight of the regent, took courage again. Etienne Marcel was killed at the very moment when, according to the story, he himself was stationing the guards who were to open the gates of the city to the King of Navarre: the last resource of the revolutionary chief seems in any case to have been to offer the crown to Charles the Bad. Etienne Marcel died a traitor.

Jean Maillart and the Parisian bourgeoisie who had led this counter-revolution arrested the friends of the provost, and sent some deputies to the regent who again took possession of the city. This was in July 1358. The disorders had lasted for two years. Their marks were to remain long in the minds of the people. When the dauphin entered Paris, a bourgeois,

² A rising of the French peasants. The name originated from the fact that the peasants as a class were called *Jacques* or *Jacques bonhomme*.

according to the tale of Christine de Pisan, approached and addressed him in a threatening speech. The young prince prevented any one from hurting the man, and contented himself by answering him in a phrase worthy of Henry IV: "No one will believe you, my fine fellow." The future king, Charles, who was to become Charles the Wise, was to retain the impression of these revolutionary events.

Royalty was reëstablished in the capital, but the civil war had not yet settled the affairs of France. The ravaged country districts, left to the mercy of the English, defended themselves as best they could. The "companies," the brigands, the hordes from Navarre added to all these calamities. Peace was the first necessity of the realm. But the one offered by Edward III was such that the States General authorized the regent to reject it. Its acceptance would have meant that the old Anglo-Norman state would have been revived. Edward III then prepared anew to invade France and this menace had a salutary effect; even Charles the Bad himself was ashamed to appear disloyal and concluded a provisional agreement with the regent, while the military pursued the large companies of marauders. Edward III having landed at Calais with a powerful army, was confronted everywhere by hostile populations and by towns which refused to open their doors to him. He appeared before Paris, but the French would not give battle. Weary of combating a desert country, Edward III, fearing a defeat, modified his demands. The treaty of Brétigny, which left the French Normandy but took away all the southwest up to the Loire, was signed in 1360. The tribute of war, called the ransom of King John, was fixed at three million gold crowns payable in six annual payments. Invasion, dismemberment and a crushing indemnity; such was the price of the disorders which had commenced in the last years of Philip the Fair, and bore fruit in the Revolution of Paris.

The French nation had paid dearly for fifty years of insubordination and disorder. She was to recover her loss by pursuing the opposite policy. John, released, was to live four years more, which he spent in ridding the country of the brig-

ands who infested it. When his son, Charles, succeeded him in 1364 the work was still far from complete. A great reign of reparation and restoration began. Charles V, surnamed the Wise, was not one of Froissart's knights. There was about him no display. He lived, as Louis XI later, in seclusion. He thought, meditated, laid up funds, and planned. He was a reconstructor, the man whom France needed. He bound up her wounds and in less than twenty years, restored her to her proper rank.

His idea is not difficult to understand. If France resigned herself to the treaty of Brétigny, she could no longer exist. The English king must be driven out or he would end by becoming master. To do this, two things were needed; first an army, and next a fleet. Charles V had no army; indeed, he was so far from having one that his famous and faithful constable, Duguesclin, was at first only the captain of one of those bands that were carrying on guerilla warfare all over France. The king attached Duguesclin to himself; through him he rallied to his cause some of the large companies, and little by little formed them into regular troops. The party of Navarre, ever goaded on by England, was defeated at Cocherel; a small victory which had momentous results. The King of Navarre perceived that he had nothing more to hope for, that order was to be restored, and that the troubled times were over. Charles the Wise compromised with Charles the Bad while waiting for something more satisfactory. He compromised everywhere, according to his maxim that it was the part of wisdom to give in temporarily to perverse people. He compromised even with the obstinate leaders of the large companies. Duguesclin, by a stroke of genius, led these malcontents into Spain, in the pay of Henry of Transtamare, to fight Peter the Cruel who was backed by the English. After various vicissitudes Henry was successful, and became a very useful ally of the French.

There was but one way to liberate France and Charles V, wise, intelligent, a man of books and reflection, understood it. The English must no longer be masters of the sea. As soon

as communication between the island and the continent ceased to be safe, the English armies, in a country that was hostile and which did not submit easily to their domination, would be lost. The creation of a navy was a work demanding a long period of time, persistence and money; and it has always been difficult to interest the French landsman in the things of the sea. Charles V began at the beginning in his preparation for the revival of the French maritime power, and depended in the meantime upon the fleet of his Spanish allies. He was aided by England's neglect of her own navy. Indeed it would be difficult to explain the reversals which were soon to overtake England, were it not for the fact that she herself in turn had weakened. At the end of Edward III's reign she was worn out by her earlier efforts. Her parliamentary government which had begun with the Charter of the Barons, had developed. The House of Commons had been separated from the House of Lords and held regular sessions as the States General had wished to do; and the Commons, less and less willingly voted taxes for war. To the chancellor, who asked them if they wished perpetual peace, they replied, "Yes, certainly." England was relaxing her former hold.

Finally, having made alliances by sea and land, Charles listened to the appeal of the ceded populations and renounced the treaty of Brétigny. The campaign, led by Duguesclin, consisted in wearing down the enemy, a process which became more rapid after the English fleet had been destroyed by the Spaniards before La Rochelle. The conditions of the contest were changing. French corsairs, or those in the pay of France, were harassing the convoys and sometimes the ports of the enemy. Edward III, alarmed, wished to strike a blow, but he needed a year to prepare a new army to send into France. The order was given everywhere, to refuse him battle and not to repeat the errors of Crécy and Poitiers. This English army wandered about seeking an adversary which ever eluded it and was finally to return to Bordeaux worn out and almost ridiculous, while chateau by chateau and town by town, the southwest provinces were being liberated. Charles V took

good care to encourage the patriotism of the latter by the creation of several privileges. He used particularly the grant of nobility, extending it to the ranks and making it easier of attainment.

Edward III, finally discouraged, accepted the overtures of peace. Charles V demanded evacuation of the entire country, including Calais. England refused, and hostilities began again. The King of France had profited by this truce to realize his great project, the creation of a navy. This part of his work has been much neglected by historians. M. Trarmond says: "He employed every means to secure money; he threatened; he flattered the States General; in person he took the deputies to visit the ships and dockyards in order to interest them in the development of the navy; he secured the funds he needed and used them with a strict economy and a keen sense of the object to be obtained." To inspire in the French an interest in the sea, Charles V proceeded exactly according to the methods of to-day.

If Charles V had lived ten years longer, it is probable that France would never have needed a Joan of Arc; there would have been no more English in France. At the end of his reign, the rôles were reversed. The French squadrons, commanded by Admiral Jean de Vienne, the counterpart of Duguesclin on the sea, were freely ravaging the English coast and the Spanish allies even entered the Thames. In France, the English possessed only Bayonne, Bordeaux and Calais. Their complete expulsion was only a matter of time, because their internal affairs were going badly. Edward III and the Black Prince were dead. Richard II was only thirteen and his minority was to be stormy. Wyclif had announced his Reform, commerce was suffering and a Jacquerie more terrible than that in France was to come. Nevertheless, fortune was turning. Through the death of Charles V, France fell back into the weaknesses of a minority. This was followed by a catastrophe from which, up to that time, the Capetian monarchy had been delivered; hardly had the king attained his majority before he became insane.

To understand these events, it is necessary to bear clearly in mind some points in the policy of Charles V. When he took over the kingdom, it was in a state of revolution; by sheer force of skill he reëstablished the royal authority. For several years the States General had virtually been the masters. Charles gently edged them aside, although he retained the financial organization which they had set up. The States General had wished to give a character of regularity to the taxes voted by them. The *aides* thus were no longer a feudal right claimed by the king as lord of his domain and as suzerain in the rest of the realm. These *aides*, thanks to the reforms demanded by the assemblies, tended to become state taxes. Charles V adopted these reforms and made them permanent; and lest the States General should undo their good work, he gradually lengthened the intervals between their sessions and then set them aside entirely. His patience, his quick mind, and the prestige of an economical administration were all needed for the success of such an astute move. The millions which he left in the treasury at his death were worth more in the eyes of the French bourgeoisie than all their arrangements for the supervision of taxes. This progress in administration was the foundation for the defeat of the English. But the government was still not stabilized, and a bad policy would soon have compromised it. Indeed circumstances were already conspiring to throw France again into disorder. The well-known saying:

“The best laid schemes o’ mice an’ men
Gang aft a-gley,”

was to apply in this case.

The monarchy remained faithful to the custom of appanages by which a French province was turned over to one of the princes. Indeed this custom seemed to offer more advantages than disadvantages. It insured peace and harmony among the sons of France. These domains momentarily detached from the crown, regularly returned to it. John the Good, having

acquired Burgundy by inheritance, had given it as appanage to his son Philip. Charles, absorbed in his great plans against England, imagined that he could make his brother, the Duke of Burgundy, serve his purpose to free Flanders from English influence by attaching it to France through a Burgundian alliance. With this idea, Duke Philip of Burgundy had married the heiress of the Count of Flanders, and to facilitate this marriage, Charles V had consented to restore to the Flemings the conquests of Philip the Fair: Lille, Douai, and Orchies. He fully expected that this French Flanders, followed by the rest of the province, would some day return to France, and in the meantime, the duchy of Flanders-Burgundy would encircle Calais, and would extend the French realm of influence towards Germany and the Low Countries. This plan seemed flawless. However, the result was quite contrary to Charles' hopes. Far from assimilating Flanders, Burgundy was absorbed by her. And this Flanders was more than refractory; she set out to conquer those who thought they had vanquished her. Thus the house of Burgundy, through the Flemish possessions, was more and more separated from France, and was to become one of her worst enemies under Jean sans Peur and Charles the Bold.

In this tragic fourteenth century, full of insanity and fury, the reign of Charles V was an oasis of reason for France. Everywhere else there was madness and revolt. Charles VI, Richard II and their uncles bear the stamp of the times as do Arteveld, Etienne Marcel and Rienzi. Respect for authority had everywhere disappeared. English kings were dethroned and murdered in a way to provide fit subjects for the tragedies of Shakespeare. The highest of all powers, the spiritual, that of the papacy, had vanished, as it were. There was a schism in the Church, two popes were at war, one in Rome, the other in Avignon. In the general dispute, neither one nor the other was venerated.

At the death of Charles V, France was very near to falling back into her old unrest. There were distressing symptoms in Brittany and in Flanders, and it was under conditions such as

these that she was again forced to undergo the perils of a minority.

Hardly had the wise king died than the uncles of Charles VI began quarreling for the regency. It was a bad beginning. An assembly of dignitaries and members of parliament had to be called in to arbitrate, and they created a council of the four dukes, those of Anjou, Berry, Burgundy and Bourbon, as regents. It was a poor combination: in this republic of princes, the Duke of Anjou thought only of his inheritance, Naples; the Duke of Burgundy, only of Flanders. The power was weak and what was worse, it was divided. The illustrious collaborators, the good councilors of Charles V, like Duguesclin, were dead, or out of favor with the dukes. Nothing more was needed to reawaken the spirit of revolution.

As soon as the regents wished to levy taxes, riots broke out in Paris. Bidding for popularity, the council of the regency immediately yielded. Whereupon the towns of the provinces, encouraged by this example, offered the same resistance. The council then turned to the States General, to vote the *aides*. The whole system of Charles V was destroyed, and the appeal to the States was as ineffectual as during the captivity of John the Good. It was evident that the government was powerless, and it was nearly everywhere defied. In Rouen, Amiens, and Languedoc there were uprisings. While the Duke of Anjou was chastising Rouen, Paris revolted again and more violently. The people pillaged the arsenal, armed themselves, and carried off 20,000 iron mallets. This was known as the Sedition of the *Maillotins*. The duke had to return to Paris, where the bourgeoisie, terrified by the excesses of the mutineers, came to terms with the regents. Right or wrong, the Duke of Burgundy insisted that the heart of the revolution was in Ghent where the inhabitants had revolted against their count, his father-in-law. An expedition was led into Flanders and the young king took part. Charles V had left a well-organized army: it was set to work in the interest of the Duke of Burgundy. The Flemings were crushed at Rosebeke. It was then necessary for the army to return to Paris as quickly as possible

to repress a new revolt of the Maillotins. This time the royal army entered, sword in hand. The repression was drastic and for three weeks the courts-martial pronounced executions (1382).

The work of Charles V was being undone by these disorders. Fortunately England at this moment, also under too young a king, the mad Richard II, was not less upset. The Duke of Burgundy, who had a gift for politics, although he applied it more particularly to benefit his own affairs, was perhaps not wrong when he said that revolutions were supported and spread from one country to another. In the midst of these disquieting symptoms, Charles VI became of age. His intentions were good and he recalled his father's councilors, whom the people derisively called the "*marmousets*," "the little men." John of Vienne and Clisson were still living and with them he undertook to liberate the country. But the young king did not have his father's prudence; he wished to settle the question of England at one blow—invade her and become another William the Conqueror. For seven years, the fleet, for want of care and money, had been neglected. Through the ill will of the dukes, the expedition was not ready on time and it never set out. Put on their guard, the English, for whom nothing could have been better than this attempted invasion, incited Brittany to revolt. It was on the way to chastise the English party at Montfort that Charles VI became insane in the forest of Le Mans (1392).

Anywhere else this unhappy mad king would have been dethroned. France kept him with a curious sort of tenderness, through respect for legality and legitimacy; and in certain quarters there was also undoubtedly a belief that this shadow of a king would be convenient and would allow license free play. His uncles hastened to return. There was to be license indeed and France was soon to be rent asunder by civil wars.

We have already seen that there was schism in the Church with one Pope at Rome and another at Avignon. The University of Paris took the rôle of arbitrator of the conflict and in order to force the rival popes to yield, took it upon herself

to say that it was no longer necessary to obey either one or the other. In the meantime, the French monarchy continued to sustain the cause of the Pope at Avignon. This policy was that of the Duke of Orléans, brother of the insane king, and a newcomer in the council of the regency, where the other dukes had to receive him against their will. There is no doubt that Louis of Orléans in this council of princes represented the interest of France and the national tradition. Louis had the University against him because of the affair of the popes; the taxpayers, because, in order to continue the work of Charles the Wise, it was necessary to levy taxes; and finally the Duke of Burgundy, because the latter, by his possessions in Flanders and the Low Countries, found himself involved in a system which was not French. This new duke, Jean sans Peur, cousin germane of the king, and of the Duke of Orléans, was no longer French; he was a nationalized Fleming. In reality, he was a foreigner in the French council of the regency. It was natural that the malcontents should have rallied about him.

It was evident that Louis and Jean sans Peur were at loggerheads. The Burgundian undid whatever Louis attempted to do. The taxes which the latter established were suppressed by Jean sans Peur, which was an easy way of courting popular favor. It also increased his popularity with the English, and to conciliate England was a settled policy of the Flemish. By his marriage with the daughter of Charles VI, Richard II had become friendly to France, and furthermore he was too busy with seditions at home to think of undertaking any campaign across the Channel. These seditions were only in part the cause of his fall, for he had been imprudent and extravagant in his dealings with his difficult English subjects and their parliament. The fate of Richard II was like that of Edward II; both of them were reproached by their subjects for having taken French queens. Richard was dethroned by his cousin Henry of Lancaster and then assassinated. France was not to profit by his death, for instead of a harmless blunderer, England was now to have a king who was not only the enemy of France but also the father of Henry V, the man of Agincourt,

an enemy more dangerous than even Edward III had been. The cautious attitude of Jean sans Peur favored Lancaster against the interests of France.

In the government of the dukes, then, it was the Burgundian influence which prevailed and directed the policy of the French state. In order that Louis of Orléans should be as powerful as his cousin, it was necessary that, like him, he should have possessions outside of France. He acquired Luxemburg, from which he could observe events in the Low Countries. The Duke of Burgundy felt himself threatened and directed all of his attention to suppressing his rival. In 1407 he had his cousin killed one evening in the streets of Paris.

The assassination of the Duke of Orléans cut France in two. It crystallized the parties, and was the signal for civil war. Both sides sought allies wherever they were to be found, even in England. The Orléans party brought in the terrible Gascons of the Count of Armagnac, and it was by this name of Armagnac that the party of Orléans was frequently to be designated as opposed to that of Burgundy. The latter had always sought the favor of Paris and that city espoused their cause. We have seen that the University had taken sides in the matter of the popes. It now opposed the Pope of Avignon who was favored by the Duke of Orléans. The University thus took sides with Burgundy and justified the crime of Jean sans Peur, and wished to legislate for France. Just as Etienne Marcel had offered the crown to Charles of Navarre, the University offered it to the Duke of Burgundy. He replied that he was not capable of governing so large a realm as that of France. It may be that he preferred to foment disorder. His interests and his heart were with the Low Countries.

The attitude of the University would have been amusing had the circumstances been less tragic. It called in the assistance of parliament; the sovereign court did not wish to be compromised in any adventure and refused to go beyond its own jurisdiction. The University was not deterred by this refusal. It was goaded on by its own pride and by its proletariat, its poor students and its mendicant monks. These intellectuals under-

took a revolution and, as they needed some one to carry it out, they allied themselves with the old, powerful, and violent corporation of butchers. Monks like Eustache and slaughterers like the butcher Caboché were to join forces and the university of the great theologian Gerson was to take sides with the rioters. She was not however to be able to control them. As under Etienne Marcel, Paris was again the scene of revolutions (1413). Finally, the rioters, led by an old surgeon, John of Troyes, tried to seize the royal family. After several attempts, the royal residence was forced, and the "traitors," for whom the people were clamoring, were carried away before the eyes of the young dauphin, and some of them were massacred. The Duke of Burgundy was present at these scenes of violence which were the work of his followers, but they would no longer listen to him when he attempted to moderate them. It was a veritable terror. In an attempt to pacify the people, the Duke of Berry advised promulgating an ordinance which was called the great Cabochin Ordinance and which brought together all the reforms asked or realized for half a century back. It was not enough to satisfy the butchers, and the excesses were continued. But the University and the bourgeoisie began to tremble before the terrorists. From that time, a reaction set in. The Armagnacs were its instrument and Jean sans Peur, having been too deeply involved with the terrorizing butchers, was forced to flee.

A national disaster was again the price of these disorders. The new English king, Henry IV, was holding England with a firm hand. Against the Jacquerie, the Lollards, and budding puritanism, he governed her with the help of the landed proprietors and the established Church. His son, Henry V, who soon succeeded him, again took up the designs of Edward III, restored the navy, and landed an army before Harfleur, which port was taken after a siege of a month; there was no longer a French army or a French navy to stop him. With Harfleur, England held the great maritime arsenal of France, the mouth of the Seine, and Normandy. As though to prove that he was afraid of nothing, Henry V proceeded slowly towards his base at Calais, aided everywhere by Burgundian

complicity. Without her knighthood France would have remained inert. We may deplore the rashness and the lack of foresight of this nobility which, as at Crécy and at Poitiers, was going forth to be massacred at Agincourt (1415); at least it was patriotic. Some Burgundians joined the ranks of the Armagnacs to whom belongs the honor of having aroused resistance to the invader.

The disaster of Agincourt did not reanimate France; she was going to pieces. Through another misfortune, her chances for the future receded. Within a few months, three dauphins died. The fourth, a son of Charles VI, and still a child, alone remained. The long incapacity of the mad king had ended only in another minority. The time had come for Henry V of England to proclaim himself King of France. Moreover, the French were fighting among themselves even in the face of the enemy. The queen herself, the Bavarian Isabeau, had gone over to the side of Burgundy whose duke was more and more popular because his party had been for peace at any price with England. Soon the Burgundians opened the gates of Paris to Jean sans Peur. The followers of Caboche, who had been driven out after their terrorizing, came back eager for vengeance. Thousands of the Armagnac party were arrested; it was not difficult to reawaken the fury of the butchers and the masses. Twice massacres occurred in the prisons. Conditions were not far different from those of the French Revolution of September, 1792, and the parallel goes to show that the revolution of the eighteenth century was not a miracle or unique phenomenon.

Jean sans Peur ended by establishing a little order in Paris, but France was in chaos. There was great confusion of ideas and there was no longer any government. The Duke of Burgundy held the mad king in his power, spoke in his name, and had for accomplice, the queen, Isabeau, the indifferent and obese Bavarian. The dauphin, Charles, had retired with his followers south of the Loire. However, Henry V proceeded methodically to conquer France, took Rouen, and installed himself in Normandy. Jean sans Peur was accused of treason by

his followers. Doubtless he did not wish to conclude a peace with England which would have been shameful, and would have aroused the protest of the dauphin; for national resistance was again to center about the future king. Jean then sought to conciliate the young prince. Two interviews took place, at the second of which, at Montereau, an altercation broke out. The Duke of Burgundy was assassinated as he himself had assassinated the Duke of Orléans (1419).

This new political crime committed in the presence of the dauphin, though not ordered by him, precipitated the closing act of the drama. Just as formerly the Orléans party, so now the Burgundian party cried for vengeance, and appealed to the country. The new Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good, took this vengeance at a terrible cost to France. It was due to him that the shameful treaty of Troyes was signed May 20, 1420. According to this treaty, Henry V, by marrying a daughter of Charles VI, would become king of France at the death of Charles and the two crowns would become one. The mad king had now entirely lost the light of reason, and cut off the Dauphin Charles from all rights to the crown; for in the words which he used, "the so-called dauphin," there was a terrible implication which meant that Charles VII was not the son of his father. All this meant that France was to lose her national government. Shameful as the treaty was, its acceptance by the University and all the governing powers of France was more so; for as the signature of Charles was null and void, the States General consented to give theirs. Even Paris acclaimed Henry V, and received him with joy and honor. Henry hastened to take possession of the Bastille, the Louvre, and Vincennes. From these fortresses, a foreign king was to govern the Parisians. It was to this pass that revolutions had brought France; they were the sole cause of this unbelievable abasement. The misery and famine, following these long disorders, were so great that Paris, after having lost her sense of nationality in these disputes, had lost her dignity as well.

The nine years that succeeded are marked by but a single fortunate event for France. In 1422 Henry V died prema-

turely, two months before Charles VI. That is, the English king did not come into the inheritance reserved for him by the treaty of Troyes. He did not become king of France; he was not consecrated at Rheims. He left a son of nine months who could neither receive the consecration nor pronounce the oath which was the basis of legitimate power. For the cause of Charles VII and for the national cause it was inestimable good fortune; that way was now open. One can understand the importance of Joan of Arc and her marvelous intuition to have the dauphin immediately consecrated.

From 1422 to 1429, the heir to the French crown, circumscribed, denuded of resources, and recognized only by a little group of faithful followers, wandered about in those parts of his realm which were not occupied by the English. He was called the "King of Bourges" where he lived most of the time; but he had no authority. He could not even levy soldiers and had with him only a few bands of Armagnacs and some Scotch guards whom he paid when, by chance, he had the money. He could not enter Rheims, still held by the English, and therefore could not receive the usual consecration of the French kings. He was regarded merely as a pretender and his rights, even his birth, were contested. How can we be hard on the vacillations and weaknesses of this unhappy young man of twenty years, so poorly prepared for his task (he was the fourth son of the mad king), so poorly supported by a demoralized country and surrounded by councilors who were quarreling among themselves? Charles attempted a reconciliation with the Duke of Burgundy but failed. He did, however, succeed in marrying the daughter of the Duke of Anjou. He felt that he had a national rôle to fill and that this was the only means of recovering the crown. He lacked material resources as well as moral support, and all his little military enterprises were predestined to failure. In the face of a victorious England and the powerful house of Burgundy, the King of Bourges felt himself crushed. The English regent, the Duke of Bedford, had again methodically tried to reduce France to submission. Orléans, besieged, was on the point of yielding after a

long and brave defense. Had this happened, the English would have been masters of the west and center of France. The cause of Charles seemed to be lost. He thought of retiring to Dauphiné and was even advised to leave France.

In a few weeks all was to be changed. The resistance of Orléans had succeeded in arousing the country and had become a symbol. The assassination of the Duke of Orléans by the Duke of Burgundy and the captivity of Charles of Orléans, the son of the victim, the well-known poet, for twenty-five years a captive at London, began to arouse national sentiment. Orléans was the city of the Orléans party, the national party, the enemy of the Burgundians and of the Cabochins. The heroic accounts of this siege spread throughout France and were even to reach to Champagne and Lorraine, to the village of Domremy where Joan of Arc, dreaming under her trees, heard the messages of the saints. The voices told her what to do: "Deliver Orléans and consecrate the Dauphin at Rheims." This idea would probably never have occurred to the wisest of the politicians living in her day, or if it had, they would have rejected it as impossible.

This was the mission of Joan of Arc and she fulfilled it. It was the salvation of France. By common consent, in no country and in no time has there been a purer heroine or a more wonderful story. What we wish to show here is how the sublime episode of Joan of Arc is in entire harmony with the history of France; it continues the past and foreshadows the future.

There is less skepticism about Joan of Arc to-day than there was in her own time. From the very day that a mysterious force urged this young girl of eighteen to leave her father, her mother, and her village to save France, she met obstacles at every hand. They never discouraged her. Those who believed in her, the people first of all, proved to be right. And even those who had no faith but who wished well to the realm felt that, after all, affairs were so bad that there was nothing risked in trying this providential intervention. Only a miracle could save the cause of the dauphin, and France was waiting for

this miracle; for hardly had Joan of Arc left her country district of Vaucouleurs to present herself before the dauphin, than her name was passed from mouth to mouth, and gave courage to the besieged people of Orléans.

From the most matter-of-fact point of view, that of politics, what is most astonishing about this Maid of Orléans is her comprehension of the situation, her good sense, and the correctness of her judgment. She understood that the fate of France was one with that of her kings and that it was necessary to revive the royal power. The heir to the throne was losing hope and perhaps was even doubtful of his own birth. His prestige and self-confidence must be restored. This is why the first meeting between Joan and Charles VII is so moving. The dauphin, doubtful, put her to the test. When Joan designated him and fell on her knees before him, her act carried conviction.

Confidence was restored. Not infrequently even the soldiers and politicians who were fondest of Joan did not wish to listen to her. Nearly always she was right, her presentiments were verified, and she gave forth such a spirit of quiet certainty that people did without effort what she told them. Thus the siege of Orléans was raised (May 8, 1429). Then, without losing a moment, and heedless of the advice, interested or disinterested, of the cautious and shortsighted. Joan led the king to Rheims. True wisdom lay in following her inspiration. It was the enthusiasm which she inspired that overthrew the English at Patay who tried to bar her passage, and which made possible the taking of Troyes. The Burgundian governors, frightened by this popular movement, and receiving no aid from Bedford, opened the gates of Châlons and of Rheims. The dauphin was there consecrated according to the accustomed rites. From that time on, the little English prince could be nothing but a false king in France.

After the consecration, France found again in her monarchy the condition of her independence and the instrument of her salvation. What a miracle could do had been accomplished. Joan of Arc, after the apotheosis at Rheims had a true presentiment that her mission was finished. She lacked only the

aureole of the martyr. It would have been her dream to lead the king to Paris after having conducted him to Rheims. She failed before the city that had remained heart and soul Burgundian: the celebrated "bourgeois of Paris" in his *Journal* insulted the heroine of the "Armagnacs." She failed again before Compiègne. Having fallen into the hands of Jean de Ligny, Joan, by the order of the Duke of Burgundy, was delivered into the hands of the English. The strife of parties continued and was the most decisive element in her trial at Rouen. For some, Joan of Arc personified the fatherland; for others she represented the hated names of Orléans and of Armagnac. Bedford and Winchester, in order to condemn the saint to the flames and to take vengeance upon her by discrediting her cause, again made use of the French civil strife. They made use of Cauchon, one of the lights of the University of Paris which, as we have seen, sided with the Burgundians and was full of rancor. Cauchon consulted the University and it declared guilty, and sent to the stake, the Maid who represented the Orléans party (May 30, 1431). The hatred of the University against Joan of Arc is the same which had bound together the doctors and butchers, the intellectuals and the Cabochins. The odium of the trial and the condemnation must be divided equally between the English and their French servants of the Burgundian party.

However, one of the great ideas of her whom Villon calls "the good lass of Lorraine" had been the reconciliation of the French people. Thanks to the national movement which her intervention set on foot, the widespread horror at her martyrdom brought her wish to fulfillment. The domination of England was more and more detested. Even Paris was worn out. The Duke of Burgundy felt himself abandoned by his followers, and the protection of England began to weigh heavily upon him. Four years after the death of Joan of Arc a reconciliation took place at the Congress of Arras between him and Charles VII, who expressed his regrets for the assassination of Jean sans Peur. It was a brief reconciliation. The house of Burgundy continued to be the enemy of France,

but the power of their party was broken. The French party, the party of legitimacy, carried the day. A year after the treaty of Arras, the Parisians opened their gates to the people of the king, and helped to drive out the English garrison.

But the end was not yet. The English still held a part of the realm. The rest was in chaos and misery. Like Charles the Wise, Charles VII had everything to do over: administration, finance, the army; in a word, the state. And the king of France had only the most meager resources. At the sumptuous court of Burgundy, wearing the rich trappings of the Golden Fleece, the courtiers made fun of this ridiculous, petty king, mounted on his "little trotting nag." And it was not only that Charles had limited resources at his disposal; his country had lost the habit of obedience, and the great vassals were setting a bad example. One of them, the Duke d'Alençon, found guilty of negotiating with England, had to be condemned.

The fine fire of enthusiasm and patriotism which had taken birth at Domremy could not last forever. Above all it could not take the place of organization and discipline. To establish order and to drive out the English was, for twenty years, the task of Charles VII. He accomplished it after the manner of the Capetians: little by little at first, step by step, placing one stone on top of another, aided in his task by men of low birth who had a gift for administration; the silversmith, Jacques Cœur, and the master of artillery, Jean Bureau. "The well-served" was the surname of Charles VII. He had the gift of choosing his assistants, of heeding good counsel, of making use of devotion; he could even be ungrateful if need be; in short, he had the talent of making things work for the good of the state. The result was that at the death of the king, England held only Calais in France. The victory of Formigny (1450) did much to efface the defeats of Crécy and Poitiers and Agincourt.

The English would not have been driven out, at least not so quickly, if dissensions had not broken out at home; their regents were quarreling. Minorities did not succeed any better with

them than with the French. That of Henry VI was fatal to them for it led to the civil war which soon broke out between the houses of York and Lancaster, the War of the Roses, which tore England to pieces at the moment when Germany, shaking off her anarchy and lethargy under the hand of the Hapsburgs, was again to become a danger to the French. With the troubles in England, the Hundred Years' War came to an end. In a very short time after Joan of Arc had been burned at the stake in Rouen, the scene changes and we see France, hardly delivered from the English, called to the east where her frontiers were cruelly incomplete.

In the hours of his deepest distress, the "King of Bourges" had found a support in the emperor, Sigismund. Just as Charles V had sent the large "companies" of marauders into Spain under Duguesclin, so now Charles VII wishing to rid himself of the armed bands which were still infesting France, sent these idle marauders into Switzerland to serve the Emperor. This move was to have unsuspected and important consequences, for the prince who led them to Basle was no other than the future Louis XI. By fighting against the Swiss, he learned to know them. He will remember them later and take them into his service. In the meantime the Swiss cantons were winning their independence. The emperor was too weak to make them submit and he appealed to the French for aid. Seeing this, certain discontented towns of the empire which, as an effect of the division of the kingdom of Charlemagne, were still loosely attached to it, asked for the protection of the King of France. This was the case with Toul and Verdun. Metz will join them later. It was in this manner that the great struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were to begin. Another event which took place far from France, was likewise to have important consequences. In 1453 the Turks took possession of Constantinople. A long time before, they had gained a foothold in Europe and were now becoming a European power. Christendom was alarmed. It is a strange fact that in the struggle of the future, France was to find in Turkey an unexpected ally against the German Empire.

CHAPTER VII

LOUIS XI—FRANCE RESUMES HER PROGRESS (1461-1515)

THE house of Valois had had from the beginning great difficulty in keeping France and the monarchy on an even keel. The prestige of royalty was no longer what it had been. Circumstances had singularly favored and emboldened the feudal lords, the great vassals. The dukes of Burgundy especially had become outwardly the equals of the King of France and with Picardy and the line of the Somme, they held Paris at their mercy. They felt themselves less and less French in proportion as their relationship to the king became more remote. Philip the Good and even Jean sans Peur had still had some scruples about injuring the mother country. Charles the Bold, however, was to become a declared enemy. At the time, it did not seem impossible that Burgundy might destroy France.

Charles VII's work of restoration was no more solid than that of Charles V had been. In 1461, he died, it was said, of anxiety and sorrow. He had abundant cause. His oldest son was in revolt against him, and had placed himself at the head of a rebellious league. In establishing order in France, Charles had made enemies. The French nobility was somewhat fickle; sometimes it was faithful, devoted, and ready to pour out its blood and be cut to pieces as at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt; but sometimes it was unsubmissive and ranged itself against the king. However it was not a caste, a closed aristocracy, and a race apart. The great vassals, to be sure, were nearly all of the Capetian family. But the nobles would have disappeared long before had not their ranks been replenished by commoners upon whom the rank of nobility had been bestowed. Every rich man, every lord, chafes at discipline; and it was precisely the reestablishment of discipline, both civil and military, which was the cause of the enmity against Charles and which

brought on the "Praguerie," or revolts thus named because of their similarity to the Hussite troubles in Prague.

This affair was the more serious in that the heir to the throne was involved. Never before, in the history of the house of Capet, had a future king been in rebellion against his father. Undoubtedly it was a sign of Louis XI's impatience to reign. It was also an indication of the weakness of the monarchy. Contemporaries, with good reason, thought it a bad symptom and preferred rather the house of Burgundy to the house of France divided against itself. But Louis XI was of true Capetian lineage. He was learning from experience, and we shall find him later all the more eager to restore the authority of the crown.

The "Praguerie" had been decisively repressed by Charles VII but scarcely had the dauphin been pardoned before he again quarreled with his father, and put himself under the protection of the Duke of Burgundy. There he watched and learned to know his adversary of future years. In spite of his grievances against the dauphin, Charles VII was wise not to lay up more disorders for France by excluding him from the throne. He did not listen to those who advised him to cede Guyenne to his second son; the system of appanages had already proved itself too expensive for France. The unity of the realm was more precious than anything else and Charles VII rendered another service to his country by leaving intact the heritage of Louis XI.

When this once rebellious prince became king, he continued the work of his father and if the feudal lords counted on the new reign to further their interests, they were to find themselves mistaken. Only, Louis XI was a man of no illusions, and he decided wisely that he was not strong enough to combat them face to face. Coalitions were a "nightmare" to him. He had recourse to arms only when he could not help himself, and preferred other means, above all money; he paid whom he could not conquer. Avaricious as regards himself, still more modest in his dress than his father, he managed to amass four hundred thousand crowns to buy a province. Trickery and a

lack of scruples were undoubtedly in his make-up. They were also necessities in the situation in which he found himself. To divide his enemies, to fight the more feeble, to humiliate himself before the others, to sacrifice his allies in case of necessity, to inspire fear when he was the stronger, to submit to affronts and await the hour of vengeance; these were not the acts of a crusader. Charles the Bold, the "great duke of the West," carried things with a higher hand. In the end, as in the fable of the oak tree and the reed, the reed carried the day because it was able to bend to the storms.

Louis XI had thought at first that a few concessions to the great vassals would suffice for his security and that he would be able, while waiting for something better, to occupy himself with other affairs; with Roussillon, for example, which he united for the first time with the crown. But the conflict with the house of Burgundy was inevitable. The Count of Charolais, soon to be known as Charles the Terrible or the Bold, ambitious and violent, both English and Portuguese through his mother, already governed in the name of the old duke, Philip. Charles and Louis held each other in mutual distrust. Everything was a source of ill feeling between them, even their negotiations. The storm was bound to break. This was exactly what the king feared; a coalition of the feudal lords, another "Praguerie." As if to punish Louis for his rebellion against his father, the coalition included the king's own brother. It took the seductive name of the League of Public Welfare, which rallied all the malcontents. It launched a demagogic proclamation in which the illegalities and the arbitrariness of the monarch were denounced. A fine piece of irony over the signature of Charles the Bold! Louis XI was even accused of plotting with England against the French princes when, by a good arrangement with Warwick, he had merely insured himself against an English intervention. He replied with good sense that, under the preceding reigns, it was the civil wars that had delivered France to the English.

Louis XI had the advantage over the great feudal lords in that he had the organization of the monarchy and the perma-

nent army left by Charles VII. "The king is always ready," said Charles the Bold in disappointment. When the Duke of Burgundy arrived, Louis had already disposed of the Dukes of Bourbon and of Nemours; thanks to which the battle at Montlhery (1465) was indecisive, and Louis could reënter Paris which he kept faithful by excusing her from taxation. Treason was everywhere, even in the royal camp; and this explains much of the king's rancor and many of the severities which he practiced later. Louis' weakness is evident when we remember that the battle on which the safety of his capital depended was fought only a few leagues from Paris itself.

In the meantime the forces of Burgundy, Brittany and Lorraine had joined and were threatening Paris. It was only by flatteries and presents that Louis could keep the city from going over to the enemy. He judged himself to be in such a precarious position that he talked of seeking refuge in Switzerland or with his friend, the Duke of Milan. Fortunately the allies of the coalition hesitated. Louis profited by this moment of hesitation to tempt the princes. Strongholds, provinces, money—he offered them much, but less, however, than they would have been able to seize. At this heavy price, Louis was able to ward off the danger and he proved that the pretended League of Public Welfare was only a league of greedy individuals.

Louis XI had had a fortunate escape, but he was left weak and without support; furthermore, it was not to be a small task to regain what he had ceded—Normandy to one, Guyenne to another. France was dismembered. Can we reproach Louis XI for having signed the treaty at Conflans only with the idea of backing down later? It would fill a volume to enter into the details of the policy which he then followed, the various intrigues which he started: calling the States General to have them declare null and void the cession of Normandy, taking back the province from his brother, and encouraging revolts at Liège and Dinan against the Duke of Burgundy.

Charles the Bold, who had just succeeded his father, entertained vast and dangerous designs. He wished to join, in one parcel, the domains made up of bits and pieces, to bind Bur-



Louis
 the
 Eleventh

gundy to the Low Countries by Champagne or Lorraine, and to govern without having to render homage to the King of France or having to respect the customs of the Flemish. Already he had terribly chastised the towns of the Meuse; Louis felt that his turn was coming and wished to ward off the danger. Trusting to his adroitness, he asked for an interview with his cousin and, provided with a proper safe-conduct, he presented himself at Péronne. It was strange that Louis, a wily fox himself, should not have scented the trap. Hardly had he arrived at Péronne than Charles the Bold, alleging a new revolt of the people of Liége, for which he held the king responsible, made Louis prisoner. He released him only after humiliating him. Louis was compelled to go in company with the duke to crush the faithful allies of France at Liége. He had to promise also to give Champagne to Charles's brother, the Duke of Lorraine. Louis accepted everything, signed everything, and sacrificed the people of Liége and his pride to save Champagne. He managed so well that, after regaining his liberty, he prevailed upon Charles to say that if his brother would consent he might give him another province less important than Champagne. Louis escaped from the worst predicament of his life. It is hard to understand why Charles ever let him go when he once had him at his mercy. There can be only one reason: the moral force which the king represented, the duty which bound the vassal, even the great vassal, to the supreme suzerain. Thus formerly the Plantagenets had respected their homage to the King of France. The feudal régime carried in itself this important corrective. It protected and still served the sovereign who had dealt France such hard blows.

It was following this adventure that Louis XI inflicted, upon those who had betrayed him, his most famous punishments. The cardinal, La Balue, had been involved in setting the trap for Louis at Péronne. This prince of the Church escaped with his life but he was shut up in one of the iron cages that they were using in Italy and of which the cardinal himself had recommended the use. These punishments, the accounts of which have been preserved in legends, laid hold

upon the imagination of the people. This was what Louis wanted, and it was one of his easiest tasks. It was necessary to inspire fear. He was constantly having to repress seditions of the vassal lords or of the towns. Everywhere he found enemies. With England, where no one ever knew who was to govern from one day to the next, the King of France had ever to be on his guard. With Burgundy, in spite of truces, there was a permanent state of war. There came a time when Charles thought he would put an end to it. Wishing to force the issue, he invaded Louis' realm and besieged Beauvais. But his reputation had begun to suffer. Beauvais feared the fate of Liège, and its inhabitants, even the women, defended the town. The Duke of Burgundy was forced to return home without a decision. It was at this time that some of the more foresighted of Charles's followers began to waver in their allegiance and Philip de Comines, among others, went over to the camp of Louis.

In his dealings with his great adversary, Louis adopted the policy of prudence. He watched Charles engaging in more and more hazardous undertakings; affronting Lorraine, Alsace, Germany, and Switzerland. Louis knew that it would be the duke's ruin. From that time on, he forebore to intervene save to egg on Charles's adversaries. He trusted in time, and waited for his opportunity. He even gave up Saint-Quentin in order that the Duke of Burgundy might turn aside to Switzerland, toward Granson and Morat where the Swiss cantons inflicted upon him two irretrievable defeats. Fortune no longer favored him. Near Nancy, which he wished to make the capital of his state, the head of a new Lotharingia, he met with his unhappy end (1477).

For France this was a great good fortune. Without any effort on her part, a dangerous enemy had been overthrown. Moreover, Charles had no sons; his appanages therefore returned to the crown. They did not return without difficulty to be sure, but it would have been much greater had not the rule of Charles ended in disaster. Louis again had to place garrisons in Burgundy, Picardy, and in Artois. The Low

Countries remained the heritage of Mary of Burgundy. She was to marry, in fact was almost affianced to Maximilian, the son of the Emperor Frederick. Louis XI has been reproached for not having married her to his son. But the dauphin was only eight years old and Mary was bitter against the house of France. She carried the Low Countries with her in her Austrian marriage. Fatal alliance! Three centuries later, Louis XV, standing before Mary's tomb, said, "There lies the origin of all our wars." However, for the moment, the evil did not seem to be so great. The Germanic emperor was so feeble, so denuded of resources, that his son did not even think of claiming the entire heritage of Charles the Bold. As for giving to Mary a prince of the blood as husband, as Comines suggested, Louis refused with good reason. He, no more than his father, was desirous of reviving the system of appanages, and possibly another Burgundian party.

Besides, accessions were being made to his territory on every hand. The good King René, the King of Aix, died very soon and left him Anjou; while Provence, passing to an heir without children, soon after returned to the crown. The death of Mary in an accident put an end to the last difficulties of the Burgundian succession. The peace of Arras was concluded with Maximilian. Louis was then able to settle down to comparative peace. Picardy, Burgundy, Provence, and Roussillon, Maine and Anjou: this was his legacy to France. It was an enormous progress, not only because these were large and wealthy provinces but because they united and brought together what had been scattered and thus constituted a barrier against invasions. Michelet put the situation very well when he said, "The kingdom, until then open, was now closed for the first time and the foundations were laid for a perpetual peace for the central provinces." Furthermore, the great feudal lords were dying out. There remained only the house of Brittany to fear. Louis XI had succeeded in bringing the vassals to terms; the Duke of Nemours had been beheaded; the Constable de Saint-Pol had already been killed for treason. Finally, as another result of his reign, a definitive peace, which closed

the Hundred Years' War, was signed with England in 1475, at Picquigny.

This great step towards the unity and security of France was accomplished without war. Louis XI did not like the risk of battles, and kept an army more for intimidating his enemies than for fighting. This king lived without display, surrounded by obscure men like Oliver le Dain and the doctor, Coctier. He was sparing of the blood of his people, and sent to the scaffold only those princes who were traitors or rebels. Legend, nevertheless, paints him as cruel, and has preserved, even to our day, all the gossip of his time which was spread by Burgundian agents. The masses are romantic and sentimental. For them Louis XI, coolly calculating, choosing his victims with an eye to their use, remained a sinister figure. They pitied Saint-Pol and Nemours, and could hardly refrain from admiring Charles the Bold, one of those men who, like Napoleon, struck the imagination even by their tragic end. But for Louis XI, the result alone counted. He put far behind him pride and self-love. Had he been heroic, chivalrous and even, if you like, franker, he would probably have courted danger. In difficult moments, he knew how to break away and even to humiliate himself. He had only modest ambitions that were capable of realization; namely, to round out his domains, to give and to give back to France what was hers by right. In contrast to him, the Duke of Burgundy forced both time and nature. Catastrophe lay in wait for him. However, even up to the present time, serious historians have reproached Louis XI with having been cruel to illustrious personages and with having shed their blood. Like the crowd, they care little for the dead bodies heaped up by Charles the Bold, the destroyed towns, the annihilated populations. History weeps over La Balue, Saint-Pol, and Nemours but passes lightly over the sack of Liège. It does not count the thousands of humble lives which Louis XI spared and those which he protected by restoring order to France and by fortifying her frontiers.

This reign whose true glory was to become evident only with the lapse of time, assured a long period of solidarity and pros-

perity to France. We shudder to think what would have happened if Louis had died some years sooner, before the party of the great feudal lords had been defeated. In 1483, his son, Charles VIII, was only thirteen years old. Another minority began, but under the best possible conditions. The opposition of the princes had ceased to be formidable; a woman was able to master them. Louis XI had designated for the regency his daughter Anne of Beaujeu, the confidante of his policies and his thoughts. It was a regency as happy and as capable as that of Blanche of Castile. To the lords who were still in revolt, the Duke of Orléans at their head, Anne sacrificed the most unpopular men at her father's court, but she preserved his work. The princes, in order to strike a blow at the monarchy, demanded that the States General be summoned. The regent went further than they had bargained for and called representatives not only from the provinces, but from all classes, even the peasantry; a truly national representation, which came furnished with *cahiers*, lists of grievances, as they were to come in 1789. In this assembly, all voices were heard; there were brought forward demands for administrative reforms; reforms, moreover, which were not ignored, and political theories, even that developed by Philip Pot, concerning the sovereignty of the people. As the regent had foreseen, the hopes of the princes were disappointed. The States of 1484, having very prudently convened at Tours instead of at Paris, did not find their Etienne Marcel. The feudal lords then took up arms. But, from the beginning, theirs was a lost cause and public opinion passed a wise judgment upon their uprising by calling it the "mad war." Its only result was that the Duke of Brittany, the only one of the remaining princes who was powerful, was defeated.

At this moment, the regent was forced to make a very delicate decision. Either way there was something to be lost or gained. The means of reuniting the Breton crown, always suspicious and jealous of its independence, was to marry Charles VIII to the heiress of Brittany, the young Duchess Anne. But Louis XI, at the treaty of Arras, had agreed that

the dauphin should marry Marguerite of Austria, daughter of Maximilian and Mary of Burgundy. Which was it better to give up? Brittany or Franche-Comté and Artois, the dowry of the Princess Marguerite? It seemed that Maximilian himself was to dictate the choice of the French court. The regent learned that the ambitious widower had himself married the Duchess Anne in secret, by procuration. Maximilian, as master of Brittany, would be an enemy installed in France. This union was annulled by the Pope and Charles finally married Anne himself. Brittany was to become French. This door through which the stranger had always found admittance, was closed at last.

All was going well with France. The Duke of Orléans, the first of the princes, the future Louis XII, had become reconciled with the king who had forgiven him. England was going from civil war to civil war. Maximilian had become emperor, but the Germanic emperor in his divided Germany continued to have more difficulties than power. Neither he nor the English were able to do anything to prevent the Breton marriage.

Charles VIII having attained his majority, was at the head of a pacified and prosperous state and of the finest army in Europe. France was calling upon him to act. She had been bored under Louis XI; as has happened to her many a time, she was weary of a prosaic life. Another generation had arrived, the evils of war had been forgotten. The French people wanted events and glory. It was a question where to direct this need of action. Tasks were not lacking; France was not yet complete. In Lorraine and on the Rhine to which Charles VIII had directed his attention for but a moment, there remained much to do; but it was not in this direction that imaginations turned. Moreover, in order to marry the Breton duchess and to break the project of the Austrian marriage, Charles had renounced by treaty both Franche-Comté and Artois. To take back his word would have brought about complications and perhaps dangers. One route remained open and public sentiment forced the young king to take it. Popular feeling was stronger than reason. Everything conspired to

drag the French into Italy. Wisely, Charles VII and Louis XI had refused to support the right over Naples which was held by the house of Anjou. They resisted the solicitations of the Italian cities. But a spirit of adventure was abroad in France. And the sunny lands of Italy were drawing the French to the south. In developing commerce—the rise of Lyons dates from this time—Louis XI had opened up new channels: Lyons and her silks were in close touch with Piedmont and Lombardy. And what is more, he, this miser, had given birth to ideas of luxury. It was not only iron cages that came from Italy. Italy meant desire, the love of art, of the beautiful; it was more than a love of conquest which inspired the French. If we look for the results of the brilliant campaigns of Charles VIII, of his entrance into Rome, of his advance to Naples, we shall find them above all in esthetic considerations. It was a beautiful journey, a true war of magnificence, and it pleased the French. With what pleasure did they talk of the exploits of Bayard and of La Tremoille! What a contrast to the drab years of Louis XI, shut up in Plessis-lèz-Tours, wearing his old hat, and studying his long lists of figures!

There was always in the Italian wars a political idea; it was to push aside Maximilian who, having married again, held through his second wife, Blanche Sforza, certain rights over Milan. It was also to ward off Spain whose princes had seized the Kingdom of Naples at the expense of the house of Anjou. Italy was wealthy and in a state of anarchy, and was calling France to her aid. Savonarola, at Florence, saluted the King of France by the titles of liberator and avenger. Everything invited Charles VIII to cross the Alps.

This war, so much desired, had to be paid for by giving Roussillon to the King of Aragon, as the price of his neutrality. It was also the beginning of infinite complications, of a succession of coalitions and leagues up to the day when, through the marriage of the son of Maximilian with Jeanne la Folle, the Germanic emperor, Charles V, was to become king of Spain and the most dangerous power that France had known since

she had freed herself from the power of England. France found herself face to face with a Germany which, through the house of Austria, was again beginning to count for something in the affairs of Europe. The Hapsburgs, who had started from such humble beginnings, were constantly rising higher and higher through their marriages and through the patient development of their hereditary domains. How many times had France had to reckon with them, in Flanders, even in Brittany! She was to find them again in Italy. She would have found them elsewhere. The great conflict was approaching without either side being aware of it. France and Maximilian negotiated a great deal on the subject of Italy where things were in a constant turmoil. They were even allies for a moment against the Republic of Venice.

The expedition of Charles VIII, so brilliant in its beginnings, ended badly, fickle Italy having turned against the French whom she had called to her aid. France, in order to save herself at Fornovo, had to fight her way through the soldiers of the Italian League (1495). This feat of arms saved her face and the Italian war continued to be popular in France. This war, which brought France nothing but difficulties, was to be renewed under Louis XII and he was to be one of the most beloved of the French kings.

Charles VIII, after a very short reign, died of an accident, leaving only daughters. Fortunately, French royal power was now on a firm basis. Even at the death of the last son of Philip the Fair, there had been some trouble at the accession of the house of Valois. Louis of Orléans, Louis XII, succeeded his cousin, Charles, without difficulty (1498). He was the grandson of that famous victim, Louis of Orléans, whose assassination in the streets of Paris, by order of the Duke of Burgundy, had formerly divided all France. All this was very far away. The new king himself had, at one time during the minority of Charles VIII, forgotten that his family had personified the French party, and had taken part in the mad war of the princes. He soon regretted and atoned for this error of his youth. That is why history has attributed to him the famous

reply to La Tremoille who had at that time, overthrown him and taken him prisoner, "The King of France does not deign to avenge the insults of the Duke of Orléans." In order that the benefits of the marriage of Charles VIII might not be lost, Louis hastened to wed the widow of his cousin, Anne of Brittany.

History has given Louis XII the name of "Father of the People" which the States General bestowed upon him in 1506. His reign, so occupied without with new wars with Italy—his foreign policy was not above reproach—was within marked by excellent administration. The French seem to have been as happy as it is possible for an entire people to be. There are few periods when they seem to have been so satisfied with their government. History generally records more recriminations than eulogies. Almost always the people are complaining about something, and declaring that things are going badly. Under Louis XII there was a concert of benedictions. France congratulated herself on her taxes which were moderate, upon her police who were efficient, upon her justice which was just. Even business itself, usually so exacting, was for once satisfied. France had not flourished in like degree since the time of Saint Louis. Life was perhaps the more easy in comparison with the difficult years of civil wars and invasions through which France had just passed. At such moments a people blesses its rulers. Undoubtedly, when France is not threatened by some great external danger and when she is not torn by factions within, she is an easy country to govern. She has all that she needs for her happiness. The popularity of Louis was due, to a certain degree, to these favorable circumstances. The French monarchy was, even in the opinion of its contemporaries, the best government which existed at that time. It was conditioned by its own traditions; and its method of building up the realm left considerable liberty to its geographical divisions and to the various classes of its people. It respected the customs and charters of the recently reannexed provinces, Burgundy and Brittany, and almost equivalent privileges were extended to the other provinces. France, alone in Europe, presented this mix-

ture of unity and diversity. Under political and social conditions very different from those of our own day, she enjoyed an enviable existence. Each class had its rights and privileges, but none was exclusive. The Church was offering an opportunity for youthful talent, and into the nobility, there was a constant infiltration from the bourgeoisie. The nobles were, furthermore, beginning to recognize their obligation to serve. Signorial rights were more and more limited and regulated, and they weighed less and less heavily upon the other classes. Custom was becoming law. The whole fabric of government was so harmonious that it aroused the admiration of Machiavelli, who had come from a country where all was in confusion. This government, which, in general, followed the lines of moderation and good sense, was well adapted to the French temperament. It is easy to understand how the Capetian government, which had already braved so many storms, should have become so deeply rooted, and why France should frequently have come back to it and remained faithful to it during so long a period of time.

In his foreign policy Louis XII was far less fortunate. The war with Italy which had been resumed, and which retained its old fascination, turned out even worse under Louis than under Charles VIII. After an auspicious beginning, France became entangled in Italian complications. Alliances, leagues, with or against the Spaniards, with or against Maximilian, with or against the Pope, Julius II, were made and unmade from day to day. Louis divided the Kingdom of Naples with the King of Spain; then this partition brought dissension and the French were defeated at Cerignola (1503). Allied for a moment with the emperor or the Pope against the Venetian Republic, Louis soon came into conflict with Julius II who was forming a coalition against France consisting of Maximilian, Ferdinand the Catholic, Henry VIII of England, the Swiss and Venice. France was then at swords' points with all of Europe. In spite of prodigious military exploits, in spite of the campaign of Gaston de Foix, as astounding as that of Napoleon, in spite of the victory at Ravenna where this young

captain perished, France ended finally by losing Italy at the battle of Novara (1513). This was the signal for invasion. Henry VIII landed an army at Calais, the terrible fatal gateway which the English still retained in France, and took Tournai. The Germans, the subjects of the empire, now appeared in France for the first time in many years. They besieged Dijon accompanied by the Swiss who had become enemies of the French. After having fought for their liberty, the cantons had turned to militarism. Fortunately the "French fury," famous since Fornovo, inspired a salutary fear. France first bought off the Swiss, who had an eye for the main chance, and then Henry VIII, who thought the money was easily earned. Louis having become reconciled with the Pope, Leo X, the other members of the coalition dispersed. The king died soon after this crisis. Although it had been easily dispelled, the warning was serious; but it was not understood. France, brilliant and happy, still mourning her "Father of the People," forgot to say to herself, as she ought always to say, "Remember that you may be invaded."

CHAPTER VIII

FRANCIS I AND HENRY II—THE STRUGGLE OF FRANCE AGAINST THE GERMANIC EMPIRE (1515-1559)

THE year 1515 has something joyous and jaunty about it; for it is in this year that Francis I, the artist prince, came to the throne. France was flourishing; she was developing her Latin genius and, under the influence of Italy, was entering upon the delights and luxuries of the Renaissance. However, somber times were coming, with foreign and civil wars. Charles V was soon to come upon the scene and a religious revolution, which was political as well, was all but ready to divide France and thus open the country to the foreigner.

These misfortunes could not be foreseen when Francis I succeeded Louis XII. France had not yet had her fill of Italian wars. On the eve of the death of Louis XII, preparations were being made to reconquer Milan. Francis I, prudent, in spite of his youth and his desire for brilliant exploits, assured himself that this time there would be no coalition to fear, and boldly crossed the Alps. He had no sooner done so than he encountered the Swiss who were holding the country in their power. The history of these cantons is interesting for, intoxicated by their victories in their struggle for liberty, they had acquired a taste for war and, from the oppressed, had become the oppressors. It is a story that has been repeated many times, and has been that of nearly all peoples who have won their freedom. The Swiss were rugged soldiers and Francis I might well be proud to have put them to flight at Marignano after a two days' battle. He won Milan and thereby a reconciliation with the Pope. The first Concordat which was to last to the time of the Revolution, dates from this time. He also won the esteem of those whom he had been fighting. A perpetual peace with the Swiss cantons was signed at Freiburg;

on both sides the pact has been observed; a thing almost unique in history.

Lombardy, the field of many European battles, was conquered for the third time. This conquest was useful for little except to keep it out of the hands of some other power. Already such a power was appearing upon the horizon. Patience and the art of making advantageous marriages had well served the ambitions of the once humble house of Hapsburg. The grandson of Maximilian and Mary of Burgundy would receive an immense heritage; he would have the Low Countries, the archduchy of Austria, Spain, and through Spain, Naples as well as the new treasures of America. The only ambition still open to him would be that of becoming emperor as his grandfather had been and to control Germany to the extent possible for an elected emperor.

Maximilian died in 1519. In order to prevent that formidable concentration of power, Francis I conceived the idea of offering himself as a candidate for the empire against Charles of Austria. There was no particular reason why he should not; the choice of the German electors was not limited, and some of them were friendly to France, while others could be bribed. The contest between the two kings was like a town election. Although only a few princes were the electors, public opinion counted and swayed their votes. A campaign was carried on against Francis in the German inns and the two contestants spared neither money, advertising, promises, nor slander. In order to combat the wealth of the French candidate, the great bankers of Augsburg came to Charles's aid; not because he was an Austrian, but because, as prince of the Low Countries, he controlled through Antwerp the commerce of Germany. The intervention of the bankers was successful and, in the final vote, Charles carried the day. The prodigious power was created; Spain and Germany were joined. But the new empire was to have internal difficulties. Some months later Luther burned the papal bull at Wittenberg. Germany was to have religious war and she was to have it before France had hers. For the French, this was an advantage. A united

Germany, with an emperor really in control, as Charles V dreamed of being, would perhaps have been the death of France.

At least she would have been suffocated. She was blocked on the north, on the east and on the side of the Pyrenees. We can now understand the instinct which, under so many pretexts, drove her headlong to keep a breathing space on the Italian side. The empire of Charles V was immense, almost absurdly so; the domain of France had not yet been rounded out. She would have to gird up her loins for the contest that was sure to come.

Both adversaries felt that it would be a serious one and both wished to forestall defeat. Each sought alliances. For the French there was always the same danger: a coalition into which England would enter, that England who, through Calais, had always a port of entry. Henry VIII held the balance of power and he knew it. He pondered the question. It might be a serious thing for England if the emperor, King of Spain, should come to dominate Europe. For it seems to be a law of European history that it will not endure one overmastering power. Henry VIII allowed himself to be courted by Francis I who was trying to win over his minister, Wolsey, and who hoped to dazzle and seduce Henry VIII himself at the famous interview on the Field of the Cloth of Gold. Henry, on the other hand, did not repel the advances of Charles and finally cast his lot with the emperor who in his turn had not been sparing of promises. As a matter of fact, at bottom England could not forget that she had been driven out of France and she felt that the hour for dismembering her had come. Charles V, strong in his English alliance, hesitated no longer. The struggle between France and the house of Austria began in 1521.

To conquer France, every enemy has always known that he must have partisans within the country itself. But the ancient factions had disappeared, and as yet others had not been formed. Of the leaders of the old feudal order conquered by Louis XI, there still remained but one representative and he



*Francis
 the
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was guilty of treachery. The Duke-Constable de Bourbon, an ambitious and embittered man, dared, although a prince of the blood, to conspire with the stranger against the safety of the state. It was a serious plot, since the duke was powerful because of his family alliances and his vast domains and also since as constable, he was chief of the army. Francis I acted with promptness and vigor. "We are not going to return to the times of Charles VI," said he. He ordered the arrest of the accomplices of the constable and made sure of their condemnation. As for the constable himself, he succeeded in escaping and, from that time forward, bore arms against France. The horror which this crime inspired was of good augury, for it stifled the discontent which the taxes and financial sacrifices, necessitated by the war, were already beginning to arouse.

There was fighting on all the frontiers of France and she was reduced to taking the defensive after Milan had been lost for the third time. It was no longer a question of a war of magnificence, but of holding the enemy far from the Alps and keeping Italy between him and herself. This protection was finally lost. France was then in great danger. The circle about her was being drawn closer and closer; the other countries thought her doomed. Paris, threatened, quickly surrounded the city with trenches. Fortunately the imperialists were stopped and defeated in Champagne. Henry VIII, dissatisfied with his ally and fearing to involve himself too deeply, retired. At one and the same time, France had escaped this danger from without and the usual peril, treason, from within. She was able to count on the morale of the country.

She had need of it. Charles V decided to redouble his blows. The French generals tried again to detach Italy. After eight months of campaigning, it was necessary to withdraw. This time the route from the south was open to invasion. The imperialists entered Provence, the Duke de Bourbon at their head, and besieged Marseilles whose resistance afforded time for the king to come up with his army. The enemy had to raise the siege, beat a swift retreat and cross over again into Italy,

where Francis thought he saw victory ahead. Instead of victory, however, it was disaster. Fortune turned before Pavia in 1525 and the king was taken prisoner as John the Good was formerly taken at Poitiers. Francis himself said that all was lost save life and honor.

There is no doubt that Charles believed that in holding the king he held France just as Edward III had held it after Poitiers. But this time there was neither disorder nor treason; public sentiment would not have allowed it. There was indeed an abortive plot to take away the regency from Louise of Savoy, the mother of the king. A few intriguers and agents of the enemy attempted, in vain, to reawaken the Burgundian party at Paris and to find again some supporters of the Duke of Burgundy within his ancient domains. The regent was careful not to convoke the States General; France did not want another Etienne Marcel. The only opposition that Louise encountered was a legal one, that of the parliament of Paris which had been, and which perhaps still was, secretly in sympathy with the Duke de Bourbon. It is worth while to pause over this incident for it foreshadows the things which were about to happen.

Through its very functions, the parliament, a judiciary body, had taken on a political character. Charged with enregistering the edicts, it examined them and thus participated in the legislative power. It had certain traditions and doctrines; empowered with the right of remonstrance, it criticized and the government gave itself liberal airs. A conflict had already arisen on the subject of the Concordat which the parliament found at once contrary to the liberty of the Gallican Church and tending too much to reënforce the authority of the king by allowing him the nomination to the ecclesiastical benefices. Parliament in this instance, had to bow before the will of the king but remained attached to its principle and was especially bitter against the negotiator of the Concordat, the Chancellor Duprat. We shall find under Mazarin this same opposition of parliament to the prime minister. After Pavia, the opportunity seemed favorable to the great Parisian magistrates to take

their revenge and acquire popularity by blaming the financiers for the French reverses. But, more important still, parliament complained that the government had not prosecuted the religious reformers—they already called them heretics—who were beginning to appear in France. Opposition to Protestantism took its rise, not in the government, which was indifferent to the Reformation, but in one of the organs of public opinion. This was to be the case until the seventeenth century and we can see the principal characteristic of the wars of religion already appearing. On the part of the Catholics, resistance was to be spontaneous, while the monarchy was to try to keep the rôle of arbitrator.

At this moment, there were other anxieties and other interests to defend. The essential thing was that during the captivity of the king, France should remain calm and united. Under these circumstances it was of no advantage to the emperor to hold him prisoner. It might have been that without anarchy and the Parisian revolutions, the treaty formerly wrested from King John would have been void. Charles V did not wish to release Francis save on exorbitant terms: taking for himself all that had belonged to Charles the Bold; for Henry VIII, Normandy, Guyenne and Gascony; for the Duke de Bourbon, Dauphiné and Provence. "Better die than do that," replied Francis. Charles kept his captive without advancing his own cause any further. He made himself odious, even a little ridiculous. Henry VIII began to consider, to perceive that the emperor was becoming very powerful, that he was not living up to his promises, and was not making payments; and the House of Commons wanted at least money. The French regent had the foresight to offer it. France was lucky to have funds and to know how to dispense them. For two million gold crowns Henry VIII changed camps.

Charles V could draw nothing further from his prisoner except that through his lassitude, boredom, and fears lest, his own absence being prolonged, order in France might be disturbed, Francis I accepted the treaty of Madrid, giving his two sons as hostages. He warned the emperor, however, that as the

treaty had been signed under duress, it would be worthless. Charles V had also demanded Burgundy. The king had no sooner returned to France than he received from the Burgundy deputies the declaration that they wished to remain French and a special assembly convened at Cognac, declared that it was not in the power of the king to alienate a province of the realm (1526).

In truth Charles V was not ignorant of the fact that the treaty would not be effective, but it provided a way out of an embarrassing situation. In his overextended empire, difficulties were not lacking. Wherever he reigned, he was regarded as a foreigner. Spain did not like this Fleming and he had had to suppress the insurrection of the Spanish towns. One part of Germany had gone over to Luther and the Protestant princes were defending their independence, their Germanic liberties, against the emperor's project of unification. Finally, there were the Turks, already en route to Vienna, who were threatening the empire through Hungary. In order to defend herself against the Germanic power, France had ever to look for allies in central and eastern Europe. The Protestant princes and the Turks were the allies nearest at hand. The policy known as the "balance of power," was beginning to take shape.

The very evening of the battle of Pavia, Francis I had secretly sent his ring to Soliman. The sultan and his minister, Ibrahim, understood the sign. This was not the first time that there had been relations between France and Turkey. They had begun in the time of Jacques Cœur and Charles VII. In those days they were merely business transactions. It took dire necessity to force the king to such a step as an alliance with the Turks. "The Turks are keeping the emperor busy and are thus assuring the safety of all rulers," said Francis to the Venetians. He even went further and brought the pirates of Algiers into line against his enemy. This alliance with the Turks, however, was the end of the ideal which had inspired the crusades, the end of the ideal of a united Christendom. Even if it had ever existed, or had been able to survive so many wars between the nations of Europe, the conception of a great Chris-

tian republic was now impossible. But in any case, for France, this alliance was a matter of life and death. Teutonism was menacing her, and forcing her to an attitude of defense. The war which ensued was the beginning of the great struggles in which the old Europe was so many times to be engulfed and changed. The Very Christian King sent his ring to Soliman. But soon, because the repudiation of the unacceptable treaty of Madrid by Francis I had reopened hostilities, Charles V, His Catholic Majesty, delivered Rome over to his pied and mongrel troops, to his Vandals and his Goths. The sack of the Eternal City, in which the Constable de Bourbon, that unforgettable type of the renegade of his country, met his death, startled Europe as a premonition (1527). It may be that the concept of a Christendom, a still surviving memory of Roman unity, had already become an illusion. It was henceforth only a chimera.

In order to understand the confusion of events that were to follow, truces concluded and broken, alliances made and unmade, it is necessary to find some guiding thread. How could Francis I twice become reconciled with Charles V; the first time through the treaty of Cambrai which returned to him his two sons given as hostages; the second time, with such cordiality that the emperor was received in France? We must remember that motives are never simple. In theory it was easy, in order to defeat Charles V, for France to join forces with Soliman and with the Protestants of Germany. But in Europe, this alliance with the Turks, whose invasions were covering more and more territory, was causing much scandal. Charles V exploited these fears and his hatred of Francis I, who in turn had to resort to ruses, reassurances and explanations in order that Charles should not be credited with the rôle of defender of Catholicism. As for the Protestant princes, banded together at Schmalkalde against the emperor, it suddenly occurred to them that they were after all Germans and that Charles V had protected them in Austria when the Turks were menacing Vienna.

It was not in Europe only that it was difficult for Francis I

to maintain his position; it was difficult even in France itself. His alliance with the German Protestants raised an internal political question from the moment that there were French Protestants. When the Reformation appeared in France the least that can be said of the attitude of Francis I is that it was one of indulgence. His sister, the learned mystic, Margaret of Navarre, the friend of Clément Marot, was sympathetic with this new movement. The king himself, since the Reformation had served him well in Germany, looked upon it without displeasure in France. He protected and saved several reformers and intervened in behalf of tolerance. But as we have seen, it was popular opinion which persecuted the reformers. And the Protestant propaganda was growing, was becoming bolder, and was encouraging iconoclasts and fanatics. Statues of the Virgin were broken and a condemnation of the Mass was nailed on the very doors of the king's apartment. The usual fault of propagandists is to attempt to compromise those who do not combat them and Francis I did not wish to be and could not be compromised. What was soon to be the Catholic League was already forming. He saw that the reformers (very ill-advisedly) were attempting to get him into their hands. He gently but firmly disengaged himself. Protestant historians have always done him justice even when they have drawn unfavorable contrasts between him and his successors.

It is easy to understand that the beginning of internal religious war disturbed the foreign policy of the king. Undoubtedly a coalition formed by the King of France with Henry VIII, then quarreling with Rome, and the German Protestants would have been formidable for Charles V. It would not, however, have accomplished much if in the face of a Catholic France—and this comprised the immense majority of the French—Francis I had become the king of the Reformation. Openly to take sides with the heretics, considering the state of mind of the country, would probably have been to run the risk of a revolution. In the meantime, the frequent and violent resistance of the mass of people in France to the spread of Protestantism was cooling the ardor of her German allies. These are the causes of the

fluctuations which the policy of Francis underwent after 1538.

But a sincere and lasting reconciliation between France and the house of Austria was not possible so long as the emperor was threatening the independence and safety of Europe. War broke out again and this time religious divisions counted for nothing. The imperialists, although defeated in Italy at Cerignola, had invaded France from the north and the French had to sign a treaty of peace fifteen leagues from Paris at Crépy-en-Laonnois (1544). It was not a peace, only a precarious truce like the others, which solved nothing and which public opinion found humiliating. Following his father's example at the treaty of Madrid, the dauphin, solicitous of his popularity, attested before a notary, that when he became king he would not recognize the treaty of Crépy. At the death of Francis I, preparations were in progress for new hostilities between France and the emperor.

If France had done nothing else at the time when Henry II became king in 1547, she had built up a policy. Her relations with Germany were of supreme importance, as were also her eastern frontiers. Italy was but a secondary consideration. All the efforts of France had, therefore, to be directed against the Germanic Empire, to break it up if possible. The results of the war which was bound to come would be determined on the line which separates the empire from France, in that Lotharingia of which France had been deprived for five hundred years through the partition of the Carolingian inheritance. The struggle against the house of Austria, that is, against Germany, led France to recover her frontiers on the banks of the Rhine. The rounding out of French unity at all points where it seemed most imperfect, became the fixed design of Henry II.

At the beginning of the new reign, there came bad news from Germany. Charles V was attempting what the Prussian kings were only to accomplish four centuries later; namely, to become master of a unified Germany and to transform the elective empire into an hereditary monarchy. Germany was at that time a mosaic of principalities and free towns. Her constitution, defined by the "Golden Bull," was at once aristo-

cratic and republican. Charles V began by depriving the towns of their independence; he then turned his attention to the princes. In the same year that Henry II came to the throne, the Elector of Saxony was defeated at Mühlberg. Left without assistance from outside, the German princes were succumbing, the house of Austria was centralizing and governing Germany. Had he succeeded in this, Charles V would have been very near to realizing his dream of dominating all Europe. In order to prevent such a catastrophe, it was necessary to act quickly. With the Turks, the Pope, the Venetian Republic, the Italian princes and the German princes, wherever it could find adversaries of the emperor, French diplomacy was busy.

One circumstance favorable to Henry was that the Reformation had not yet seriously troubled France, while Germany and England were torn by religious conflicts. For this reason, England was prevented from intervening in continental affairs. At the same time that French policy was allying itself with the Protestant cause in Germany, it was supporting the English Catholics. A sister of the Guises, of the house of Lorraine, that family already so influential in France, and destined later to play so great a rôle there, had married the King of Scotland. The hand of her daughter, Mary Stuart, was demanded by Edward VI of England but it was refused, and she was brought to France and married to the dauphin. Likewise, Philip II married Mary Tudor; France and Spain were trying equally through the Catholics, to exert political influence in England already divided by its religions. For the French, the advantage of these religious and political struggles was that England was not, for the moment, to be feared. Boulogne, lost at the end of the last reign, was retaken, and hope of Calais was not abandoned.

Henry II was wise to defer the renewal of hostilities with the emperor. The great political design of Charles V was encountering obstacles within. The German branch of this family did not wish the empire to pass to his son Philip II of Spain. The German Protestants and their princes, in spite of

their defeat, were still resisting. Kept in a state of ferment by the French agents, they concluded the secret treaty of Chambord which made them allies of France. Henry II assumed the title of "Defender of Germanic Liberty." Marillac formulated this policy as follows: "By secret methods keep the affairs of Germany as much stirred up as possible," a motto which Henry II translated more energetically by the word *grabuge*, "squabbling." On their side, the Protestant princes recognized the rights of the king over Cambrai, Metz, Toul, and Verdun. All was ready for the war which every one felt to be inevitable (1552).

As a prelude to this war, the King of France issued a manifesto in French and German, which bore at its head a Phrygian cap, between two swords, with the device, "Liberty." The French monarchy carried on a republican propaganda in Germany. Toul opened her gates, Metz and Verdun were taken, and the French army watered its horses in the Rhine. In the meantime, Charles V, defeated by the Elector of Saxony, was all but taken prisoner. Germany was on the point of escaping him. He hastened to sign the Convention of Passau with the Protestants, by which he recognized the Germanic liberties. Then, believing Germany pacified, he wished to regain Metz. The Duke de Guise hurried to occupy the town, put it in a state of defense and, after two months of siege, compelled Charles to withdraw (1553). This was a personal triumph for François de Guise, a triumph which he was soon to complete in taking Calais by another bold stroke. His popularity became very great. A soldier of genius had appeared and this great captain was to become the leader of a party, a political power. He was at one moment to become more powerful than the king himself. And it was military glory which was to give him, as well as his son, a sort of dictatorship at a time when the government was weakening and demagoguery appearing.

The war was prolonged for five years in Italy and the north of France without the emperor's being able to obtain any decisive result. Success was deserting him. In Germany the Protestants were becoming bolder, and were imposing new con-

ditions. The sovereignty of each German state in matters of religion having been recognized, the unity of the empire became chimerical. It was at this moment that Charles V, discouraged and obliged to abandon his dream, not even able to transmit the imperial crown to his son, decided to abdicate (1556). By this voluntary withdrawal, over which the King of France silently rejoiced, he confessed his defeat. Of course his son Philip II still possessed the Low Countries and Spain. Under the guise of consolation for the loss of the empire, Philip married Mary Tudor. He was to take up the plans of his father and like him, only under conditions far less favorable, was to attempt to dominate Europe. The first part of the struggle against the house of Austria had turned in favor of France.

There were, however, some new misfortunes. Philip II had renewed the war, and had as allies the English of Mary Tudor and the Duke of Savoy. This time the enemy turned aside from Metz and entered France through the Low Countries, the great route of invasion. The Duke of Savoy, by a forced march, reached Saint-Quentin which Coligny was defending. An attempt of the Constable de Montmorency to raise the siege of the town was unsuccessful; the French army was crushed, and the way to Paris lay open. At this moment only Philip's hesitation, his fear of compromising the fruits of a successful campaign, saved the French from a great disaster. The Duke de Guise who was campaigning in Italy, was hastily recalled and made lieutenant general. This great captain was a political genius. He found France worried, fatigued and demoralized. It was necessary to strike a blow to restore public confidence. François de Guise thought of Calais, the precious possession of England, her last foothold in France. Through extraordinary boldness and good luck, the town was recaptured in a few days (1558). As the defender of Metz and the liberator of Calais, Guise became irresistible. In the meantime, his rival, Coligny, who was defeated at Saint-Quentin and who with his brother, Dandelot, favored the Reformation, was an unfortunate prisoner. The unequal struggle was already beginning be-

tween these two who were to be the respective champions of the Catholic and Protestant causes.

When the Duke de Guise had reëstablished the affairs of France, peace became possible. It was a peace of liquidation. All the contestants were exhausted. Mary Tudor was dead. With her, Philip II lost his English alliance and Queen Elizabeth pronounced herself for Protestantism and widened the breach between the Anglican Church and Rome. The King of Spain was harassed on the sea by the Turks, as his cousin, the Emperor Ferdinand, was by land. The latter, who was also having trouble with the German Protestants, had not even taken part in the conflict. France regained Saint-Quentin, kept Metz, Toul, Verdun, and Calais. But save for Turin, she gave up all claim to Italy. It is for this reason that the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis was not more glorious. The military party sighed for those Italian campaigns which brought promotion and booty, and declared that the abandonment of so many conquests was a dishonor. The memoirs of Montluc are full of these protests. History has repeated them and, curiously enough, instead of registering results has allowed itself to be influenced, even at so great a distance, by men who took up the pen, as is nearly always the case with authors of memoirs, only to complain or boast.

Henry II died in the midst of these events, as the result of an accident (1559). At the entertainments given in honor of the peace, the king took part in a tourney in which the lance of Montgomery entered his eye. The death of this energetic and cool-headed prince came at an unfortunate moment. He left only young sons at a time when France was in trouble. As is always the case, such long years of war were costly. They had exhausted the finances and touched even private fortunes. It had been necessary to multiply the loans and taxes, to draw money from all possible sources, and to sell some of the public offices. Already, at the beginning of the reign of Henry II, the provinces of the southwest had revolted against the *gabelle* or salt tax and the insurrection had assumed a revolutionary character, proof of which was the famous pamphlet against the

"tyrants," the "*Contre un*," written by La Boétie, the friend of Montaigne. This "*cri républicain*," republican slogan, will soon be taken up by the Calvinists who, at first, had been respectful towards authority and the established government, as Luther and Calvin himself had recommended.

That there was at the bottom of the Reformation a political leaven, a principle of revolt, is hardly to be doubted. In Germany, the great uprising of the Swabian peasants, then that of the Anabaptists of Münster who professed communism, had both coincided with the Protestant preaching. If France seemed much more antagonistic to the Reformation which gained headway there only slowly, nevertheless, the deterioration of her currency and the high cost of living, consequences of the war and perhaps also of the sudden influx of American gold, had, by impoverishing the middle classes, created discontent, a favorable ground for political agitation. In France, this was the great stimulant to Protestantism which attracted especially the bourgeoisie and the nobility, while the populations of the country districts, whom the economic crisis had not reached, remained untouched. As for those whom a special turn of mind, or intellectual, or mystic reasons had converted to the reformed religion, they were finally drawn into the civil war. The distinction between "Huguenots of religion" and "Huguenots of state" was soon effaced.

Francis I had been compelled to deal with the Protestants whose preaching had caused disorders. Under Henry II, the incidents were multiplied. There were serious occurrences at Paris where the crowd assaulted a meeting which the reformers were holding in the Pré aux Clercs. Churches were springing up pretty much everywhere, like the one which Calvin founded at Geneva; and persecutions, clamored for by the public, drove the converts, as usual, to proclaim their faith and seek martyrdom. These were disquieting symptoms. It was clear that France would be cut in two; also that the resistance of the Catholics would be stronger than the Calvinistic propaganda. The crowd demanded punishments for the heretics and never found them severe enough. Michelet says of this time: "One

was suffocated by the throngs at the gallows and the funeral pyres. The congregations themselves directed and regulated the executions." Other signs appeared, of a kind to absorb the attention of any government; two parties were forming in all departments of the state. In the army, Guise and Coligny opposed each other. In parliament, one party acquitted the Protestants, the other condemned them to the flames. The magistracy was bringing discredit upon itself. To put an end to this scandal, Henry II delivered a solemn speech in parliament, which ended in an even greater furor. One of the councilors, Dubourg, a new convert, defied the king, and compared him to the biblical tyrant, Ahab. In the midst of the session, Henry had some of the high magistrates arrested by his guard. In spite of the energy of this reply, it was impossible not to see that a crisis was at hand, that the king's authority was at stake.

CHAPTER IX

CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS WARS BRING FRANCE TO THE VERGE OF RUIN

THE death of Henry II precipitated matters; the "*grabuge*," as it was called, was coming back from Germany into France. His son, Francis II, was only sixteen years old and was, moreover, a sickly child. It was during his reign of one year, that the Catholics and Protestants took up definite positions, while a "third party" was springing up, which benefiting by the experience of the League, and become the party of the "politicals," was in the end to carry the day. This "third party" was in reality that of the crown. It was represented by the Chancellor Michel de L'Hospital, a friend of Montaigne, a venerable and verbose liberal, and had for its brains, as far as planning was concerned, the queen mother, Catherine de' Medici; for Henry II had married this descendant of the Florentine bankers.

The acknowledged head of the Catholics was the Duke de Guise. His great popularity and his military glory stood him in good stead. As for the Protestants, they were seeking a chief without much success. They had, to be sure, Coligny and Dandelot. But Coligny, a soldier, was still taking no stand and was content to plead for tolerance. Moreover, a prince of the blood would have suited the Calvinists better. They looked to the King of Navarre, Antony de Bourbon, whose wife, Jeanne d'Albret was turning him toward the Reformation, but whose interests and character rendered him hesitant; and to his brother, the Prince de Condé; more resolute and more susceptible to the lure of ambition.

This was the general situation at the beginning of the Wars of Religion. "There were two great camps in France," said Pasquier. The monarchy, faithful even under its weak

princes to its national rôle, was forced to maintain the equilibrium and to remain above the factions. These events, so extremely confused, are still more obscured by the passion with which they have been reported even to our own day. Each party accuses the other of having begun the strife. It is, however, certain that the Duke de Guise, whether he wished it or not, found himself at the head of the Catholics. It was he who was most hated by the Protestants, and he was led by that very fact to defend himself and to desire power. As uncle of the young king, for Mary Stuart was his niece, the accession of Francis II gave him an influence in the government which was augmented by the fact that his brother, the Cardinal of Lorraine, occupied the position which would to-day correspond to that of the Minister of the Interior and of Finances.

Up to this time, the Protestants had only shown themselves vigorous in words and violent in pamphlets. They had not yet resorted to action. This great step was taken by a desperate man, La Renaudie, whose coreligionists appeared to approve his actions while in reality they planned to betray him. La Renaudie, having united a certain number of gentlemen converts, proposed that they do away with the Guise party and thus obtain freedom for the Protestant religion. In order to reassure them, he promised not to touch either the king or the "legitimate state of the kingdom." In reality he planned to seize the king and the followers of Guise, to call an assembly of the States General, and proclaim the Bourbons. This was the conspiracy of Amboise (1560). It was discovered by the Cardinal of Lorraine, and the Duke de Guise forestalled La Renaudie who was killed at the moment when he was concentrating his forces in the forest of Château-Renaud. By this misadventure, the Protestant party was placed in a serious position. Already too strong to withdraw, they sought issue from their position in rebellion. Their followers took up arms at various points; at Lyons, in Dauphiné, and in Provence.

The service which the Guise party rendered at this time was that it saw the necessity of repression and made itself responsible for it. They needed, however, in order to resist the re-

bellious Protestants, a kind of national approbation which they did not have; for the Chancellor L'Hospital, upheld by the queen mother, was for measures of conciliation. The result was that, with the consent of all, the States General—that dangerous remedy in troubled times—was called together.

But Guise and his followers left nothing to chance. Their plan was to strike a great blow immediately, and present the deputies with a *fait accompli*. When the States General had gathered at Orléans, the King of Navarre and Condé were invited to present themselves before it. If they refused, they would show themselves guilty and deserving of punishment. If they came with troops, they would betray a troubled conscience. If they came alone, they would place themselves in the hands of their adversaries, which was exactly what happened. The King of Navarre whose irresolution rendered him inoffensive, was frightened by the cold reception tendered him and by the strict watch under which he was kept. As for Condé, summoned by the king to explain his conduct, he answered that he was falsely accused by the Guise party. Arrested and tried he was condemned for treason. The Guises had obtained what they had hoped for. In striking at the dukes of Bourbon, they were striking at the head of the Protestant party.

The death of Francis II in the same year, 1560, came as a blow to the Guises, in the midst of their success. His death changed everything, for the new king, Charles IX, was a minor and the queen mother and L'Hospital became the veritable rulers. One may easily believe that, at this moment, a change of dynasty suggested itself to the Guises as it had already done to the Protestants. And from a change of dynasty to the suppression of the monarchical régime, was only a step. A kind of revolutionary spirit began to spread.

An attempt at reconciliation was the program of Catherine and of L'Hospital—a chimerical program—party lines were too clearly drawn, and passions too violent. The dexterity of the Italian queen mother and the liberalism of the chancellor succeeded for a while in postponing irritating questions, which

were for the most part questions dealing with certain individuals. But it was not possible to be so impartial that the balance did not swing to one side or another. The Guise party deprived of power, the King of Navarre in the council, Condé pardoned, amnesty given to the Calvinists; the balance was leaning to the Protestants who took courage, while the Catholics became alarmed. L'Hospital mistook the nature of the problem, or rather he did not see it at all. He had not taken account of what Sainte-Beuve calls the "primitive republican spirit of the Reformed churches and their express purpose of forming a state within the State." L'Hospital thought only of contenting the Calvinists by concession and edicts of tolerance. Not seeing clearly the course of events, he weakened the state at the worst possible moment. He had thus a heavy responsibility in the ensuing massacres and civil wars. The ordinance which he issued, according to custom, after the meeting of the States General at Orléans, answered the demands of the bourgeois deputies who were frightened above all by the expenditures and the deficit which was approaching 43 millions, an enormous total of that time. The chancellor sought to economize, but he did so in a most dangerous way. He diminished the public defense, and dismissed the Scotch guard. The reduction of pensions and the retirement of many officers on half pay resulted in much discontent. But that was not all. The powers of the municipalities had increased; it was as if in time of trouble the police should be controlled by the communes. L'Hospital thought that liberty would make everything all right; he disarmed the government and armed the parties. Michelet, almost in spite of himself treats this liberal as an imbecile. "To the angry waves of the sea, to the furious elements, to chaos, he said 'Be Kings.'"

These circumstances explain how, at almost a single touch, France broke into flames. In vain the chancellor multiplied edicts; no one heeded them. The Calvinists thought that he gave them too little, while the Catholics thought he gave them too much. The Protestants disturbed the Mass, while the Catholics interrupted the Protestant preachers, without either

party's knowing who had begun it. L'Hospital's strange idea of calling together the priests and ministers at Poissy to bring about an understanding between the two religions, resulted in a violent quarrel, and made the Catholics think that the government was ready to sacrifice their religion. In her rôle of conciliator, Catherine de Médicis brought suspicion upon herself. The Duke de Guise, the old Constable de Montmorency, and the Marshal de Saint-André had formed a sort of government, the triumvirate. A serious conflict between the two religious parties, in which the Duke de Guise was personally involved, was the signal for civil war. The Protestants, whose coreligionists had had the worst of that bloody skirmish, the massacre of Vassy, clamored for vengeance and took up arms. This was in March, 1562. A veritable civil war began and a manifesto of the Prince de Condé opened it.

François de Guise, with his usual foresight, wished to enter into this war under favorable conditions. He had Paris on his side, which was to remain Catholic to the very end, and this passionate resistance of the capital meant a check to the new religion, for France, even then, was nothing more than an image of Paris. Guise wished something further—to be sure of the government. By a stratagem as bold and calculated as that of Orléans, he took possession of the queen mother and the young king at Fontainebleau, conducted them to Paris, and took over the government.

The surveillance that Guise imposed upon the royal family and to which Catherine submitted with impatience, and against which Charles IX and Henry III were later to defend themselves, was most illegal. And yet, without this dictatorship, France would have run much greater risks. Guise's diagnosis was swift and sure. He had seen immediately the direction events were taking. All civil war invites foreign interference, and when a religious principle is involved, it takes on an international character. The fear of the Guise party was that the Protestants of France would combine with the Protestants outside. As France was at that time on good terms with Germany, Guise sought to convince the Germans that there was much less

difference between Lutherans and Catholics than between Lutherans and Calvinists. The Cardinal of Lorraine by a policy that has brought upon him much reproach, in a famous discourse on faith and dogma, even made astonishing concessions to the Duke of Württemberg. His policy was successful and after a little judicious use of funds, German cavalry was found fighting in the Catholic ranks against other Germans. Towards England which favored Protestantism, the Guise party was without means of action. But an alliance with Spain was open to Francis. Philip II had opposed the Reformation in Europe and Elizabeth of England was his enemy. Thus, in France, each of the two camps found allies.

If foreign interventions at this time were deplorable, that of Spain seemed at the moment least dangerous. Catherine herself had resorted to it to frighten the King of Navarre, whose kingdom was thus threatened, and the maneuver had been successful. And so it happened that the entente between the Catholic party and Spain came about by regular and diplomatic means, while the Protestants, the rebel party, in spite of all its efforts, found itself in a bad position to negotiate. Elizabeth gave them her support in return for certain promises; first the return of Havre and later the restitution of Calais. Condé and Coligny, who signed this convention, denied that they had any intention of betraying the interests of France. And yet they were opening their country to England.

The year 1562 has been compared to 1793. It was, truly enough, a year of massacres and terror in which neither party spared the other. The names of Montluc and the Baron des Adrets, in the south, have become associated with these pitiless struggles. But the Revolution destroyed fewer monuments, churches, tombs and statues; for the Protestants took a firm stand against "images." Many places in France still show the ruins of that time. Yet the map of beliefs and religions had materially changed. For if, in the south, Catholics and Protestants, personified by Montluc and Des Adrets, have always opposed each other, the west, partly Calvinistic in the sixteenth century, witnessed the defeat of the Reformation. It

was in Normandy where Condé and Coligny found their main support and where the battle took place. For the purpose of protecting Havre against the English and securing Rouen, Guise met Condé and Coligny near Dreux and won a difficult victory, yet a victory none the less. It only remained for him to take Orléans, one of the strongholds of Protestantism, when he was assassinated by Poltrot de Méré in 1563. The son of François de Guise was to reply to this ambushade on the night of Saint Bartholomew. To civil and religious war, this crime added the motive of vengeance.

In the meantime, events had worked for Catherine de' Medici. The Duke de Guise, that uncrowned king, and the uncertain King of Navarre, killed at the siege of Rouen, were both dead. The triumvirate had ceased to exist. The Prince de Condé and the Protestants were defeated. Catherine, who understood the strength of the Catholic party, made use of these circumstances. The Calvinist party was discouraged and worn out by the struggle. She divided it. She offered peace to Condé and to the Protestant noblemen, according them liberty of worship which, on the other hand, was refused to whoever was unable to celebrate the sacrament in private and in his chateau. The honor of the Protestant aristocracy was satisfied, although they appeared to abandon their common people. A blow had thus been dealt the party, but it was far from being its death blow.

During this momentary calm in which Charles IX became of age, the royal authority and traditions revived. The queen mother who kept the directing power, thought that she had at last discovered the true formula for equilibrium—a Catholic government with legal justice toward the Huguenots. Catherine flattered herself that she had reëstablished tranquillity in the kingdom and that she knew how to manage affairs better than Philip II who was engaged in bloody encounters in the Low Countries. She was too optimistic. The tranquillity was most uncertain. The Protestant party was not yet sufficiently conquered to be content with the place which had been given it without making an effort to redress itself. It had among its members some fanatics who longed to take up the struggle again,

and who, in order to revive the energy of the party, were exploiting every incident. In the end they won over Coligny who, taking his inspiration both from La Renaudie and François de Guise, from the conspiracy of Amboise, and the coup d'état of Fontainebleau, wished before beginning hostilities, to get possession of the person of the king. Did he hope to dominate Charles IX or to replace him by a Bourbon? Did he have those republican ideas in the back of his mind which Michelet ascribes to him? His plans were defeated and so we shall never know. In spite of the blindness of L'Hospital, who thought such a bold step impossible, Coligny's attempt failed, and Charles IX, after barely escaping capture at Meaux, took refuge in Paris.

The Protestants had committed a serious blunder. They forced the monarchy to regard them as rebels, and alienated the sympathy of the third party which respected the crown above all else. L'Hospital, held responsible for the catastrophe which had so nearly happened, was obliged to resign. Thus, influence swung back to the Guise party and repression began again. But the royal army was so weak that in two years, in spite of a few successes, (at Jarnac, where the Prince de Condé was killed, and at Moncontour) it was not able to stamp out the sedition. Coligny had as a base of support, La Rochelle, where he communicated by sea with his Protestant allies in England and the Low Countries. Sometimes he even succeeded in joining forces with other Calvinist forces formed in the central and southern part of France, who had come from Holland or Germany, and his influence was felt even in Burgundy. This third civil war also ended because of weariness on both sides. Moreover, Charles IX desired a reconciliation with the Protestants for reasons of internal politics. Was not an agreement better than wars which were ruining France? Moreover, the house of Lorraine was becoming powerful, very haughty, and the young Henry de Guise, the son of Francis, was beginning to give umbrage to the crown. In addition Charles had to be on his guard against Philip II whose "Catholic alliance" was none too sincere and who was not sorry to see France enfeebled

by divisions. Always advised by his mother, and brought up in the politics of the third party, Charles IX, who had even had a Protestant nurse, cherished no hatred for the Calvinists. He desired reconciliation with them. He had already accorded them liberty of conscience. By the peace of 1570 he gave them also liberty of worship, except for some few restrictions for the sake of public order, and four "places of safety," La Rochelle, Cognac, La Charité, and Montauban.

In fact, the monarchy had treated with a rebel party as with belligerents and this policy, in order to succeed, presupposed a general pacification and a vast family reconciliation among the French. To obtain it, Charles IX wished to begin at the top. The first prince of the blood was the son of Antony of Bourbon and the Queen of Navarre. He was the future Henry IV to whom the crown would revert if the king and his younger brothers died without children. Henry of Bourbon was a Protestant. His mother, the ardent Calvinist, Jeanne d'Albret, had taken him to La Rochelle and he had first borne arms under Coligny. One could foresee that a serious situation would arise on the day when the crown should pass from the Valois to the Bourbons, when the principle of heredity should summon to the throne a Protestant whom the Catholics would refuse to recognize. It was, and remained, the greatest difficulty that the monarchy had to encounter in all its history. It was necessary, therefore, to help and prepare for the fusion, and facilitate the transmission of the heritage. The idea of Charles IX, the idea which in spite of all opposition he did not renounce, was to make his sister, Margaret, the wife of Henry of Bourbon in order to bring together the two branches of the family.

In 1571 Catherine wrote with the joy of great success, "We have the Admiral here at Blois." Coligny at court meant a complete reversal of the situation. The leader of the rebels, who had some months earlier almost besieged Paris, and burned one of the *faubourgs*, entered the city at the right hand of the king. He became his councilor. With him he made plans for a foreign policy based on an alliance with the Prince of Orange against Philip II. They even became reconciled with the

Queen of England, although she held Mary Stuart a captive in prison. A marriage between Elizabeth and the Duke of Anjou or, in his stead, the Duke d'Alençon was planned. Coligny surrendered his places of security as proof that the Calvinists were no longer enemies of the state, and he sent his troops to deliver the Low Countries from the Spaniards. The Spanish War was to bring together all the "good Frenchmen," and the conquest of Flanders was to turn the nation from civil war.

By a too sudden change, the policy of France became Protestant and Coligny seemed to have gone too far. A great and rapid success of his plan might perhaps have carried everything with it. But his calculations were faulty. A French undertaking in the Low Countries disturbed both England and Germany. Spain under Philip II was powerful and one could not tell where a war with her might lead. Diplomatic circles became alarmed at the dangers of this enterprise and they felt that the Catholic population was losing strength under the growing favor and authority of the Protestants. Above all, the marriage of Margaret of Valois and Henry of Bourbon, the first "mixed marriage," and that without the sanction of the Pope, was causing scandal. Sermons were preached against it in Paris. Charles IX, however, as this union was the most important part of his policy, persisted. He even forced the consent of his sister. At Notre Dame, when she still hesitated, it is said that the king, with a brusque gesture, forced her to bow her head in assent.

It is in this marriage, so hopefully planned to be the symbol of reconciliation among the French, that lay the origin of Saint Bartholomew. The vengeance of the Guises against Coligny, is not enough to explain this explosion of fury. It is probably true that a first attempt directed against Coligny, who was only wounded, was inspired by Henry de Guise in reprisal for the murder of his father. But the excitement in Paris was great. It had been prophesied that the marriage of Henry of Bourbon would be a "bloody marriage." In fact, the government, by its new policy of favor to the Protestants, had placed

itself in one of those false positions from which it is impossible to issue except by violence. The sincerity of Charles IX cannot be questioned. After the attempt against Coligny, he took further measures for the protection of the Calvinists. It was not till after long hesitations that he finally ranged himself with the opposite party and surrendered to the counsels of Catherine de' Medici. His mother, now influenced by different sentiments, convinced him that he was placing the monarchy in a dangerous position, that Coligny was leading it to destruction, and that if the Guise followers should take command of the Catholic reaction which was threatening, they would become masters of the state. The only plan was to forestall them, and strike the Protestant party a fatal blow.

Saint Bartholomew was then much less the effect of fanaticism than the result of a cautious seesawing policy. The king, having favored Coligny, was in an impasse. The Protestants were installed in the Louvre with his brother-in-law. How could he drive them out? But if he continued to govern with Coligny, a revolution might upset them both. How could he get rid of Coligny? Another perplexity. It meant also driving out Henry de Bourbon to whom the king had just given his sister. It meant repudiation of this marriage which had caused so much trouble, excited so much opposition, and which had so much importance for the future of the monarchy. However, a coup d'état by the Guise party, which had refused to leave Paris and which the people approved, was imminent.

The two days which preceded the twenty-fourth of August, 1572, were full of stormy councils, where were expressed the most diverse opinions. The strangest of all and that which best shows the situation, was given by Catherine de' Medici who believed that they should leave the field free to the Lorrainers, as the Guise party was called, and then turn against them again after the latter had suppressed the Calvinists. Thus the monarchy would not be implicated in the bloody affair, and yet would be freed of all the nobles and leaders, both Catholic and Protestant. This plan appeared complicated, dangerous, uncertain, and liable to give the Guise party an authority which it

would be difficult to take back from them. Besides, time was pressing. It was necessary to decide upon something; it was necessary to take some definite action. It was known that the Huguenots were coming in a body to accuse the Guise party before the king. Charles IX saw himself between two perils, and his last hesitations were overcome.

Far from there having been any premeditation in the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, it was, on the contrary, the result of a kind of panic. The objections of the king were those of a man who sees only dangers in all the plans submitted to him. Another enlightening feature is that Charles IX began to make up his mind when Gondi had suggested to him that the king could say to France, "Messieurs de Guise and de Chatillon are fighting against each other. I wash my hands of the whole affair." It was not heroic, but this anxiety, this prudence, this care to protect himself on all sides, shows that Charles IX felt that the fate of the monarchy and the state was at stake. Michelet agrees that in the royal council, the hypothesis that seemed most to be feared (and it was to be realized later with the League) was that a great Catholic party might be organized and ranged against the monarchy which had compromised itself with the Protestant party. Future events were to prove that this hypothesis was correct. This was what decided the fate of the Huguenots.

There was no need to stir up Paris. Not only Coligny and the other leaders, but all the Protestants were massacred with an enthusiastic fury. Paris had old grievances, both religious and political. The little Paris merchants accused the Huguenots of having upset business by their civil wars. Even the Protestant nobles in the Louvre were killed, and there were among them some of the fairest names in France. Charles IX with great difficulty managed to save his brother-in-law and Condé, whom he wished to spare, not only because of family feeling, but also because he hoped to have some one to oppose to the Guise party. This is the true explanation of that famous Day. Later in his "*Considérations sur les coups d'Etat*," Gabriel Naudé was to write that the one of 1572 remained incom-

plete because the princes of Lorraine had not met the same fate as those of Châtillon.

The provinces had eagerly followed the example of Paris. Almost everywhere the Protestants were killed *en masse*, as if the Catholics had only awaited the signal, and the government intervened to moderate this ardor rather than to encourage massacre. The effect of this terror on the Calvinists was profound. Many abjured, especially the nobles and the upper bourgeoisie, following the example of Henry de Bourbon, who had become converted for the first time. Protestantism, deprived of its leaders, and also deprived of its conservative element, was to show thereafter tendencies more and more republican and revolutionary. If it flickered out in one part of France, it took refuge in the west, at La Rochelle, and in the south around the Cévennes where the memory of the Albigensians gave it a kind of precedent. Thus the civil war was still unfinished. What was finished, however, was the experiment of Charles IX, the attempt at collaboration with the Calvinists. The fact which remains is that France wished to accept neither the Reformation, nor the influence of the reformers in the government.

One must realize that the horror of Saint Bartholomew's Day, spread and magnified as it has been by history, was only moderately felt by contemporaries. Charles IX and his mother, if troubled at the time of making their decision, were not without anxiety afterward. But one seeks in vain for a trace of any great reproach on the part of the rest of Europe. In fact, the event was judged from the point of view of its political results. The French monarchy had escaped a threatening peril; Philip II found no pleasure in that fact. As for the Protestant powers, they thought that France could better maintain the equilibrium of Europe against the King of Spain. The Queen of England, the Prince of Orange, and the Protestant princes of Germany drew nearer to the court of France. With their consent, the third son of Catherine de' Medici, the Duke d'Anjou, was elected king of Poland. Louis of Nassau even tried to have Charles IX made emperor.

The king, still very young, was to die in 1574. With the passion which obscures this period of France's history, it has been said that remorse on account of Saint Bartholomew killed him. That these terrible scenes had disturbed the imagination of Charles IX is to his honor. But this death from pleurisy was troubled by other things than memories. In a country where for fifty years incessant civil wars had followed a great foreign war, there was bound to be suffering and irritation. The "malcontents" had joined with the unconquered Protestants in the south and in La Rochelle. And just as the house of Guise was allied with the Catholics and the house of Châtillon with the Protestants, so the malcontents had with them another great family, that of Montmorency, which represented the third party. Thus it was easy to foresee new convulsions, but also a new combination of tendencies and forces, that of the moderate Catholics united with the Huguenots in a new party under the leadership of Henry of Bourbon, King of Navarre.

The second troubled and almost fantastic phase of the Wars of Religion, presents a curious reversal of the situation. France was not to be Protestant. That was an evident fact. But the Catholics were still far from assured. Charles IX left no son. It was probable that Henry III would leave none. Thus the heir to the throne would be Henry of Bourbon, the only half-converted Protestant who had already returned to the Reformation. Preferably a king, but rather a republic than a Huguenot king; this was to be the formula of the League. But Charles IX, and after him Henry III, these last Valois, more accused and maligned than any other kings of France, held fast at all risks, to the essential principle, the foundation stone of the state, the hereditary monarchy. It was for the sake of this principle that Henry III, accused of effeminacy as he was also accused of having favored Saint Bartholomew's Day, was to struggle on for fifteen years. In the end, he was to pay for it with his life.

He was in Poland when his brother died and he came back to find a divided kingdom and an unstable throne. His younger

brother, the Duke d'Alençon, was against him with the coalition of the malcontents and the Huguenots. Rebellions, uprisings, struggles were everywhere. And the king was not strong enough to put an end to these factions. He tried in vain. Vainly also, he tried through negotiations to stop a German army of twenty thousand horsemen who were marching to join the rebels of the west and south. To prevent this formidable meeting, Henry III preferred to capitulate and yield of his own free will what the rebels would have imposed upon him. The Duke d'Alençon received an appanage. The Montmorencys resumed their offices. The Protestants obtained freedom of worship without restrictions of any sort, as well as their strongholds, their seats in parliament, all that they had been demanding sword in hand for a quarter of a century, besides a disavowal of Saint Bartholomew's Day, the only amends that could be made, four years after the famous day. Once again the monarchy was seeking peace with the Protestants.

The response from the Catholics was not long in coming, and it was violent. It was at this time that the League was formed, that League which Charles IX had predicted and fear of which had decided him on the days before the great massacre. Following the example of the Protestants who had raised armies, formed a government, and raised up a state against a state, the Catholics formed, in their turn, a political association. The movement started in Picardy, whose inhabitants refused to give up Péronne as a place of security to the Huguenots; but the idea had already spread to many other districts when the manifesto of the "Holy League" was issued by Henri de Guise. "*Le Balafre*" the "scarred" (he had just been wounded in the face while fighting the German horsemen) was as popular as his father had been. The situation created by François de Guise under the preceding reigns repeated itself; the Catholic party was to have a political leader more powerful than the king himself.

The manifesto of Henri de Guise was not expressly directed against the monarchy; but it contained disquieting indications. It demanded for the "provinces of this kingdom," the reëstab-

lishment of the "rights, privileges, franchises, and ancient liberties, such as they were in the time of Clovis, the first Christian king, and even better and more profitable ones if they can be conceived." This strange solicitude for old rights and tradition hid, it is said, the great idea of the Guise family which claimed to be descended from Charlemagne, and wished to make its members kings. In any case, the League was no sooner formed than it showed its force. Henry II, not to be outdone, hastened to recognize it and placed himself at its head. It was difficult to rule under such conditions, and the oscillations of the monarchy showed its weakness. In its perpetual effort to maintain the equilibrium, instead of directing events it was impelled by them. It no longer had even sufficient money for the most necessary expenses, nor the authority to raise it. Finally, to obtain the indispensable resources, the States General to which the League had had only Catholics elected, was called together at Blois in 1576. It ended after expressing its confused desires, in contradictory votes as well on questions of religion as on those of subsidies. Henri de Guise did not come out victorious, but the king's power was much weakened.

From this date till 1585 the government lived from hand to mouth in a state of extreme weakness. The year after the meeting of the States at Blois, Henry III, to show his authority, announced the dissolution of all Leagues, Protestant as well as Catholic. It was in vain. He lacked the means to enforce obedience. Many people thought that royalty was nearing its end. The king was hardly safe in the Louvre and his court resembled that of a little Italian prince, surrounded by plotters and assassins. In order to protect himself, he had to keep gunmen in his service, who were called the "*mignons*," favorites, and who were later the Forty-Five. Advised by his mother, he tried all the devices of Catherine de' Medici, and even those of Charles IX, to keep the throne—the entente with Elizabeth of England and a foreign diversion in a campaign in the Low Countries. The expedition failed, and after the defeat at Antwerp, the Duke d'Alençon, fourth son of Henry II, died. From that time on, Henry of Bourbon, who had escaped from Paris

a long time before, and had returned to Calvinism, became the undoubted heir to the throne. This gave the Guise party an opportunity to revive the League by exciting the Catholics against Henry III, who wished to leave his crown to a Protestant and impose a "heretic king on France."

The League, strongest in Paris, was a minority but a most active and violent minority. The petty bourgeoisie and the shopkeepers, irritated by the economic crisis, made up the principal element. It is not surprising to find in the "days" of the League the characteristics of all the Paris revolutions, those of the fourteenth century as well as those of the Fronde and of 1879.

In 1576 the League had languished. This time it took many months to bring about an explosion. The idea of Henry III was to wear out the Catholic and Protestant parties by pitting them against each other. While pretending to conform to the desires of the Leaguers, he was trying to conciliate the Protestants. A mistake in judgment disarranged his plans. Against his instructions, his lieutenant, the Duke de Joyeuse, charged with the duty of holding back the King of Navarre who had once more become the leader of the Calvinists, offered Henry battle and the opportunity of victory. Le Béarnais, as Henry was called because he came from Béarn, was victorious at Coutras (1587). It was the first victory that the Protestants had gained. Henry of Bourbon profited by it to a certain extent. He was already giving the impression that he was comporting himself more like a future king of France than as leader of a party and that he wished to "leave entire the heritage for which he was hoping." But Coutras produced a profound effect on the Catholics. Henry III was suspected of weakness and of favoring the enemies of the religion of the state. He was accused of treason. Innumerable libels of extraordinary violence were published against him. The cry of the League became "*Sus au roi!*" "Down with the King!" The Leaguers again demanded the States General. They announced openly that, if Henry III were to die, the order of succession would be changed and the Cardinal of Bourbon would be called to the

throne and not the Protestant, Henry of Navarre. Priests from the pulpit accused the king of every vice and crime; it is not surprising that such opprobrium still attaches to his memory.

No government could have suffered like scandal and continued. Henry III wished to show his force, and ordered the arrest of the preachers who had insulted him. Immediately the city was aroused; some of the Leaguers took up arms and summoned the Duke de Guise who came to Paris, in spite of the fact that the king had forbidden it, and was acclaimed by the crowd. The city became filled with Leaguers who had come in from the neighboring provinces, and the insurrection progressed in the face of the powerless authorities; for the Commune of Paris controlled the police. The government had to defend itself or abdicate. Henry III resolved on a kind of coup d'état and, violating the municipal privilege, summoned a Swiss regiment and some French guards. Then the Leaguers cried out against this illegality and tyranny; barricades were thrown up in all the streets, even around the Louvre where the agitators thought of entering to take the king. Henry III was almost alone in the center of a hostile Paris. He did not wait to be arrested but escaped secretly with a small number of nobles and councilors (May, 1588).

The "Day of the Barricades," this Parisian insurrection, this flight, and the republican sentiments of many of the Leaguers show how low the monarchy had fallen. However at Chartres, where Henry III had taken refuge, the idea of the state and of nationality was still preserved. Foreign influence is seen in this conflict of parties. Elizabeth upheld the Protestants, Philip II the League. Spain and England continued in France, the strife which they had been carrying on against each other for a long time. It was fortunate for France that no power was in a position to profit by her internal disorders. Germany was divided, England was held in check by Spain, while the disaster to the Armada which was scattered off the English coasts, deprived Philip of the means of dominating Europe. France was, however, so weak that the Duke de Savoy could with impunity take from her the marquisate of Saluces.

The king, humiliated, was obliged to submit to the demands of the "Holy League"; anarchy was general; the republic which the Protestants had been unable to establish was half realized by the Catholics. In 1588 the States General of Blois, the triumph of the League, presented this spectacle. The deputies of the League demanded that France should be governed like England and Poland. Through the influence of a facile oratory, the taxes were little by little suppressed. Later the League was to abolish even the rents and the revenues.

The king was no longer master in France. The League governed in his place, and left him hardly enough to live upon decently. Driven from Paris, made ridiculous by the States General, he was now no more secure at Blois than in the Louvre. He was pursued to his very antechamber and at any moment, the Duke de Guise might take possession of him, force him to abdicate, and shut him up in a monastery like an obscure Merovingian. Henry III had not advanced his cause either by his shifts of opinions or concessions, or the attempt at the use of force in Paris. One last resort remained: to strike at the leaders and suppress the princes of the house of Guise. It was impossible to do this legally, for the king would find neither a parliament nor a tribunal to condemn the princes of Lorraine. The idea which had already been suggested to Charles IX on Saint Bartholomew's Day came to the mind of Henry III. To save the monarchy and the state there remained only one means—political assassination. Henry III resolved upon it and Guise, even though he was warned, did not think him capable of so much daring. His famous "He would not dare" was the expression of his disdain, the words of a man who is sure of himself. He lived in the chateau itself surrounded by his followers, and the king was almost relegated to his "old study." The assurance of Guise played as great a part in this drama as the boldness of the king. Henry III had only his few Gascon noblemen to count upon, and they killed the duke with daggers and swords as he entered the council chamber (December 23, 1588). His brother, the cardinal, was killed the next day and

the other members of the house of Lorraine and the principal Leaguers were arrested.

This act of violence did not have the result that the king had hoped, for although it deprived the League of its leaders, it did not suppress it. However, it was a timely act whose indirect consequences were to be the cure for anarchy. There was no longer any hope of an understanding between Henry III and the League. It demanded his resignation, governed Paris by the Council of Sixteen, and created for France the General Council of the League. For the sake of appearances, a king was added to this republican régime, and the name of Charles X was given to the Cardinal of Bourbon. Thus succession by order of primogeniture, the fundamental and tutelary law of the kingdom, was threatened and almost overthrown. In this disorder, in this revolution which was ruining the work of many centuries, there remained one means of safety: it was that the king and his legitimate successor, the Protestant prince, should act in concert. Henry III and Henry of Bourbon became reconciled and took this great step. They united their forces three months after the drama at Blois. The assassination of the Duke de Guise had prepared for the regular transmission of the power from the Valois to the Bourbons. It had made possible the reign of Henry IV. For this inestimable service to France, which saved her from anarchy and division, Henry III was rewarded by assassination and the ingratitude of historians who have heaped upon him the injuries of the Catholic and Protestant pamphlets.

Thanks to the army that the Béarnais brought to the royal cause the troops of the League were driven back and the two cousins, the King of France and the King of Navarre, undertook the siege of Paris. In the city, passion, frenzy, and that indescribable hate which only civil war can engender, reigned. A fanatic monk, Jacques Clément, armed with a false letter, presented himself at the royal camp at Saint Cloud and, led into the presence of the king, killed him with his dagger. The last words of Henry III were to designate Henry of Bourbon as his

the Protestants, who even then had only a moderate confidence in him would have abandoned him completely. That he might not lose all he had gained, he waited to take his chance, and let events decide for him. The joy of Paris at the news of the crime at Saint Cloud, this exalting of the regicide by the League, was warning enough that the hour had not yet arrived. In his declaration of August fourth, Henry was content to state that the Catholic religion would be respected and that in six months a council should decide what action to take. This half measure, perhaps the only one to adopt, did not satisfy all the royalists, certain of whom refused to serve him while a good third of the Protestant army deserted him. Without the nobility, who were as a rule faithful to him, he would have had very few followers about him.

As King of France, Henry was much weaker than as King of Navarre, almost as weak as Henry III had been. He was in reality no more than a pretender and his only strength lay in the principle of heredity. Obligated to raise the siege of Paris, he fled to the west of France, pursued by the army of the League. He received help and troops from the Queen of England, while the League was aided by the King of Spain. Through these civil wars Elizabeth and Philip II sought to strike at each other and to get a foothold in France. Henry IV did himself honor in refusing to give over Calais at any price. Mayenne, the brother of Henri de Guise, who commanded (and that badly) the army of the League, was defeated at Arques near Dieppe. At Ivry (1590) the day of the "white plume," Henry IV was again victorious. These victories were infinitely useful to his cause, though they brought no immediate advantage. When he returned to the walls of Paris, the city resisted as before.

Paris has undergone many sieges in her long history. But this one was fiercer than any other, through the very obstinacy of those besieged. Sometimes blockaded, sometimes relieved, Paris was practically invested for nearly four years. Twice Henry tried to enter by force. Twice he failed. It seemed as though the Calvinist king was rejected by the very walls them-

selves. Perhaps he would finally have succeeded by blockade and famine, which was terrible, if the Duke of Parma, sent at the head of a Spanish army by Philip II, had not forced him to retreat. Still Henry IV would not yield, nor would Paris. The six months that he had fixed had long since passed, and the situation had not changed. Henry still thought that his conversion would be a humiliation and more apt to weaken than strengthen his cause. It was first necessary that the League should realize itself powerless to provide a regular and orderly government for France.

The League's own government was chaotic and revolutionary. It had a king, it is true, but this king, the pretender Charles X, Cardinal of Bourbon, was only a figurehead and was, moreover, prisoner of his nephew Henry IV as he had been of Henry III. This king of the League soon died and his death excited numerous ambitions. Every one was so sure that Henry IV would never succeed in having himself recognized as king, that candidates for the throne began to present themselves. The King of Spain, disregarding the Salic law, claimed it for his daughter Isabella, granddaughter of Henry II. The Duke of Savoy, grandson of Francis I, placed himself in the ranks. He believed that France would be divided and contented himself with Dauphiné and Provence. The Duke of Lorraine was another candidate, as was also Mayenne, who really believed that the "bread was baking for him." These ambitions opposed and nullified each other and Henry IV profited by them.

However, the masters of Paris were really the "Sixteen," supported by the League. This Catholic Committee of Safety reigned by terror and applied to its adversaries, and even to the moderates of the League, the classic measures of revolution; the law of suspects, seizure of the property of émigrés, proscriptions and the general "clearing out" of the public offices. After a summary trial the first president of the parliament and two councilors were hanged for "treason." This act of terrorism disturbed Paris even more than the Duke of Mayenne. How far would these obscure tyrants go? Already they had summoned a Spanish guard and kept sending assurance of loyalty to

Philip II. The Duke of Mayenne, encouraged by the "politicals" of the League who were really the most numerous in the Parisian population, broke up the faction of the "Sixteen," some of whom were hanged in their turn. Those who did not flee were thrown into prison.

The League persisted but its political power was diminished and its organization weakened. Mayenne, by striking at demagoguery, was rendering a service to Henry IV although he thought he was working only for himself. Moreover weeks were passing and nothing was happening; both sides were marking time. Henry IV driven back from Paris had, under the same conditions, failed before Rouen which likewise did not want a "heretic king." This powerlessness of the two camps engendered a lassitude which in itself led to attempts at reconciliation. The party of the politicals, the Third Party, began to say openly that it would be better to come to an understanding with the King of Navarre. But the difficulty was that Henry wished to be recognized without conditions. Already resolved to "take the step," to be converted, he wished his abjuration to be voluntary. He intended to owe the crown to legitimacy only and did not propose that the monarchy should depend upon anything or any person, upon any religion or any pope, or upon any authority usurped by a League. All his maneuvers tended to preserve the independence of the royal power and to avoid even the appearance of a constitution imposed by the Leaguers.

In order that legitimacy should win the day, one more thing was necessary. It was that the Holy League should be recognized as incapable of founding a regular government. The States General of 1593, convoked for the election of a king, ended in a fiasco. Here again it was the Duke de Mayenne who, without meaning to, aided Henry IV. Desirous of occupying the vacant throne himself, and of setting aside the claims of the infanta whose candidacy was being urged by Philip II, supporter of the League, Mayenne addressed an appeal to the royalists and asked them to participate in the States General. Henry



a Paris chez L'Benneville rue du Theatre Francoi N. 2.

Henry
the
Fourth

seized this occasion to affirm his rights and to announce that he was ready to become a Catholic. This news, launched at just the right moment, produced an immense sensation. Among the Leaguers, the group of "politicals" was encouraged. Public favor passed to their side and the famous pamphlet, the *Satire Ménippée*, which some of the talented orators and journalists among them brought out, ridiculed the irreconcilables and made their Spanish allies odious. Even in the states controlled by the League, opposition to foreign intervention was growing. Voices were raised in protest against the abrogation of the Salic law and the candidacy of the Infanta Isabella which was proposed by Philip II, and sustained by the legate of the Pope. The affair dragged out in debates without end until finally, parliament, the preserver of the laws, took the initiative. By a vigorous decree which was immediately made known to Mayenne, the sovereign court declared that the throne could not be occupied by a foreigner. The Spanish intrigue, which had been languishing, was crushed at a blow.

Events were turning in favor of Henry IV and the irreconcilables of the League were losing ground. A feeling of nationality was awakened which helped the royal claim. Since the end of April conferences had been held at Suresnes, between the moderate Leaguers and the Catholic royalists, who were seeking a solution of the problem. This reconciliation was in itself a considerable result, the more so, in that the negotiators, feeling themselves supported by public opinion, persisted in keeping in touch in spite of the difficulties which arose. Henry had hoped that the promise of his conversion would suffice to bring about his recognition. But it was evident that he would have to yield on this point in order to succeed and that he would have to be converted first. Moreover, his conversion preceding the recognition no longer had the disadvantages which it presented before the meeting of the States General. The desire for peace and the need of a regular government had become such that the king no longer ran the risk, as he would have done earlier, of becoming converted for noth-

ing. As soon as he became a Catholic, the movement in his favor would be irresistible. But it was necessary for him to become a Catholic in order to start the movement.

This is in fact what happened. On July 25, 1593, Henry IV abjured the Protestant faith in the Church of Saint-Denis, a short distance from Paris. The League resisted eight months longer though without hope. Its obstinacy at least proves the strength of the idea from which it arose; fifteen years later it was still the same passion that was to arm Henry's assassin, Ravaillac. Even in its defeat, the League remained victorious on one point. It had wrested the state from Protestantism. That the legitimate heir to the French throne was a Protestant had appeared to be a great good fortune for the Calvinist cause. This, the League had destroyed. But what the League had not understood was the hereditary and national character of the monarchy. France had not wished a heretic king, but neither had she wanted a foreign or an elected king. Her institutions emerged from the tempest intact. The restoration of Henry IV—a restoration for him, as for Charles VII—consolidated the monarchy whose future, for the last fifty years, had hung in the balance.

The political talents of the king and his genial disposition did the rest. He pleased France but his greatest quality was his ability to restore order and repose. People passed over and even found charming and heroic in him what would have been condemned in others: his caprices, his affairs, and even his shocking indelicacies. Neither their contemporaries nor history have had very severe blame for Gabrielle d'Estrées and Henriette d'Entraigues, and Henry IV has even been admired that through his amours he earned the name of *Vert-Galant*. La Vallière, Montespan and Maintenon shine with the glory of Louis XIV while Louis XV is reviled and the virtues of Louis XVI helped him little. It is politics which makes the reputation of kings.

After his abjuration, Henry IV was successful in everything because the French were tired of anarchy and foreign intervention and "hungry to see a king," according to his say-

ing. As he could not go to Rheims, which was still in the hands of the Guise party, he was consecrated at Chartres. He negotiated with the Pope to have his excommunication raised. In the meantime, the number of his followers was increasing daily and he threatened to resume hostilities against those who were still rebellious, at the same time allowing them to hope for clemency. The League, which had lost its reason for existence, began to dissolve. The party of the "politicals" was successful almost everywhere and the Duke of Mayenne, seeing that his cause was lost, left Paris whose doors were soon after opened to Henry by the remaining Leaguers who had rallied to his support. On March 22, 1594, the king made his entry into Paris with almost no resistance. The government of the League vanished; the Spanish garrison was allowed to withdraw without hindrance and a generous amnesty was accorded even those who had been most compromised.

We must not, however, suppose that order and tranquillity were restored, and divisions wiped out overnight. Feelings had been too deeply stirred, France had been too profoundly shaken; and we can imagine the state of anarchy which followed a half century of civil war. In the absence of public authority a sort of feudal order had been built up, the demolishing of which was to be the work of Richelieu. Up to the very day of his assassination, which came after a long series of intrigues, Henry was surrounded by hatred and conspiracies. Before he fell in the rue Ferronnerie, he had already escaped obscure regicides like Jean Châtel and had been forced to condemn to death such a high conspirator as Biron. It was difficult to maintain the balance between the Catholics and the Protestants; the Catholics always on the watch for heresy and the Protestants with their "restless spirit" always greedy for "securities," through which they tended to form a state within a state.

Henry IV spent four years more in police operations, in negotiations, and all sorts of bargaining, before he had become master of the kingdom. He bought those whom he could not reduce, and many of the former Leaguers, among whom were

the Guises, sold their allegiance dearly. Mayenne was pardoned because he had never agreed to the dismemberment of France; the king's idea, that of national reconciliation, appears in this noble motive.

The League did not really abdicate as an organization until the day when Henry IV had received absolution from the Pope. It still remained to conquer the obstinacy of Philip II who was not resigned to the revival of France and who still kept accomplices there. Henry IV called upon the country to rid itself completely of the foreigner. This war of deliverance was to efface the memory of the civil wars and the plan was a good one. Unfortunately, France was so exhausted that in spite of a success at Fontaine-Française, she suffered some serious reverses. In 1595 Amiens was taken and Paris threatened. It became necessary to ask aid of England who responded only after much urging and then demanded, what was again refused, permission to place troops in Calais. She gave little aid on land but willingly undertook the pursuit of the Spaniards on the sea. Spain has never recovered from the naval disaster of the Armada. It was only the exhaustion of his country which made Philip consent to sign the peace of Vervins. He had lost his hold in France and had half lost it in the Low Countries. Holland had asserted her independence and the new state, the "United Provinces," formed after bitter combats for liberty, added an active element to European politics.

Almost at this same time, the Edict of Nantes was signed (April 13, 1598). The Protestants had taken as long as the League and Spain to recognize that Henry was king. Since his conversion, they had not ceased holding assemblies, addressing complaints and demands to the government, seeking support from without, and even profiting from the embarrassments and reverses of the government to increase these demands—as was the case after the disaster at Amiens. It was when they saw that peace with Spain was going to be concluded that they reduced their pretensions and accepted an agreement. As a matter of fact, the Edict of Nantes was not

a gracious act due to the good will of the king, accorded in the plenitude of his sovereignty, but a treaty whose articles were debated as though between belligerents. If Henry IV could have helped himself, he would not have paid such a price for peace or accepted such dangerous conditions. If the Calvinists had not been filled with distrust, if they had been desirous of entering into the community instead of remaining organized in a party, they would have been contented with liberty of conscience. In order to obtain their signature, it was necessary to add to this liberty not only political but territorial guarantees; more than a hundred towns were handed over to them among which were some that were of great importance and capable of standing a siege, such as La Rochelle, Saumur, Montauban and Montpellier. And these places of safety were to be kept up at the expense of the public treasury, that is by the taxpayers, even the Catholics. Besides, with their synod and their assemblies, the Calvinists had the organs of a government, an autonomy, what might be defined as an "authorized republic." A like encroachment on public sovereignty would be inconceivable in our own day. Even then when the régime of privileges and franchises was commonly accepted, the concessions accorded the Protestant party seemed excessive. They were soon to prove dangerous. These conditions were not in harmony with the idea of tolerance. Without doubt, Henry IV signed in the hope that it was only a first step and that a real peace would follow. He had above all to remember that the Protestant party was always capable of setting in march twenty-five thousand soldiers and of resuming the war. The Huguenots had wrested the Edict of Nantes by force just as the League had forced Henry's conversion. Public opinion was not deceived and the Edict passed with difficulty, a fact which presaged its future revocation. In order to obtain its registration, the king had had to negotiate, revise the treaty, and finally influence the parliaments either by his eloquence or by his authority. The parliament of Rouen did not wholly give in until 1609.

Henry IV who understood and feared his former core-

ligionists could not rest until he had given a severe lesson to their protector, the Duke de Bouillon, who, through his principality of Sedan, then outside of France, might be formidable. In the meantime, another lesson had been given to the Duke de Savoy, who continued to covet the provinces in the southeast. A brilliant campaign gave France La Bresse, Le Bugey and Gex, while by renouncing the marquisate of Saluces, she showed that she had abandoned any thought of conquest in Italy. The policy of aggrandizement was taken up again; the patient, measured, traditional policy, observing the law of utility and possibility, which Richelieu later defined as "completing the square field," in other words, the rounding out of French territory. The king bettered his European position still more by marrying Marie de Médicis, a relative of the house of Austria and of the Pope, Clement VIII. Soon an heir to the throne quieted the fear of another Protestant succession as well as of another League. After so many setbacks, the monarchy was becoming consolidated.

At the same time, little by little, calm and order were returning. In the first years of the seventeenth century, the debts of the sixteenth began to be liquidated. The economic and financial revival was keeping pace with that of politics. With Sully, a new type of Protestant man of affairs, Henry IV was working to establish the fortunes of France. The destruction in the country, the disorder in the administration, and the poverty of the families, was immense. When the king desired that every one should be able on Sundays, "*mettre la poule au pot*," "to put a chicken in the pot," he evoked years of privation. When Sully made the other famous remark, "Tilling and pasturage are the two breasts of France," he had in mind that very correct idea that agriculture has always been the source of French wealth. Reconstruction came then as it always does by means of good sense, by work and saving, by means of the peasant and bourgeois virtues. On the basis of her agriculture and her land which always rewards labor, France built up her wealth. Business was improving. Industries, encouraged by the government, were being founded. The

spirit of enterprise was reviving, and the French were beginning to found colonies.

France was rebuilding and regaining her strength at the moment when Europe had need of her. What had saved her during the time of her civil wars was the rivalry between England and Spain, the struggle of the Low Countries against their Spanish masters, and the effacement of the Germanic Empire. Since Charles V had disappeared, the Hapsburgs of Vienna, though keeping the imperial crown, had no real power in Germany. The independence of the German princes, the progress of Protestantism, and the religious conflicts had rendered the Hapsburgs inoffensive. There was always the possibility of their becoming dangerous through their alliance with the Hapsburgs of Madrid and the duty of French politics was to keep watch of the house of Austria. In the first years of the seventeenth century there were many signs that it was awaking and preparing to reconquer its authority in Germany by assuming the leadership of the Catholic movement with the support of Philip III. The danger was the same as that under Charles V. Henry IV saw it and encouraged the Protestant princes to resist. This policy, so natural, was still more difficult than in the time of Henry II because Henry IV, more than any other, had to avoid the suspicion of sympathy for the cause of the Reformation. His intentions could be only too easily misunderstood. A purely French foreign policy but one which, in the very nature of things, was directed against a Catholic power, revived the accusations and suspicions of the old Leaguers.

It was, however, necessary to take some action when the matter of the succession of Juliers presented itself. By claiming this inheritance, the house of Austria was seeking to install herself on the left bank of the Rhine. From there she would have menaced both the United Provinces of the Low Countries and France herself, who could not keep from intervening. The policy of Henry IV was that of Francis I and Henry II—to oppose the domination of a great power, to protect the independence of the smaller states. In his “great plan” which

contemplated universal peace, Sully has left only a caricature of this policy of common sense, so adapted to the position of France and to her interests. Henry IV was looking for equilibrium and not for an Utopia.

He was ready to drive the Hapsburgs out of Juliers at the risk of war, in order to avoid a more serious one in the future. These preparations did not go on without murmurs. It was said that the king was allying himself with all the Protestants of Europe in order to combat the Catholic religion and even the Pope. Propagated by the enemy, these fables spread over France. Furthermore, there was even a party at the court, hostile to the conflict with Austria and Spain. In this excitement of public opinion which was stirred by the memories of the Wars of Religion, there was one weak and unbalanced spirit who was thinking of regicide. By assassinating Henry IV, on the fourteenth of May, 1610, Ravallac thought he was accomplishing a holy mission. His crime reproduced that of Jacques Clément, and showed that the fury of the League was not yet entirely spent.

Henry IV's nine year old son, Louis XIII, became king. The queen mother, Marie de Médicis, was Regent.

CHAPTER XI

LOUIS XIII AND RICHELIEU—THE STRUGGLE WITH THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA

AFTER the death of Henry IV, every one feared there would be trouble. It was a well-founded fear. The civil wars and those of the League were still too near. "The time of the kings has passed. That of the princes and great men has come." According to Sully this was what men were saying after the crime of Ravallac. Besides the Calvinistic seditions, the princes and aristocrats were making trouble. But the mass of the country was anxious to keep the tranquillity which it was beginning to enjoy. It was hostile to fanatics and ambitious men. Thanks to this general sentiment, France passed through these difficult years without serious accident.

The ministers of Henry IV, who continued to govern in the name of the regent, diagnosed the situation well. It was not the moment to enter into foreign complications, still less into a war. Villeroy honorably liquidated the great enterprise of Henry IV. France contented herself with taking the town of Juliers in concert with Holland, in order that it might not be left to the imperialists, and with giving it back to her allies in Germany. To reassure herself with regard to Spain, the marriage project planned during the lifetime of the king was realized and the young Louis XIII married Anne of Austria.

This policy served as pretext for an opposition which had nothing national about it. The Protestants feared, or pretended to fear that they were menaced by the new Catholic alliances. The princes of the two religions, Condé, Soissons, Mayenne, Bouillon, Nevers and Vendôme formed a league and took up arms. Warned by her confidential adviser, Concini, who had become the Marshal d'Ancre, Marie de Médicis pre-

ferred to negotiate with the rebels rather than run the risk of a civil war. She appeased them by places and pensions and, as they had demanded the calling of the States General, she took them at their word, though not without first having taken pains to show the young king to the country. He journeyed through the provinces of the west, which were still being agitated by Vendôme. On his return from this journey, which produced an excellent impression, Louis XIII was declared of age and the States were convoked. As the government was stronger at this moment, the maneuver of the princes turned against themselves.

The States General of 1614 were to be the last before those of 1789. They discredited themselves as an institution because they showed an utter indifference to the general good. Each of the three orders was thinking above all else of defending its own particular interests. The nobles objected to the fact that the right to certain hereditary offices, especially in the magistracy, could be bought and sold. This virtually constituted another aristocracy for, in this way, members of the Third Estate came to belong to what was known as the "*noblesse de robe*." This was really the essence of the celebrated quarrel of the *paulette*. The question at issue was really whether a position in the magistracy was hereditary and whether the incumbent had the right to dispose of his position or charge. It irritated the families in parliament who were threatened in the hereditary right to their offices. As for the clergy, its orator was the young Bishop of Luçon, Armand du Plessis de Richelieu, the man of the future. Richelieu complained that his order had been removed from the public functions and that the ecclesiastics were "more robbed than any other of the special interests." Thus Richelieu was adroitly preparing his own candidacy and the spectacle which the nobility and the Third Estate had presented justified his language. Of the three orders, it was the first two which the government most feared because of their independence; while the Third Estate, always interested in material questions, was much more docile. The authorities hastened to dissolve the States after having prom-

ised to suppress the venality in the sale of offices. But the government made up its mind never to convoke the States General again.

Concini's bad reputation which, in spite of the favorable testimony of Richelieu, has come down through history, arises from the intrigues of the parliaments, which began from this moment. Making offices hereditary was undoubtedly an abuse. The bourgeoisie who profited by it were attached to it. In order to protect what they considered their rights, parliament played politics. In their protests, they attacked the Florentine, Concini, as they were later to attack Mazarin whom he resembled. This agitation of the gentlemen of the robe who pretended to speak in the name of the general good, aroused the opposition of the princes and this in turn aroused the Protestants. In the midst of these disorders, Concini called to the government some energetic men, among them Richelieu who was named secretary of state for war and who set himself, as he immediately announced, "to chastise the disturbers."

If it were only for having found Richelieu, Concini ought not to pass for so poor a man. His fault was that he loved money as well as power; hence his unpopularity. In the high position which he owed to the favor of Marie de Médicis, he also lacked tact and prudence and he humiliated the young king by keeping him apart from the affairs of the kingdom. Louis XIII had just reached the age of sixteen. He confided in a gentleman of Provence, Charles d'Albert de Luynes, who was in his meager suite and who had no trouble in convincing him that his authority was being usurped by the Marshal d'Ancre. But the question was how to overturn this all-powerful Florentine, master of the government, the finances, and the army. There was no other resource but boldness. On April 24, 1615, when Concini was entering the Louvre, he was arrested in the name of the king, by Vitry, captain of the guards, and when he called for help he was shot. "I am now the king," said Louis XIII to those who were congratulating him. He dismissed the collaborators of Concini, even Richelieu himself, to whom he addressed some severe reproaches which

Luynes hastened to attenuate, divining the future of the Bishop of Luçon. Marie de Médicis was removed from the court.

Since the death of Henry IV, no matter who had held the power, the policy had hardly changed. Like the others, Luynes wished to avoid foreign undertakings and a conflict with Spain; within the realm he wished to maintain order and to restrain the Protestants. In the meantime, there were preparing in Europe events which soon would prevent France from remaining neutral. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants was beginning again in Germany. In truth, although it was not immediately visible, it was not a religious but a political struggle. The house of Austria was resuming the plans of Charles V. She was Catholicizing Germany in order to dominate her. Bohemia (the Czechoslovakia of to-day) had begun her resistance by the famous attack upon the representatives of the emperor at the chateau of Prague. She had taken for king, the Elector Palatine, leader of the Evangelical Union. The Hungarians in their turn were revolting. The emperor, Ferdinand, saw himself in danger and sought help from without. He turned to France whom he solicited both in the name of the Catholic religion and the solidarity of monarchies.

The French government had to make a decision and the choice was difficult. To come to the aid of the house of Austria was contrary to the interests and the safety of France. To support the German Protestants was to awaken the distrust of the French Catholics and to embolden her own Protestants who were becoming restless in the south. The Council decided to intervene only to advise the German Evangelical Union to preserve peace. It feared in fact to be dragged into a great central European conflict, and attempted to prevent it through the ordinary channels of diplomatic mediations. It is only rarely that this method arrests the great currents of history. Soon the insurgent Czechs were crushed at the battle of White Mountain. For Europe this was the "thunderbolt" which the battle of Sadova was to reproduce at a later day. The power of the emperor was increased by this victory which indirectly

affected France. The house of Austria was becoming dangerous again. However prudent the government of France might be, however much it might dislike to go to war, it would finally be forced to intervene.

Before France could take up her national policy, before she could enter actively into European affairs, she would have to secure peace within her own borders. At the moment when Luynes died, the south was still troubled by the Calvinists, and the king, who had come in person to take Montauban, had to raise the siege. France had need of a firm government which should establish order within before passing to any foreign undertaking. Furthermore, it would be necessary to prepare for this action by means of alliances. The circumspect pace which Richelieu followed justified the abstention of his predecessors.

He came to power only in 1624. Louis XIII could hardly forgive him for having been Concini's man and the candidate of the queen mother. Having become cardinal, his prestige had grown and he had known how to make himself indispensable. In the Council, he was soon the leader and without bluster and by prudent and carefully circumscribed plans, he began building up the foreign policy of France. The point which he chose for his first move was important but did not risk setting all Europe in motion. It was the Swiss valley of the Valteline through which the imperialists were passing freely into Italy. By liberating the Valteline from the Austrian garrisons, France cut the emperor's communications with Spain.

This rather complicated affair was in process when the French Protestants started a revolt, taking La Rochelle as base, and putting Richelieu in great embarrassment. In order to combat the house of Austria it was necessary to enlist the sympathies of the Protestant allies—the German princes, the Low Countries, and England. It was for this reason that Henriette of France married Charles I. But these alliances offended those French Catholics who were still animated by the spirit of the League and at the same time they aroused the Protestants,

never weary of complaining. Richelieu was still far from having the country in hand and his declaration that he intended to punish the trouble makers disturbed those who were unwilling to compromise. It was necessary to break up the cabal which was forming around Gaston d'Orléans. Chalais, who was intrusted with the task of keeping watch over this troublesome young prince, had taken part in the plot and was beheaded. It is at this same time also that two young noblemen who had defied the edict against dueling were sent to the scaffold. In order to forestall and stop greater disorders, Richelieu with the approval of Louis XIII, was establishing discipline with an iron hand.

The position of France in Europe was no less difficult to maintain. Richelieu, anxious about what was happening in the interior, had hurriedly made peace with Spain; then the English turned against him. It is true that in taking up the projects of Henry IV he had conceived the idea of giving France a navy; for almost a century she had had none and she needed it to carry out her great design against Spain which Richelieu refused to give up. She needed one also in order to maintain her own position beside the great maritime powers, England and Holland, who were becoming powerful and beginning to quarrel over their colonies. And finally she needed one in order to put an end to the trouble with the Protestants who, from the port of La Rochelle, kept all France in check because she had no arms upon the sea.

All this distracted France's attention from the essential consideration, which was Germany. Never was the country so divided between land and sea. But first of all the Calvinist rebellion had to be put down. The English who had landed on the Ile de Ré to bring aid to the Protestants were, fortunately, driven out. It was still necessary to bring La Rochelle to terms. This required a long siege which has become famous and in which Richelieu showed his tenacity. Upon the success of this enterprise all the rest depended. When La Rochelle had once capitulated, after a second defeat of the English, it was a simple matter to take the last rebellious towns in the south.



Cardinal
 Richelieu

The year 1629 marked the final defeat of Protestantism as a political party and as a state within a state.

Delivered from this internal danger, Richelieu had still to defend his personal situation against the opposition which was grouped around Monsieur and the queen mother. Assured of the support of Louis XIII after the "Day of the Dupes"¹ Richelieu nevertheless had to combat the intrigues and cabals to which the brother of the king was lending his aid. This period offers a striking resemblance to the reign of Louis XI and Louis XIII was equally severe towards those guilty of sedition: Marshal de Montmorency, governor of Languedoc, who had espoused the cause of Gaston d'Orléans, was beheaded. Up to the very end of his reign there were to be plots and rebellions of a more or less serious nature, which Spain encouraged and which are inseparable from all great foreign undertakings because they constitute a means of attack or defense for the enemy. The defeat of the Protestant party was, however, a capital advantage. The other agitations and diversions of the princes and aristocrats were thereby rendered less dangerous. But although the taking of La Rochelle was popular, we are surprised at the murmurs which the execution of Montmorency excited as did later that of the conspirator, Cinq-Mars, and his accomplice, De Thou. Just as the victims of Louis XI had seemed pitiful, so did those of Richelieu. They became romantic figures. "Sometimes," said the Cardinal, "the people blame those things which are most useful and necessary to them."

Order was finally almost established at the moment when France could no longer avoid intervention in Germany. Against the growing power of the house of Austria, which was again taking up the work of unification of Charles V, the Protestant princes had first been supported by the Danes. Denmark having been conquered, Sweden took her place. Gustavus-Adolphus, a champion of Protestantism, won some

¹ The day when Marie de Médicis and Monsieur, who thought they had accomplished the overthrow of Richelieu, and were receiving congratulations for it, found that Louis had reinstated him (1630).

astounding victories over the imperial arms, which retarded by that much the hour when France herself would have to enter the struggle. However, Gustavus-Adolphus gave to the war a religious character which did not altogether please Richelieu. The Swedish king appeared as the champion of the Reformation and although Richelieu was contracting Protestant alliances against the Emperor Ferdinand, he did not care to increase the political power of Protestantism in Europe, and unite all that was Catholic around the house of Austria. There was a balance to be kept. However, when Gustavus-Adolphus was killed in his last victory, that of Lutzen, France lost an important ally (1632). Richelieu was still reluctant to enter directly into the struggle. It cost less to support the enemies of the emperor by subsidies. For two years more he postponed the moment for entering the war. The Protestant League of Germany, aided by the Swedes, were still holding their own. The great and powerful general of the imperialists, the famous Wallenstein, was in revolt against Ferdinand, and was almost a king in the midst of his army. Richelieu was hoping that, thanks to these events, he might advance as far as the Rhine and realize what he called his "*pré carré*," his square field; in other words, that he might round out the frontiers of France. As a matter of fact, Lorraine, whose duke had lent himself to the intrigues of Gaston d'Orléans, was taken. Richelieu put garrisons in Alsace whose inhabitants had asked for the protection of France, fearing that their country might serve as a battlefield for the two parties who were seeking to master Germany. But Wallenstein was assassinated and the imperial authority was, therefore, strengthened again. Spain put her formidable infantry at the disposition of the emperor; the Swedes began to fall back; the Protestant League was defeated at Nördlingen. France had to intervene or leave Europe to the domination of Austria.

This was in 1635. For twenty-five years France had kept out of the war. This time it came to seek her out and Richelieu was forced into it. As in the preceding century, France found that it was no small affair to war against Austria. After a few

successes in the Low Countries her troops were outflanked, and the enemy penetrated into France. The taking of Corbie by the Spaniards in August, 1636, recalled the fact that France was vulnerable and that Paris was dangerously near the frontier. Richelieu and Louis XIII remained in the capital, thus checking the beginnings of a panic and immediately there occurred one of those patriotic movements to which the French people are accustomed but which had not been seen during the civil wars. The "year of Corbie" greatly impressed the contemporaries of that time. France then gave evidence of her solidarity; she began to have confidence in herself. It was the year of the *Cid*, and the year in which Richelieu founded the French Academy. It foreshadowed the century of Louis XIV.

In the meantime, the enemy was on French soil. Richelieu had to free Picardy and Burgundy before he could again take up his great policy with regard to Germany. Furthermore, it was clear that in the face of the forces which the house of Austria could control, France could not follow out this policy without having an army and a navy. Richelieu worked unceasingly to give them to her. He was a great statesman, not so much by reason of his calculations and his designs as by his exact appreciation of the means necessary for arriving at a certain end, and of the relation between a state's internal policy and administration, and its foreign policy. This is the secret of his success in an enterprise in which France was running counter to a power stronger than herself.

Some difficult but fortunate campaigns, marked by the taking of Brisach and of Arras, the success of her Protestant allies in Germany, the revolt of the Catalonians and of the Portuguese against the Spanish government—a circumstance from which Richelieu knew how to profit—all helped, little by little, to establish an equality of forces. The King of Spain withdrew into his own country. It was then that Roussillon was occupied and the French did not again leave it. Invaded in 1636, France in 1642 had advanced by great strides towards her historic frontiers of the Rhine and the Pyrenees. Nothing however had been finished; the war was still going on with

Germany and with Spain, when, in this year, the Cardinal died. Five months later Louis XIII followed him. These two men united for reasons of state, one might say by service and not by affection, could no longer be separated in history.

For nearly twenty years, they had demanded of France great effort in the way of discipline, organization, and even finances. Supported by the king, Richelieu had exercised a veritable dictatorship which the French people had submitted to with impatience, but without which the national work would have been impossible. The nobles were not the only ones who protested. More than once the peasants rose up because of the taxes, the bourgeois because the interest was not paid. The greatness of the result to be attained—France entrenched on the Rhine, the conquest of the “natural frontiers,” the end of the German danger, the humbling of the Hapsburgs—were ideas fitted to exalt the minds of those shaping French policy. But how could the masses be expected to renounce their comforts cheerfully for such far-off ends which were beyond their powers of comprehension? Later the policy of Richelieu became a tradition, a national dogma, respected even by the revolutionists. But during his lifetime his contemporaries were far from feeling that no sacrifice was too great if it meant the defeat of the house of Austria. In truth the death of the great Cardinal was felt rather as a relief.

For the safety of France, however, it was necessary to continue his policy and she was falling back into the weakness and embarrassment of a minority. A king five years old, a Spanish regent, an Italian minister—bad conditions, indeed, but offset by one important thing. Richelieu left a state policy and for carrying it out he left an administration, an organization, an army accustomed to war, and experienced generals. Mazarin, chosen and trained by Richelieu, understood his methods, and had the adaptability to apply them under new circumstances. This foreigner, this Italian, greedy for money and profit, so prodigiously detested, nevertheless created for France a policy which most of the French did not even understand. He had the good fortune to find favor in the eyes of Anne of Austria,

so much so that people believed there had been a secret marriage. He inspired her with confidence and in spite of the cabals, in spite of a veritable revolution, she never abandoned him. It was thus that this troubled regency rounded out the work of Richelieu.

The war was continuing on all the fronts, this war which, for Germany, was to last thirty years. In 1643 a crashing victory at Rocroy in which the Spanish infantry was defeated by Condé, gave France new courage. The empire could do nothing more. Spain was growing weaker. The great work of Richelieu had been to retard his own intervention, to husband his forces. France, with her young generals, came to give the final stroke at the moment when her adversary was beginning to be exhausted.

There had been talk of peace in Richelieu's time. The year after Rocroy negotiations began. The place chosen for the conference was Münster in Westphalia. But the time was not ripe. Four more years passed before it was signed, while the war still went on. The parties to the treaty were negotiating while the battles were raging, and Mazarin understood that in order to obtain any definite results, he must conduct hostilities with new energy. The campaigns of Turenne in Germany, a decisive victory by the great Condé at Lens over the united forces of Spain and the emperor, finally decided the latter to treat. The peace of Westphalia was signed in October, 1648.

This peace which was to define the boundaries in Europe for a century and a half, crowned the work of Richelieu. It was the triumph of that method which consisted in rounding out the territory of France by assuring her the peaceful possession of her new acquisition. It was not sufficient merely to add Alsace to the realm. It was necessary to provide against its being seized again at the first possible date by the Germans. It was not sufficient merely to humiliate the house of Austria, to impose upon her a peace favorable to France. It was necessary, in order that that treaty should be respected, in order that the results of a struggle which had lasted for more than a century should not again be put in question, that the empire

should be permanently weakened and that it should not be able to reunite in "one single body." In the treaty of Westphalia the policy of the "Germanic liberties," which had always been supported by the French monarchy, received its consecration. The victory of France was that of German particularism, of the independent German states; the defeat of the emperor was the defeat of the idea of a united Germany. Instead of being a single state, Germany was a mosaic of principalities, republics, and free towns. She was, therefore, weak and offered a free field for French diplomacy because her three hundred and forty-three independent states of all sizes and sorts, were masters of their own movements and of their alliances. Their relations with the empire were becoming extremely vague, and were represented by a Diet, a veritable parliament, where, with a little skill, the French agents could intervene in such a way as to keep the "Germanic body" divided. The principle of European equilibrium, founded by the treaty of Westphalia, rested on the actual elimination of Germany and this remained the policy of France, a policy which naturally was to her greatest interest, up to the end of the eighteenth century. Finally, in order to protect these results, France, as well as Sweden, had a right of guaranty, in the name of which she could oppose any change in the constitution of the empire, or any redistribution of its territories; in other words, she could oppose the ambitions of Austria or of any other power which proposed to again take up the domination of the Germanic countries. As Frederick II said later, "Germany was no longer anything but a republic of princes," a vast anarchy under the protectorate of France. Ruined, depopulated by the Thirty Years' War, reduced to political impotence, she ceased for a long time to be a menace to France. Although the French would still have to busy themselves with Germany, they no longer had to fear her invasions. The grandeur of France dates from this security.

It is rare that we can fix the date when a certain policy has succeeded in obtaining what it was seeking. The signing of the treaty of Westphalia represents one of those moments. It did not end everything, because in history nothing is ever

ended, because all progress, in order to be preserved, demands a further effort. It did not end everything because the King of Spain did not consider himself beaten and continued the war. He had reasons to believe that the triumph of Mazarin was not final. In France the treaty of Münster had excited neither enthusiasm nor gratitude. It passed almost unnoticed. At the moment that it was signed, France had been in a state of revolution for three months and the French government was hardly in control of Paris.

CHAPTER XII

THE LESSON OF THE FRONDE

WE have become accustomed to thinking of the Fronde as a romantic and even gallant episode, because of the fine ladies who took part in it. It was in reality the revolutionary growth of the seventeenth century. This "great century" became one of order only after passing through disorder. A moral fever and eruption seemed to spread through many of the countries of Europe. We have already seen the King of Spain at grips with movements for independence in Catalonia and Portugal. At Naples a fisherman, Masaniello, seized the power and his act was to stir the imagination of others. At Paris, in the streets, the people cried out to Anne of Austria as she passed, "To Naples!" But nothing could compare with the impression created by the revolution in England. The execution of Charles I, brother-in-law of Louis XIII, seemed to foretell the end of monarchies. That there was some relationship between all these events and the troubles which broke out in France, cannot be doubted.

We find in the Fronde all the elements of which revolutions are usually composed. The exertion and fatigue of the Thirty Years' War played a great part in it. Richelieu had demanded much of the country and all that he had held down under his iron hand, Mazarin was unable to restrain. An alliance was formed between the nobles whom Richelieu had subjected to discipline and the bourgeoisie who had suffered financial loss. Another element, and that by no means the least, which entered into the war of interests, was Jansenism, that Reformation without schism which has been called "The religious Fronde." The pamphlets against Mazarin and the polemics with the Jesuits, the "Mazarinades" and Pascal's *Provincial Letters*,

(although slightly later) spring from the same attitude of mind. One admirer of the Fronde has called it "the war of the honorable against the dishonorable crowd." If it had succeeded, historians would certainly have recognized in it the intellectual and moral characteristics of a real revolution.

When trouble broke out, in the beginning of 1648, the year of the treaty of Westphalia, the government had for several months been in conflict with parliament which declared certain new taxes illegal. The reason for the discontent was the usual one. War, foreign undertakings, the annexation of territory—all this cost heavily. The treasury was empty. It was necessary to borrow, to impose taxes, sometimes even "to hold back a quarter" of the *rentes*, a thing which the bourgeoisie bore with little grace, as one might suspect even without Boileau's satire. Mazarin, deep in important European affairs, left the finances and fiscal arrangements to his superintendent. When things went wrong, he flattered himself that he could arrange them by finesse. He made a great mistake, when parliament first remonstrated with the government, not to see that something far more serious was involved than the intrigues of the "Importants," or princes of the queen's party, whom he had overcome in the beginning of the regency. The resistance of parliament was part of a political movement. The people were asking for reforms; they were talking of liberty. Especially they resented the administration left by Richelieu, the intendants whom he had created and who were increasing the strength of the central authority. The high magistrates received encouragement on every side. The concessions by which Mazarin thought to conciliate them were therefore useless. Parliament became bolder and although it had only the name of the Commons, as in London, the example of the English revolution fired their imaginations. In short, the parliament of Paris, sustained for the most part by those of the provinces, pretended to act as a sovereign assembly, and in the name of the ancient institutions and liberties of the realm, to limit the authority of the monarchy which had become so strongly re-enforced under Richelieu. From that moment, parliaments be-

came much more like what they were to be in the eighteenth century: a center of resistance to the government and of opposition to reform, a center at once of agitation and of reaction, an obstacle to the progress of the state.

The government finally perceived the danger. It wished to end the matter and to profit by the impression which the victory of Lens had created. The arrest of some of the councilors was ordered, among them Broussel, who had become popular because of his violent opposition to the taxes. This was the signal for an insurrection and barricades. The government yielded before this uprising of Paris. Broussel, "the father of the people," was liberated. The abolition or reduction of the taxes was accorded as well as certain other reforms, especially the guaranties of individual liberty, which parliament demanded. The governing authority had capitulated before this attempt at a revolution.

The queen, Anne, took the matter so seriously that she no longer felt herself safe at Paris and took the young king to Rueil. She returned only after the signing of peace, believing that this great national success would change the temper of the people. But the treaty of Westphalia, so important for the future and for history, made hardly any impression at the time. As the war with Spain continued, Mazarin, who was becoming the object of public hatred, was accused of aiding it. The opposition became stronger than ever. The campaign of pamphlets and songs against the cardinal and the regent became more and more venomous. For a second time, the government thought it prudent to leave Paris, this time for Saint-Germain, but at night and secretly, so tense was the situation. Parliament replied to this flight by demanding the dismissal of Mazarin and the city put itself in readiness for defense. This was the initial act of the first Fronde.

It was the signal for general disorder. Every class was involved: great lords and beautiful ladies, even generals, and the clergy with Gondi (the Cardinal de Retz), parliament, the bourgeoisie and the people. Mixed with all there were memories of the League, of the Protestant hatreds (which explain

the case of Turenne), impatience with the discipline which Richelieu had imposed. Everything adds to the flame when there are numerous causes of discontent and the people feel that authority is no longer strong. In the meantime, this confusion of so many interests and so many different classes seems to have been one of the causes of the weakness of the Fronde. At its first encounter with the regular troops, the army raised by the Parisians suffered defeat near Charenton. Discord broke out among the members of the Fronde and they ended by concluding a peace, or rather a truce, with the court. It would require too much space to describe in detail the intrigues and troubles which filled the rest of the year 1649 and the years which followed. This period can only be compared with that of the League. The disorder extended to the provinces; Normandy and Bordeaux were at one moment in open revolt. In the meantime, the French were still at war with Spain and neither Condé nor Turenne, eager for glory, hesitated to march with the enemy who advanced as far as the Marne. Spain must have been weak indeed not to have reaped greater benefits from these advantages.

In the midst of this great disorder, suffering was extreme. The moneyed class, those who lived on their incomes, had begun the Fronde; they were to be the first to regret it. One is surprised at but one thing and that is that in all this confusion, France should not have gone to pieces. The thing that saved the monarchy was the lack of singleness of purpose among the rebels. As was usual in times of calamity, an assembly of the nobles called for a meeting of the States General. Invoking the ancient feudal traditions, which we saw brought to life again under the League, they pretended that they were restoring to the nobles a right of control over the government. This language, although accompanied by liberalistic formulas, disturbed parliament who reserved this rôle for itself and remembered the States of 1614, the affair of the *paulette*, the tax paid for permission to dispose of one's office, and the hatred of the military party against the magistracy. The germ of the defeat of the new Fronde lay in this conflict.

The new Fronde, however, was much more serious than the old. Mazarin and Anne, unable to do anything by force, tried to divide their adversaries, and obtained the arrest of Condé and the princes of his family, through promises to the clan of Gondî. This maneuver succeeded and, Turenne and the Spaniards having been defeated at Rethel, Mazarin wished to profit by these circumstances to bring back the court to Paris and to reëstablish his authority. This was enough to make all the factions of the Fronde unite against him. The Duke d'Orléans, President Molé, Gondî, the members of parliament and the nobles—everybody—rose up against Mazarin. In the end, parliament demanded not only the liberation of the princes but the banishment of the minister. Mazarin did not wait to be arrested, but fled from Paris and took refuge with an ally of France, the Elector of Cologne, after having agreed with the regent to advise her from a distance while awaiting the opportunity to return.

The situation was truly revolutionary. The queen, Anne, having wished in her turn to leave Paris, was prevented from doing so by the Fronde. The bourgeois militia was called and she appeased them only by showing them the young king who was sleeping—or pretending to sleep. He never forgot these humiliating scenes. In fact, the royal family were prisoners while Beaufort, Gondî, and the "Grande Mademoiselle," niece of Louis XIII, all the agitators, the upstarts and the doctrinaires of this strange revolution were masters of Paris. Fortunately, this society group, allied with that of the streets, was not long in disrupting. Before taking flight, Mazarin had opened the gates of Condé's prison with the idea that this proud man would not long find himself in agreement with the rest of the Fronde. Mazarin was right; Monsieur le Prince displeased everybody. His alliance with Spain became a scandal, and parliament, who denounced Mazarin because he was a foreigner, ordered that Condé should be pursued as a rebel and a traitor who had delivered strongholds into the hands of the enemy. This situation, which he had calculated on, seemed to the Cardinal, propitious for his reëntry into France; in-

stantly the parties reunited against him and as the young king, whose majority had in the meantime been proclaimed, was away in pursuit of Condé, the Fronde reigned supreme in Paris. When the royal army, commanded by Turenne who had again become submissive (in those days men passed with facility from one camp to another) wished to reënter the capital, it was stopped at the gate Saint-Antoine and it was there that Mademoiselle, from the top of the Bastille, turned the cannon on the troops of the king.

This was in 1652 and for the state it was the most critical moment of the Fronde. The king was stopped before Paris, and had the revolted provinces at his back. A government was being formed of demagogues, together with the princes and the princesses of the blood; it was a return to the worst days of the League. But common sense, through the organization of a third party, was also returning. It did not take the Parisian bourgeoisie long to perceive that disorder was not aiding business. A riot accompanied by fire and slaughter at the Hôtel de Ville frightened some and began to disgust others. After three months of this turmoil, Paris, having become wiser, was ready for the return of the young king. Mazarin himself returned in February of the following year.

All France was bruised and torn by this stupid adventure. From a civil war, aggravated by foreign conflicts, which had lasted for four years, there resulted what a contemporary called "the general ruin of a people." History has described the "misery of the time of the Fronde." There was such dire distress that the missions of Saint Vincent de Paul journeyed everywhere throughout the country bearing aid to the sick and food to the starving. Furthermore, as after the League, it took the country a long time to recover from the effects of the shock. Insubordination did not disappear overnight. It was necessary to negotiate and repress, to pay some and punish others. Some provinces were delivered over to anarchy, exploited and tyrannized over by brigands with feudal pretensions. This was the case in Auvergne where, ten years later, it was still necessary to hold "great days," where the harsh procedure

of the government acted as a warning to other malcontents. We are tempted to wonder how the French state was able to resist this shock, unless we remember that the army in general remained true to its duty and that everything would have been lost save for a "few unknown officers of the old regiments" of whom M. Lavissee speaks as those "whose firm fidelity saved the king of France."

Sainte-Beuve has written regarding another troubled period in French history: "We are apt to imagine our ancestors as living in the infancy of the doctrines with which we are familiar and as having had no experience of the things which we ourselves have seen; but they saw many of them themselves and were present at many others that we have forgotten." The Fronde afforded one of these lessons; a lesson for the nation and a lesson for the king who always remembered in the days of his power and glory the evil times through which the monarchy had passed during his youth.

Even with the Fronde vanquished and Mazarin back in Paris, order was not restored as by magic. France longed for it but under what form of government could she realize it? It was hard to tell. One fact became clear in the midst of all the agitations, all the campaigns of pamphlets and press, and all the bold speeches of parliament—the opposition to Mazarin was born of the opposition to Richelieu and was all the more violent because the government was weaker and the second cardinal was a foreigner. For thirty years and more, for the trouble dated back to Concini, the government of France had been that of a ministry; a government by a minister in the name of the king. The régime had been good for France since under two men of the first rank it had given her frontiers, security, and prestige in Europe. However, the French did not take kindly to it. It displeased and irritated them. And since it had not been supported and had caused such violent seditions, it was dangerous and to be avoided in the future. Although France had said plainly what she did not want, she still did not voice her real desires. The word republic, pronounced occasionally during the Fronde, remained without an

echo. Since France was exhausted by anarchy, since she feared another eclipse like that at the time of the League, since she wished a government that would govern and which should not be that of a kind of grand vizier, there remained but one solution—the personal government of the king. Hence, out of the Fronde came the reign of Louis XIV.

From 1653 to 1661 this idea was ripening. Louis XIV was growing up, he was thinking and forming his policy. It was a transition, a preparation for what was to follow. Calm was returning and authority was reëstablishing itself and this authority was to be that of the king. Legend has admirably preserved the need of this time and the change which took place. Louis XIV did not actually enter parliament whip in hand nor did he utter the words, "I am the State." This, however, was the significance of his warning to the magistrates, demoralized by their disobedience, when having learned that they were refusing to register the edicts presented by him that day, he returned in haste from the chase and addressed them in no uncertain terms. But the words "I am the State" expressed rather a situation that was in process of becoming. It was not as yet an accomplished fact when the king was still but seventeen years old and Mazarin had to pacify the parliament always jealous of its own importance and angry at this affront.

The astonishing thing is, that in spite of her great weakness, France should have been able to continue her policy and bring to an end her war with Spain. It is true that tit for tat, Mazarin had supported the revolution of Portugal just as the Spaniards had aided the Fronde. Furthermore, the treaty of Westphalia favored France. There was no further anxiety about Germany. If Mazarin had not been able to prevent the election of Leopold of the Hapsburg family, after the death of Ferdinand, he formed an alliance with some dozen of the German princes, known by the name of the Rhine League, which was powerful enough to paralyze the empire. Finally, Mazarin sought the friendship of Cromwell, although France had given asylum to the Stuarts. After the execution of Charles I, uncle of Louis XIV, neither the French nor the Spanish

monarchy severed diplomatic relations because both of them desired the support of England. Such was the general indifference to ideals and forms of government that even republican Holland, for the sake of her maritime interests, entered into conflict with republican England. In the struggle between France and Spain, England, as in the preceding century, was the arbitrator. Cromwell took the side of France because he desired to ruin the Spanish sea power, and inaugurate a colonial policy. Colonial rivalries were beginning to exercise an influence in European politics.

The aid of the English, although very weak from a military point of view, turned the balance in favor of the French. The war with Spain, that war of more than twenty years, which was languishing, suddenly came to life, especially in Flanders. Turenne found himself face to face with Condé who was still in the Spanish camp, and defeated him in the dunes near Dunkirk. This was the end. The treaty of the Pyrenees was signed between France and Spain in 1659; and this peace, in so far as the difference in the situations permitted, was drawn up on the model of that of Westphalia. The French acquisitions were important: Roussillon and Cerdagne, a part of Artois, some strongholds in Flanders, Hainaut and Luxemburg. But in this policy of moderate progression which was the true Capetian tradition revived by Richelieu, the growth of security was equally important with the acquisition of territory. It was ever a question of hindering the union of Austria and Spain. In maneuvering for Louis XIV to marry the eldest of the infantas, Mazarin prevented the marriage of Maria Theresa with the Emperor Leopold, a marriage which would have brought back the old peril of Charles V. Leopold married another daughter of Philip IV, but he was no more than coheir to Spain with the King of France. Moreover, by a clause of the contract, Maria Theresa did not abandon her rights to the succession to the throne of Spain except in return for a "dot" or dowry, which was never to be paid. The pretensions of France in Flanders, which for the most part she had had to

renounce, therefore remained possible and she would be able, if the occasion presented itself—and it was to do so—to oppose the transfer to Austria of the Spanish succession. Thus eleven years after the treaty of Westphalia, that of the Pyrenees left France without any formidable enemy on the continent and through the elimination of the two dangers, Germany and Spain, she became what she had never been before, the first of the European powers.

It is as vain to deny the part Mazarin had in this success as to calculate it exactly. He continued Richelieu's policy under difficult conditions and this Sicilian was more conscientiously French than Turenne or Condé. The world has not forgiven him for loving money and for having filled his own pockets. He paid himself for the services which he rendered. We admit it was not delicate. In another way, however, some more honest but less adroit ministers have cost the country dearer.

In 1661 when Mazarin died and the king really entered into his majority, all things, both within and without, were favorable for a great reign. However, affairs in France were still far from perfect. As the preamble of an ordinance of the time said, disorder was "so universal and deep-seated that a remedy seemed almost impossible." In this disorder, although the feudal power was becoming weaker, the power of money was growing stronger. The financiers, farmers of the public revenues, skillful in attracting men of letters to their side and through them controlling public opinion, had become a disturbing element in the state. The trial of Fouquet was to be the act through which Louis XIV, at the beginning of his reign, was to establish his authority. For the king it was a question of governing in his own person, as the nation, which was tired of ministers, demanded. In foreign affairs, it was a question of preserving the progress already made—a thing as difficult as had been its attainment in the first place. In the end and in general, Louis was to prove himself equal to these tasks. And to explain his work, his policy, his temperament, his character, one word suffices and that is the word of the sagacious Sainte-

Beuve: "Louis XIV had only good sense, but he had a great deal of it." That is why the classic school, the school of reason which was developing at the moment when he became master, found its expression in him. One might say that in all domains the lesson of the Fronde was bearing fruit.

CHAPTER XIII

LOUIS XIV

THE long reign of Louis XIV, of more than half a century, which really began only at the death of Mazarin, has one dominant characteristic: there was complete tranquillity within the realm. From that time on until 1789, that is, for one hundred and thirty years, four generations, there was to be an end of those troubles, those seditions, those civil wars whose incessant return had wrought such desolation. This prolonged calm and the absence of invasions bear witness to what a high degree of civilization and of wealth France had attained. Order within, and security without; these are the ideal conditions of prosperity. France rewarded him whom she called the "Great Monarch" by a sort of admiration which lasted for a long time after his death. Voltaire, in his *Century of Louis XIV*, is in the same state of mind as the contemporaries of the years which followed 1660. He underlines as the fact which most impressed him and which really was the most impressive: "All was peaceful during his reign." The glory of Louis XIV was to illumine Louis XV. And it was not until still later, until after fifteen years of the reign of Louis XVI that the charm was broken and France entered a new cycle of revolutions.

Under Louis XIV, the king both reigned and governed. The monarchy had authority. That was what the French desired. Since they wished neither Leagues, nor Frondes, nor all-powerful ministers, the personal government of the king was the only solution. As soon as the idea of the new sovereign was understood, it became popular and was acclaimed. Hence the concert of praises that literature has passed on to us, that enthusiasm which sometimes astonishes us but which we are wrong in interpreting as flattery. As under Henry IV, France

expanded happily under this reaction. In every way, in all domains, she loved and exalted order and that which assured it—authority. From the comic poet, Molière, to the bishop, Bossuet, there was but one voice. It was thus that in the second part of the seventeenth century, monarchy came to have a prestige to which it had never before attained.

The originality of Louis XIV was that he thought out his situation and understood, as no one else did, the circumstances under which his reign had begun, which in France gave him unlimited credit. He has expressed it in his *Memoirs* for the instruction of the dauphin, in the words of a man who had seen much—the Fronde, the English, and the Dutch revolutions. There are periods when “extraordinary events” make the people realize the value of authority. “So long as everything prospers in a state, they may forget the great benefits that royalty bestows and envy only those which it possesses; man, naturally ambitious and proud, never understands in his own heart why another should govern him until his own need makes him feel it. But of this need even, as soon as he has a constant and regulated remedy, custom renders him unconscious.” Thus Louis foresaw that the movement which made the monarchy more powerful than it had ever before been, would not last forever, that the time would come when the need of liberty would be the stronger. Approved in 1661 for its benefits, authority would appear in 1789 as tyranny. By the end of his reign, Louis could see that France was growing weary of that which she herself had demanded and even hailed with enthusiasm and gratitude. He foresaw this fatigue, foretold the return swing of the pendulum and, in so far, was a better judge of men than those who assert that he gave monarchy its death-blow by concentrating the power in the hands of the king.

This reign of fifty-four years, so full of external events, counted within but two events of note: the condemnation of Fouquet and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. These two events were in perfect accord with the general sentiment and approved and even demanded by public opinion.

If there was one man more than another who seemed fitted to succeed Mazarin, it was the superintendent, Fouquet, richer and almost as powerful as the king himself. Fouquet had built up an immense fortune at the expense of the public finances, following the example of the Cardinal who at least had as an excuse for his thefts, the services which he rendered the nation. Louis XIV, immediately upon the death of Mazarin, took upon himself the direction of affairs of state, working with his ministers but delegating his authority to none. He feared the superintendent who had great financial means at his disposal, a numerous clientèle, a crowd of protégés and friends everywhere within and without the administration and in the world of letters and society. Furthermore, Fouquet, following a habit which dated back to the time of the civil wars, had acquired at Belle-Isle a refuge and stronghold where he could, in case of disgrace and misfortune, defy the government. It was this dangerous person, aspiring to the rank of prime minister, whom Louis wished to overthrow. His fall would be a sign that there would henceforth be no mayor of the palace, no grand vizier, and that no one would be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of disorders and the state treasury. The dissimulation and guile with which Louis proceeded before arresting the superintendent show that he feared him, and was not sure of success. Fouquet was broken more easily than was foreseen, and his fall was acclaimed by France as the fall of the power of money in the government. The example became famous and was salutary. From that time forward, Louis met with no opposition.

Twenty-five years later, the same motives—the fear of a great independent power within the state—led him and even drove him, to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. This affair cannot be separated from the other religious agitations of the time. What became, little by little, the persecution of the Protestants was closely allied with the conflicts with the papacy—conflicts which ended in the famous Declaration of Rights of the Gallican Church in 1682. By this the king took over the right to appoint bishops of the Church of France. The

Revocation took place in 1685. People were haunted by the memory of the Wars of Religion. Remembering the League, the authority of the Pope in matters outside of religion seemed to them a danger. Jansenism which had played a minor rôle in the Fronde was looked upon with disfavor. For the same reason, the dissent of the Protestants who, however, were living in peace, awoke constant apprehensions. It is an error to believe that the need of moral unity which led to the revocation was in essence only religious. It was first of all political. In this respect, England and the Protestant countries of the north, by suppressing the remains of Catholicism, by persecuting Catholics and depriving them of the right to hold public office, had set the example. The English had not forgotten the impression made by the Gunpowder Plot and regarded all papists as traitors and public enemies. For the French, still mindful of the "state within the state" and the siege of La Rochelle, Protestantism represented the possibility of a return of civil war and revolution. It is very remarkable that Bossuet should have carried on openly his controversies with the ministers of the reformed religion and the defense of the liberties of the Gallican church and that the quarrels of Louis XIV with Innocent XI should have coincided with the measures against the Protestants.

It was by the method of conversion that the government first attempted to bring back the Protestants. There were some famous converts, Turenne among others, which gave the impression that the zeal of the Protestants was dying and that heresy, having become "old-fashioned," was voluntarily disappearing, as Madame de Maintenon said, she herself having been converted. However, the resistance of the Reformed Church, especially in the thickly settled districts of the south, irritated those who were directing the conversions. Little by little, rougher methods were resorted to. The Protestants replied by emigrating. Others, in the Dauphiné and the Cévennes, old strongholds of the Reformation, took up arms. All France then saw red, and thought that there was to be a return to the desolations of the previous century and to plotting with the enemy, all

the more as France was then on the eve of the struggle with the League of Augsburg. She wished to compel by force what she had been unable to obtain by persuasion. This was the whole story of the revocation and the government was led to extremities that it had not foreseen and into embarrassments which Louis himself admitted when he declared that, if he had suppressed the liberty of worship for political reasons, he intended to respect liberty of conscience. Emigration deprived France of a great number of her most industrious citizens (the statistics vary from 150,000 to 400,000) and the government, which was soon forced to bring back the refugees, was more sensible of this loss than the public who would willingly have cried "good riddance." By a curious turn of events, these *émigrés*, welcomed in Protestant countries, especially in Prussia, helped to spread the French language and arts as well as a feeling of bitterness against their country which the enemies of France were not slow to exploit. It was only later that in France herself Louis XIV was blamed.

The condemnation of Fouquet and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes were the only internal affairs of importance in this reign. Nothing, therefore, disturbed the work of organization which Louis undertook with his ministers. He adhered to the rule which he had set for himself, never to delegate power to any one of them no matter how great they might be. Colbert, the disciple of Richelieu, trained by Mazarin and recommended by him to the king, had the duties of several of the most important ministries: those of finance, the navy, commerce, agriculture, public works, and the colonies. However, he never had the title or the function of prime minister any more than Louvois, the reorganizer of the army.

The Duke de Saint-Simon complains of this reign as that of the vile bourgeoisie. Under Louis XV, d'Argenson will say with the same disdain: "Satrapy of plebeians."

The direct collaborators of Louis XIV did in fact come from the middle classes, a matter in which this reign is not distinguished from other Capetian reigns. It is only that in the generation of 1660, a zeal, an enthusiasm, an ardor for work,

a taste for all that is ordered and great, is found in administration as in literature. The idea was plain to all. France had a firm and stable government. She occupied the first place in Europe since neither a divided Germany, nor a conquered Spain, nor an England weakened by revolutions was longer menacing her. However, France was not yet complete. She still needed Lille, Strasbourg, and Besançon, for example. It was the moment for rounding out her frontiers, for realizing her old aspirations. For this it was necessary that she should be strong in her own right and not merely through the weakness of others, a weakness which would not last for ever and which coalitions would remedy. It was, therefore, necessary to give the country means which it did not have and to restore to it what had been swallowed up in the disorders of the Fronde—her finances, her wealth, industry, a navy and army—all that had fallen into a state of disrepair. A few years of work and method sufficed to provide ships, regiments, resources of all sorts, even money, without which, as Colbert said, a state is not truly strong. The moment to pass to external action had arrived.

To understand intelligently the complex events which are to follow, we must imagine for ourselves Europe as she was at that time. The power which, until then, all the world had feared was Spain. Holland, who had freed herself from Spanish domination, looked with anxiety upon her presence in the rest of the Low Countries. As this proximity was equally painful to France, a Franco-Dutch alliance was easily and naturally formed. On the other hand, England and Holland, both maritime and commercial nations, were competing with each other and with Spain for the great colonial power of that period. As long as France had neither navy nor commerce, her relations with England and Holland were friendly and untroubled. But all this changed when, under the influence of Colbert, France became a commercial competitor and when the war of tariffs began. A still greater change took place and animosity arose when the Dutch, seeing the French army on its march to conquer Spanish Flanders, perceived that they would have as neigh-

bor the powerful French state which had now become for them much more formidable than a far-off Spain.

The completion of France, the realization of the great national design, so often compromised, so often hindered and pushed aside, and finally resumed by Richelieu, required, in order to succeed and not cost too dearly, that England should at least remain neutral. This was a difficult matter; it was neither in her tradition nor to her interests to see the French advancing in Flanders on the Ostend and Antwerp side, while the French flag was becoming more powerful on the sea. Two favorable circumstances permitted France to keep England for several years where she wanted her. First, the English-Dutch rivalry and finally the restoration of the Stuarts which had been accomplished by the aid of France. France controlled Charles II, whose throne was weak, by the aid which she gave him and by his fear of the remaining followers of Cromwell whom Louis XIV, in keeping with the frankness of the time, boasts of having supported at the same time that he was aiding the other faction, namely that of the king, which wished to lead England back to Catholicism. The French situation was good and successes were easy as long as this combination held, as long as England, weakened by her internal struggles, was subject to French interests and misunderstood her own. Difficulties began the day when England and Holland united and William of Orange, having overturned the Dutch Republic, was also to overturn the Stuarts, take the throne of his father-in-law, James II, and become king of England in 1689. After this revolution, the fortune of Louis XIV was to change. England was to become his principal enemy, the soul of the coalitions which were to oppose the development of France by sea and on the continent. It is easy to understand why Louis XIV should have become interested in the cause of the Stuarts when his mother and Mazarin had been indifferent to the death of Charles I. Louis' one desire, therefore, was to neutralize England's power. This policy, which succeeded for twenty-five years, permitted him to follow up the work of Richelieu, to efface the more serious effects of the marriage of Maximilian

and Mary of Burgundy, and to give to France the territories and the protection which she sorely needed on the north and east. After that, Louis' task was to defend his conquests. One might say that his reign had two distinct parts, that there were two sides to the shield: before and after the fall of James II.

These brief explanations permit us more easily to follow the course of events from the time of the wars which had the acquisition of Flanders as their object up to the time of the question of the Spanish succession, which occupied the end of the reign. If we accuse Louis XIV of ambition, of love of conquest, then we must accuse the first Capetians of ambition because they wished to advance beyond Dreux and Etampes. As the essential object was to protect France against invasion, to give her a firm frontier, it was as reasonable to have Mons, Namur, and Maëstricht as the strongholds of the Scheldt and the Sambre, Valenciennes or Maubeuge, which protect the valley of the Oise. What are called conquests of Louis started from a strategic plan for national security. They were in harmony with the system of Vauban and were, so to speak, dictated by him. We are no longer astonished that countries of the Flemish tongue should be incorporated in France. It is thus that she has kept Hazebrouck and Cassel. It was a question, said Auguste Longnon, of "closing the entire Low Country comprised between the sea and the Lys." The invasion of 1914, the battles of Charleroi and of the Yser make the reasons for this clearer. The real conqueror, then, was Vauban, who pointed out the places and the lines where France could be most easily defended. It was by a method of trial and error, after resistance conquered or recognized as insurmountable, that the French frontiers on the north and the northeast were fixed where they are to-day.

By the time of the death of the Spanish king, the reforms of Colbert had borne their fruit; the finances of France were on a sound basis and she had an army—the two necessary foundations of her policy. The moment had come to think of external action and the pretext was ready at hand: the dowry of Maria Theresa had never been paid. The renunciation con-

ditional upon its payment was therefore nul and void and Louis XIV demanded the inheritance of his father-in-law. All this proceeding had been planned in advance. From the military as well as the diplomatic point of view, the affair had long been in preparation since, although the King of Spain died in 1665, Turenne did not begin the campaign until two years later. It was conducted, moreover, with such extreme prudence that the outer world marveled at the "lack of boldness" of the French. In the meantime, Spain was incapable of defending her provinces which were so far removed.

In 1667, the French army entered Flanders as it had planned, and the following year proceeded into Franche-Comté, all with such precaution that one would have thought that Spain was still formidable. We must admit that this moderation, planned so as not to arouse either England or Holland, served no purpose and is perhaps what in the end left Louis less considerate of European opinion. Turenne had not even dared to proceed as far as Brussels. In the meantime, because the French had taken some Flemish strongholds, the Dutch, allies of the French up to this time, thought themselves lost and stirred up Europe against the King of France whom they accused of aspiring to a "universal monarchy." French diplomacy, skillfully conducted by Hugh de Lionne, proceeded with caution. The new king of Spain, Charles II, was weakly. It was probable that he would leave no children and that the inheritance would be claimed by the husbands of his two sisters; one had married a Bourbon, the other a Hapsburg. If the Emperor Leopold was not for the moment a dangerous competitor, he might become so; thus the question of the Spanish succession was already absorbing. A treaty providing for the eventual division of the kingdom was signed with Leopold in order to forestall these future difficulties and to reassure France on the subject of the Spanish possessions. These were crowding in upon her, and shutting her out from her natural frontiers, a stretch of country much more extended than the modest conquests of the recent campaign.

Informed of this transaction, Holland made Louis an offer

on the basis of his conquests. To accept this and to keep the friendship of Holland, Louis would have had to abandon the treaty of partition and tie his own hands for the future and France would have had to renounce the idea of rounding out her frontiers. The wise Lionne himself advised him not to sign such a contract, which would destroy the transaction concluded with the emperor and which would have profited only the house of Austria. Holland, as though she had only waited for this pretext, then became reconciled with England and even attempted to draw Sweden, France's old ally, into a coalition against her.

In the midst of these events, the French army had taken possession of Franche-Comté almost without striking a blow. Louis XIV did not wish to go too fast and, greatly to the discontent of his generals, preferred to risk nothing. The opposition which he had encountered in Europe, this attempt at a triple alliance of Holland, England and Sweden, which he had not expected, made him cautious. He hastened in 1668 to sign the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle with Spain, to whom he restored Franche-Comté, keeping only what he had taken in Flanders. Lille and Douai were not unimportant acquisitions. Vauban immediately fortified these new strongholds, thus giving them their significance as bulwarks against invasion on France's most vulnerable side.

Historians have claimed that in 1668 France could, with one blow, have extended her conquests as far as Antwerp, thus crushing the future Belgium in the egg. Louis XIV reasoned better than they. He knew that England had given up Calais against her will and barely tolerated the French occupation of Dunkirk. The taking of Antwerp would certainly have meant war; and French policy demanded that England should remain neutral if France was to carry out Vauban's plan for national security. The French of this period were not dreamers, their imagination was practical. They cared less for enlarging their country than for protecting it. Lille seemed to them an especially good protection. In every town taken, Vauban dug ditches, constructed screen fortifications and half-moons and

these works of his have always been of service to France whenever she has been attacked. It is easy to understand that Louis XIV should have listened half-heartedly to Leibnitz who counseled him to leave his paltry towns on the Meuse and the Scheldt to conquer Egypt and India. Historians have even written disdainfully of the policy of Louis as commonplace. They mean to imply that in spite of the ample style of the century and the majestic manner in which he talked of his glory, his policy was that of the bumpkin who preferred good soup to fine language.

The first great political and military operation which Louis XIV undertook had in it the germ of the rest. The result of this first experience was his conviction that, in order to secure France on the north, he must settle with the Dutch. To do this, it was first necessary to dissolve their alliances. Negotiations were again taken up with Charles II of England. France outbid Holland for Swedish support; a great number of the German princes were won over by subsidies and the French had a strong ally in the Elector of Cologne. In this way, it was possible in 1672 for a powerful French army to invade Holland. This campaign whose beginning augured an easy conquest became in reality a war which lasted six years.

It might perhaps have been ended in a few weeks if, through an excess of prudence, the French had not arrived too late at Muyden where the principal dikes were. The Dutch inundated the country to save themselves and to put Amsterdam out of reach. They did more; they overturned the bourgeois republic which was partially friendly to France, in order to give the stadtholderate, in other words the monarchy, to William of Orange, the inveterate enemy of the French. The course of events was entirely changed by the resistance of this little nation which passed from a republican to a monarchical and military régime. France was held in check. William of Orange bestirred himself everywhere to raise up enemies against her. He incited Protestant England against Charles II; he allied himself with the Elector of Brandenburg—the Prussia of to-morrow—with the emperor, even with Spain, with every one who had a grievance against France and who would willingly

have destroyed the treaties of Westphalia and of the Pyrenees. Thus was formed a first coalition, weak and tottering, to be sure, which France combated victoriously and without much difficulty. The abstention of England relieved France of danger by sea and on the continent it was a simple matter to set Sweden and Poland against Brandenburg, the Hungarians against the emperor, and to encourage insurrections against the King of Spain. Some of the German states, like Bavaria, moreover, remained faithful to France and others became her allies either through fear of the Hapsburgs or for a money consideration.

It is nevertheless true that the situation was completely reversed. France was now forced to the defensive. At one moment Alsace, which the emperor dreamed of reclaiming, was invaded and it was there that Turenne was killed. But France was strong on land and on sea and she was rich. Her army progressed slowly but surely in Flanders which remained her main objective. Her navy, the work of Colbert, became war proficient and the illustrious Ruyter was defeated by Duquesne. In spite of the obstinacy of the stadtholder, the Dutch were growing tired of the war, they were becoming fearful and the friends of France in the republican party were asking for peace. Louis XIV also was ready to stop. He was keeping his eye on England, which was getting beyond his control; Charles II yielding little by little to public opinion had just given his niece, Mary, in marriage to William of Orange. Finally peace was signed at Nimwegen in 1678 and Louis was able to impose his own conditions; conditions which were always inspired by the same principle of the acquisition of the territory necessary to safeguard the frontiers of France. Those strongholds which were too far advanced, such as Ghent, Charleroi, and Courtrai were returned to Spain. But he kept Valenciennes, Cambrai, Saint-Omer and Maubeuge, that is, half of Flanders, besides Franche-Comté which protected France on the east. She thus assumed her modern aspect and dimensions. Other stipulations of the treaty imposed upon the emperor, prepared for the annexation of the duchy of Lorraine. Still others, placing the left bank of the Rhine under the control of France, protected

her from invasion on this very vulnerable side. All this was in conformity with a system of foresight and prudence to which posterity has rendered scant justice.

Her frontiers, that iron belt around France, were at the same time enlarged and strengthened and this result was attained, thanks to the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees which had freed France from the pressure of Germany and Spain; thanks also, and one cannot insist too strongly on this point, to circumstances encouraged and exploited by French diplomacy which kept England out of the struggle. If England had turned against France a little sooner, it is not certain that the undertaking in Flanders would have succeeded any better than the one under the Valois. But we are approaching the moment when England was to assert herself and oppose the French policy and was, through her leadership, to make the coalitions of the future formidable. France was about to enter upon a period of difficulty and danger, a new Hundred Years' War, as it were, which, like the other, was not to be continuous but was to end only in the nineteenth century at Waterloo.

There was in the meantime, however, a respite, during which the French state, having dictated her conditions at Nimwegen, seemed to be at the height of her power. Louis XIV profited by this to fill up certain gaps, to suppress the annoying and dangerous enclaves which existed in the midst of the new possessions. The method adopted was to proclaim them incorporated in the realm, by means of "*arrêts de justice*," judicial decrees, founded upon the interpretation of the existing treaties and supported at need by military force. It was thus that Louis proceeded in Franche-Comté and in Alsace and Lorraine. It was thus that in 1681 Strasbourg became French in government before she became so at heart.

These annexations, in time of peace, by a method very economical for France, and which were very justly called "re-unions," caused much discontent in Europe. They disturbed Germany. But neither the emperor, menaced by the Turks under the very walls of Vienna, nor the peaceful Dutch bourgeoisie who had returned to their business, were in any condition or

humor to undertake a war to oppose France. England was still neutral; French diplomacy kept the German princes from interfering and by the truce of Ratisbon the "reunions" were provisionally accepted by Europe. It was a success but a precarious one. The danger of a coalition had appeared and it was discovered that Europe would not submit to the undue aggrandizement of France and that, at the first opportunity, she would exert her power to force her back within her old limits. In this situation, diplomatic means were not neglected but they were of little avail. Louis XIV judged that the only way to do was to take a bold stand, because "if he should cease to inspire fear, all the powers would unite against him." This explains his action in several events which followed, as, for example, when he bombarded Genoa who had supplied Spain with ships. It is easy to criticize from a distance; at the moment it is not easy to decide which is the wiser course. Some say that Louis XIV provoked the coalition. Are we sure that he would not have encouraged it by giving an impression of fear and weakness? There was already a secret understanding between William of Orange and the Emperor Leopold. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes, coming just at this time, fed the propaganda against France in the Protestant countries. But the Protestants were not her only enemies. The emperor undertook to stir up the Catholic countries by accusing Louis of having allied himself with the Turks. The king even had a serious conflict with the Pope, Innocent XI. Avignon was seized and the Marquis of Lavardin having entered Rome with his soldiers, came very near imitating the experience of Nogaret, who had made Boniface VIII prisoner. In this respect there is a strange resemblance between this reign and that of Philip the Fair.

It was to combat the growing power of France that the League of Augsburg was formed (1686). At first, it was far from including all Germany or all Europe, but it was soon to be extended. The most serious event, however, was now about to take place; England was to join the enemies of France. The opposition to James II was growing and seven members of the

House of Lords took it upon themselves to offer the throne to William of Orange. When Louis offered to back James, he was disagreeably surprised to find himself repulsed by this Stuart who, through fear of being definitely compromised by this alliance, deprived himself of his only help. No longer able to count on James II, Louis decided to follow a *laissez faire* policy with the idea that the usurpation of William of Orange would bring a long civil war in its train and that it would disorganize both England and Holland. This calculation proved false. The Prince of Orange landed in England and dethroned his father-in-law without difficulty (1688). From that time forth, England was hostile to France and firmly united with Holland. The political situation in Europe was completely changed.

Louis, who had a presentiment of these events, did not wish to wait for them. Having assumed the attitude of a bold front, his plan was to use intimidation and precaution. Without declaring war, he announced that he was compelled to occupy the left bank of the Rhine and a part of the right bank, in order that the empire should not be able to use it as a military base against France. By devastating the Palatinate on the other side of the Rhine, Louvois was but brutally following the logic of Louis' conception of defense; in order to give himself a surer protection he put a desert between the empire and France. Louis criticized this violence which was contrary to the French policy of friendliness towards the Germanic populations. As a matter of fact, throughout the war which lasted from 1689 to 1697, this glacis was impassable in spite of the number of her enemies and the importance of the forces which attacked France. Furthermore, these preparations in the Rhine country were accompanied by extensive operations on other parts of the frontier. The policy of Louis XIV remained true to its main idea—to surround France with fortresses and trenches, to close up all gaps and bar all routes of invasion. That is why the king wished at the beginning of the campaign to seize Mons and Namur which protected the valley of the Oise. Unable to break down this impregnable system from the front, the enemy hoped to proceed through Switzerland. But the treaty of friendship

concluded with the Swiss cantons protected France on that side as well.

With the League of Augsburg compromising the empire, England, Holland, Savoy, and Spain, France had nearly all of Europe against her. The object of the coalition was to stop the expansion of France and drive her back to her old limits fixed by the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees. After this, these treaties themselves would have been assailed. In spite of eight years of campaigning in which both sides avoided any great decisive battles, the coalition (often disunited although William of Orange was its head) did not obtain the result it hoped for. Everywhere, on land, France successfully held her own. There was no fighting on French soil and she had been victorious at Steenkerke, Neerwinden, Staffarda and at Marsaglia.

The war would have ended entirely to the advantage of the French if they had been successful on the sea. However, the beginning of the naval campaign had been brilliant. The powerful fleet which Colbert had left did not fear the combined forces of the Dutch and the English. They landed freely in Ireland to support James II and even thought of landing in England. But the difficulty for France was to keep her supremacy both on the ocean and in the Mediterranean. At Paris there were two parties—one that believed in the importance of strength on the sea, and the other that believed only in continental supremacy. After the disaster of La Hogue, the “continentals” carried the day over the maritime party. This naval defeat was irremediable. It ruined the hope of reducing England by menacing her in her own territory, although the fleet was not destroyed. But confidence was lost. The public ceased to take interest in naval exploits. The expense which was entailed in maintaining a powerful navy served as a pretext. Colbert was dead, his work was not followed up and decadence set in. For a long time to come the French were to have no naval force capable of opposing the English who thus became masters of the sea.

The defeat of the French fleet in 1692 was far from ending

the war. It only deprived France of a complete victory. Tourville and Jean-Bart still dealt the English and Dutch admirals some hard blows. On land the coalition was weakening, but France, too, was growing weary. She had not been invaded either on the Rhine or on the side of the Alps or the Pyrenees, but she had suffered. Her immense effort had been costly. The resources created by Colbert had been consumed and Louis XIV saw with anxiety that the hour was approaching when the question of the Spanish Succession would again create a dangerous situation. He had sought for a long time to arrange a peace by compromise, which should be at once advantageous and honorable. This peace, the terms of which were moderate and carefully thought out, was that of Ryswick (1697). Although France restored much that she had taken, she kept Strasbourg. These restitutions were inspired principally by her desire to follow out her plan of keeping her frontiers strong. Vauban's plan had victoriously withstood the proof of war; but he was somewhat inclined to overextend his system. Louis thought that nothing would be lost by withdrawing a little. He has, none the less, been criticized for not having made better use of the victories of his generals, Luxemburg and Catinat. The military party complained bitterly of this peace, and Louis to whose name we to-day attach the ideas of excess and pride passed in his own day as having sacrificed, through timidity, the interests and the grandeur of France.

What cost Louis more than anything was recognizing William of Orange as King of England and renouncing the cause of the Stuarts. It meant that England was no longer under French influence. But a question of greater importance was now to demand great diplomacy on all sides. The event foreseen since the beginning of the reign, since the marriage with Maria Theresa, was approaching. The King of Spain, Charles II, brother-in-law of Louis XIV and of the Emperor Leopold, would die without children. According as Charles II left his succession to one or the other of his nephews, the fate of Europe would be changed. The danger for France was that the inheritance might revert to the Hapsburgs of Vienna, an event which

would have reconstituted the old empire of Charles V. But Charles II could not decide. Innumerable intrigues were started concerning his will. Louis XIV also thought, and rightly, that even if a Bourbon were chosen, he could not enter into his great inheritance without trouble and even war. This inheritance would include Spain, Belgian Flanders, a great part of Italy, Mexico, and almost all of South America. He realized now that in all his projects for the future he would have to reckon with the maritime powers. Moreover, it was evident that England coveted the colonies of Spain. Louis, therefore, preferred to negotiate a treaty of partition in regard to the Spanish succession and for nearly three years the map of Europe was made and remade in order to give satisfaction to all the competitors, Hapsburgs and Bourbons, Bavaria and Savoy. The plans of Louis were, as usual, founded upon the basis of the French frontiers and it was in Lorraine, in the Alps, and at Nice that he sought his compensations for abandoning the Spanish inheritance.

The first attempt at partition was rendered void by the death of the Elector of Bavaria. In order to arouse no anxiety on the part of any of the powers, Spain had been attributed to him. Now all had to be done over again. William of Orange did not enter wholeheartedly into any of these negotiations because a peaceful solution would take away England's hope of enriching herself through the spoils of Spain overseas. The Emperor Leopold who was working to turn the will in favor of his own family was slow in giving his consent and there were also the Spaniards themselves to be considered who did not wish their state to be dismembered. A decision was finally forced upon the vacillating Charles II who was unwilling to consider the possibility of his own death, by the Spanish patriots who designated the second grandson of Louis XIV, the Duke of Anjou as the heir. To them a prince of the powerful house of Bourbon seemed more likely than any other to maintain the independence and integrity of Spain.

Few deliberations were more serious than those in which Louis XIV, with his council, weighed the reasons for and

against accepting the testament of Charles II who died in 1700. To accept was to run the risk of a war with the emperor at least, and very probably with England, whose government was only waiting for a pretext in order then to seize the colonial part of the Spanish inheritance. No matter what precautions were taken war was, therefore, inevitable. On the other hand, to hold to the treaty of partition was to open the way for the emperor to claim the whole inheritance because partition was excluded by the will. Thus, according to the saying of Chancellor Pontchartrain, whom Saint-Simon quotes, "It was within the choice of the king to allow the house of Austria to branch out a second time into something far less powerful than it had been ever since the time of Philip II. This was the capital consideration and decided Louis to accept the will of Charles. One of the ministers present at the conference was, however, of the opinion that France would gain little by installing a Bourbon in Madrid, "whose next generation at the latest, having become Spanish by interest, would show itself as jealous of the power of France as the Austrian kings of Spain had done." Indeed it is true that the Duke of Anjou very quickly became Spanish at heart. But the great point gained was not only that there would be a dynasty of French origin at Madrid. It was that there would no longer be a bond between Spain and the Germanic Empire and that France would no longer be taken from behind.

The famous diplomatic boast, "There are no longer any Pyrenees," expressed this great result—the end of an anxiety and a danger which had long weighed upon France. In what followed, France had reason to congratulate herself on having removed Spain from German influence.

From the moment that a grandson of Louis XIV succeeded Charles II, under the name of Philip V, it was inevitable that there should be violent opposition in Europe. That of the disappointed emperor was immediate. As for William of Orange, he had already made his decision, but he had to reckon with the English parliament and with the Dutch States General, both equally weary of war. It might perhaps have been pos-

sible for Louis to avoid a conflict. He has been criticized for having given William III the pretext that he was seeking to excite public opinion in England and the Low Countries. From the nature of the situation, Louis knew there would be hostility and the measures of precaution which he took were immediately interpreted as provocations. With his grandson as King of Spain, he had free access to Antwerp and Ostend and this was just what England would not stand. Neither would she suffer that, through his association with Spain, Louis should dominate the Mediterranean and perhaps make of France the first of the colonial and maritime powers. The House of Commons did not hesitate after it once understood, according to the expression of one historian, that it was to be a "commercial war," the stake of which was to be the commerce of the rich Spanish colonies. As in all the great wars, economic considerations were combined with politics.

William III died before he could declare war, but it was none the less inevitable. The situation was stronger than the men who thought they were controlling it. It may occur to some that Louis could have reassured the anxious powers by declaring definitively that France and Spain would not be consolidated. But the emperor had already taken up arms to reclaim what he called his rightful inheritance and Spain was so weak, so incapable of defending herself (without considering the internal unrest attendant upon a change of dynasty) that France was forced to support her by putting her generals, her armies, and her resources at the disposal of Philip V. Under these conditions, it was easy for the enemies of France to pretend that the French and Spanish states were now one and the same, and the accusations of imperialism redoubled.

Louis XIV, foreseeing that the struggle would be difficult, fortified himself by alliances with the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, with the Duke of Savoy, and with Portugal. The tactics of the coalition were to win away these allies or to render them powerless. The Duke of Savoy, an adept at changing his policies to his own advantage, deserted first. The English imposed upon Portugal the treaty of Lord Methuen by which that

country was, for the future, to become one of their protectorates. They further profited by these circumstances to install themselves at Gibraltar where they have since remained, and at Port-Mahon. England served her own cause and assured her mastery of the sea while pretending to fight for the liberty of Europe. Furthermore both on sea and land she conducted the war with more and more vigor, kept the coalition together in spite of difficulty, was lavish with subsidies to the emperor, and recognized as King of Spain, the Archduke Charles whom her fleet landed in Catalonia. Marlborough and Prince Eugene were formidable enemies, the French generals were less efficient and less fortunate; the French navy, neglected since the battle of La Hogue, was reduced to pirate warfare. After the defeat of the Franco-Bavarian army at Höchstädt, Bavaria was forced to submit, and Germany was lost for the French. Milan and Belgian Flanders were next reduced. In 1706 after four years of war, the French armies were driven back upon their own frontiers, which had to be defended, at the same time that France was forced to help Spain which was being invaded. It was an enormous effort which drained her strength and she barely succeeded in keeping the enemy on the frontiers prepared by Vauban. Matters were becoming worse and worse; France's own territory was being invaded and the taking of Lille was felt to be a terrible calamity. At the end of the year 1708, the Coalition believed that France was doomed. Louis XIV had attempted, early in the crisis, to open negotiations fearing that the results attained in the first part of his reign might be compromised. This was, at bottom, what the Coalition wanted. To each of his offers they replied by heavier demands. The emperor at first had demanded Strasbourg and then all of Alsace. Louis would have gone so far as to abandon Philip V; the powers wished him to go further and promise to take up arms against his grandson and oblige him to leave Spain to the Archduke Charles. Even at this price, France would have obtained only a suspension of hostilities for two months, "a miserable and uncertain truce."

It was evident that the intention was to ruin and dismember

the country. France had to fight to the end, no matter how great the need and desire for peace. To carry on the war, she had to explain to her people that her enemies were forcing her to continue. Louis XIV was advised to call the States General, but he did not wish to resort to this dangerous expedient. He preferred to write a letter—to-day we would call it a message—which was read throughout the realm and the French responded with a new enthusiasm. The faculty of rising to an emergency, which is a national characteristic, was shown at this moment. Recriminations and people crying for reforms, to whom the reverses gave an opportunity to complain of the régime, were of course not lacking.

Louis' resistance was not in vain, for the enemies of France were in their turn growing weary. In fact, except in the north, France was not invaded and, on her lines of defense, was giving way only foot by foot. The day of Malplaquet in 1709, that dreadful year, was again unfortunate for France, but it was terribly costly for the enemies. Negotiations were reopened with a stronger desire on the part of the English to end the struggle. They were weary of supporting a continental war by subsidies first to one ally and then to another. The Tories, the conservative party, came into power and were less favorable to France than the Whigs or liberals had been. They thought that the time had come for England to consolidate her colonial and maritime advantages which the war had brought her. Furthermore, an unforeseen event had occurred in Europe; through the unexpected death of the Emperor Joseph, the Archduke Charles had inherited the Austrian crown. By continuing the war at her own expense to give him Spain, England would have been working to establish the empire of Charles V, which was no longer a metaphor but a reality. Were not the conditions which Louis was willing to accept, namely, the separation of the two monarchies, France and Spain, preferable? It appeared in the end that Louis XIV, by accepting the succession, had saved Europe from danger and had fought for that European balance of power whose doctrine, although less clear to the English than to the French, was better understood by the Tory party. The

debate over these new ideas was brought to a head in London by a rising in Spain in favor of Philip V and by the Franco-Spanish victory at Villaviciosa. From then on, the negotiations advanced and a Franco-English armistice was concluded in 1711. The Dutch and the imperialists remained hostile, but deprived of their chief support. For France the peace was opportune. The stronghold of Landrecies was giving way and the last lines of the "artificial frontier," which had enabled her to stem the tide of invasion, were yielding in their turn. The Dutch and the imperialists were calling their gains, the "way to Paris." Villars succeeded in stopping the enemies and defeating them at Denain. Then, taking the offensive, he delivered the places in the north which had already fallen into their hands. The treaty of Utrecht (1713) was signed soon after.

Shorn of useless detail and of praise, as superfluous as blame, the history of Louis XIV comes down to this: the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees having proved so profitable for France, all one part of Europe had leagued together to destroy these results. At the end of this long struggle, a sort of balance was reëstablished. France had lost on the sea. On the continent, she had kept the frontiers, slightly extended at some points, (she kept Landau, for example, which she has to-day), except the duchy of Lorraine which was not then united with the realm, although under its control. But she was driven out of Belgian Flanders. In that particular case the will of England prevailed. The principal clause of the treaty of Utrecht was that which took Belgium away from Spain in order to give it to the emperor under the guise of a compensation. There was no more to be a French Belgium than a Spanish Belgium under a prince of French origin; this had been the deepest motive of England's opposition to Philip V. If the house of Austria received the Low Countries it was only on condition that it could never dispose of them to any one; and by any one was meant France. Holland having become through William of Orange simply an annex of England, was charged with the duty of watching over the execution of this essential clause and had

the right to keep a garrison in a certain number of Belgium strongholds. The treaty, called that of the "Barrier" (the barrier was against France), constituted an Austro-Dutch condominium quite similar to the neutrality under which Belgium exists in our own day. In demanding that the port of Dunkirk should be destroyed and its fortifications razed, England showed the importance she attached to disarming France on the side facing her and to keeping her separated from Antwerp. The question of Belgian Flanders so long contested between France and England is one of the keys to French history.

This was not all that England obtained. She had her share of the succession of Charles II of Spain. Mistress of the seas, she was to be that of the colonies also. In North America where France had had a foothold from the time of Henry IV, some of the lands inhabited by the French, such as Newfoundland and Acadia, were lost and Canada threatened. In South America the trade privilege taken from Spain was given to England to whom the maritime and colonial supremacy reverted. Even Holland herself, a mere "skiff in England's wake," no longer counted.

In comparison with these, the other conditions of the treaty of Utrecht and those which completed it are only secondary. The formal separation of the crowns of France and of Spain and Philip V's renunciation of his rights as a French prince go without saying. Other conditions of the treaty were to have great consequences which did not at first appear. In order to obtain a lasting peace through a sort of balance, an attempt which the European congresses begin over again at least once every hundred years, they proceeded to numerous exchanges of territory. The physiognomy of Europe was transformed by them.

The emperor, in compensation for the loss of the crown of Spain, received, besides the Low Countries, the important concessions of Lombardy, Tuscany, and the Kingdom of Naples. Through these acquisitions, the center of gravity of Austria was suddenly moved towards Italy and the east, and removed

from the "Germanic body." The possessions of the emperor were from that time widely separated and difficult to defend. Weakened by this extension and powerless in Germany, the house of Austria ceased to be a danger for France. She became a conservative power in Europe like France herself, who had no desire to put again in question the results so painfully acquired. However, two states had emerged, two states with their futures to make. The Elector of Brandenburg had become king in Prussia and it was destined that the Hohenzollerns, the most active and the most ambitious of the German princes, should try to dominate Germany and build up for their own profit the German unity which the Hapsburgs had failed to compass. The Duke of Savoy was also given the title of king and his position was the same with regard to the future unity of Italy. It was a great change in the system of European forces. Louis XIV, nearing the end of his life, comprehended that the struggle against Austria had become an anachronism. In keeping with the true spirit of French policy, and the treaty of Westphalia, the duty of France for the future would be to keep watch of that state, whichever it might be, that would be capable of reducing the "liberties of the Germanic states," and to an experienced eye that state was Prussia. Such was the political testament of Louis XIV, who had recognized the new king at Berlin only after long resistance. But France was not to listen to Louis. It was his true glory to have understood that the rivalry between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons was at an end, that it was becoming an anachronism; and that continental upheavals would only injure France and profit England, to whom each European conflict would afford an opportunity to strengthen her maritime supremacy and enlarge her colonial empire. Austria had ceased to be dangerous; Prussia had not yet become so; while England, victorious on the sea, threatened to stifle France. To maintain her position on the continent, France had had to yield on that side and it was also on the sea that after many errors and unfortunate diversions she was one day to attempt to reëstablish herself. The thing that this long war had taught her was that she could not contend victoriously

with the English if her naval forces were not in condition to combat theirs.

France was exhausted when Louis XIV died in 1715. Once more she had paid dearly for the acquisition of her frontiers and her security. There were many, even among the French, who felt that she had paid too dearly. The suffering had been great. France had just managed to get through the year 1709 with its terrible winter and famine. There was much complaint and the people were singing almost revolutionary songs against the king and his family. Some of the women of Paris even set out to march upon Versailles to demand bread. The troops had to be called to stop them.

There were also some honest people and some "fine quixotic spirits" who were offering plans for reform. The death of the young Duke of Burgundy broke up a small group who had been inspired by Fénelon, Saint-Simon, and Boulainvilliers. They were forming plans for the return of an imaginary past, a kind of political romance which comes to partial expression in *Télémaque*. Contrary to the trend of French history they dreamed of a delightful harmony between a patriarchal royalty and a periodic States General where the nobility should again play its great rôle. This "neo-feudal" movement or "aristocratic reaction" is not negligible because it will reappear under the Regency, will tend to fuse with the theory of "checks and balances" of Montesquieu and will perpetuate itself in the royal family up to the time of Louis XVI who will have been brought up on these ideas.

At the same time, Vauban was recommending the "*dîme royale*," that is a tax of 10 per cent upon all incomes without exemption for any one. His system of a single tax, so often revived since his time, was childish, but at that time it was the form only that was condemned. As early as 1695 Louis XIV had created the head tax which affected every one except the king and the very small taxpayers, but it encountered vast opposition, so contrary was it to the general customs and interests. In 1710, the "tax of the tenth," which greatly resembled Vauban's "*dîme royale*," was instituted. Every one that could,

bought himself off from this tax either by installments or all at once—by contract or by a “free gift”—so great was the horror of regular taxes. This had already been the origin of many of the fiscal privileges; for it would be an error to suppose that the privileged classes under the old régime had been only the nobles and the clergy. These, moreover, had had certain obligations to fulfill in return for their immunity: the clergy, those of public assistance and of defraying the expenses of the church; the nobles of rendering military service. Among the “*privi-légiés*” or those who were exempt, were also certain bourgeois who had acquired public office, and the inhabitants of certain free towns or provinces; the latter were generally those lately acquired, which had their own charter, their States and their liberties and which the government thought best to handle carefully. Of these rights and privileges the parliaments, acting as the “intermediary body,” were the recognized defenders. When, after Louis XIV, the “sovereign courts” awoke from their long sleep, their resistance to the taxes was furious. From this situation, there will come under Louis XV those struggles between the government and the magistrates; the one attempting to restore the finances and the others opposing the taxes of the “tenths” and “twentieths.” The ideals in which Fénelon had educated the Duke of Burgundy were opposed to those of Vauban. It is important just here to note this essential contradiction in order to understand the character of the internal difficulties which will exist in France throughout the eighteenth century.

There were still other reasons that led Louis XIV, at the end of his reign, to believe that the disorders which had made the beginning of it so uncertain might possibly return. In his opinion, what was to be feared was another Fronde. A minority would come after him. His son and his grandson were dead. The heir was “a child of five years who may encounter many obstacles,” said the king on his deathbed. He also said, “I am going away, but the state will last forever.”

If Louis XIV did not found the state, he left it signally stronger. He had disciplined its turbulent elements. The

nobles no longer thought of new Leagues or new Frondes. For fifty years, the parliaments had neither repelled the edicts nor opposed the ministry or the government. There was but one authority in France. Contemporaries recognized perfectly that the strength of the French nation, which had enabled it to resist the assaults of Europe, sprang from this fact, while the King of England had had to reckon with the House of Commons, and the emperor with the Diet of Ratisbon and with the independence of the German princes guaranteed by the treaty of Westphalia.

All had not gone as well within the realm of France as Colbert had dreamed, whose vast projects of organization had been realized only in part because the great external tasks had prevented. At least, France had political harmony, without which she could not have resisted such powerful coalitions or settled so advantageously the questions of Germany and Spain. It has been said that Louis XIV left only the appearance of harmony, because, three-quarters of a century after his death, revolution broke out. The astonishing thing is that after the fifty-four years of calm of his reign, it should have lasted for sixty-five years longer. Modern history does not present so long a period of tranquillity. It was thus that France could pass through a minority and a regency which justified only in part the anxiety of the old king who lay dying.

We have so far passed over the domain of literature and anecdote which belongs to this century. Nevertheless, Louis XIV had his legend, inseparable from his history and that of France. Versailles, the court, the mistresses of the king, the appealing La Vallière, the haughty Montespan, the austere Maintenon who became his legitimate companion, are still an inexhaustible source for romance, the theatre, and for conversation. Turn by turn, if not both at once, the French have admired or blamed this royal life begun in success and glory, ended in family sorrows and reverses. They have not yet grown tired of repeating the details of it, divided between the respect and the envy which great names and great fortunes always inspire. Curiosity concerning this great reign has not been ex-

hausted even in our own day, so much does France owe to the century of Louis XIV, and so greatly has the imagination been impressed by this *roi-soleil*, this sun king. Versailles remains an historic monument not only for the French but for all Europe. This palace whose costly construction drew so many complaints from Colbert, and where Louis enjoyed himself all the more because the memories of the Fronde had left him bitter against Paris, is a place that millions of men have looked upon with admiration and which many have tried to imitate. Versailles symbolizes a civilization which for many years had been that of Europe, because the French were considerably in advance of other countries and France's political prestige had helped to spread her language and her art. Following generations will inherit the material and moral capital which was then amassed. The Revolution itself will inherit some of its ideas and will spread them over another Europe which a man of the eighteenth century, a stranger, the Italian Caraccioli, will call "French Europe."

CHAPTER XIV

THE REGENCY AND LOUIS XV

It has been repeatedly said, ever since the eighteenth century, that the Regency was "pernicious for the state." It was, in fact, for reasons which had less to do with the character of the regent than with the nature of the circumstances.

The great preoccupation of the monarchy was always to assure the succession to the throne, and Louis XIV, before his own death, had witnessed that of his oldest son, the dauphin, and his two grandsons, the Dukes of Burgundy and of Berry, while the Duke of Anjou, King of Spain, by accepting a foreign throne had lost his rights. The heir was still but an infant who for a long time would have no descendants. The first prince of the blood, the natural regent, was the Duke of Orléans against whom Louis XIV entertained an antipathy because of his intrigues in Spain against Philip V and, above all, because of the distrust which the members of this royal family inspired in him through the memory of their old seditions. It is worth remarking that Louis XV and Louis XVI, by a regular system, shoved the princes aside from all the important offices.

Louis XIV, indeed, had every reason not to like his nephew whose reputation was not good and who passed for a rebel—to-day we would say a progressive. Furthermore, the ranks of the house of France were much thinned out, and Louis would have to look to distant collaterals to fill the regency. Hence came the idea which he put into execution in 1714 and 1715 without any one's daring to interfere, of reënforcing his own family. The two sons whom he had had by Madame de Montespan, the Duke of Maine and the Count of Toulouse, were declared legitimate and rightful heirs in case of the death of the young prince. Parliament dutifully registered the edicts. By

his will Louis XIV instituted a Council of Regency of three members of which the Duke of Orléans would be only the president, the other two members being his legitimatized sons.

This was the initial cause of the difficulties and scandals which were to follow. The Duke of Orléans worked incessantly to oust the Duke of Maine and Count of Toulouse, possible contestants for the throne. That was not all. He was also afraid of Philip V who persisted in claiming his rights and who, in case the young Louis XV should die, might be able to make them prevail. This complicated situation was to weigh heavily for several years in all French politics. In wishing to limit the authority of the regent, Louis XIV had driven him to exert all his force to strengthen it.

The first care of Philip of Orléans was to set aside Louis' will and to rid himself of the Council of Regency. He asked parliament to render him this service. The chief magistrates perceived here the possibility of assuming a political rôle which they had lost for over fifty years and which they had not hoped to regain. They remembered on this occasion that in the time of the League, parliament had saved the monarchy by opposing the Spanish candidacy. They adopted the maxim that parliament is feeble when the king is strong and strong when the king is weak. Flattered, they accorded Philip the powers of a veritable regent and the testament of Louis XIV remained a dead letter. In exchange, the right of parliament to remonstrate was recognized, and it was not slow to abuse this power which had been restored to it.

This change was not wise, since the government in seeking to fortify itself on one side had weakened itself on the other. But this was not the only price that the Duke of Orléans paid for the regency. He sought popularity because he feared rivals. Having friends to reward and partisans to gain, he created seven councils consisting of ten members each. These councils corresponded to what had been the different ministries. In other words, the secretaries of the state were replaced by small assemblies, according to a system which Saint-Simon recommended and which had been promulgated some years before by a group

headed by the Duke of Burgundy under the influence of Fénelon. The regent even ordered that *Télémaque* should be printed, to show that he intended to be guided by reformers like its author, Fénelon, who had appeared at the end of the last reign, and to inaugurate a liberal government of a new kind, a strange mixture of feudalism and liberalism, an imitation of England and of the old Merovingians. Other measures were taken; notably the abolition of the restrictions against the Jansenists whom Louis XIV had never forgiven for having participated in the Fronde. It was a policy contrary in every way to the policy of the late king, and was easily imposed because every one was tired of the austerity with which the court of Versailles had ended by surrounding itself. The Regency was a reaction against the piety of Louis, the confessors and the Jesuits; and the Duke of Orléans, an agreeable and generous man withal, became the idol of a great part of the public up to the day when exaggeration and injustice began to paint him as a monster of debauch.¹

The drawback to the councils, to this government with so many heads, was not slow to be felt, and they were suppressed. It is none the less true that these changes—these pretended reforms so suddenly annulled, this return of parliament to political activity and finally the stroke by which, in 1718, the regent, still with the aid of the chief magistrates, took away from the legitimatized sons of Louis XIV the right to be called princes of the blood, shattered the monarchical system as Louis XIV had devised it.

The confusion in the foreign policy was perhaps even worse. The ideas and the testament of Louis XIV were no more respected than had been his family arrangements. In the face of England, which had been rendered very powerful by the treaty of Utrecht, France undoubtedly needed to keep peace; but she had also to look out for her independence and her future. Spain and Austria, who no longer threatened her, could

¹ In this respect impartial historians will recognize that they were very near the truth. The reputation that France has received for licentiousness springs very largely from the notorious debauchery which characterized the life of Philip of Orleans.

unite with her in a system of maritime and colonial equilibrium. There were still the remains of a Spanish navy and the emperor was going to try to create one in the Low Countries, through the Ostend Company. These possibilities did not escape the notice of England; and in order to destroy them, she put in play what means circumstances offered. Her attempt was to frighten the regent by a threat of war which she had no intention of carrying out, and then to guarantee him not only the government but the succession, which, in case the young king should disappear, would be disputed by Philip V. Duclos affirms that a year before the death of Louis XIV, Stair, the English ambassador, had held secret conferences with the Duke of Orléans. "He persuaded this prince that King George and he had the same interests. The better to gain his confidence, he admitted that George was an usurper with respect to the Stuarts; but he added that if the feeble scion of the French royal family should fail, all the renunciations of other members of the house would not prevent him, the Duke of Orléans, from being considered a usurper with regard to the King of Spain. 'He could not therefore,' Stair had said, 'have a surer ally than King George.'"

Such was the secret reason for the Anglo-French-Dutch alliance, for the pact by which the regent and his minister, Dubois, bound themselves, even delivered themselves, to England. The avowed motive, by which historians have allowed themselves to be deceived, was to guarantee the peace of Utrecht, which had no need of being guaranteed. The regent and Dubois abandoned themselves to the English who led them straight into war with Spain, at whose side France had just fought against England in order to establish a Bourbon on the Spanish throne. That Philip V may have been at fault in meddling with French affairs and in insisting upon asserting his rights in case of the death of Louis XV, is undoubtedly true. But the "conspiracy" of his ambassador, Cellamare, with the Duchess of Maine has been much exaggerated and this intrigue, rather worldly than political, served only as a pretext for the war with Spain (1718). The faults of Philip V do not excuse the fact that to

the sole profit of English politics, the regent destroyed France's natural system of alliances after the War of Succession. The pretensions of Philip V were platonic so long as the young king lived. It would have been easy to reassure England, since she was still alarmed about the reunion of the two crowns—or pretending to be alarmed. If the projects of Alberoni, minister of the King of Spain, with regard to Sicily were daring, they did not constitute a reason for aiding England to destroy the Spanish navy—a feat which Admiral Byng took upon himself. Neither was it a reason for invading Spain with a French army and destroying her arsenals and her ships that were in process of building, only to assure the naval supremacy of England. This war, of advantage to England alone, ended in the dismissal of Alberoni who had wished to reanimate the corpse of Spain, and in the renunciation by Philip, of his claims to Sicily as well as of his rights to the crown of France.

The useless war with Spain, which has even been called fratricide, had already stirred public opinion. Philip V had addressed a manifesto to the French people, which had not been without effect, in which he reminded them that he was the grandson of Louis XIV. At this time an event within France herself had even more serious consequences; it had its victims and its ruins and engendered a lasting discontent.

Law and his System have become famous. Every one knows of them, their history has come down through two centuries and we still speak of them as we do of the "assignats." It is an evidence of the profound impression made by this financial adventure. To understand how the regent was led to give his confidence and protection to the Scotchman, Law, the ingenious and bold banker, we must reckon with his desire to please. We have already seen that at the death of Louis XIV, the French finances, reëstablished by Colbert, had again relapsed into a critical state. It is monotonous to reiterate that great foreign enterprises, the acquisition or the defense of territory, have, in all epochs, consumed enormous capital and left difficult financial questions to be solved. To find resources and to reëstablish the equilibrium by ordinary means, it was necessary to ask sacri-

fices of the taxpayers, to suppress privileges, no matter what their origin, to make everybody pay, and pay a great deal, to oblige those who had enriched themselves through the war to give up a part of their gains, and to reduce the rate of interest and the pensions. It was this that the Duke de Noailles honestly attempted to do, at the same time taking care to avoid the bankruptcy which certain people, like Saint-Simon, advised. For the success of these measures, and these reforms, what was needed was what Michelet called "a strong government, firmly seated." That of the regent was not of this sort. He feared everything. He had reëstablished in all their ancient power, the parliaments which were always hostile to taxes. To submit the great lords and persons of influence to the tax of the "tenth" might perhaps send them over to the party of Philip V, and the Dukes of Maine and Toulouse. To bleed the bourgeoisie, the people, was to create irritation and the regent needed popularity. He was conquered by the System of Law, very seductive in appearance, which consisted in creating, with the air of demanding nothing from any one, an artificial wealth and fictitious resources, by printing paper money.

Law's System still has defenders who assert, without proof, that he was ruined by the jealousy of the English, a thing which in any case would have, if true, accomplished the ruin of Dubois and the policy of complacency towards England. The fact is that after a brilliant period, a whipping up of commerce, industry, and colonization (the founding of the port of Lorient dates from this time), the collapse came. There had been some months of speculating in stocks, the memory of which has become legendary, where fortunes had been built in a day. Suddenly Law's scaffolding began to give. It was founded on the Company of the Indies, commonly called the Mississippi Company, whose shares served to guarantee the notes of Law's Bank, which had become the State Bank. The fall of the shares involved that of the notes, and vice versa; the whole system caved in. There were sudden ruins, and a vast displacement of fortunes, to say nothing of the loss of credit, and of public confidence; in short, it was a social smash-up which came just

at a time to aggravate the moral unsettling, the first traces of which were seen at the end of the reign of Louis XIV.

This change is plainly shown in the literature of the day. After the school of 1660, the school of order and authority, came the school of cynicism. It is very significant that the collapse of Law's System should have come in 1720 and the publication of Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*, the year following.

Contemporaries were astonished that a revolution did not break out. But a new Fronde was no longer possible. The state, as Louis XIV had formed it, was too well regulated, too well disciplined, too powerful. It would have been necessary to overturn the whole governmental machine, as was actually done towards the end of the century; but for the present no one was ready to go so far. The prestige of the monarchy, which had been raised to such a height, prevented it then and was to prevent it again later. There was every hope for the reign of Louis XV.

The king was fourteen years old, the age of legal majority, when Dubois, and then the regent, died within a few months of each other, in 1723. In the space of eight years, through the misfortune of their situation and the force of events rather than through evil intentions, they had committed some fatal errors. Above all they had lost sight of the situation of France in a transformed and complicated Europe where new elements were appearing and were tending to change the relation of forces. There was not only Prussia, but, with Peter the Great, Russia as well to be considered. The advance that France had made in the seventeenth century gave her a great prestige which she had to defend against England, who was bent, at that time, on economic prosperity and the conquest of markets and colonies. Never had the choice between land and sea, the problem as to what balance to keep between the complex interests in order to turn them to the good of the country, demanded such close attention as after the treaty of Utrecht. Through the initiative of enterprising Frenchmen, which Henry IV, Richelieu, and Colbert had successively approved, the French had

laid the basis of a colonial empire which was to excite the jealousy of England and interfere with her development as much as the Spanish colonial empire had done. The French possessions comprised almost all of North America, from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, the finest of the Antilles, some settlements in Africa and in India, possible forerunners of vast establishments. At all of these points France had preceded the English who had been distracted during the greater part of the seventeenth century by revolutions, and France was standing as a barrier to their future. France should have expected their jealousy and their hostility. It was to their interest that she should engage in sterile enterprises in Europe and neglect her navy, for a country who neglects her navy does not long keep her colonies.

After the disaster of La Hogue the French public was disgusted with naval affairs. It was equally disgusted with colonial enterprises after the failure of Law's System, founded on the exploitation of the wealth overseas. No one has expressed this state of mind better than Voltaire in his disparaging remark about the "acres of snow in Canada." That was the way they pictured the American possessions. Public interest still centered about the old questions, although they had been successively regulated by the treaties of Westphalia, the Pyrenees and Utrecht. Mention of the struggle against the house of Austria was always sure to draw a response from the French. This struggle had no longer any cause for existence, but tradition was stronger than reason. There was a large and eloquent party for whom the enemy was still Austria, and any government which would combat the house of Hapsburg was sure of popularity. In this respect also, the Regency, in seeking the good graces of public opinion, for the reasons which we have noted before, added to the evils of the reign of Louis XV.

At the time when they died, both the regent and Cardinal Dubois had changed front. They had entered into a new triple alliance, Franco-English-Spanish, against the Emperor Charles VI, whom they wished to drive out of Italy in

order to install there the Spanish Bourbons. England took part in this undertaking, disregarding the treaty of Utrecht, in order to ruin the maritime enterprises of Charles VI at Ostend, at Trieste, and at Fiume. She had made a good bargain and had entered the alliance on the condition that France should give up her commerce in Spain. This policy followed England's plan of suppressing all naval and commercial rivals by exploiting the quarrels, ambitions, and errors of the other European powers. This project, arrested by the death of those in France who had conceived it, was not put into execution, but it nevertheless had consequences. In order to seal the reconciliation of the houses of France and Spain, Dubois and the regent had arranged a marriage between Louis XV and a five-year-old infanta. Whether or not it was intended, this would have retarded the time when the crown would have an heir. It is, therefore, difficult to blame the Duke of Bourbon on this point who, having become prime minister after the death of Dubois, undid what the latter had done and sent the young infanta back to Spain. This angered Philip V, who at once became reconciled with the emperor. But this reconciliation was more to the interest of the French than a war in which Spain and Austria, who were both useful to France, would have been exhausted and she with them, while England alone would profit thereby. It has been said that in arranging a modest marriage for Louis XV, by giving him as wife, Marie Leczinska, daughter of the dethroned king of Poland, the Duke of Bourbon and Madame de Prie intended to dominate the future queen. There is some truth in the imputation, but the choice was difficult since they had previously vainly demanded the hand of an English princess. Moreover, Marie Leczinska was twenty-two years old and would probably soon have children. This, by assuring the succession would abolish the intrigues which had troubled the minority of Louis XV, whose frail health aroused so many hopes and jealousies. It is only too certain in any case that the monarchy suffered a considerable deterioration under the Regency, owing largely to the fact that death had interrupted the natural order of succession and Louis XIV had left only a

great-grandson. But this deterioration may perhaps count among the distant causes of the Revolution.

Historians in general reproach Louis XV for his indolence and his apathy. It is true that he did not always impose his will even when he was in the right, and in this he showed good judgment. However, and this is where he differed from Louis XVI, he did not doubt his own authority and he showed it on several occasions. Historians seem to regret that he should not have controlled the government in as personal a manner as his great-grandfather had done. Perhaps they do not reflect that the circumstances in the midst of which Louis XV attained his majority were in no way similar to those existing in 1660. The desire for strong leadership which was then felt had ceased to exist. The critical spirit dominated everything. This period marks the beginning of the vogue for English institutions, developed by Montesquieu and Voltaire, and favored by the regent's attempt at reforms. The task of governing had become as difficult as it was clear and simple at the beginning of the reign of Louis XIV.

It was, however, by an act of authority that Louis XV began his reign at the age of sixteen, when he dismissed the Duke of Bourbon, much as Louis XIII had rid himself of the tutelage of Concini. The young king had given his confidence to his preceptor Fleury, Bishop of Fréjus. It was a happy choice: this wise old man directed affairs with prudence. For fifteen years France had an intelligent and economical administration which restored her finances and reëstablished prosperity in the kingdom—a proof that bankruptcy was not inevitable after the War of the Spanish Succession and the evils of Law's System.

After all her crises, France had only needed a few years of work and order to restore the country to ease and wealth. Her brilliant civilization of the eighteenth century could not be explained without this economic renaissance which was singularly aided by the bureaucratic traditions left by the preceding century. One is tempted to criticize the bureaucracy, yet it was at the time almost indispensable. Orry, whose name remains

obscure, was a worthy successor of Colbert in the management of the public funds. The famous d'Aguesseau continued the legislative work that Colbert had begun, and many of his ordinances have been reproduced in the Civil Code.

Applying himself to the rehabilitation of France, Fleury avoided external complications. He did not entertain any very great vision of European politics, but he had a keen sense for the useful and the necessary. The black cloud on the European horizon at that moment was the Austrian succession which presented itself in an entirely different light from that of Spain. The emperor, Charles VI, having only daughters, was very anxious to leave his hereditary states to the Archduchess Maria Theresa, and was attempting to have all the powers guarantee the provisions of his will, by signing the "Pragmatic Sanction." A large party in France claimed that the house of Austria was the enemy of the kingdom and that their country had no interest in helping to perpetuate it; they held rather that no opportunity should be lost to crush it. They were anti-Austrian in the name of tradition and the principles of Richelieu. Thus, over a question of foreign politics, arose a controversy which was to degenerate into a conflict and at a future date was to become fatal to the monarchy itself. Fleury contented himself with watching events and with baffling intrigues that might endanger peace. He also refused to sign the "Pragmatic Sanction" of Charles VI, in order to avoid internal difficulties, and thought to hold the emperor by the possible hope of his signature. But for all his prudence, Fleury, who was accused by public opinion of being pusillanimous, as Louis Philippe was to be a hundred years later, found himself compelled to intervene in 1733 when the independence of Poland was in danger. France has always needed an ally who could attack Germany from behind and Sweden, who had formerly fulfilled this function, was now unable to do so inasmuch as she was at grips with Russia which had recently come to the fore under Peter the Great. The appearance of the Russian power in the system of European politics is the cause of many of the upheavals from which France has had to suffer. The independence of Poland and

the Polish alliance were as much precepts of French politics at that time as they were later in 1918, and they caused her much embarrassment in the eighteenth century.

It was not, then, to sustain the father-in-law of Louis XV that Fleury intervened in favor of Stanislas for the throne of Poland, against the Elector of Saxony, but to sustain the independence of Poland, which was menaced both by the empire and by Russia, who wished to establish August III as king. Only, one can easily understand, it was not easy to defend Poland, caught between the Germans and the Russians, if she was not capable of helping herself. Plélo perished in a vain attempt to deliver Danzig. France was reduced to a diversion against the empire, into which the anti-Austrian party threw themselves with joy. Villars and the Chevalier de Belle-Isle, the grandson of Fouquet, were among the most ardent. Fleury curbed these wild spirits both young and old, as well as he could. The cause of Stanislas was already lost, because the Poles could not remain united in the face of the invader. Fleury took care to limit the risks and to keep the war from becoming general by obtaining the neutrality of England through a promise not to attack the Low Countries. His one thought was to get out of this unfortunate situation advantageously and he negotiated the treaty of Vienna (1738) through which he guaranteed the "Pragmatic Sanction." In exchange for and in lieu of his loss, Stanislas, evicted from Poland, received Lorraine which at his death, was to return to the crown of France; while Duke Francis of Lorraine, in order to marry Maria Theresa, renounced his rights to the duchy. This was a diplomatic and advantageous solution of several difficulties at once. Yet until that time no means had been found of uniting this French province with France and in spite of perpetual conflicts with the princes of Lorraine and even in spite of a prolonged occupation of their territory, the monarchy had never wished to annex Lorraine by violence, and against the wish of the inhabitants.

Reason demanded that France should stop here, and such was the opinion of Fleury, legitimately proud of having attained these results without the interested mediation of England. But

in France, the anti-Austrian party complained that Fleury had ceded too much to Austria and regretted that instead of brief campaigns on the Rhine and in Italy, an army had not been sent into Bohemia. The minister of foreign affairs, Chauvelin, was the most bellicose of the Austro-phobes. Fleury, that he might be able to sign the peace of Vienna, had persuaded Louis XV to disgrace and dismiss Chauvelin. This was the first episode in that great conflict of opinions. It had been managed well and without injury to France.

The two most important men in Europe at this moment, Fleury and Walpole, were both working for peace. One would have thought then that when the emperor died, his succession would have been accomplished without difficulty. But there were other forces to be reckoned with, forces which were then at work in England.

Walpole was the first to be forced to abandon his policy. England, who was constantly seeking to develop her commerce, coveted the Spanish colonies. Spain, having been driven to defend herself against veritable expropriation, the English merchants and shipbuilders became exasperated, the British parliament listened to them and Walpole yielded, preferring, according to a well-known saying, an unjust war to a stormy session. The war on the sea had lasted for a year between England and Spain, and Spain was, moreover, successfully defending herself. France, remaining neutral, began to see that she was being menaced through Spain and that it would be prudent to arm herself on the sea, when the emperor died in the month of October, 1740. He also had entertained an illusion similar to that of Fleury and Walpole. He had thought that the signed compacts would suffice to guarantee peace and the inheritance of his daughter. All went well at first. The Elector of Bavaria, who had pretensions to the imperial crown, alone raised a protest, when, without warning and violating all the rules of international morality, the King of Prussia invaded Silesia, an Austrian province.

From the day when the Elector of Brandenburg had taken the title of king, Prussia had been silently growing powerful.

Frederick William, the sergeant king, had by force of application, organization, and economy, built up a strong state and a strong army. His son, Frederick II, who had just succeeded him, had deceived every one with regard to his ambitions. He had spent an undisciplined youth and had displayed a taste for French literature and taken pains to acquire popularity in France through his protection and flattery of her writers, especially her most celebrated writer, Voltaire. Frederick II passed for an enlightened prince, a friend of progress and of the ideas that were called new, and whose vogue was spreading. His bold stroke of invading Silesia, which should have aroused indignation, was, on the contrary received with applause because he had dealt a blow at Austria, still considered as the traditional enemy of France.

At this moment, Fleury, in spite of his prudence, found himself obliged to intervene in the English-Spanish war which was menacing the maritime interests of France to a very serious extent. Belle-Isle and the anti-Austrian party skillfully allied the Austrian succession and England's war with Spain. They claimed that Austria was an English ally, that the time to strike at her had come and that in doing so, France would strike at England as well. This reasoning overlooked two things—the sea and Prussia. But Frederick II passed for one of those German princes like the Electors of Bavaria and the Palatinate, who had formerly been associated with the French against the emperor's party. Furthermore, he was sympathetic. The current became so strong in favor of the Prussian alliance and the war that Fleury, old, weary, and afraid that if he resisted he would lose the government, as Walpole had feared, finally yielded. Louis XV himself yielded. He was wrong, since he did not approve of this war and said that it would be preferable for France to stand aside and watch the others fight. He saw correctly, but unfortunately for France, he did not impose his opinion. It may have been indolence; it may also have been the feeling that the monarchy, weakened since the Regency, was not sufficiently strong to combat the strength of public opinion.

Thus in 1741 France entered into a continental war whose

first effect was to turn her away from the maritime war, in which, in concert with Spain, she might have dealt England some sufficiently hard blows to arrest her in her pursuit of hegemony. For greatly to the surprise of England, her squadrons, insufficiently organized, had suffered some mortifying defeats. But in France, every one favored the undertaking with Germany, which Fleury at least attempted to limit, determined that England should not enter this new conflict. The experience of the Spanish succession had taught him the cost of a war of coalitions in which England was involved.

However, the French were indignant at Fleury's prudence; it seemed to them senile. They had the illusion, skillfully flattered by Frederick, that they were the masters of Europe. During the first year of their campaign, success attended the Marshal de Belle-Isle, who had led his troops to the very walls of Vienna, marched into Bohemia and by a bold stroke seized Prague. In January, 1742, France's ally, the Elector of Bavaria, was elected emperor at Frankfort and there was a cry of triumph in France; at last the imperial crown had been taken away from the house of Austria. But at the very moment of this rejoicing, the temporary nature of these successes became plain. Maria Theresa had not given way before her reverses. The Hungarians, her best troops, stood by her. She knew that she could count on the English. She had already negotiated with Frederick, a very unstable ally of France, whose only thought was to withdraw from the game and make sure of his winnings. Three weeks after the coronation of the new emperor, Bavaria was invaded by the Austrians; she was no longer anything but a dead weight on the hands of the French. At the same time, the English were preparing to intervene actively in favor of Austria, and the King of Prussia, not wishing to incur their enmity, hastened to accept the bargain offered him by Maria Theresa, in other words, all of Silesia, as the price of this defection.

In vain had Fleury counseled peace ever since the month of January, after the election at Frankfurt. He immediately understood the gravity of the situation in which Prussia's treason

had placed France. Trusting to the force of reason, he conceived the idea of addressing a confidential letter to Maria Theresa in which he represented that it was to the interest of neither Austria nor France to continue the struggle. Maria Theresa, through spite, had the indiscretion to publish this letter, fanning the indignation against Fleury and against Austria, and rendering any reconciliation the more difficult since her ill-natured act and her pride only increased the unpopularity of the house she represented. It is true that at this moment she was counting on a complete victory. Belle-Isle, isolated in Bohemia, had to lead his army back in mid-winter with heavy losses. Chevert, blockaded at Prague, capitulated. The brilliant successes of the beginning had turned to disaster and there arose in France a perfect storm of recriminations against every one, which only added to the already troubled state of public opinion.

The worst of it was that the French could no longer withdraw from the war. The classic diversions which were attempted, through Sweden and through Italy, did not succeed. In the beginning of 1743 when Fleury died, broken by years and grief, affairs in France were going badly. England had an army in Germany, raised the more easily inasmuch as King George was at the same time Elector of Hanover. The Anglo-Hanoverians succeeded in giving a helping hand to Austria after the battle of Dettingen. The French troops had to evacuate Germany, recross the Rhine and, thrown back upon the defenses of Vauban, protect their frontiers.

Then came a veritable overhauling of French policy. This check at last opened the eyes of the French. The real enemy of France was not Austria, but England who was always crossing her path. She was the soul of all the coalitions. France had therefore been mistaken in carrying on war in Germany, in working directly for the Elector of Bavaria, unworthy of the rôle conceived for him, and indirectly for the perfidious and dangerous King of Prussia. It was imperative, with regard to Germany, that France should return to her true tradition, that of the treaty of Westphalia, and assume toward Germany only

the rôle of protector of the Germanic liberties and equilibrium. The next step was to turn her forces against England in order to drive her from the continent and to strike at her in that country where her alliance with Austria and Holland had installed her, but where it had left her vulnerable, namely in Flanders. Then it would be possible for France to liquidate her recent error with honor and obtain peace.

This well thought-out plan, proposed by the Marshal de Noailles, was accepted by Louis XV. Preparations were made during the winter to carry it out and in the spring, a strong army, accompanied by the king himself, invaded the coast districts of Flanders and seized Ypres and Furnes. It is true that in the meantime the Austrians, by a bold march, had entered Alsace. Frederick II, who was watching events, ready to keep an equal balance between the adversaries, feared lest Austria should become too powerful. He broke his contract of neutrality and began a swift diversion in Bohemia. The Austrians were thus forced to leave Alsace as quickly as they had entered. It was at this moment that Louis XV, having followed De Noailles to Metz, fell dangerously ill. His recovery caused extraordinary enthusiasm in France; the danger the country was incurring aroused the national sentiment symbolized by the monarchy, and rarely had France seen so ardent a loyalty as was then manifested. It was a sign of the powerful hold that royalty had acquired during the reign of Louis XIV. France could not forget that a hundred years before she had been on the eve of the Fronde.

The French were installed in a corner of Flanders, and they had repelled an invasion; but their affairs were scarcely advancing when the situation brightened in the beginning of 1745. Charles VII of Bavaria died. The imperial crown was free for the Archduke of Lorraine, the husband of Maria Theresa, and an arrangement with Austria was becoming possible. To obtain this, it was necessary for France to carry out the plan of De Noailles, concentrate her effort upon Flanders and defeat the English there. Maurice of Saxony, an experienced captain, one of those Germans who had formerly served as volunteer for

France, was placed at the head of a large army and marched boldly upon Tournay. The English who were attempting to deliver this important place on the Dutch border, the barrier determined by the treaty of Utrecht against France, were defeated at Fontenoy in the presence of Louis XV, (1745). This famous victory, in which the French commander is credited with the chivalrous "Englishmen, fire the first shot," was followed by other successes and soon gave France control of all Belgium. Louis XV entered Antwerp in triumph. The Dutch who had again overturned the republic and reëstablished the stadtholderate, as in the preceding century, were brought to terms by the taking of Berg-op-Zoom. But it was not enough for France to be victorious in the Low Countries. The theatre of the war was far wider. She was defeated in Italy and, as in the sixteenth century, Provence was invaded by the imperial army. Frederick II was accomplishing his design in Germany; he defeated the Saxons; entered Dresden; and then, again betraying France, made a settlement with Austria by which she left him Silesia while he recognized the new emperor, Francis of Lorraine. Finally, and most important of all, the English, now masters of the sea, had for a moment been able to land a force on the coast of Brittany. The conflict had extended to the colonies and the French were defending themselves as best they could in Canada and in India where Dupleix, with but feeble means, was doing a splendid work. By continuing the war, France might perhaps keep the Austrian Low Countries; but in that case peace with England would be impossible, and France would lose her colonies. Hostilities would still continue with Austria, and the French had already learned that it was impossible to count on Frederick. It seemed wiser to liquidate while they still held some guaranties. Thus this first Seven Years' War ended by an inconclusive peace in 1748.

The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle has become a monument of absurdity. From it has come the proverbial expression, "Stupid as the treaty." But if the basis of the war had been bad, how could the peace be good? All that the French had gained in the eighteenth century, by resuming the policy against the Haps-

burgs which had been opportune in the seventeenth, was that they strengthened Prussia and destroyed the equilibrium of Europe. Frederick was the beneficiary of the fault committed by France in 1741. In the campaign he had held the balance of power, lending aid to France just so long as it was to his interest and not a moment longer. Again, he was to hold this balance, with even greater power, for he was stronger than he had been before. From this time it was clear that Prussia was aspiring to take the place of Austria in Germany and that her ambition was unlimited. Consequently, if France persisted in her anti-Austrian policy, she would be working for Frederick. If she changed her system, reversed her alliances, she would have Frederick as an enemy. In either case, England, with whom she had settled nothing and with whom her colonial rivalry continued, would find an armed ally on the continent. This is what the error of Belle-Isle's party, the anachronism of the struggle against the house of Austria, had cost France. French policy had become muddled. It had ceased to be intelligible to the nation and in this mass of contradictions, it was hardly so for those who were directing affairs, and needed above everything to find again some guiding principle. The extraordinary complexity of a Europe, of a world which was changing from day to day, aggravated the conflict of opinions and the theories and this conflict itself rendered the task of French politics more difficult and opened the door to intrigues and intriguers. It was in the midst of this confusion that was formed the famous "*secret du roi*," or secret diplomacy which meant the superposition of one diplomacy upon another, the surveillance of one diplomacy by another. It was to take France a long time to repair the damage caused by the senseless War of the Austrian Succession and to build up a new political method.

There is nothing stranger than the state of mind in France in the middle of the eighteenth century. Never had there been such content, never had life been easier. We can see this by the painting, the furniture, the buildings, the monuments, and the public works. If the state, after the war, found itself in

new financial difficulties, they were not tragic and France has seen worse. On the whole, what the French had to complain of was as a wrinkle in a rose leaf compared to so many of the calamities they had already suffered and were to suffer again. One is struck by another thing as well. The writers of the time were demanding reforms. The administration which was daily becoming more and more regular, was working to accomplish them, but it met with constant opposition because it is impossible to reform anything without disturbing special interests. Parliament resisted the authority of the king and refused to ratify the taxes as in the days of the Fronde. And what were these taxes? They were war taxes; after the provisional "tenth," there was the permanent "twentieth" instituted by the controller-general Machault, and which, as Louis XIV had formerly desired, were to affect every one, without regard to privileges or privileged.

Twice, in 1753 and in 1755, it was to be necessary to exile and imprison the members of parliament, who would not give in, considering themselves as charged to defend the "customs of the kingdom," among which, the first in their eyes was the fiscal immunity of the magistracy. It was here, as in the foreign policy, that the opposition was fighting for the past and the government for progress. We have thus a very different picture of the old régime, from that which represents it as the defender of fiscal privileges. The truth is that history has recorded the complaints, the wrath, the slogans, of those who were unwilling to pay. Already at the end of the reign of Louis XIV, Saint-Simon, indignant at the head tax, and the "tenth," which did not spare the great nobles, characterized them as a "monstrous exaction." He had even written that "the King was bleeding his subjects and squeezing them even to the pus." Under Louis XV, Madame du Deffand was to say, "They are taxing everything except the air which we breathe"—which was to be heard again in the time of the Revolution concerning the tax on doors and windows. It is necessary, therefore, to take these lamentations that literature has brought down to us, for what they are worth. They emanate from sev-

eral categories of persons, almost all rich or at least comfortable, who up to that time had escaped taxation and paid only what they pleased. Among these persons, the greatest number belonged to the bourgeoisie, to the Third Estate, holders of those offices and those charges of the magistracy which entitled them to exemption. Among the protests against the "twentieth," the most just was without doubt that in which parliament, in order to find an honorable pretext for its opposition, took up the cause of the poor nobility of the country districts, who were forced to render military service.

We can thus understand the difficulties with which the old régime was confronted in the eighteenth century, in establishing some sort of order in its finances. We can understand whence arose the continual deficit. Contemporaries have obscured the situation by blaming only the prodigalities of the court. It was because of these financial troubles in a time when morals were far from rigid, that there was more ill will towards the favorites, Madame de Pompadour or Madame du Barry, than there had ever been towards Madame de Montespan. Then also there appeared many books against absolutism which became immensely popular. In reality the power of the king, far from being absolute, was held in check by parliament whose opposition to the financial reforms paralyzed the government and made its administration of the kingdom impossible.

Louis XIV, at the beginning of his reign, had, by his own authority, brought parliament back to its judicial rôle, and as the country had just passed through the Fronde, public opinion approved his action. We have seen how the Regency, having need of the magistrates in order to set aside the will of Louis XIV, had restored the political power of parliament. It only profited by this power to refuse to ratify the taxes. It also intervened, with equal zeal, in the religious controversies of the day. For many years in France, a controversy raged over the bull, *Unigenitus*, which was nothing more nor less than the old dispute for and against Jansenism—and parliament was usually Jansenist. These clerical agitations, these wars of doctrine and of pen, involved nothing new. They set against each other

eternal tendencies which had clashed much more violently in the Middle Ages and at the time of the Reformation. Whatever may have been the illusions of contemporaries who imagined that it was all without precedent, what have been called the great debates of the eighteenth century pertained only to very old subjects. A new element was added to be sure; the campaign of the philosophers and the encyclopedists against the Catholic church. It resulted, therefore, that the Jansenist parliament had the support of the deistic or unbelieving philosophers who were stirring up public opinion against the abuses that parliament was protecting and against the bull which involved the religious question. Curiously enough, the courts which were conservative and reactionary when it was a question of privileges and which clung to old customs, even including torture, were, for some fifteen years, the allies of the writers who in all things demanded reform and the abolition of the past. On the other hand, the government found itself in the presence of the Catholics and clergy who supported the bull; also of the parliament which opposed not only the bull but also the reforms and the taxes; and also of the philosophers who stirred up public opinion against the abuses which parliament protected and against the bull which raised the religious question. One will agree that the task of the government was not an easy one. It had to find its way between all these currents and one is astonished to see to what a degree it showed itself free from prejudice. In fact, if, to obtain religious peace, it ended by imposing upon the magistrates the registering of the bull, on the other hand it allowed them to expel the Jesuits in order to obtain the ratifying of the taxes. And just as the monarchy had not persecuted Protestantism in its beginning, so it did not seek to stifle the philosophers and the encyclopaedia. It even had ministers who protected them and used them and their influence on public opinion, either like Choiseul to come to terms with parliament, or like Maupeou to combat and dissolve it.

The only thing that remained to render the question of taxes more serious than they already were was a new war. A con-

flict with England in the middle of the eighteenth century, was fatal to the French. War had been continuous in the colonies. The work of Dupleix was disavowed in India where he had been building an empire for France. This sacrifice was useless as far as peace was concerned. In America, the English colonies in the east were attacking the French Canadians and were receiving aid from London. When the French government became alarmed and wished to send reinforcements to Canada, her ships were stopped and seized by the English fleet. To the protests made at London by the French government, the English replied that hostilities had already commenced. In May, 1756, France's declaration of war was the card forced at England's wish. To defend her own country, France found herself engaged in a great conflict for something which she did not desire and which she regarded as of secondary importance—namely the maritime and colonial interests which had become all-important in the minds of the English people.

But France's conflict with the English necessarily brought about a general war. It is here that the fatal consequences of the mistake made in 1741 appeared. Prussia thought only of keeping Silesia, Austria of recapturing it. The seizure of this province dominated the politics of Europe. As early as January, 1756, Frederick had signed with George II, Elector of Hanover as well as King of England, a treaty which guaranteed his conquests. In the conflict between France and England, he took the part of France's adversary. Whether they liked it or not, France and Austria found themselves thrown together. Through the first treaty of Versailles, in the very month of France's rupture with England, a defensive alliance was concluded between the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs. A year later this alliance was made firmer when Frederick invaded Saxony as he had invaded Silesia, and made evident the ambition of Prussia to bring all Germany under her control.

This "reversing of alliances" was an important event in French history. Naturally the Austro-phobes, the blind upholders of the old tradition, protested, and the worst of it was that soon, in the eyes of the public, the unfortunate result of the

war seemed to justify them. From the Austrian alliance dates the divorce of the monarchy and the nation, and thirty-five years later it was to be the most powerful grievance of the revolutionists—the cause that was to give them the means of condemning Louis XVI.

Report had it that royalty had renounced its former policy and abandoned the struggle against the house of Austria only through a court intrigue. Frederick did his best to make this believed and as he already had one woman as adversary (the Empress of Russia was yet to become one) he accused Madame de Pompadour, “Cotillon II,” of having sacrificed the interests of France to the vain pleasure of carrying on a correspondence with the daughter of the Hapsburgs. It is true that Maria Theresa, her minister Kaunitz, and her ambassador Stahremberg, omitted no flattery towards the “favorite.” It is also true that the house of Babiole where the preliminaries took place and the part which with Madame de Pompadour was there taken by the Abbé Bernis, a man of the court and the author of “*vers galants*,” give to the reversing of the alliances an air of frivolity. It was, however, a serious and well-deliberated operation. By the first treaty of Versailles, the French government had concluded only a defensive alliance. This was extended after the aggression and success of Frederick; but, by a second treaty, France lent her aid to Austria in return for the promise to extend the French frontier in the southern part of the Austrian Low Countries, from Ostend to Chimay. The remainder was to form an independent state, the outline of the future Belgium, which should be given to the Prince of Parma, son-in-law of Louis XV. It is only in our own day that the instructions of Bernis, who had become minister of foreign affairs, to Choiseul, named ambassador to Vienna, have become generally known and they show that the alliance with Austria was the result of calculation and not of caprice. “Experience has proved,” said Bernis, “that the French have been wrong to contribute to the aggrandizement of the King of Prussia. It is to the interest of France to see that no power dominates Germany and that the treaty of Westphalia is respected.” Now Frederick had seized

the occasion of the French conflict with England to ally himself with that power, with the idea that France would be too much occupied on the sea to oppose his movements in the Germanic countries. If France were to leave the King of Prussia to fight it out alone with Austria, there would be serious danger that he would attain his ends and that the German system would be overturned to the detriment of France. There remained no choice but to respond to the advances of Austria and join with her to maintain the equilibrium of Europe.

In 1756 and 1757, Bernis perceived that the danger in Germany was Prussian. He also saw how heavy the task of France was to become since, at the very moment that England was provoking her to a formidable conflict, Frederick was involving her in a continental war and in the complexities of the affairs of central and eastern Europe. This situation was aggravated by the fact that the Empress of Russia was entering into the coalition against Prussia. This meant that France would have to protect her other and her former ally, Poland, against the greed of both Austria and Russia, her present associates. Furthermore, in order to obtain the aid of Russia, France had had to persuade Poland not to take any part in the conflict. We thus have some idea of the veritable maze in which French policy more than once lost its way while trying to solve some of the contradictions. But we cannot at one and the same time blame the secret diplomacy of the king and the overturning of the alliances, since the "secret" was Polish and was for the purpose of preserving the future of the French relations with Poland in spite of the alliance with Russia and Austria.

The war on the sea had begun well in spite of the inferiority of the French naval forces. The Marshal de Richelieu had landed at Minorca and taken Port-Mahon. This success, which liberated the Mediterranean and allowed the French to install themselves in Corsica, gave them, besides, the promise of the alliance of Spain. For England it was a check which greatly irritated her. Nothing shows the pitiless character of this struggle more than the fury with which the mass of the English demanded the execution of Admiral Byng.

In spite of this brilliant beginning the state of mind in France was bad. The conflict with the parliaments still continued. It became worse when it was necessary to ask for the registering of the edicts imposing temporary taxes and creating new ones. It was, however, indispensable to find resources for carrying on the war by land and sea. In the provinces which voted their own contributions, the assemblies and parliaments resisted, and it was the beginning of the long and serious conflict with the States of Brittany. At the same time the religious quarrels over the bull, *Unigenitus*, sprang up again. The government was driven to extreme measures. One *lit de justice*, a special court, at which the king presided, imposed the king's will in the matter of the taxes and another, in the matter of religious disputes. The parliament of Paris replied by resigning *en masse*, which caused great excitement. The attempt of Francis Damiens, a few days after, against the life of the king, was one of the symptoms (January, 1757). The dangers which the king had run at least had the effect of inspiring a fear of an upheaval in France. There were great manifestations of loyalty and the resignations were withdrawn. But if the external order was not troubled, the moral disorder persisted. The reverses of the Seven Years' War were falling on bad ground and this double war against England and Prussia, so serious in its consequences, and which demanded such effort on the part of every one, was little understood. The literature of the day bears witness to the fact that its significance escaped the guides of public opinion. The attitude generally was one of indifference or disparagement.

Naval warfare is an affair of organization. It requires long preparation and much money. Three industrious ministers, Maurepas, Rouillé and Machault, had worked in vain to remedy the naval inferiority of France. In the meantime, with an implacable will which the first Pitt personified, the English, after the French victory at Port-Mahon, had become masters of the sea again and had seized the French colonies with whom communication with the mother country had been cut off. In spite of a glorious resistance, Montcalm succumbed in Canada

and Lally-Tollendal in India. One by one, the French possessions were falling into the hands of the English.

It is more difficult to understand why the war in Germany should have turned out so badly for France. It is true that the French generals committed some blunders. But even they also seemed to lack the sacred fire of conviction; d'Estrées has been suspected of having been hostile to the Austrian alliance. And although Frederick II, of whom this war made a Germanic hero, finally escaped the quadruple alliance—the formidable coalition which was attacking him—he owed his safety not to his military talents alone, but to a sort of popularity which the philosophic and literary fashion of the day, carefully cultivated by Frederick, had given him even among his adversaries. His popularity was increased as a result of the unpopularity of the Austrian alliance.

In 1757, Prussia, attacked on four sides at once, seemed on the point of succumbing. The French had defeated the Anglo-Hanoverians who had capitulated at Klosterhaven. This deprived the English of their means of carrying on the conflict on the continent; but they never bowed before a continental disaster so long as they were masters of the sea. The states of Frederick were invaded by the Swedes, the Russians, and the Austrians, who had just entered Berlin. The French army, with an important contingent furnished by the German princes, was advancing towards Saxony. Frederick met them at Rosbach, overthrew the twenty thousand Germans, who disbanded; and he then conquered the French under Soubise.

The French had undergone more serious defeats in the course of their history, but none had caused such humiliation as the one at Rosbach. Mingled with this shame a new and unfortunate spirit began to show itself in France; a delight of accusing her own generals of incapacity and in contrasting the luxury of her officers with the simple virtues of the conquerors. Never had admiration for an enemy gone so far; it continued and Prussia profited by it until the eve of 1870. Frederick of Hohenzollern passed as the type of the enlightened ruler, his victories for those of progress and even of liberty. He was,

however, a despot, an absolute sovereign, and one of the most dictatorial. His method was that of militarism, of corporalism, of stiff-necked Prussian discipline, quite the opposite of liberal government. It took more than a century for this fact to be appreciated.

After Rosbach, Bernis felt that the war with Germany was doomed and that it would be better to withdraw. In the council, the opposite opinion prevailed. The campaign was continued throughout the year 1758 with a series of successes and failures which brought no result. Frederick was holding his own against the Austrians and Russians. It seemed impossible, however, that he could avoid being crushed. Still another effort and the coalition would put an end to Prussia. This was the thesis of Choiseul, the partisan of the Austrian alliance, who quitted his ambassadorship to Vienna to succeed the discouraged Bernis.

If the war was to be continued, Choiseul was right in thinking that no definite result could be obtained so long as France was powerless on the sea. To overcome this defect, it was not only necessary to reënforce her navy as much as possible while hostilities were going on, but also to find naval allies. Spain, although fallen, still counted; Naples was in a good position on the Mediterranean and Bourbons were reigning at Madrid and at Naples as well as at Paris. In helping them to secure these realms, France ought not to have worked in vain. To add the *pacte de famille* to the Austrian alliance was Choiseul's policy.

Although the idea was good, it came too late. Moreover, Choiseul was too ambitious. He organized a descent upon England but the English fleet, which had been blockading the French coast for a long time, defeated at Lagos the fleet of Toulon which was attempting to reach Brest; and in the Morbihan, the "day of M. de Conflans" was a disaster equal to that of La Hogue. A diversion of the French pirates in Ireland was useless. And the *pacte de famille* itself, signed in 1761, was this time of no avail. Spain was not ready and the English profited by the fact to seize some Spanish colonies. With her hands full and master of the island off Brittany, she

nevertheless, as in 1711, began to grow tired of the heavy expenses of the war. Pitt fell, and the pacific Tories returned to power. In the meantime, the circle of Germany's enemies was drawing closer about Frederick. His ruin seemed certain. One circumstance, the same one that Germany calculated on in 1917, saved him. Elizabeth died in 1762 and the Russia of Peter III deserted her allies and sought reconciliation with Prussia. Austria, giving up the struggle, concluded a peace at Hubertsburg by which she abandoned Silesia to Frederick. A few days before, when she accepted the treaty of Paris, France had resigned herself to signing the peace that England wished, (1763).

Thus, with England as with Prussia, France had lost the upper hand but she had been especially unfortunate on the sea. It had long ago been proved that in any conflict with the English, the French could not hope for victory so long as their navy was incapable of holding its own against the British. By the terms of the treaty of Paris this lesson was paid for by the loss of almost the entire French colonial domain—Canada, the left bank of the Mississippi, Sénégal except Gorée, and India except the few settlements that she still possesses there. The price of her defeat was heavy, the more so in that it helped to lay the base of the British Empire. However, it was only the base. England would still have to protect the results of this great victory; she immediately saw the danger and reproached her government for not having laid France as low as Pitt had set out to do. Because, although the French public took the loss of its colonies lightly, it also began to feel that the domination of the sea by the English constituted an insufferable tyranny, a danger from which France must be freed. During the Seven Years' War France had constructed some war ships by public subscription. After the treaty of Paris, Choiseul directed all his policy towards revenge upon those who were called the "tyrants of the sea." The restoration of the French naval power, the consolidation of the *pacte de famille*, the acquisition of Corsica, an advance post in the Mediterranean, which neutralized the presence of the English in Minorca—all these were his work.

For his vast projects he had need of funds and the Seven Years' War had already been a severe drain. To obtain money, it was necessary to have parliaments to authorize taxes. To win over the parliaments whose conflict with the clergy was still going on, and whose tendencies were always Jansenist, Choiseul persuaded Louis XV to sacrifice the order of Jesuits to them. The condemnation of this order, which had numerous colleges in France and which was forbidden to teach, was at the same time a victory for the Encyclopedists, for the philosophers, and for the men of letters who were attacking religion and the Church. Choiseul calculated that he would flatter, in this way, not only the members of parliament, but a noisy section of public opinion. It was undoubtedly the popularity thereby acquired which permitted him to follow his national work, his reform of the army and the navy. But he did not disarm the opposition. That of the parliaments against the taxes began again and was particularly violent in Brittany where the States were attached to their ancient privileges and were sustained by the parliament of Rennes. The parliament of Paris took sides with their *confrères* of Rennes in favor of Chalotais against d'Aiguillon, who was acting as governor, and there followed a whole series of incidents; "letters of royal command" and *lits de justice* which lasted from 1766 to 1771. Choiseul, who was considered, not without reason, as being favorable to the magistrates, fell in the course of this struggle. Maupeou convinced the king that the opposition of the parliaments was becoming a danger to the government. At the same time, Louis XV was alarmed by the projects of Choiseul who, still with the idea of revenge, was pushing Spain into war with England in order to involve France again. The fall of Choiseul was another of the significant events of this reign. The day he was sent back to his estates, there were some manifestations in his honor. By a strange contradiction, the crowd was acclaiming the man of that Austrian alliance which they had detested, the man who had just given the dauphin, the future Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette of Austria as wife.

The departure of Choiseul was followed by the coup d'état

of Maupeou. We are too apt to overlook this event in the reign of Louis XV. The parliaments, whose powers had increased with time, had become an obstacle in the way of government. The opposition of the sovereign courts, and those of the provinces following the lead of the one in Paris, ended by becoming a political danger. These courts had even gone so far as to proclaim their unity and indivisibility. They thus practically assumed the power of the States General. They acted in concert, rejected edicts under the direction of the Paris parliament, and issued writs of arrest against the officers of the king. "This astonishing anarchy," said Voltaire, "could not continue. The crown had to take back the authority or the parliaments would have prevailed." It was as a matter of fact, a government raised against a government and one or the other had to succumb. Ever since the time of the Fronde, the monarchy had had to reckon with this independent magistracy, its own creation and almost as old as the monarchy itself, but which was little by little getting beyond its control. Louis XIV had solved the difficulty by the autocratic method and, thanks to his prestige had been successful. During his régime, the parliaments had been subjugated. Revived by the regency, they had gradually become bolder and their opposition, founded on respect for acquired rights, had become more injurious in proportion as the state and the administration had developed and had been confronted with the task of organizing and modernizing a France which had been reclaimed and constituted, piece by piece, out of the old chaos of feudal Europe. The ministers of the eighteenth century, including the unfortunate Calonne, continually complained over the difficulty of governing a country which had taken eight hundred years to form its territory. Towns and provinces had been united under the most varied conditions and as soon as there was talk of any change, simplification, or improvement, the government was confronted by exceptions, franchises, or privileges stipulated by contract. At the end of the reign of Louis XV, it appeared that the parliaments, by opposing all changes, and consequently all reforms, and all progress were making it impossible for the monarchy to govern, were

forcing it into a rut and by a blind and selfish attachment to custom, were leading it to destruction. To satisfy the needs of the new era, it was necessary to break with much of the old. The resistance which the monarchy had always encountered in its political and administrative work, a resistance which had been feudal in form up to the time of Richelieu, now took a juridical and legal form all the more dangerous perhaps, because, as it was not armed, it did not appear as open and brutal sedition.

Choiseul had tried to govern with the parliaments by giving them the Jesuits as a sop, by flattering their Jansenist opinions, and by choosing some of the ministers and controllers-general from among their number. This was already a worn-out policy. The only thing left was to resort to bolder methods. In 1771, Maupeou, charged with the task, suppressed the parliaments and the court of *aides*. In their place were instituted "superior councils." The selling of offices was abolished and justice became free for all. This was one of the reforms most desired by the country. The suppression of the parliaments, a bold stroke of policy, permitted Maupeou to continue that rational organization which for centuries had been undertaken by the monarchy. The way was open. What Bonaparte accomplished, when he became First Consul, thirty years later, could then have been carried out without the ruin of a revolution. From 1771 to 1774 the administration of Terray, unjustly criticized by history but better understood in our own day, was beginning to correct the abuses. It first moderated, with the idea of later abolishing, the most vexatious of the taxes; it organized the famous "twentieths" which had raised so much opposition; and finally set itself to create just taxes, such as the tax on personal property, adopted later by the Constituent Assembly; in a word, it accomplished all that the parliaments had made impossible.

If France could ever have revolutionized her government peacefully, it was not in 1789, but in 1774 at the death of Louis XV. The great administrative reforms which were then beginning, without shock and without violence, and through royal authority, were those which the revolutionary assemblies were

to sketch out but which were to perish on account of the anarchy—the same ones which Napoleon was to revive and which were to succeed under his dictatorship. One of Napoleon's collaborators, the Consul Lebrun, will even be a former secretary of Maupeou. We see here another sort of continuity in French history which has been little understood.

As soon as the reign of Louis XVI began, we shall see how all these promises were brought to naught through the recalling of the parliaments. Only then did revolution become inevitable.

If there was discontent at the time when Louis XV died, it was not incurable; if there was agitation, it was only superficial. The old régime had needed reforms and it knew it; its motto had never been immobility. It had suffered many transformations since the days of Hugh Capet. It is easier to rebuild society on an ideal plan than to adjust the institutions, the laws and the administration of a country to the needs of new generations. This is the secret of the success of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the supreme simplifier. But since the beneficent coup d'état of 1771, there had not been any organized opposition. The government had stood its own ground and had not been afraid. Louis XV had never consented to call the States General, knowing that it would mean the abdication of the monarchy. It was blamed and criticized but it gave no signs of weakening. The "affairs" of the time, those of Calas, of the Chevalier de la Barre, of Sirven and of Lally-Tollendal, famous trials which Voltaire pleaded in the name of justice and humanity, had no other political repercussions than to help discredit the parliaments by whom the condemnations had been pronounced. Choiseul was dismissed and the parliaments broken up without there being any barricades as under the Fronde. As for the other complaints and accusations, they were those which few governments escape. The necessary reductions of the interest and the pensions, to which Terray proceeded under Maupeou, were called bankruptcy. Because of a scarcity of grain and the speculations which were carried on, there arose the legend of the "*pacte de famine*"; the favorites of the king, Madame de Pompadour and Madame du Barry,

were considered as public scandals. However, at two other epochs in French history royalty had survived more serious moments and had several times been driven from Paris. Although some gloomy spirits prophesied catastrophies, the preparations and the desire for a veritable revolution were nowhere evident.

It is always difficult to govern, but it was no more difficult for the monarchy at that moment than at another. If we examine closely, we shall see that the situation was more complex without than within the realm. Louis XV had added Lorraine and Corsica to the kingdom. France had to preserve on the continent the advantages bequeathed to her by the seventeenth century; she had to prevent upheavals in Germany, and keep her eye on the ambitions of Prussia. In the meantime, with the appearance of Russia, the Eastern question was assuming a new aspect. Turkey was threatened with dismemberment; Poland, the necessary ally of France, was threatened with ruin (the first partition was in 1772). Finally France had to wipe out the most serious effects of the treaty of Paris if she did not wish to renounce her colonies, her future on the sea, and the new kind of expansion which the great European peoples were seeking; if she did not wish, in other words, to abandon the oceans and the world to England. The maritime and colonial questions, the German question, the Eastern question—these were things which were to occupy the reign of Louis XVI, and, through a serious initial error—the recall of the parliaments—they were to provoke the drama of 1789.

CHAPTER XV

LOUIS XVI AND THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION

WE must consider not only the state of affairs in France at the moment when Louis XVI, a young man of twenty years, became king; we must consider the state of all Europe. It was sinister. The age was one of great conquests. Frederick of Prussia and the German Catherine of Russia, had already begun the partition of Poland and had drawn Austria into the deal. England, consolidating her conquests, thought only of her commercial interests and of guaranteeing her maritime supremacy against all competitors. Such was the state of the world when the majority of Frenchmen were dreaming of the regeneration of humanity and of a golden age.

The differences of doctrines and of schools did not prevent the French from having a common basis of aspirations and illusions. It is thus in every epoch and the young king would not have belonged to his age if he had not, to a certain extent, shared its ideas. One has often wondered what would have happened if the Duke of Burgundy, the pupil of Fénelon, had succeeded Louis XIV. Perhaps we have seen under Louis XVI. The vague conceptions expressed by the overgentle *Télémaque*, which had appeared during the latter years of the seventeenth century, a mixture of tradition and reform, and which the Regency, with its aristocratic councils, had for a moment applied—these conceptions had been preserved in the royal family. The conscientious dauphin, the son of Louis XV, was attached to them and Louis XVI had been bred in their atmosphere. "What indeed have the great men, the States of the provinces, the parliaments, done to deserve their fall?" he wrote shortly after his coronation; thus condemning the evolution pursued since 1660. The least intelligible measures of his reign, at

first view, as for instance when the minister of war, Ségur, demanded that the officers be nobles, arise from this predisposition. The public welfare, compassed through a monarchy acting as a paternal authority and respecting the old rights, liberties, franchises, and guaranties, the three orders and the great political bodies; in short, a return to the old constitution of the monarchy such as it had been conceived—this was the idea of Louis XVI. France was following not so much principles as a tendency which seemed, at certain points, save on the religious question, to be confused with that of the philosophers, but which was really its opposite. For the philosophers, progress was to realize itself through the abolition of the past, through a uniform legislation—in a word, through an “enlightened despotism,” that of a Frederick or a Catherine or a Joseph II, or of him of whom men like Choiseul or Maupeou, men the furthest removed from tradition, were dreaming.

Under Louis XV the great question had been that of the parliaments. Choiseul had governed with them, Maupeou without them. The coup d'état of Maupeou—they even called it his revolution—was still fresh in 1774 and opinion remained divided. But the suppression of the parliaments had been an act of authority and Louis XVI, as the entire course of his reign will show, had neither the sense nor the taste for authority. The new king reversed the policy of his grandfather. “He found,” said Michelet, “that parliament had rights, after all, as well as royalty; that Louis XV, in meddling with them, had done a revolutionary, a dangerous thing. To reëstablish parliament was to repair a breach that the king himself had made in the monarchical edifice. Turgot, in vain, strove and argued. Parliament returned (November, 1774) haughty, as it had left, quarrelsome, and always ready to oppose the most useful reforms.”

Thus, for the school of tradition, to suppress the parliament had been to change the monarchy, the independence of the judiciary having been one of the fundamental laws of the realm. But recourse to the States General was a change also. For more than a century and a half, the monarchy had ceased con-

voking the States because they had generally been an occasion for disorder. The independence of the parliaments had been suppressed in its turn because the opposition of the parliamentarians was becoming dangerous, as at the time of the Fronde, and was paralyzing the government. The conflict which was not slow in coming to a head, between the crown and the parliament, made a return to the States General inevitable. Although it was not evident at the time, it is now clear that the return to tradition, which was at the bottom the idea of Louis XVI, and which was combined in his mind with a program of reforms, though he had no means of realizing them, led the monarchy into the very difficulties from which it had endeavored to free itself under Louis XIV and Louis XV.

These political troubles brought to a head the financial difficulties born of the two seven-year wars, which could be resolved only if Maupeou's method were continued and which were, moreover, to be increased by the tasks France was soon to encounter abroad, where hostile forces were growing stronger. If we add to this the state of public sentiment, fed on Utopias by the literature of the day, and the condition of a society which, from the lowest to the highest, wished vaguely to change things; if we add also the decline of the idea of authority—a weakness which extended even to the throne—we shall have some of the elements which led to the approaching Revolution. History should note that this Revolution came fifteen years after the recall of the parliaments and on the very day when the States General was convoked.

"Louis XVI," as Sainte-Beuve admirably says, "was only a man of good intentions, exposed upon a throne and feeling himself ill at ease there. By a succession of incomplete attempts, none of them followed up and always interrupted, he irritated the public fever and only ended by redoubling it." "Because," added Sainte-Beuve, "goodness, to be anything but a dream, must be organized and this organization must have a head, a minister, or a sovereign. This was entirely lacking during the fifteen years of trial and groping accorded to Louis XVI. The personages, even the best, by whom in his sincere

love for his people, he at first surrounded himself, as auxiliaries and collaborators were imbued with principles, doubtless even with vision, but also, to a great degree, with the prejudices of the century, the basis of which was an excessive confidence in human nature."

The time needed a "practical and prudent" king. Louis XVI had only good intentions and confused ideas. His first ministry was what we should call a "great ministry." It was composed of competent, hard-working men, men of integrity, and for the most part popular. The young king considered neither his own opinions nor preferences, since he even called Malesherbes, the friend of Rousseau, famous for the protection he had accorded the philosophers when he had been in charge of the book trade, that is of the press. Maurepas, a statesman of wide experience; Miromesnil, keeper of the seals; Vergennes, France's foremost diplomat; later, Saint-Germain for the ministry of war; and finally and above all, Turgot, the illustrious Turgot, whose hands Voltaire kissed in tears: there was in such a personnel, much ground for hope.

However, this ministry did not succeed. It is impossible to tell whether the reforms of Turgot would have saved France from revolution. His plans were partly practical and partly chimerical. They were inspired by the current ideas; his successors followed them and the revolutionary assemblies later took them up again. But in this very choice is shown the inconsistency of Louis XVI. Turgot had first become known as intendant and the intendants represented "progress from above," in the districts which depended directly upon the crown. Their spirit was opposed to the spirit of the parliaments which the king was restoring. This, then, was the first contradiction in the new reign.

In any event, time was lacking for Turgot to execute his program and although during the time that he was intendant at Limousin, he had obtained results which had made him famous, it was because he had remained thirteen years at his post. He was minister only two years. It was not only on account of the opposition with which he met and which was to be expected.

Turgot could not combat the abuses without wounding interests or meeting with resistance; that of parliament in the first place, which had hardly been reinstated after its promises not to fall back into the old habit of opposition, before it again manifested its unaccountable spirit, at once reactionary and revolutionary. Turgot's plan for regulating the finances was not new and history has recognized the ability of the controllers-general who preceded him. It was a question of economizing, of making a better redistribution of the taxes among the taxpayers, of suppressing exemptions and privileges; and these projects always raised the same tempests. On the other hand, Turgot was convinced, as Sully had been, that agriculture was the basis of national wealth, and he tried in various ways to favor it and at the same time to remedy the scourge of famine by allowing free trade in grains. But in this way he jostled not only special interests, but prejudices. This honest man was accused of having the grain sent out of the country, just as Louis XV had been accused of the *pacte de famine*. In his liberal program, Turgot, moreover, trod on other interests, those of the trade corporations; and this aroused the anger of the smaller merchants. His favoring of agriculture brought upon him the resentment of both industry and finance. "Turgot," said Michelet, "had against him the lords and the shopkeepers." We may add the bankers also, whose spokesman was Necker, a Genevan, a foreigner like Law, and who, like him, had that fatal and wonderful remedy; loans and an unlimited drawing upon credit.

The animosity which Turgot had aroused against himself at court and in the country was what every minister, who attempts to reform the finances of his country, has to encounter. It undoubtedly contributed to his overthrow. But the true cause of his fall was of another sort. For Turgot to carry out his program, peace was necessary. He had remarked that the first cannon shot would be the signal of bankruptcy. But what was the reply of the ministry of foreign affairs? In 1776 an important event occurred: the English colonies of North America revolted. It was the opportunity for France to efface the

consequences of the treaty of Paris, to free herself and to free Europe from the "tyrants of the sea." Could she afford to lose this opportunity? With regard to this the opinions which divided the French government still divide historians according to their point of view. The historians of finance judge that this war was unfortunate because it cost a billion and a half or two billions, and, as Turgot had prophesied, bankrupted France. The political historians hold that the result to be attained was worth more than the risk. This was the view of Vergennes and it was because the latter won the day that Turgot preferred to retire.

We have now arrived at that juncture of external difficulties with the political and financial difficulties within, before which the monarchy was soon to succumb. We have seen a public sentiment developing which had in it something of the morbid. Michelet was right in underlining the importance of the magnetism of Mesmer and the invention of balloons, both of which fortified the faith in human miracles, the miracles of progress. We have seen, on the other hand, that the government had lost its energy and that it had deliberately put itself in the way which led to the convoking of the States General—in other words, to making an explosion sure. The American war, from which it could not keep aloof without compromising the interests of France and resigning itself to irreparable effacement (we have only to think what the British Empire would be to-day if it comprised also the United States)—the American war gave the shock which started the Revolution.

Let us admit at once that Necker, called to the ministry of finances under cover of a man of straw because he was a foreigner, found the means to finance the war against the English. But at what a price! By his combinations of loans, terribly burdensome for the treasury, he bequeathed to his successors a crushing debt of which they had to bear the unpopularity. Here again it is difficult to choose; if it is not fair to accuse Calonne and Brienne of the faults of Necker, is it any more so to reproach Necker, charged with finding the money for the war, for having procured it by easy methods which had the

advantage of arousing no opposition, even though they were the means of finally wrecking French finances?

The enthusiasm of the public for the cause of American independence aided Necker in placing his loans and Vergennes in realizing his projects. America, in her rebellion against England, aroused the echo of the idea of liberty which the eighteenth century had spread abroad. That "good fellow, Franklin," at bottom a rather sophisticated good fellow, who came to Paris to plead for his country, knew how to flatter the sentiments then fashionable and was received as a character out of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This enthusiasm was realized in the departure, to which the government closed its eyes, of Lafayette and his volunteers. A little later France sent to America, besides several subsidies, some regular troops under Rochambeau. There is not a doubt but that, without this aid, the insurgent Americans would have been crushed.

However, the experience of the Seven Years' War had not been lost. Vergennes knew that to strive advantageously against England, France must have her hands free on the continent. A partisan of the Austrian alliance, he refused to be its tool and to turn it from its true object, which was to preserve in Germany the equilibrium against Prussia, which had been created by the treaty of Westphalia. Emperor Joseph II, that brilliant and restless spirit, who was jealous of Frederick's laurels, believed that the war between France and England would enkindle a new European war favorable to his interests. Vergennes hastened to disillusion him; Austria was not to become, like Prussia, a cause for disorder in Germany at the expense of France. Joseph II at the death of the Elector of Bavaria, having wished to seize for himself the states of the latter, France intervened in the name of her right of guaranty over the Germanic Empire and by the convention of Teschen (1779), imposed her mediation on Austria and Prussia, both ready to take up arms. She did this in the traditional spirit of French policy with regard to Germany, without breaking the Austrian alliance and at the same time without allying herself with Prussia. Louis XVI and Vergennes did not allow them-

selves to be turned aside from the war on the sea, by one on land. They had long ago learned that England could be vitally injured only by means of the sea. The peace thus preserved in Europe had another advantage; not only had England no allies but Spain and Holland, menaced by her greed, and weary of her naval tyranny, ranged themselves on the side of France, while others, at the instigation of Russia, formed a league of neutrals, an armed league, determined to impose upon England the freedom of the seas.

These measures, the result of a wise policy, permitted the expiring monarchy to take its revenge for the treaty of Paris. The War of American Independence had not been merely an episode in the rivalry between England and France. England gave up the conquest of the American colonies (who signed the treaty, moreover, without waiting for the French) the day when she renounced the idea of conquering France on the sea. The French fleet had not been reconstructed and fortified for naught. The money it had cost was not spent in vain. If a project of landing on English soil failed, as that of Napoleon was to fail, everywhere, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, the French squadrons had held the English in check and the Bailli de Suffren showed himself one of the greatest sailors of France. England was no longer undisputed mistress of the seas. She had coveted the Dutch and Spanish colonies as recompense for the loss of America; she had to relinquish them and, although she kept Gibraltar, she returned Minorca to Spain. As for France, by the treaty of Versailles (1783), she freed Dunkirk from the yoke under which it was left by the treaty of Utrecht and she regained Sénégal without which her African empire would not exist to-day. Her prestige in the Far East was restored, and permitted her to penetrate Annam and to make the beginnings of that establishment in Indo-China by which she was later to compensate herself for the loss of India. It was a great lesson which was not to be forgotten; she had lost her colonies through weakness on the sea; it was through naval strength that she began to repair that loss.

The defect of the treaty of Versailles was that it brought

a sort of peace without conquerors or conquered. It proved that the French were capable of holding their own against England. It settled nothing. The compromise of 1783 was but a feeble thing. The equilibrium might be upset at any time by a naval effort on the part of either country and it was what England feared and prepared for. Vergennes, moderate and prudent, wished to consolidate what had been gained. The rivalry between France and England seemed to him a misfortune and he claimed that incompatibilities between the nations were only prejudices. In 1786, by a treaty of commerce which was later to be one of the grievances of the States General against the monarchy (it was accused of having flooded France with English merchandise), the government of Louis XVI wished to reconcile the two countries, unite them and bring them into closer association through such exchanges and through a common participation in a prosperity which was increasing daily on either side of the Channel. In all matters that presented themselves, up until the Revolution (in Holland, for instance, where the republicans, the friends of France, were overturned by the Orange party at the instigation of England and Prussia) France avoided everything that could lead to hostilities. She let things take their own course without interference. She was deliberately "conciliating and pacific." However, England watched this progress with jealousy. She would not agree to sharing the sea with France and the more her industries and her population developed, the more she feared French competition. The idea gained way among the English that the white peace of 1783 had demonstrated the necessity of arresting the maritime regeneration of France. The rivalry, nearly a century old, and to which Vergennes had hoped to put an end, was soon to break out with new violence and this time the English would be determined to carry the struggle through to the bitter end. We can therefore understand that the French Revolution should have been for England what the American Revolution had been for France—an element in their policy, an opportunity, a means.

Louis XVI had many reasons for wishing to preserve peace.

First of all, only too happy to have effaced the unfortunate results of the Seven Years' War, he wished to stop there and not compromise what had been gained. He imagined that France would be grateful to him. Moreover, the state of Europe was not favorable. The Eastern question which had arisen with the progress of Russia, placed in a precarious position two powers friendly to France—the Polish state, her political ally, and the Ottoman Empire where her material and moral interests, an accumulation of two hundred and fifty years, were not inconsiderable. To protect at one and the same time the integrity of Turkey and the independence of Poland, already weakened by a first partition; to make use of the Austrian alliance to prevent the emperor from succumbing to the temptations of Catherine of Russia, who was offering Vienna and Berlin their share in the spoils of Turkey and Poland; in short, to protect Europe from an upheaval that would have thrown France from the lofty and sure eminence she had held under Richelieu and Louis XIV, such were the cares which beset the French monarchy. We can understand with what relief the other monarchies later heard of her fall, since it was she who had done police duty for the continent, maintained order, and prevented depredations by the great powers.

Another circumstance imposed prudence upon the government. The question of money, considerably aggravated by the expenses of the American war, was becoming as great a pre-occupation with the public as with the government. The combination and interrelation of all these events explain how the Revolution was brought about.

From the examples which we have under our eyes, from the experience of the war and the years which followed it, where a thousand things of the past were relived, we can to-day understand how a bad financial situation may accompany economic prosperity. All witnesses agree that there was great prosperity in the reign of Louis XVI. Business had never been more flourishing nor the bourgeoisie so rich. There was an abundance of money in the country. The deficit, great as it was, could be met by a better distribution of taxes. Unfortu-

nately, the reform ministers constantly encountered the old resistance, not only that of the privileged classes but of all the taxpayers whose official protector was the parliament. The prodigious popularity of Necker arose from the fact that he resorted not to taxes but to loans. Skillful at wrapping his pills in gold foil and presenting the budget, his famous Account Rendered, under the most favorable but also the falsest light, he had no difficulty, by disguising the truth, in attracting large capital. Two consequences followed; the bondholders became very numerous and consequently national bankruptcy would thereafter strike and displease a great number of people; on the other hand, Necker, having given the impression that new taxes were not necessary, acquired the favor of all the taxpayers, notably the clergy, to whose purse it was the custom to turn in case of need. But in this manner he made the French of all classes still more rebellious against taxation.

Necker had fallen in 1781, two years before the end of the war, through a question of internal politics. To borrow was not enough. It was necessary to find resources through financial reforms. And none was possible so long as the parliaments were opposed to it. That is why Necker had undertaken to create in all the provinces, no matter what their régime or rights, provincial assemblies to whom would be transferred in part the powers of the parliaments and intendants. As soon as it was understood that Necker wished "to keep the parliaments to the honorable and tranquil functions of the magistracy and take away the great objects of administration," he had the parliaments against him. Necker arrived by detour at the position of Maupeou. Whatever repugnance Louis XVI may have had to parting with Necker, after having lost Turgot, he was easily convinced by Maurepas of the danger of this new conflict, as well as of the inconsistency involved in humiliating or again breaking up the parliaments after having restored them. It was extremely difficult to find a way out of these contradictions and Louis XVI began to find himself a slave to his principles. He was turning in a vicious circle. In the meantime, under his artifices, Necker had hidden some enormous gaps.

His successor, Joly de Fleury, revealed the truth; immediately the deficit was imputed to him. He fell in his turn together with the Financial Council which he had established for the purpose of straightening out the accounts. After him the king judged that a professional administrator, an honest man, would best fulfill the task. Lefèvre d'Ormesson employed definite and open measures which had no other effect than to strike a blow at national credit and cause a panic. Within two years, two ministers had tried and failed. Undeterred by their experience, a clever man then presented himself for the office—the famous Calonne.

Calonne has remained famous because he has been regarded as the grave digger of the *ancien régime*. With his name has been associated the famous saying of Beaumarchais, of which the *Figaro* made so much. "The position called for a mathematician, a dancer got it." At the present time history has very nearly rehabilitated the character of Calonne. In any case, his intentions have been better understood. He was an adroit man and seductive, who relied upon the resources of his own wit to solve the most difficult situations. In the face of an empty treasury, he assumed an optimism which he did not feel. Knowing human nature, he thought that to avoid running counter to the same oppositions as his predecessors, it was necessary to adopt an economy that should be agreeable and not nagging; a few generous acts, judiciously carried out and pleasing to certain influential persons, would suppress the outcries and permit the execution of serious reforms. At the same time, by means of a few millions, he would give the impression of wealth and restore credit. A delay could thus be obtained and the resources of France were sufficiently great to free the state from embarrassment in a few years. This is the secret of what history has called the prodigalities of Calonne; they arose from a method very like that of Necker. It has been established, moreover, that the great extravagance of the court has been exaggerated simply because it was so apparent, but that, all told, the "profusions" of Calonne, the expenses which he allowed the queen and the brothers of the king, did not exceed

what Turgot himself had sanctioned. "It is going beyond all limits," writes one of the most recent and most impartial investigators of French financial history, "to see in his favors to the people of the court the principal cause of the ruin of French finances." In short, Calonne, in order to maintain his position, and to gain time, threw dust in the eyes of the people generally, and an occasional sop to the malcontents.

But like all the others, he experienced the hostility of the parliaments whose attitude before any attempt at financial restoration was entirely negative. Ardent in preaching the necessity for economy, they continued on principle to refuse taxes, loans, or reforms. There lay the great obstacle to everything. We may then repeat with even more emphasis what we have already said: In resuscitating the parliaments, Louis XVI had prevented a reform of the state which could have been made without disorder only by the government's acting on its own authority. Thus, through his adherence to the ideas of his ancestor, the Duke of Burgundy, Louis XVI provoked the Revolution.

Indeed, if under Louis XV, Choiseul had flattered the parliaments and Maupeou had dissolved them, it was in both cases that they might not be obliged in case of an *impasse* between the crown and the independent bodies, to have recourse to the arbitration of the States General. Either the crown had to stand by the coup d'état of 1771 or depend for support upon national representation. Louis XVI, hostile to the coup d'état, was led to adopt the second alternative, which for the last twenty-five years had been inevitable. Calonne correctly interpreted the idea of the king when, after two years of conflict with the parliaments, he suggested to him to call an assembly of the nobles, one of the mechanisms of the constitutional and aristocratic monarchy which Fénelon had already conceived.

From this moment (February, 1787) the Revolution was on the way. What did Calonne bring to the notables? A mixture of the ideas of Necker and Turgot, ideas that were being vaguely agitated pretty much everywhere, the program which we shall find the Constituent Assembly adopting in great part. Noth-

ing would be more mistaken than to regard Calonne as a reactionary. It was as a reformer that he addressed the representatives of the three orders, who had been chosen from among the most important or popular personalities. La Fayette was among them as well as some great nobles, celebrated for their "philanthropy" and their devotion to the new ideas. Mirabeau and Talleyrand, at the head of their groups, were making their débuts. Calonne hoped to have the support of this assembly to obtain the reforms that parliament was refusing. Imbued with the optimism of his time, increased by that of his own nature, he thought that by invoking the public welfare he could obtain what he wanted—a new system of taxation, voted by the provincial assemblies with the suppression of the "unjust exemptions." That is, Calonne appealed to the generosity of the privileged classes and to the equalitarian aspirations of the Third Estate. With astounding naïveté, in order the better to work upon their minds, he unveiled the distressing state of the treasury. The nobles, instead of opening their purses, profited by this disclosure to charge him with every crime. The accusations of incapacity and extravagance which burden his memory, date from this time. He became the scapegoat for the collective causes of French bankruptcy. The scandal was such that the king had to ask for his resignation. This first assembly of picked members had at its very beginning overturned a minister hated by the parliaments.

It did nothing else. Loménie de Brienne, a prelate, a friend of Choiseul and the philosophers and said to be an atheist, succeeded Calonne and took up his projects. He obtained nothing more than his predecessor had from the nobles who were determined above everything not to pay. In order to postpone the day of reckoning, they had recourse to the idea that a great reform of the taxes should be approved by the States General or as La Fayette said, "better than that," by a national assembly. And this is exactly where they were heading.

The end of the year 1787 was particularly unfortunate for the monarchy in that it found Louis XVI in contradiction with himself. He was obliged to enter into open conflict with the

parliaments which he had reëstablished. They refused to register the edicts which created new taxes and to recognize the new provincial assemblies; at all points the sovereign courts showed themselves intractable. They also invoked those fundamental laws, those ancient traditions of the realm in virtue of which the king had restored them—respect for ancient provincial customs, the independence and permanent tenure of the magistrates and the voting of subsidies by the States General. Before this stubborn resistance it was necessary to have recourse to the *lits de justice*, the exiling of the parliaments and the arrest of their members. The government was reduced to the methods of the reign of Louis XV without having the power to apply them so energetically; and this time public opinion was hostile. The resistance of parliament, henceforth bound up with the convocation of the States General, was popular. The idea of consulting the nation was promulgated by pamphlets and was associated with the idea of liberty. The philosophic school of enlightened despotism which had sustained Choiseul and Maupeou had disappeared; a liberalism, made popular by the literature of the day and strengthened by the example of America, replaced it.

Brienne, an “impotent Maupeou,” or rather an unconscious one, was not fortunate in his struggle against the parliamentarians. They stood on their tradition. He wished to go further back and invented a plenary court, “established” he claimed on the model of that of the first Capetians, if not of Charlemagne. By this, parliament, which insisted so strongly on its own tradition, would be reduced to the modest functions which it had in the beginning. In short, Brienne was beating the magistrates at their own game. His system, artificial as it was, had but one result. What did it mean? The king in his councils, the people in their States; no intermediary powers, a direct appeal to the nation. Thus Brienne, although he intended only to promise it for a later day, actually was bringing about the convoking of the States General. In appealing to tradition, the government and the parliaments, equally, hastened the hour of opening the dikes. They both killed themselves at the same game. The royal family was torn asunder by it; the

Duke of Orléans entered the opposition and was exiled to Villers-Cotterets for having publicly accused Louis XVI of having acted illegally the day of the enforced registration of the new edicts.

The government became impossible because it had multiplied the obstacles in its own path and set a snare before every step it took, at a moment when there was no good will anywhere. At bottom, the greatest subject of discontent and anxiety was the question of money. The privileged classes feared the taxes; an assembly of the clergy, called by Brienne, who hoped for a subsidy from them, refused blankly and declared on a very convenient pretext that the French people were not taxable at will. On the other hand, the numerous creditors of the state and the holders of state obligations became alarmed. No one wished to pay and the lenders were clamoring for their money. Every one counted on the States General either to free them from taxation or to guarantee the payment of the public debt. They were like so many Simple Simons, impatient to throw themselves into the water for fear of getting wet in the rain. In the meantime the existing taxes were not coming in on account of the new mechanism of the provincial assemblies which did not yet function well. The resources of the treasury were exhausted because, as all confidence had been shaken, not to say destroyed, no one was subscribing to the loans and the bankers refused any advances. The government still struggled on during several months, against the winds and waves, never abandoning the reforms, persisting in showing itself more liberal than parliament and forcing the latter to recognize the civil status of the Protestants. At best, it would have taken five years of tranquillity to establish even moderate order in the finances. It was too late to obtain this respite. The parliaments had talked louder than any one else about the States General, about individual liberty, about the abolition of the *lettres de cachet*. Public opinion took the part of the parliaments whose resistance was paralyzing the state and consigning it to bankruptcy by refusing the taxes. Thus the Revolution began as the Fronde had done, only with the difference that this

time the provinces gave the signal for the movement, Paris having as yet seen only a few manifestations without results.

In Brittany, in Dauphiné, in Béarn, the rigorous measures adopted against the refractory parliaments brought about serious agitation. In those provinces which had been added more or less lately to the realm, just as in the mind of the king himself, there was a strange mixture of feeling, a mixture of new ideas with old, an attachment to the old franchises which had been limited or threatened, and at the same time an enthusiasm for the liberal principles. The extreme complexity of the situation both politically and morally can be felt only if we observe that at Rennes, for example, the nobility took the part of their parliament, that the Breton gentlemen sent to Paris to protest to the king used such insolent language that they were put in the Bastille where they celebrated, amid the applause of the people of Paris, the day of Briennes' downfall. In Dauphiné the nobility counted for little and was confounded with the bourgeoisie. There, all classes united for the defense of the parliament of Dauphiné. An assembly of the three orders was formed at the same time and, the government having forbidden it Grenoble, it sat at Vizille whence was issued, on July twenty-first, a declaration which resounded throughout France. It was a clear, complete program of which Judge Mounier was the author; a striking résumé of the ideas which had been floating about for the last ten years and which the ministers themselves had launched—no reforms; no subsidies without the previous vote of the States General; the election of all deputies; double representation for the Third Estate; and finally the vote by head and not by orders; that is to say, the possibility for the Third Estate to have a majority over the other two. This program spread over France and had an enormous success. The old cask of the States General, put in its place of honor by the amateurs of tradition, was to be refilled with new wine. A curious thing happened which is not surprising after what we have already seen; some lagging recruits were counting on the States General in order to play politics and to defend their own interests, as happened in the

parliaments of 1614. Certain *cahiers* show that the nobility hoped to throw the weight of the taxes upon the clergy and vice versa. There was instead to be a great housecleaning, in the course of which would disappear privileges, exemptions, old provincial franchises, parliaments themselves, government, and monarchy—everything that they had hoped, through the return to the old institution, to preserve and rejuvenate.

When the proclamation of Vizille was launched, Brienne had already, on July fifth, announced a meeting of the States General, but did not fix the date. The assembly of the clergy, by refusing all financial aid, had struck the knell of this bishop-minister. In all this agitation, the financial questions were closely bound up with the political. The treasury was empty and reduced to the last extremities. They were even on the point of suspending interest payments on their loans. It was becoming difficult to pay the public officials. Finally, to soften the blow, Brienne, on the eighth of August, definitely convoked the States General for May first, 1789. On the sixteenth he announced that the state was at the end of its resources and, for this semi-bankruptcy, he gave the reason which still remains the true one: "Public confidence had been destroyed by the very ones who should have conspired to preserve it; the public loans had been refused as though they had not been necessary." Then amid the general hue and cry, greater even than that which assailed Calonne, Brienne fell.

Thus the financial wound from which the old régime had suffered so long had finally become fatal. And the root of the evil lay in the liberties, franchises, and immunities—the historic inheritance of the difficult French constitution—in guaranties which rendered the individual or the special group stronger and the state weaker. We no longer have the idea of fiscal exemptions with regard to estates or towns; of sovereign courts whose magistrates, having bought their charges, are independent of the government and systematically favor the cause of the taxpayers; of privileged or recently acquired provinces who enjoy a financial autonomy. At that time one-quarter of all France lived under a different régime from the rest. The clergy, equally in-

dependent, had its budget, its debt, its charges, but with respect to the state it could accord or refuse at will its "free gift." Under the combined weight of these opposing privileges, the finances of the state succumbed and with them the old régime, because it had abandoned the policy which Richelieu, Louis XIV, and Louis XV had laid down for it; because it had relinquished its own power to the powers which it should have dominated and disciplined. And what happened afterwards? Whatever may have been the fiscal work of the Revolution, whatever simplifications, whatever unity it may have effected in the state, it succeeded no better than the monarchy because at the same time it provoked disorders that it could not suppress. Furthermore, it immediately fell into an irremediable bankruptcy, that of the assignats. Financial order was not to be restored again until the dictatorship of Napoleon. Whence we come to this paradoxical conclusion—paradoxical in appearance only—that at the very moment when it was being accused of despotism, the monarchy's greatest need was authority.

Since the monarchy perished through the question of money, it is well to investigate as to whether this question was insoluble. Two facts will show; the deficit, according to Brienne's report was 160 million on an expenditure of half a billion. France at that time had a population of about 25 million; it was then a matter of six or seven francs a head. On the other hand the interest on the loans absorbed about half of the receipts. Such a proportion seemed excessive and ruinous until the day when France's postwar budgets showed a far greater disproportion. We cannot therefore say that her situation was desperate. It was without issue only, we repeat, through the incapacity of the state to create for itself sufficient resources and to collect taxes calculated on the basis of its needs. In this respect the Revolution will be no more fortunate and the liberty which it strove to create will succeed no better than the liberties offered by Louis XVI. As for the expenses of the royal family, and of the court; as for the favors and pensions of which so much has been said, aside from the fact that many of them were rewards for services rendered to the state and constituted re-

tiring allowances, nothing more just can be said than what Marion says in his *Financial History of France*: "There does not exist and there cannot exist any statistics of this sort of expense or of resources exhausted, any more than there can exist, in times much nearer our own, statistics of economies which were not effected, of sinecures, established and maintained, of useless expenses imposed by parliamentary influences and by the obligation of representatives to their constituents."

However, it was necessary to pull through until the convocation of the States, on which every one set his hopes. Louis XVI recalled the magician, the prestidigitator, Necker, the man through whom credit was restored. This time Necker had all the powers of a minister and he set himself to the work full of confidence in his own talents. He loaned two million of his personal fortune to the treasury, obtained advances from the bankers and paid everything with an open hand. But Necker's great fault, especially at such a time, was that he saw everything from the financial and not from the political point of view. He did not understand what was going on and was as astonished as many others at the Revolution. His excuse lies in a misunderstanding which was well-nigh general. This was evident when parliament, with its usual reactionary spirit, decided that the States should be held in the same manner as those of 1614. At bottom, every one counted on these States to defend his own interests as upon those of former centuries. The crown itself thought that, as formerly, the orders, classes, and independent bodies would clash and that it would be the arbitrator of this struggle. But that time was past. The claim of the Third Estate, that of the right to vote by head, formulated at Vizille, became irresistible. For having resisted it, parliament lost its popularity in a day. Necker, like Calonne, having had the idea of consulting the notables, who in 1787 had demanded the States General in order to avoid a sacrifice of money, became hostile the moment these States no longer responded to their calculations, and diminished the power of the first two orders to the profit of the third. Notables and parliaments alike then regretted having called so loudly for national representation.

It was too late. But in a France which a little while ago had been unanimous, a new schism was soon to appear.

There was not only misunderstanding. Much has been said, even admiringly, of the *cahiers* which, according to the custom of the day, were prepared in every district and which summed up the wishes of the nation. In reality they were either very contradictory or very vague. They raised every problem and solved none. It is true that we find in them no word uttered against the monarchy and, so far as they were concerned, France appeared to be entirely royalist. But what they demanded was equivalent to an overturning of government and society. They manifested a keen attachment to the old liberties and local privileges together with the desire to unify the laws. Above all, and there the three orders are in agreement, they strongly advocated the principle, very old and very natural, that taxes ought to be agreed to and their use controlled by those who pay them. Care for the finances, hatred of a deficit and of bankruptcy—admirable sentiments in themselves—were accompanied by a pitiless criticism of the existing taxes. We find the privileged classes holding the more tenaciously to their exemptions in that the latter protected them against the *taille*, that is from the fiscal inventory. No more personal taxes, no more *tailles*; on that point there was perfect accord. This reform was to be realized—a legitimate and an excellent one. For more than a century, up to our own day, the French will be delivered from the tax on their incomes; secrecy with regard to their private affairs, a thing to which they are strongly attached, will be respected. But this desire is nothing new; we recognize in it the spirit of ancient France in its long struggle against taxation. What above all else the *cahiers* show is the desire not to pay, or to pay as little as possible. The kind of taxation which they demanded was the lightest possible, since common sense told them that there must be some. But they would have no other. Indirect taxes were proscribed, those on beverages as well as those on salt. In other words, the state was to have increased expenses and decreased resources. Furthermore, the revolutionary governments, slaves of demagogy,

were to be rapidly led into financial difficulties and expedients worse than those from which they had just emerged. In addition, once anarchy had declared itself, the taxpayers would immediately interpret the wishes of the *cahiers*, would go on strike, and would not pay anything. Carnot said later, "Every agitation of the people, whatever may be the apparent or immediate causes, has at bottom only one end, that of ridding themselves of the burden of taxation."

The deputies who on May 5, 1789, came together at Versailles, did not suspect the difficulties in store for them. Soon the responsibilities of administration would devolve upon the Third Estate and they were to enter upon a determined struggle to wrest the government from the monarchy. In following the history of this time, as it was truly enacted, we shall see the government pass into new hands without the nature of the task's having changed.

The language of the times which was especially declamatory, and the famous sayings, often prepared in advance, have lent to these events an heroic and legendary character. As a matter of fact, they surprised every one and no one desired what really happened. The government, that is Necker, meant to obtain from the deputies only the means for contracting his loans and reëstablishing the finances. He had no political plans or ideas. He allowed things to drift. The nobility were immediately offended because the tactics of the old States General had been discarded at the beginning; the clergy had gone over to the bourgeoisie, and the Third Estate, having held out for the vote by heads, had declared that it was no longer a question of a States General but of a national assembly where the three orders would deliberate in common. The king and the government were utterly disconcerted by this new state of affairs, in spite of the fact that everything had been tending in this direction. As for the deputies of the Third Estate and of the clergy, they never suspected that they would be carried so far and then overtaken and left behind by the popular forces already in motion. No one seemed even to have noticed the frequent bloody riots which had taken place in Paris in the winter of

1788-89 and which the famine, or fear of it, had provoked; nor the violent incidents which in many places had accompanied the electoral campaign. In any case the government had shown the greatest lack of prudence in convoking the States at Versailles, within a stone's throw of that great capital where riot was rife.

The Third Estate took two months to carry off its first victory, the transformation of the States General into a National Assembly. It feared that it might be dissolved; on the twentieth of April, by the oath of the *Jeu de Paume*, six hundred deputies swore that they would not adjourn before having "established the constitution of the realm." This was a cruel embarrassment for the government. It had troops and could dissolve the Assembly, certainly. But Necker contended that the deputies had been convoked in order to obtain money and that things would be worse off than before. The Assembly was not dissolved. The government (according to the regulation of June twenty-third) recognized that the taxes and loans had to be voted, admitted the States to participation in the legislative reforms, but would not yield on the division of the three orders. That is, it did not admit the transformation of the States General into a National Assembly, a transformation for which the Third Estate, the majority of the clergy, and some members of the nobility had already pronounced themselves. All the deputies decided to remain in session and when the Marquis Dreux-Brézé came to remind them that the three orders were to sit separately, Mirabeau replied in that famous saying in which he set the will of the people in opposition to that of the king: "We will leave only by force." A clever challenge; Mirabeau well knew that the government, strangled by the need of money, prisoner of its own principles, watched by an hostile parliament, could not dissolve the States General. The Third Estate had won. It was joined by the clergy as a whole. A large part of the nobility went over to it with the Duke of Orléans, and the rest followed less by conviction than by prudence. At Paris, even at Versailles, the noise of uprising was already beginning to be heard. Mounier and Mirabeau were anxious and the

government did what any government would have done in its place; it took measures to preserve order. Immediately the rumor was started that the Assembly was going to be dissolved; agitation in Paris grew and increased the more when Necker, who disapproved of the presence of the troops, left the ministry (July 11). On the twelfth of April it was learned that the king had chosen as ministers Breteuil and those who were already styled men of the court party, or the queen's party. It was but a pretense at a coup d'état and only served to hasten the capitulation which was sure to come.

The insurrection which thereupon broke out in Paris, and which was fully successful, was not what the moderate spirits, the bourgeois who formed the majority of the Assembly and who had conducted the movement for reform in the provinces, had dreamed. It was not the more respectable part of the population, not even the electors who had seized the guns and cannon at the Hôtel des Invalides, who, on July fourteenth, took the Bastille, massacred its governor, De Launay, and paraded his head through the streets together with that of Flesselles, the provost of the merchants. Ordinarily the French bourgeoisie has little taste for disorders of this kind and it must be confessed that at the first news which they had of it, the Assembly of Versailles was filled with consternation. It was only afterwards that the taking of the Bastille became a glorious and symbolic event. But there is little doubt that this insurrection, which let loose dangerous passions, had at least been encouraged by those who were already known as "capitalists," by men who at bottom stood especially for order which was represented for them by the regular payment of interest and for whom the departure of Necker was synonymous with bankruptcy. Necker was recalled since his name was a fetish with the *rentiers*; but already the wherewithal to pay them was disappearing.

The taking of the Bastille was indeed a symbol. It not only resounded in Königsberg where Kant even gave up his afternoon promenade because of it. In France it was the beginning of an anarchy which was all ready to break loose. The disavowal of measures taken to preserve order, the command forbidding

the troops to fire on the crowd, the fraternizing of certain troops (the French guards) with the people, the absence of all repression after the uprising had their necessary consequences and prolonged results. After the fourteenth of July, a vast insurrection broke out in France. Against whom? Against the old object of general hatred, the treasury, the taxation. In the towns, the crowds demolished the offices of the tax collectors, burned the registers, and maltreated the commissioners—a sure means of getting rid of taxes. There was a *Jacquerie* in the country districts and it was no new phenomenon. Thus were translated the demands so reasonably expressed in the *cahiers*. The ambassador of the Venetian Republic, observing affairs with a keen eye, wrote, “A horrible anarchy is the first result of the regeneration that it was desired to give France. . . . There are no longer executive power, laws, magistrates, or police.”

This explosion, called by Taine the “spontaneous anarchy,” did not escape the Assembly. They were terrified by it, and dealt with the crowd as the king had dealt with them—by impulse and without reflection. A report concerning brigandage, ending in the same terms as had the Venetian ambassador’s, spread alarm. Something had to be done to calm the people for whom the promise of just and regularly voted taxes was a meager satisfaction. On the fourth of August, at an evening session, a deputy of the nobles, the Viscomte de Noailles, proposed to suppress the feudal rights. What remained of these rights were naturally much hated. For centuries tenants had been buying them off with the land itself and it is calculated that only the twentieth part of these rights still remained the property of the older nobles. Feudalism had been declining for a long time. The sacrifice was none the less praiseworthy for that. It would have been more so if the proprietors of the feudal rights had not, at the same time, relieved themselves of the feudal obligations, the heaviest of which was military service. Above all, this sacrifice would have had more force had it not been made under the influence of fear and in a very reckless manner. As a result, as though

in a sort of delirium, everybody proposed to sacrifice privileges. After the signorial rights went the tithe, upon which however depended all public charities; after the tithe, the special privileges of the provinces, the communes, and the corporations. In this night of panic rather than enthusiasm were abolished pell mell, without discrimination, rights of historic origin, which belonged to Frenchmen who were nobles as well as to those who were not; things that were outworn, and things which deserved to remain. An entire organization of social life disappeared and its downfall created a void which in our own day legislation has attempted to remedy in order not to leave individuals isolated and without protection. Mirabeau who was absent on that night was the first to blame this tremendous demolition, this "electric storm," and to foresee its consequences. "They had," said Rivarol, "uprooted the tree that they should have trimmed." It was already impossible to retrieve this mistake and one evil, at least the immediate evil, was irreparable. Because if at one fell swoop France had been made uniform through the suppression of all the exceptions, which had made financial administration so difficult, the state at the same time took over burdens which, in many cases, were the offset to the abolished privileges. As for the public generally, it interpreted this hecatomb in the light of its own desires, that is, a deliverance from all obligations. The result was that overnight every one ceased paying. The collection of the taxes which the Assembly thought had been reëstablished by proclaiming justice for all, only became the more difficult. They had thought to "stop the fire by pulling down the houses," but the violence of the flames were only redoubled.

At the end of this same month, August, 1789, Necker was in trouble again and appeared before the Assembly. The treasury was again empty. The public revenues were exhausted and the receipts did not cover half the expenses. Necker called upon the Assembly to establish order, without which the collection of taxes was impossible, and to authorize a loan. The taxes came in no better and the loan lagged. On the twenty-fourth of September Necker announced that he was checkmated

and could do nothing more. He described the increasing penury of the state, the danger of leaving it without resources when the scarcity of food was already causing trouble, and asked them to vote a special contribution, to be called a "patriotic tax," of a quarter of all net incomes over four hundred livres.

The Assembly was more distressed by this demand than by the portrayal of the disorders which had ruined the treasury. Having come together to find a remedy for the deficit and to lighten the taxes, they found themselves face to face with an increased deficit and the necessity of levying a tax heavier than any that had existed before. For these representatives of the middle classes, it was a terrible blow. Certainly this was not what the Third Estate had expected. It appeared from Necker's speech, the speech of the financier, that a revolution was not a good method for solving the financial question, the question which so terrified France and of which she so bitterly complained. The Assembly feared the discredit it would bring upon itself with regard to this part of its program, since the constitutional government which it wished to establish had promised to do better than the absolute monarchy. It was on the point of refusing the tax. At this moment Mirabeau, with a greater sense for the state and government, intervened and carried the majority with him by showing that the Assembly would perish all the more surely by a "hideous bankruptcy." It was this indeed that was to kill the Revolution a few years later.

In the writing of history the dividing into chapters is, for the most part, artificial; the breaks are arbitrary, because events are always moving. When did the Revolution begin? At what moment did the reign of Louis XVI end? Several dates might be given. It seems rational to fix the days of October, 1789, for the reasons which follow.

The States General had opened in accordance with the traditional principles and ceremonials. Then the distinction between the three orders, an essential distinction, had disappeared. The States had become a National Assembly which proclaimed itself a Constituent Assembly. While it was occupied in giving

a constitution to the realm, that is, a new form to society and government, it had not only been powerless to find a remedy for the financial ills, the purpose for which it had been convoked, but it had actually aggravated those ills. Every one therefore was surprised and disappointed. But if the king and the Assembly understood far better than has been admitted that it was a question of revolution, it was too near its inception for them not to believe that everything could be arranged. They were also too close to believe that they were in an entirely new situation. And in fact it was not new. There was one thing necessary for it to become so: that the debate should no longer be between the king and the Assembly merely, that another force, and this time one truly revolutionary, should intervene, should impose itself upon these two powers and should thenceforth become more powerful than they. This happened in October at the moment when the royal authority had already been diminished by the Assembly and when the prestige of the Assembly had been weakened by its inability to maintain order or reëstablish the finances.

Since July the Assembly had been discussing the Constitution and Louis XVI had allowed this debate to begin. But he was the living law. It was for him to accept or reject the blows dealt to his authority. The Assembly therefore always feared refusal and was tempted to see either at court or in the army, plots for encouraging the king in his resistance. To spread the fear of these plots and to denounce them constantly, was the rôle of the agitators who quickly appeared on all sides and for whom the taking of the Bastille and the disorders which followed it had been a signal victory. Among them were such men as Camille Desmoulins, Marat, and Loustalot who by their speeches and through the press were rousing all Paris. The Assembly distrusted Paris where its new and extremely dangerous municipal law, the origin of all that was to happen later, had created a commune of three hundred members. This commune was still moderate in temper but it was served by a national guard which under the direction of La Fayette, a utopian idealist, avid of popularity, was a poor guaranty of

order. The Parisian agitators did not miss an opportunity to arouse the rabble, and the growing anxiety of the Assembly whom they unceasingly menaced and intimidated, did not escape them. During the first days of October the rumor was started that at Versailles, at a banquet of the bodyguard, the new tricolored cockade had been trodden under foot and that the king was preparing to use force. On the fifth, a few of the Paris bakeries having run out of bread, because the supply was beginning to suffer from the general disorganization, there was an uprising of the women, which increased rapidly and the watchword, "To Versailles," was circulated everywhere. Lafayette, after a little hesitation, had the great weakness to yield and the national guard, instead of barring its way, followed the tumultuous crowd. The rioters then proceeded to Versailles, invaded the National Assembly and the chateau, cut the throats of the bodyguard and demanded that the king should return to Paris. Lafayette promised this and on the sixth of October, followed by the crowd, or rather its prisoner, he conducted the king, the queen, the dauphin and the deputies, back to the capital. "We are bringing back the baker, the baker's wife and the baker's little boy," sang the crowd. The sad truth was that the king and the Assembly had both capitulated. From that time on, the rioters held their hostages. On the day when the more violent elements were to become masters of Paris and its municipality, its commune, they were also to become the masters of the government of France. The history, the mechanism, the progress of the Revolution up to the 9th Thermidor are to be found in these significant events.

CHAPTER XVI

THE REVOLUTION

THE sinister meaning of those days of October, when even the worst excesses went unpunished, was finally understood; one hundred and twenty deputies, finding that the Assembly was no longer free, withdrew. Among them was Mounier, the author of the Vizille program. Moreover, ever since the month of June, emigration had been going on. From the ideal of fraternity, men were passing into civil war just as a little later, for the love of humanity, they would rush into foreign war.

The effect of the first emigrations was not merely that, within, it weakened the elements most likely to resist disorder. For the most part, the *émigrés* were not timid or afraid of revolution; they were men of energy who wanted to combat it and who found it as natural to go over to the enemy as, under the Fronde, Condé and Turenne had done. They were thus led to take up arms against France and perceived too late that the European powers were not disposed to make any sacrifices to restore the French monarchy. The first emigration brought in its train serious consequences within France. It caused great embarrassment to the king whom the *émigrés* did not pardon for his concessions to the revolutionary party and who was caught between two fires. The deputies of the Third Estate who, like Mounier, withdrew through spite and immediately gave up the struggle, were just as guilty. In any case, both had come to understand that it was a question of a revolution. But there were still many who kept their illusions or were blind to everything. In this respect, one of the comic incidents which marked these tragic times was that presented by the parliament when they pretended, as though nothing had changed, to register the decrees of the National Assembly in the same way that

they had registered the royal edicts. They were finally made to understand that they were dreaming, and were suppressed and forgotten.

Towards the end of the year 1789, only a few months had passed since the convoking of the States General. Already so much had been transformed that a simple return to the old state of affairs was no longer possible. Louis XVI's acceptance of all these events has seemed inexplicable. His unconquerable aversion to the use of force does not entirely explain his passivity. But the author of *Télémaque* and the wise Mentor himself would have been quite as embarrassed as he. Let us imagine that at any moment a bold stroke would have broken up the Assembly. What sort of a government would have been left? Would the king have reëstablished the parliaments, restored the privileged provinces, those states whose opposition and resistance had so hampered the monarchy? The old institutions of historic origin, to which the king himself had attempted to give new life, had been overturned by the States General, also an institution of historic origin. Where was the way out? This contradiction had paralyzed the king's action from the beginning of his reign. Perhaps he came to think, as did some of the men who had seen the embarrassments of the government before 1789, that after all what was disappearing had invited and deserved its fate. However, it was necessary to replace what had been destroyed. The constitution which the Assembly was elaborating had to take the place of customs, of traditional rights, of fundamental laws which made up what the jurists called the former Constitution of the realm. They still expected to preserve the rôle and future of the monarchy, the principle of which had never even questioned. In 1789, according to Camille Desmoulins, there were not six avowed republicans in France.

But it was not only a question of giving the realm a form of government and of choosing between the constitutional theories then in vogue. It was a question of governing while the constitution was in the making. This the Assembly undertook to do; and some of the measures which it adopted were to produce

some totally unexpected repercussions. Moreover, it was necessary to reckon with personal ambitions, men who were aspiring to power, opposing parties which had immediately appeared and who would fight to obtain control. The monarchical constitution which was being prepared was destined to be ephemeral; for the same reasons those which followed it were to be no less so.

In order to find our way through these confused events we must bear in mind a few simple and clear ideas. Every one knows that up to the 9th Thermidor, the most violent of the revolutionaries eliminated successively, first, the more moderate spirits, and then the less violent. The mechanism of these successive eliminations was always the same. It served against the Constitutionals, the Girondins and against Danton. The system consisted in dominating the commune of Paris, in taking possession of it, in keeping the turbulent parties in Paris in a state of continual exaltation by means of the press and of the clubs, and in playing upon such powerful sentiments as the fear of treason and of famine, through which a large city can always be roused; and then by intimidating, through insurrection, the assemblies filled with weak and hesitating men. The financial, religious, and foreign policies of the first two assemblies, the Constituent and the Legislative, aided to a singular degree the progress of that demagoguery which triumphed under the Convention.

The executive power was suspended and the ministers counted for naught. Assuming sovereign power, the Assembly passed laws continuously. It reorganized all of France, simplified even the map, divided the provinces into departments of about equal size, and brought uniformity where there had been diversity. This superpower was brought to a halt by the deficit. The Assembly even aggravated the distress of the treasury by innovations which created new expenses. By forcing certain measures of redemption and reimbursements, it exhausted the old resources without supplying new ones. The abolition of fiscal privileges did no good because those who had not been exempt before asked for and obtained discounts which quite offset the

amount which the former privileged classes would pay in the future. As for collecting the taxes, we have already seen that the prevailing anarchy made the results almost ridiculous. They were to fall more and more below what was expected because of the relaxation of authority, the general disorganization, and the overturning of private fortunes.

By autumn, the Assembly found itself before an impassable gulf. Necker, with his old expedients, was no longer heeded. The magician of yesterday had lost his prestige. It was necessary to find some new remedy and the one they hit upon was strange. The clergy possessed a large number of landed properties. Calonne had already considered using them to make up this deficit. The clergy had to consent to "put its lands at the disposition of the nation" for operations of credit, much like those which took place under the old régime when the state borrowed readily through the intermediary of the great bodies and the municipalities. As soon as the Assembly was able to "dispose" of this enormous capital, it was tempted to turn it into money in order to rid itself of financial embarrassments worse than those which it thought it could remedy. The ecclesiastical property, soon increased by that of the crown and of the *émigrés*, formed the nationalized property that was put up at auctions. The assignats were in a sense mortgage bonds, guaranteed by the nationalized property, and represented an advance on what their sale would produce. Only since the value of the lands to be confiscated was considerable (it has been estimated at about two billions) and since the government wished to avoid any chance of failure, it stipulated, in order to attract buyers, that the latter would have twelve years in which to pay. These provisions had consequences of historic importance, which no one foresaw.

In fact, the 400 millions of assignats in the form of mortgage bonds, issued in the month of December, 1789, were rapidly absorbed. They represented a claim for that amount against the confiscated property. The needs of the treasury were immense and always increasing. In April, 1790, the Assembly started another stage in their proceedings. The clergy

were purely and simply dispossessed, in exchange for which the state assumed the expenses of the Church and of public charity. The wealth of which the Assembly had taken possession was to put to an end all financial difficulties by securing resources which were considered to be almost inexhaustible. It served as a basis for another issue of assignats, this time, of paper money. There were many warnings, even in the Assembly. Law's disastrous example was recalled. Certain orators prophesied what was actually to happen—the progressive decline in value of the assignats and the misery which would follow. But the means were too tempting and the Assembly had no other way of fulfilling its promises. From that time on, the malady of inflation followed its fatal course—constant depreciation which could not be controlled, and which called for larger and larger issues—just what we have seen in our own day in Russia and Germany. Starting with four hundred millions, the Revolution, at the end of a few years will have issued 45 billions of assignats when it will finally have to announce itself completely bankrupt.

The system of paper money, by ruining private fortunes, raising the cost of living, and by provoking speculation and panic, contributed not a little, especially in Paris, to keeping up that insurrectional state of mind so indispensable to the ringleaders. But, by a very natural phenomenon, the assignats, from which the towns suffered at once, were a blessing to the country districts. As a matter of fact, it was through the assignats which were depreciating every day, but of which, in exchange for their products, they received larger and larger quantities, that the buyers of the nationalized properties, peasants, for the most part, managed to free themselves. In 1796, long before the expiration of the twelve years, an assignat of one hundred livres was worth just six sous. However, the state received its own paper at par. It happened, therefore, that many managed to become proprietors at the price of a few pullets. The new conveyances of the nationalized properties were made on equally advantageous conditions, assignats and orders having collapsed at an increasingly rapid rate. Thus

was swallowed up without any profit to the state but greatly to the benefit of the rural districts, the enormous capital which was to reëstablish the national finances. The operation was disastrous for the public treasury, the stockholders and the inhabitants of the towns. It was magnificent and unexpected for the farmers. And the less their acquisitions had cost them, the more they wished for the duration of the régime which had permitted them to enrich themselves. Since in most cases they had acquired the land for almost nothing, they feared either that it would be taken back again or that they would be called to render an account and forced to supplement the price. They thus became interested partisans of the Revolution which found that the paper money was an attraction which more than balanced the antagonism caused by the sufferings and vexations (the law of the maximum, requisitions and lawsuits) which the frightfully high cost of living quickly brought about. One might say that without the assignats, the sale of the nationalized property would not have brought to the Revolution what may probably be considered its most solid popularity.

In committing itself to the paper money, the Assembly thus opened a whole series of consequences. The confiscation of the ecclesiastical possessions opened another. It is difficult not to see a connection between this measure and that which the Assembly took in July, 1790, when it voted the civil constitution of the clergy. They had dispossessed the clergy partly that it should be less strong. They should have suspected that it might remain the stronger for the very fact that it had been dispossessed. The second order, that of the nobility, had been suppressed and its titles abolished. The first order (it realized it too late) was to disappear in its turn. In order that the clergy should cease to be a political body, the Assembly wished to make it dependent upon the civil power. In order to bring this about, it attempted to control the organization of the Church. By so doing it immediately touched the consciences of the people and created a new sort of conflict. Almost everywhere the priests who had sworn loyalty to the civil constitution which was not recognized by the Pope, were disavowed by

the faithful. The "unsworn" priest, was the true priest. In wishing to prevent a counter-revolution the members of the Constituent Assembly gave it formidable nourishment. They started the religious war.

In order to overturn so many things, to disregard so many interests, traditions and sentiments, the majority, opposed by the Right wing which included men of talent like Maury and Cazalès, needed support from without. It was condemned from the very first hour to seek the aid of demagoguery and not to recognize the Left as enemies. It looked upon Camille Desmoulins and Marat himself, as useful auxiliaries through the impetus which they gave. Furthermore, it refused to put a stop to the excesses of the press, even of the sanguinary, *l'Ami du Peuple*. Neither would it renounce making public the debates nor forbid demonstrations by the galleries, nor the bringing into the Chamber of sometimes scandalous delegations. Neither would it close the clubs and popular societies which were the heaven of the Revolution. They themselves had, as a meeting place, the Jacobin Club where their policy originated. Those who were to separate themselves from the mother cell, like the Feuillants and the Girondists, were to find themselves isolated and crushed. The majority had need of the rabble, through which if necessary a riot could be started. The national guard, entrusted to La Fayette, had been founded to preserve both order and the Revolution. Two-thirds of the sections of which it was composed, in Paris, were more favorable to the Revolution than to order and they had, as chiefs, Danton and Santerre. The rest of France had been divided into districts whose electoral committees, permanently open, were centers of agitation; they were never dissolved nor their offices closed.

The two men who by reason of their personal situation and their popularity could pretend to any sort of a great rôle, Lafayette and Mirabeau, were jealous of each other and could not agree. Both made use of the same methods of flattering the crowd, and used at the same time both the court and the agitators in order to obtain control. In this way, they also

made for disorder; only, endowed with political talent, Mirabeau perceived first in what direction the Assembly was tending. He wished to stop, hold back, and dike up the Revolution. Ever since March, 1790, he had been negotiating with the king and queen. He overwhelmed them with his advice. It was a moment of calm, when Louis himself had the illusion that his concessions, certain of which had surprised even his adversaries, might not be useless. The Fête of the Federation at the Champ de Mars seemed to mark a better feeling. The day chosen for the reunion of the delegates from the national guards, and the deputations from all the departments, and for celebrating the new unity of France was the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. This event had already become a symbol and a legend, purified and rid of all memories of insurrection and riot. The national guards and the members of the Federation, sixty thousand men from all the former provinces, represented the French bourgeoisie. Even at Paris, the electors, all bourgeois and taxpayers, had just renominated Bailly and the moderate municipality. Everybody, the king at their head, took the oath of loyalty to the Federation before the "altar of the Fatherland." It was the triumph of the middle classes. Camille Desmoulins and Marat were only the more ardent to excite the true "patriots" to denounce the reaction, the "great treason" of M. de Mirabeau and to demand hangings and massacres. The majority of the Assembly, faithful to its policy, refused to take action against these demagogues. The result was that a year later on this same Champ de Mars, where he had been acclaimed and where there had been a general embracing, Lafayette commanded the troops to fire upon the crowd.

From the time of the Fête of the Federation, from that illusory calm, up to 1791, the disorder became more and more aggravated. It was not only the customs offices that were pillaged. There was no longer merely a *Jacquerie*; military mutinies appeared. These had already been going on for some time in the war ports and the French ambassador at London reported that England was rejoicing over the disorganization

of the French navy through these troubles. The Assembly had closed its eyes to these disorders, even to the serious ones which had taken place at Toulon. In the month of August, 1790, it had to be admitted that insubordination was growing in the army. After three regiments had revolted at Nancy, the Assembly bestirred itself and ordered Bouillé, who was commanding at Metz, to suppress it. The repression was severe and in the "patriot" papers, the mutineers of the regiment of Châteauvieux were represented as martyrs. The example of Nancy and the energy of Bouillé stopped the disintegration of the army, but the Assembly, intimidated by the press, dared interfere no more. A general insurrection of the crews, which soon broke out at Brest, was not repressed. In a short time, discipline in the fleets and in the dockyards was ruined. Some attacks were made upon the officers themselves, a great part of whom emigrated, abandoning "posts where there was no longer either honor or security." Soon the Revolution was to find itself at war with England and its fleet could do no more than let itself be sunk, after the manner of the *Vengeur*. Bouillé had at least rendered the service of keeping the old army on its feet and the Revolution was very shortly to need it.

"A hundred pamphleteers whose sole opportunity was disorder, a multitude of independent foreigners who preached discord in all the public places, an immense populace accustomed for a year to a succession of victories and crimes;" it is in these terms that Mirabeau described the state of Paris at the end of the year 1790, three months after the final retirement of Necker. Mirabeau then undertook to moderate the Revolution without breaking with it, even remaining in alliance with the Jacobins. He wished to make use of what prestige royalty still possessed, to prepare for the next elections so as to obtain an Assembly of less advanced ideas which would revise the Constitution in a reasonable way and so as not to diminish the royal power excessively. Mirabeau was not the only one who was forming projects of this sort. In order to carry out these designs, it was necessary to find some support since the Jacobins were relying upon the power of riots. Mirabeau had

been thinking for a long time of removing the king and the Assembly out of reach of the influence of the Parisian demagoguery. It would be necessary to have an armed force in order to accomplish this removal but it was impossible to count on the national guard and, besides, La Fayette, who had been approached on the subject, had refused. There remained the regular army. Bouillé, the commander who had come before the public through the repression of the insubordination at Nancy, proposed a plan by which Louis XVI should join him at Montmédy, after which it would be possible to convoke a new Assembly somewhere else than at Paris.

No one knows what success this plan might have had if Mirabeau had lived. Would he have been able to obtain from the Assembly the authorization to allow the king to leave for any place whatsoever on the frontier? Would he even have persisted in his projects? The secret had leaked out and the Jacobins, put on their guard, were already demanding measures against emigration and the *émigrés*. In any case, Mirabeau died after a brief illness, April 2, 1791. His relations with the court had become known. He was openly accused of having received money to pay his personal debts. In spite of the solemn funeral ceremonies which were observed in his honor, his credit began to suffer under the violent attacks of Desmoulins and Marat. It is probable that he would soon have been compelled to defend himself; he had foreseen the possibility of his "ostracism." He disappeared. His plans, uncertain enough when he was there to defend them, were now becoming very hazardous. However, Louis XVI and Bouillé persisted in them; they even saw in the death of Mirabeau one reason the more for escaping from the Parisian tyranny. On April eighteenth a riot had prevented the king from going to Saint-Cloud and Danton's battalion of the national guard had held La Fayette back when he was hastening to clear the Tuileries. In spite of the Constitution, the king was no longer free. The Constitutional party was powerless to protect his liberty. This event decided Louis. He left the Tuileries with his family during the night of June twentieth to join Bouillé at Mont-

médy. Recognized at Varennes, he was arrested and brought back to Paris.

This flight had been badly planned. Bouillé was hardly sure of his troops, among whom the Jacobins, who hated and suspected him, had been spreading their propaganda. If Louis XVI had wished to leave France to emigrate as Monsieur—the future Louis XVIII—had done and who reached Belgium without difficulty, he could easily have escaped. Having returned to Paris, more than ever a prisoner, there remained to him the possibility of abdicating, of saving his head by renouncing the throne. This idea never for a moment occurred to him; a king of France did not abdicate. Neither Charles VII nor Henry III, in circumstances perhaps worse than these, had done so.

Moreover, the episode at Varennes had had the effect of making Louis more precious than ever to those who were called the Constitutionals. Without the king, however insignificant they rendered his rôle, the Constitution which they had made would fall to earth and they with it. The flight of the king had increased the boldness of the extremists who were crying for the overthrow of Louis. If the monarchy disappeared, it would mean the triumph of the violent party. The Constitutionalists, who had thought that all would be well and that they could put a stop to this era of revolution, began to fear an endless anarchy. They also began to fear lest the Extreme Left, of which, up to that point, they had made use as an advance guard, should be victorious. They came, therefore, to have more regard for royalty and less complacency towards the demagogues. It was like a halt of a few months, an attempt at reaction against the disorder, but without hope and without results.

On July fifteenth, the majority of the Assembly had decided that since the king was inviolable, the Varennes incident would have no aftermath. On the sixteenth, the Jacobins laid upon the altar of the country, at the Champ de Mars, a petition which called for the abdication of the king and they organized a manifestation against the Assembly which the ringleaders

took upon themselves to turn into a riot. For the first and only time the Assembly held its ground and proclaimed martial law. La Fayette himself ordered the guards to fire on the crowd who refused to obey his commands. On this same spot where a year earlier there had been fraternizing and rejoicing, there now lay three or four hundred killed and wounded.

The agitators trembled and believed their cause lost. A little more vigor and the demagogues would have run to cover. They were reassured when they saw that the Constitutionals were not hunting out those responsible for the trouble and that they did not even dare close the Jacobin Club which they had abandoned to form another, that of the Feuillants. The energy of the moderates stopped with the fusillade of the Champ de Mars and it is easy to understand why the members of the Right, the *émigrés* themselves to whom the Constitutionals now turned, did not respond to their overtures; these weak shows of resistance inspired the confidence of no one. As a matter of fact only six deputies remained with the Jacobins, but the Club remained the soul of the Revolution. It was necessary to conquer the Extreme Left or to submit to its yoke. The Constitutional Left once separated from the Extreme Left without having crushed it, was as short-lived as its own Constitution.

It is therefore useless to stop to examine this stillborn document which was, however, accepted by Louis and to which he gave his oath. He kept this oath but those who were bound to carry the Revolution to the bitter end, that is to destroy the monarchy, were to find another pretext to overturn it.

Barnave had said in July, 1791: "The Revolution cannot go a step further without great danger." On September thirtieth the Constituent Assembly held its last session before Louis XVI, whom the president, Thouret, addressed in those memorable words, a monument of human illusions; "Sire, Your Majesty has put an end to the Revolution." The first act only was ended. The Assembly, before disbanding, had passed a resolution which was to renew the drama; it had decided that its members should not be eligible for reëlection. A strange sacrifice for which various reasons have been given—disinter-

estedness, an affectation of virtue, naïveté—but whose real reason was without doubt that this Assembly born of the States General, where the three orders were represented, wished to signify that having destroyed these orders it had severed the last bond which held it to the old régime. Having made a clean sweep of all that belonged to the past, it was itself to disappear in its turn. All this was rational as was the entire work of the Constituent Assembly. But realities were swiftly to take the upper hand. It was chimerical to establish a constitution for the purpose of ending a revolution to which new fuel was being added each day. And this new Assembly which had nothing in common with that just disbanded added fuel also. The Legislative Assembly may quite properly be designated as the second impact of the Revolution.

The new members, all new men, for the most part very young and almost all obscure, were elected by a limited number of taxpaying voters, consisting of that numerous educated and comfortable bourgeoisie which had been developing for the past hundred years under the prosperity of France and which had voted at the moment of the Varennes incident, and under its influence. Among these deputies, there were few nobles or none and no priests save a few who had sworn loyalty to the Constitution. The Right was now composed of the Constitutionals and the Feuillants, the Left of the previous Assembly. But this new body was homogeneous. The men who composed it were nearly all of the same origin and of the same training. In philosophy and politics, they held the ideas which the writers of the eighteenth century had spread. Their theories about the world and Europe were derived from the systems and traditions which had controlled opinion under Louis XV—the natural frontiers, the struggle with Austria, the alliance with Prussia. Moreover, this bourgeoisie had followed events since 1789. They had heard Sieyès tell them that up to that time they had amounted to nothing—an exaggeration in any case—and that hereafter they would be everything. But this could mean nothing unless they took possession of the government.

To do this, it was necessary to carry through the Revolution and overturn the monarchy; a thing that only a great national commotion could accomplish, so closely was the monarchy bound to France. A republic could be established only by war. But the republic once established, it would still be necessary to know who would direct it, and to whom it would belong. Hence would arise opposing parties and their desperate struggles. The republic, like the German Empire, could not be created by laws and discussions, but only according to Bismarck's formula, by blood and iron.

The happenings in France had been received with apathy by the other European governments. Revolutions were not a new thing to their chancelleries and it was a custom which has not yet disappeared, even to desire them for one's enemies. It was everywhere considered that the Revolution was weakening the resistance of France and London, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg rejoiced over it. "England is persuaded that she has nothing more to fear from France," wrote the French ambassador at London. She was more than ever convinced of it when the Constituent Assembly which, in contrast with the Legislative Assembly, was pacific, had refused to keep to the engagements of the dynastic agreements with Spain from whom England wanted to take the Bay of Nootka in so-called California. Nothing, moreover, could be more advantageous for the English than the disorder in the French war ports and the disorganization of the navy. Pitt persisted in remaining neutral in order to watch Russia; Catherine counted on the ruin of France to realize her designs not only in Poland but on Constantinople. Prussia was most pleased of all. "The moment has come," wrote Hertzberg to Frederick William as early as July 1789. "Here is a situation by which the powers ought to profit." Prussia reckoned that she would be delivered from the surveillance which the French monarchy exercised in Europe by virtue of the terms of the treaty of Westphalia, and she was playing a double game: either an expansion of her territories on the Rhine, or the final partition of Poland. There is no doubt but that Prussian agents had been busy in

the days of the Revolution. "At Paris the King of Prussia was inciting the revolutionists against Austria, and in Vienna he was arming Leopold II against the French," says Emilie Bourgeois. The emperor, brother of Marie Antoinette, in spite of the relation between the two courts and of the common policy which the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons had been pursuing for the last forty years, was not the slowest to understand the situation: "There is no reason why we should waste our gold or our blood to restore France to her former position of importance." And this was not the only time when the brother of Marie Antoinette spoke his mind. Albert Sorel has treated as a pathetic and impressive comedy the acts and words of the kings in the face of the Revolution. It is a sinister comedy with a changing and double action; the emigration was a whip in their hands and they used it to incite the revolutionary element in France, preferring that she should be the one to begin the war. They deliberately sacrificed the royal family to their own interests just as the *émigrés*, eager to confound the cause of the counter-revolution with the cause of the enemy, sacrificed it to their own passions. They perceived too late that they had aided at the same time the enemies of France and the maneuvers of the Girondists.

In the new Assembly, composed mainly of mediocre men, the more brilliant members, grouped about a few deputies of the department of the Gironde, from whence their group took its name, were republicans without having yet declared themselves as such. Because they were eloquent, they thought they were great statesmen. They thought the moment had come for their bourgeois aristocracy to govern France. The only obstacle was the monarchical Constitution of 1791 upon which the Feuillants thought themselves firmly established. The Girondists believed themselves quite capable of taking over the government. The members of the Constitutional Assembly had imagined that as they, with the aid of the Jacobins, had destroyed the old régime, the Revolution was established. The Girondists, on the other hand, thought that with the same support, they could start it up again to their own advantage. And

to abolish what remained of royalty, to "destroy its secular charm" according to the saying of Jean Jaurès, they did not hesitate to set fire to all Europe.

If there was to be a choice between the countries which France should attack, it was necessary, in order to discredit the monarchy—to kill it morally—that the adversary should be Austria, the official ally of the government, the family ally of the king and queen. To drive France into war with Austria by appealing to the political traditions of Louis XIV and Richelieu, traditions to which French policy was always sensitive, would be to strike a mortal blow at royalty. "The rupture of the Austrian alliance," said a Girondist, "is as necessary as the taking of the Bastille." In fact this rupture brought the Revolution into the domain of foreign politics, and by a calculation which proved to be fatally correct was to bring the king into conflict with the nation.

However, the difficulties in starting such a war were numerous. France had nothing to gain by it. A pretext had to be found. One presented itself after the night of August fourth. Some of the German princes were protesting against the suppression of the feudal rights which they had possessed in Alsace; it was a question which could have been arranged without trouble through redemptions and purchase. But when there is a desire for war, it always comes. The Girondists even waived a capital objection to it. The war which they desired with Austria supposed, in order to conform to the classic tradition, that Prussia should be the ally of France and remain neutral. Now, after August, 1791, Frederick William and Leopold had drawn closer together. It was to the interests of both to observe the events in France, to adopt with respect to them a policy of waiting, an ambiguous policy which would not involve them whatever the outcome, and which found its expression in the equivocal Declaration of Pilnitz. This declaration, the *émigrés*, with criminal imprudence, interpreted publicly as a support given to their cause, as a condemnation of the constitutional régime accepted by Louis XVI, as a threat of the kings against the Revolution. But its true significance was that if France

waged war against Austria, she would have to fight Prussia too and finally all of Germany. This meant destroying the French policy of German equilibrium and renouncing the treaty of Westphalia. This was the situation which brought about a veritable revolution in Europe, much more serious than the people's declaration of fraternity against tyrannies with which the Constituent Assembly had resounded. For France it was a leap in the dark and one full of danger. A slight knowledge of Europe or of French history was sufficient to enable one to foresee the tottering of the European system that had existed for a century and a half in the interest of France; a shock whose consequences would be still more inevitable than those of the internal revolution because the latter, sooner or later, would reach its goal and cease when it had fulfilled the aspirations of the country. Everything then suggested to Louis XVI, well versed, by his training, in European affairs, to oppose the venture, to maintain the contact with Austria, to unite with her to preserve the equilibrium of Europe. Hence arose the idea to which the king turned as a last resort, the idea of a congress in which the whole situation would be examined. Austria with her old egoism, hoped to reap some profit from this congress and the project was speedily imputed to Louis as treason.

The few months in which the Girondists, by sheer force of obstinate will, brought about the triumph of the war party, were decisive in the history of France. She still feels the effects of them. Her condition has been changed in proportion as the harmony between the European powers has changed and in proportion as her security, so painfully acquired, was compromised. All that the Revolution at first availed France, she was gradually to lose again. Her natural frontiers, possessed for a moment, were again to be lost. Individual liberty was to be replaced by military servitude. The hated personal tax was to reappear, having changed its name from the *taille* to the income tax. This shift in policy, which occurred in 1792, was to result in evil consequences not the least of which were to be felt by the present generation.

Mirabeau had perceived and had prophesied to the Constituent Assembly that a later age would be that of wars "more ambitious and more barbarous" than the others. He suspected the cosmopolitanism of these men of the Revolution which tended to disarm France. He feared their spirit of propaganda which tended to launch her into foreign adventures. He feared their ignorance of international politics which was to throw them head first into conflict with all Europe. He feared their illusions about others and about themselves because, imagining that they were starting on a crusade, they would quickly confound liberation with conquest, and would provoke a coalition of the people which would be worse than that of the kings. Mirabeau was right. Brissot, the diplomat of the Gironde, hoodwinked the Assembly with his eloquence. He thought that the nations would refuse to fight Revolutionary France. He assured them that Hungary was ready to rise against the Hapsburgs, that the King of Prussia had no money for war, that "the sentiment of the English about the Revolution was not doubtful," that they applauded it and that the British government had "everything to fear, the impossibility of collecting its debts and the loss of its possessions in India." Less than a year after the declaration of war against Austria, England was to enter the struggle; and this war, the great war and the real one, began under the most unfavorable conditions for France and was to continue after the Revolution had ended.

There was at that time in France a great confusion in ideas, in opinions, which extended even to the vocabulary. The "patriots" were those who were preaching war against tyrants for the love of humanity and who at the same time were provoking contempt for discipline and encouraging the mutinous soldiers. They proclaimed, in the same breath, the disinterestedness of France and the natural right to annex to the nation all liberated populations. When Le Comtat, the district about Avignon, and Avignon itself, which belonged to the Pope, rose in revolt, the Constituent Assembly hesitated to receive them because annexation and conquests were contrary to their principles. These scruples were overcome by some of the members of the Left

who asked if the Revolution would refuse to complete France and if it was more timid than the monarchy. This old idea of the natural frontiers, of the rounding out of French territory, continued to work upon and influence the French people. Thus, there were many gates open to the ambitious men of the Gironde, through which they could force France into war. Their move played into the hands of the Jacobins; the Gironde could have done nothing without them and it ended by turning the Revolution over to them.

In the beginning of the Legislative Assembly which met on October 1, 1791, the Girondists had pronounced themselves in favor of a war policy. Robespierre, who did not belong to the new Assembly, remained all-powerful at the great Club. He was at first opposed to the war and made fun, not without reason, of the illusions of Brissot, fearing as the Constituent Assembly had done, militarism and military dictators. He rallied to the war policy, however, as soon as he understood the advantages to be derived from it in combating the monarchy and the new incentive that it would give to the Revolution. Cosmopolitan and humanitarian Jacobinism, by means of a little well prepared oratory, became bellicose; it was sufficient to say that they were only going to combat tyranny.

All the measures which Brissot and his friends were forcing upon the Assembly had as object to bring about a break with Louis. They consisted in threats against the *émigrés*, especially against the brother of the king, and in penalties for the priests who refused to take the oath. Under these attacks on his family and his religious feeling, the king felt that he was compromised, not so much personally, but as the guardian of the great interests of France beyond her borders. By every means possible, his enemies sought to make his position untenable and to shackle him in his very rôle as constitutional sovereign. This is what with insidious skill, the Girondists accomplished, quite unconscious that they were working in the interest of the Jacobins and preparing their own ruin.

Before describing the rapid succession of events, we must show what was the position of France at the end of the year

1791, when the orators of the Legislative Assembly were already defying Europe. The general situation became less and less favorable. The assignats were depreciating, gold and silver was being hidden, the cost of living was rising, and the Assembly was resorting continually to new issues while accusing the speculators and counter-revolutionists for the growing discredit of its paper money. In the provinces, especially those of the west, the religious question was arousing much feeling. And finally the general disorganization of the country, far from being arrested, was greatly aggravated. The following is a picture drawn by an historian who has carefully examined the situation: "A crowd of people out of work: smugglers who had ceased to have a trade through the disappearance of the taxes which had once made smuggling profitable; criminals who had been unwisely pardoned; as well as, to use the expression of the deputy Lemontey, those flocks of foreign birds of prey who had descended upon revolutionary France, filled her with elements of disorder. They were adept at provoking pillage and incendiarism among populations imbued with the idea that every farmer or seller of grain was conspiring to starve them, every shopkeeper to loot them, every noble to bring back the old régime, and every refractory priest to destroy the Revolution." And yet, even more than the Constituent Assembly, the Legislative hesitated to repress disorders or to use armed force. It allowed the anarchy to increase and even favored it. Two important things happened at Paris. La Fayette, who no longer had the confidence of any one, had left the command of the national guard; the municipality of Paris was delivered over to the Jacobins under the hypocrite Petion who authorized the insurrections that followed by arming the "sans-culottes" with pikes. It was under these conditions which combined every possible difficulty, that the Girondists launched France into a vast war.

The period of the Constitutionals and the Feuillants was already over. They had no influence upon the Legislative Assembly and controlled only the ministry; and from that, they were soon to be driven as well. In accord with the king, De

Lessart, the minister of foreign affairs, opposed the war. He was immediately denounced from the platform and in the press, as the protector of the *émigrés* and the head of an "Austrian Committee" which was said to be inspired by the queen. Until that time nothing had succeeded in seriously compromising the royal family. Neither the affair of the necklace, before 1789, nor the flight to Varennes, had destroyed the old prestige of that family whose life for eight hundred years had been fused with that of France. The accusation launched against the queen, the "Austrian," of serving the interests of the enemy and turning the monarchy against the nation, was the poisoned arrow of the Girondists. To seal the fate of royalty, it was necessary to accuse it of nothing less than treason. In March, 1792, the Girondists won their first victory; Brissot was able to bring De Lessart up for trial. It amounted to an accusation against the king as well.

Obedying the Constitution to the end, and faithful to his oath, Louis submitted to the vote of the Assembly. He accepted a ministry of Girondists with Dumouriez as president. The latter was ready to do anything; he was the friend of all, and capable of good as well as evil; he flattered himself even more than Calonne had done, that he could manage everything by his tact, but, as a matter of fact, he let things drift. The Girondists, once in power, conducted things with a high hand. On April twentieth, they obtained from the Assembly by an almost unanimous vote, the declaration of war against Austria, the prelude to a general war. This historic date cannot be understood in its full significance, unless we remember that five days before, the Legislative Assembly had authorized the "ignominious and degrading" apotheosis of those rebel soldiers of Nancy who had been chastised by Bouillé and to whom amnesty had later been granted. The Legislative Assembly had received their delegation with approval. The Jacobin Commune of Paris organized, in their honor, festivals which roused the indignation even of the liberal-minded poet, André Chénier. This exaltation of mutiny at a moment when they were defying the half of Europe, gives us the measure of the political sense of

the Girondists. A country corrupted by demagogues and without a government was being blindly driven into war. It is thus they paved the way for the Terror; they were making a dictatorship inevitable.

The war of 1792 resembled that of 1740 in the anti-Austrian tradition upon which it was based. In other respects, happily for France, it was one of those old-fashioned wars in which campaigns dragged on, in which battles ordinarily were mere simple engagements, and in which few decisive blows were struck. As Mirabeau had proclaimed, it is when wars will have become altogether national, of a people against a people, that they will become really terrible. However, under Louis XV, the conflicts in which France had taken part had been fought on foreign soil, for at that time the superiority of France permitted her at the outbreak of hostilities to carry the war into the enemy's country. It was not so in 1792. The speeches of Brissot and Vergniaud could not by themselves bring victory; it was necessary to organize it. The three years of anarchy were dearly paid for. The plan contemplated first entering Belgium; it was hoped that the population would revolt in France's favor. Not only did it not revolt but two of the French corps, marching one upon Mons and the other upon Tournay, were repulsed by the Austrians in such panic that General Dillon was assassinated by the stragglers. The causes and responsibilities for this humiliating check were plain indeed. The Girondists had tried to shift the responsibility by attributing it to the treason of the "Austrian Committee"—the latter meaning of course the queen and the king. From that time on the Girondists worked openly for the overthrow of the monarchy by forcing Louis XVI into impossible positions. They wished to force him to sign a decree condemning the priests who had not taken the oath of allegiance, to be deported. Another decree ordered the dissolution of his personal bodyguard. Finally, as the Girondists had been afraid of the national guard ever since the affair of the Champ de Mars, they demanded the creation at Paris of a camp to which should be called twenty thousand federal troops to replace the regular

army and to combat the counter-revolution. That is to say, and every one understood it, they were preparing to overthrow the government. Louis refused to sign the decrees and on the twelfth of June dismissed the Girondist ministers. As the king persisted in his veto, Dumouriez abandoned him and left on the eighteenth. The regiments had been removed and the Constitutional guard was dismissed. The federal troops from Marseilles who arrived first at Paris were authorized, after the intervention in their favor by Vergniaud, to lead a popular demonstration against the double veto. On June twentieth, a noisy delegation, bearing a petition for the recall of the Girondist ministers, filed before the acquiescent Assembly, then stormed the Tuileries which had been left without defense. It was on that day that Louis XVI showed his resigned and quiet courage in the face of the crowd who insulted and threatened him, and accepted the "red bonnet" which was offered him.

The Girondists, who had permitted if not organized all this, triumphed in the humiliation of the king. But each of their victories over the monarchy was a much greater one for the Jacobins. In its fatuous blindness the Gironde missed no occasion of paving the way for its own ruin, with that of the king. From the Days in October up to the twentieth of June the disorders grew apace. No one doubted any longer that there was going to be a violent convulsion. The Prussians, in their turn, were at war with the French. The Gironde had succeeded in uniting Prussia and Austria, the two traditional rivals. Then, on the proposition of Vergniaud, the Assembly decreed that the country was in danger. It was in danger by its own fault, which was that of the Girondists. They had counted on one thing only, and that was that the war would overturn the monarchy.

By proclaiming the country in danger, the Assembly made an appeal to French patriotism. In decreeing enrollments, it was adopting a decision of extreme urgency since France was about to be invaded. After so many accusations launched against the "Austrian Committee," which in the popular opinion meant really the king and queen, and in the emotion caused

by the danger of invasion and by a measure so extraordinary as the levy *en masse*, the idea that the monarchy had betrayed the nation was to grow with irresistible force. In the streets and even in the Assembly the fall of Louis was demanded. The result which the Girondists had desired was attained but it was the moment for which the Jacobins were waiting in order to go a step further. The king is guilty, declared Robespierre; the Assembly is also, since it has allowed him to betray the country. He added with his trenchant logic that the Assembly, not having overthrown the king when it should have done so, was thereby under suspicion and that it would now overturn the monarchy only to usurp the sovereignty of the people. It should therefore be dissolved and a National Convention be elected which would reserve to itself all power and which would be inaccessible both to aristocrats and schemers. This speech, which began the Terror, pronounced a double death sentence, that of Louis and that of the Assembly. There was a shudder of horror. Then too late, the Girondists attempted to treat with the king, to assume the rôle of the Constitutionalists, and themselves went so far as to advise Louis to leave Paris secretly, in other words to attempt another Varennes. La Fayette also was about to leave the country. But Louis, who had perhaps too easily sacrificed himself so far, hoped for nothing further. Disgusted with these later overtures, weary of the factions which, having urged on the Revolution, in turn became afraid of it, he no longer had confidence in any one. He had never been inclined to action, to flee, and he did not believe it possible. The Constitutionalists and the Girondists did not agree. There was not even a hope that they might agree sufficiently to form a party of order. Even under the guillotine they would never be reconciled. It was too late. All the furors of civil war were uniting to destroy royalty. The manifesto of the Prussian general, Brunswick, published in the midst of these happenings with its insolent threats to destroy Paris, was conceived in terms best calculated to wound the pride of the French. It was sufficient to convince them that there was nothing left them but to fight or to perish, and to encourage them in the

idea that the enemy and the king were conspiring against them. If, as is believed, the Marquis de Limon launched this defiant manifesto under the signature of Brunswick, we may say that it was from the *émigrés* that Louis received his death blow.

While the king resigned himself to his fate, the Girondists tried in vain to delay his fall, realizing at last that it would be their own. Another uprising organized by Danton and Robespierre, forced their hand on August tenth. They had disarmed the king and the Assembly and delivered Paris to the Jacobins by calling in the federal troops. There was hardly more than the national guard to protect the Tuileries. Mandat, a faithful officer, who was commanding on that day, was assassinated by Danton's order. The method had not changed in any way since October. To the end, the Revolution progressed by way of rioting. While the royal family, threatened with death, was leaving the Tuileries and taking refuge in the midst of the Assembly, the insurrection violently took possession of the Commune of Paris. The Jacobins were completely victorious. On the day following the tenth of August, Robespierre went to the Hôtel de Ville and repeated with greater emphasis his threats against the Girondists. From that time on, the Commune in insurrection made the laws and became the veritable Legislative Assembly. They had conquered the government. In permanent session they decreed the suspension of the king—which meant his fall though the word was not used. They demanded that the royal family be delivered to them and conducted them as prisoners to the Temple. Danton became the minister of justice. The tribunal of the people, the Revolutionary Tribunal, was created. Finally the Assembly, still in the power of the Commune, abdicated completely, voting a new electoral law for the nomination of a sovereign Convention which should combine all the powers of government—just as Robespierre had demanded.

So many melodramatic and tragic scenes, so much bloodshed, began to arouse the imagination especially in a country like France, where for nearly a century and a half tranquillity had no longer been seriously troubled and where life had been

brilliant and gentle. There has resulted a tendency to exaggerate those events and to magnify their personages. In reality those upstarts of the riots were in turn astonished by and then frightened at their own victory. They felt their instability, suspecting that they might not be followed by the people as a whole. They feared a reaction and they might well fear it for already Thermidor was not far off. Hence arose numberless obscure intrigues, the history of which is little known, but whose existence is attested by the continual accusations of treason which the men of the clubs directed against each other. From the mystery which still surrounds the fate of Louis XVII, M. Lenôtre has drawn the conclusion that the fiercest members of the Convention must have taken precautions and guaranties against the eventuality of a counter-revolution. In any case, it is clear that they distrusted each other. It is natural also that having achieved power by means of audacity and violence and at the cost of certain risks, they should have thought as Danton did, that they could keep it only through exercising "more and more audacity" and more and more violence. That is the psychology of the Terror, since terrorism was used not only against the counter-revolutionists but in the world of the revolutionists themselves. There was no one who was not "suspect" because no one was sure either of the morrow or of his neighbor. Dantonists and Robespierrists dispute with each other without its being possible to fathom many of the enigmatic phrases thrown out by Danton and Robespierre and without its being possible to arrive at their ultimate intention or their deepest secrets. The twenty-four months of convulsions which separate the tenth of August from the 9th Thermidor are the paroxysm of this life of the clubs to which the Constitutionalists, then the Girondists, had allowed free play in the same intention and through the same necessity—because it was the very life of the Revolution.

After the tenth of August, the Jacobins in spite of their victory, did not feel sure of themselves. The Prussian army was invading France. The result of the elections was not certain and, more than all, the Girondists were demanding that

the usurpation of the Commune should come to an end before the meeting of the new Assembly. Danton, whose fate was bound to the fate of the Commune in revolt, saw but one resource—terrorism. It was not by chance that the massacres of September second took place on the same day as the second Parisian elections, and that these massacres were preceded by house to house visits and arrests *en masse*, which had been ordered by the minister of justice and this after the Legislative Assembly had voted on August thirtieth that the Council of the Commune should submit to legal procedure. By this horrible action, which was their own work, Danton, the Commune, and the Jacobins defended themselves and cowed the Convention which in reality, like the Legislative Assembly, represented a France much more moderate than Paris. Like the Legislative Assembly, also, this third Assembly was composed for the most part of timid men, favorable on the whole to the Girondists, but who, arriving a few days after the massacres of the prisons, were frightened before they began. Danton, elected in Paris with Robespierre and Marat himself, quitted the ministry after having paved the way for the fall of the Girondists, which was not far off.

These events viewed from without did not fail to give the impression that France was being consumed by anarchy and was rushing to her doom. By placing end to end the hideous or banal manifestations of the demagogues, from the regular massacres down to the looting of the shops and markets, one could construct a tale of horror like that in which the ill-starred minister, Roland, was soon to set forth the effects of what he modestly terms "a disorganizing tendency." One might thus be easily misled and it is certain that the enemy was deceived. He did not suspect that in the midst of this confusion certain elements of order had still survived; that in the space of three years not everything had been destroyed and that great resources still existed; that a few conscientious men had remained at their posts, had continued to follow their calling and were doing their best to maintain or reëstablish an organization. France still possessed some administrators and some officers.

This protection saved her. The volunteers who were coming into the armies were at least as insubordinate as they were enthusiastic. But they came in contact there with some of the old troops, some organizations, some trained leaders and a discipline which little by little got the upper hand again. This "amalgam" ended by producing some strong regiments and by making the military temperament of the nation count for something. This is just what the Prussians were not expecting. Judging France weaker than she was and encouraged by the surrender of Longwy and Verdun, they were disconcerted at the first resistance. Although Brunswick was master of the road to Châlons, he was unwilling to advance upon it after the clash at Valmy. This was a mediocre affair in itself since there were not eight hundred men *hors de combat* on each side, but it was big with consequences. The Prussians having found the task harder than they had expected, having counted on a military promenade, made no further advances. They did not care to be detained in France while Austria and Russia divided Poland between themselves. It was sufficient for them that the Revolution should be unable to prevent this partition and such was in fact the case. Moreover, Dumouriez only too happy over his success at Valmy, was careful not to pursue Brunswick and thus expose his own army, whose weakness he knew, to a counter-attack by the enemy. He even proposed peace with Prussia and an alliance, which was rejected, against the house of Austria. So strong was the illusion in the minds of the men of the eighteenth century that the country of Frederick the Great could be only the friend of France.

The battle of Valmy took place September 20, 1792. The Convention opened on the twenty-first. It immediately proclaimed the Republic. But who was to govern it; which party was to be in power? From the first day, the struggle began between the Left and the Girondists who had become the Right of the new Assembly. Counting on the support of the deputies of the departments, they immediately attacked the Jacobins, accused them of the usurpations practiced by the Commune of Paris and of the September massacres. Louvet demanded the

trial of Robespierre and the Septembrists—those guilty of the September massacres. The majority did not dare to follow him. His friends of the Gironde themselves abandoned him because they felt that they lacked the strength for such a reaction. Thus, at the beginning, the Girondists committed a serious error; they had threatened their former allies, their present enemies and they had shown that they had not the means to carry out their threat. A month after the opening of the Convention, their cause was already lost. The Jacobins, who had begun by defending themselves, took the offensive. Themselves accused of murder and anarchy, they in turn accused the Girondists. The accusation against them had been capital and their reply, to save themselves, had to be of the same nature. The accusation that they launched was that which the Girondists had used against the Constitutional ministers and against the king—treason, lack of civic spirit, and complicity with the counter-revolutionists. The Gironde had invented the “Austrian Committee.” Under similar appearances the crime of federal separatism, of an attempt against the Republic, one and indivisible, was trumped up against them. Thus the Jacobins, in every way, out-manuevered the Girondists, held them through their fear of not appearing sufficiently republican and shoved them from position to position. The trial of Robespierre had failed. The reply of the Jacobins was the accusation of Louis XVI. Regicide was to be the test of republican sincerity. Caught in this trap, the Girondists could not escape. They had condemned bloodshed; they were put in the position of having to vote for the execution of the king or of rendering themselves “suspect.” They avoided neither. Recoiling from the crime, they proposed an appeal to the people as a way of escape. Immediately the rabble, the sections, the galleries, threatened the Convention which yielded under the same pressure as had the previous Assemblies. They rejected the appeal to the people. The Girondists, utterly routed, were divided on the question of the death of Louis. They had no leadership; they were no longer even united. The death of the king, the stake in this battle for power, was voted by 361 out of 721 voters. The

Duke of Orléans, a Conventionalist of the Left, under the name of Philippe Egalité, also voted for it. But even regicide itself could no longer save any one. The guillotine was erected permanently in the Place de la Révolution (the present Place de la Concorde).

The oratory of these times has given the impression that the Convention hurled the king's head as a challenge to Europe. On January 21, 1793, the day of the execution of Louis XVI, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were busy dividing up Poland. The emotion felt at the various courts was no greater than it had been after the execution of Charles I. In truth, the Revolution had already hurled its most serious challenge—and at whom? At England, and it was not the head of the king.

It has often been asked how the Revolution came to be victorious; and many explanations have been given which contain a part of the truth. The spirit of propaganda, the revolutionary crusade, the tradition of the natural frontiers, the memory of the policy of Richelieu, which had always remained powerful, and of the nation's struggle against the house of Austria—all of these elements in the moral life of the French people had contributed largely to make the Revolution warlike and to furnish it with motives for annexing populations under the pretext of liberating them. However, new as they were at these affairs, the members of the Convention were not all ignorant of the great laws of European politics. They wished to keep England neutral and there was one thing that England would never permit, that France should be mistress of the Low Countries. How had they received the plans of Dumouriez with regard to Belgium which the victory of Jemmapes had just opened to him? Here, we must remember that the Revolution was falling deeper and deeper into financial distress and that it was being crushed under the rising flood of the assignats. Conquests were a possible source of hope. Since the French armies of which Dumouriez had reëstablished the discipline, had delivered the Republic from invasion, why should they not deliver it from poverty? It was necessary, at any cost, to relieve France from her impossible situation, to find, as Cambon said, "a way out in

order to diminish the mass of paper money circulating in France" and to "raise the credit of the assignats," by a mortgage which would be guaranteed by "the properties brought under the trusteeship of the Republic." This necessity in large part determined the politicians and the financiers, under pretexts drawn from the revolutionary philosophers, to approve the occupation and exploitation of Belgium, in spite of the risk of English intervention. They would attempt to turn this aside and in the meantime Custine was crossing the Rhine. Well received at first by the Rhenish population, which for a long time had been friendly to France, Custine roused them against her by demanding a large contribution from the town of Frankfort. He was soon driven from there by the Prussians. Moreover, immediately after the French victory at Jemmapes (November 6, 1792), England had decided upon war rather than leave France in Belgium. The execution of Louis XVI was only her pretext for a war which had become inevitable; the English would have cared little about the execution of Louis, if the French had not already occupied Antwerp.

Then the real war, the war between England and France, the old war over the Low Countries, began. It was the same under the Revolution as under Philip the Fair, the old war involving the naval supremacy of Great Britain—as it had been under Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Louis XVI. It was no longer a question of a continental war against adversaries like Prussia and Austria over whom France could still be successful. The old coalition had again found its head and its banker. This time England would carry the struggle through to the end, all the more determined to liquidate her old account with France in that she saw the latter first deprived of her naval forces through the Revolution and then left incapable of reconstituting them because of her financial distress. One of the least visible but most appalling mistakes of the Revolution was that it put itself in conflict with the greatest maritime power of the world without itself having any fleets or any hope of finding any; because a navy, an instrument which demands most careful preparation, cannot be improvised. The French fleet had been

ruined through anarchy and as Villaret-Joyeuse said, "Patriotism alone is not sufficient to command ships." Profiting by this unique situation, England would not now abandon the struggle until she had won. She was, as always, slow to enter fully into action, slow in deciding, and slow in preparing, owing to the nature of her parliamentary government. She herself extended the duration and seriousness of this war, in that only little by little did she put into it all her resources, while France, regaining her old superiority on land, flattered herself with the old illusion that a few continental victories would suffice to bring England to her knees. The illusion was only to be dispelled at Waterloo.

Many have wished to see in the events of the Revolution, even in the Terror itself, profound reasons and a carefully planned line of conduct. The extreme confusion of this period shows rather that the decisions of the men of the Revolution were decisions of expediency. This was the case from the time of the Constituent Assembly. The truth is that there was the greatest confusion in the minds of men. Danton, who has been represented as a man of one idea, drifted no less than many others. Raised to power by the events of the tenth of August and the massacres of September, he was no more capable than the Girondists had been of "diking up" the Revolution. He would have liked to place himself between the Assembly and the Commune, between the Gironde and the Jacobins, when the positions had already been determined. The Girondists had finally discovered that the Commune was the true government of the Revolution, and would not admit that the usurped power should command all France. To this the Jacobins replied that in rousing the departments against Paris, the Gironde rendered itself guilty of "federalism," that it tended to disrupt the unity of the Republic, that it was betraying the nation, Danton had become too deeply compromised with the Commune, he had too great need of it in case he should have to render account for the shedding of blood, to work for its overthrow. But the Girondists would perish if they did not overthrow it. By entering the government, Danton in his turn placed himself in an im-

possible position. He has been admired for having upheld the institution of the revolutionary tribunal which was to regulate and moderate the Terror. Rather he gave it its instrument; he perfected it, very much as Doctor Guillotin had perfected the ax of the executioner. After the Terror had been legalized, it remained none the less in the hands of the violent. And it lacked only one more formality, this also legal, to make it possible for Robespierre and his friends to bring before it their political enemies, confounded with traitors, counter-revolutionists and the fomenters of anarchy, whom the revolutionary tribunal was to punish. This formality was that the members of the Convention should cease to be inviolable.

In April, 1793, the Convention had already drawn from its numbers the Committee of Public Safety, to control the ministers, that is, to govern. In order that the controllers should in turn be controlled, according to the logic of terrorism, the members of the Convention, on Marat's proposition, had renounced their inviolability. The revolutionists were then free to guillotine each other.

Marat, a "disinterested fanatic," was the most influential man of the Revolution, the one who most consistently guided it from without, because he had the instincts of the demagogue, the gift of divining the popular passions and the talent to express the hatreds and suspicions of the crowd in the manner in which they felt them. Marat, a writer and an agitator, was a terrible artist of demagoguery. He inspired disgust even in Robespierre himself, but from the beginning he was indispensable to the progress of the Revolution whose development—and this is a key which we must not lose—depended upon a chronic agitation of the Parisian population and the possibility of provoking riots at any moment. Camille Desmoulins was right when he said that "you could not go further than the opinions of Marat." The progress of the Revolution will not end even on the day when Charlotte Corday kills the monster, but it will be appreciably retarded. Freed of Marat's presence, Robespierre, having been the head of the government in his turn, will have less trouble in opposing the subordinate leaders like

Hébert and in so far will himself render possible the reaction of Thermidor.

While waiting, the Girondists had realized that, in order to save their own heads, they must strike at the man through whom the Revolution was making common cause with anarchy and was finding in it, at every critical juncture, its propelling force. One of their most fatal illusions which Danton seems to have shared was that the revolutionary tribunal would serve to rid them of Marat—to obtain from the Assembly a formal accusation against him. But bringing him to trial before Fouquier-Tinville and the Parisian jurors, was equivalent to having him judged by himself. Marat's acquittal was a triumph and the Girondists received this new blow from the Extreme Left.

April, 1793, and the two months which followed were as bad for them as for the Republic. Things had never been so serious. Dumouriez had failed in Holland, lost Belgium, and then emigrated as La Fayette had done, after having delivered the commissioners of the Convention over to the Austrians. The defection of the victor of Valmy and Jemmapes signified a lack of confidence that might become serious. It redoubled the ardor of the political strife at Paris because, Danton having been in touch with Dumouriez, the Girondists accused him of treason. Danton violently defended himself. But if his words were bold, his thoughts were hesitant. He was troubled, uncertain, as a man who bore on his conscience the September massacres. The accusation launched against him had the effect of driving him over to the Left. He took sides against the Girondists when the latter, frightened by the acquittal of Marat, turned their attack upon the Commune of Paris. Always able to rally a majority of the Convention when they invoked respect for order, they had been able to impose a committee of surveillance upon the Jacobin municipality. The reply of the Jacobins was in conformity with the process which had never failed to succeed in the revolutionary period: a violent campaign by the clubs and the press against the Gironde, which was accused of favoring federalism and royalty. This campaign was accompanied by a vigorous excitation of the Parisian population which was

kept in a continual state of nervousness by the growing depreciation of the assignats, by the uncertain arrival of food caused by the law of the maximum, and the fear of famine. "Famine," said Lanjuinais, "remained the lever of the insurrections." After this careful preparation, the Commune called out the ordinary rioting troops. "General" Henriot, at the head of the most advanced seditions of the national guard, surrounded the Convention, turned his cannon upon it, prevented the deputies from leaving, proved to them that they were at the mercy of the Commune, and then demanded the formal accusation of the Girondists. Robespierre had managed the whole affair and Danton had at least consented. May 31, 1793, was as humiliating for the Girondists and the Assembly as they had made June 30, 1792 for the king and the monarchy.

By this use of force, the Jacobins, already masters of Paris, became masters of the government also, which from that time was composed of the Committee of Public Safety and of the Commune. The Girondists, with three or four exceptions, fled and tried in vain to arouse the departments. Most of them perished by suicide or on the scaffold. In October the trial of the Girondists, deliberate and willful authors of the war with Austria and with Europe, coincided with the execution of Marie Antoinette, "the Austrian." Philippe Egalité, Mme. Roland, the former Mayor Bailly, all the important actors of the drama who had contrived the misfortune of others and of themselves fell under the knife of the guillotine in rapid succession.

As a result of a more and more adroit use of patience and demagoguery, and above all, thanks to the manipulation of the clubs and riots, Robespierre was victorious. After May thirty-first, he was the master and all those who were passing and were still to pass through the hands of the executioners before he himself should follow them, had contributed to bring him into power. But in what state did he find France! Again her frontiers were open to invasion. In the spring the forced enrollment of three hundred thousand men, in addition to the religious war, and the execution of Louis XVI definitely aroused La Vendée which did not understand how conscription

and the barracks could be conquests of liberty. Lyons and Marseilles were in revolt against the Jacobins. To escape them, Toulon opened her port to the English. In these astounding conditions, France had no government but that of the Terror. By the demagogical attitude which he had taken against conspirators and traitors, and by his propensity to find these everywhere, Robespierre personified war without quarter. Pursuit of treason was the justification of the Terror. It was convenient for the dictator to accuse his antagonists, and those who bore him a grudge, of "defeatism." He thus made his dictatorship appear synonymous with public safety. It had been created by the war which the Girondists had made upon Austria when France had no government strong enough to wage it. Brissot and his friends had filled their cups with blood. There was nothing left but to drink it.

It is thus that in spite of its atrocious follies and its ignoble agents, the Terror became national. It made France tense in one of her most critical periods. It helped to save her or rather to defer the hour of disaster that was to return at the end of the Directory and which Napoleon was to stave off a little longer, until he himself was conquered. It is very probable that the Republic would have succumbed in the summer of 1793 and that the territory of France would have been invaded if England had been ready, if she had supported the insurgents of La Vendée and if Prussia, Austria and Russia had not still been engaged in cutting up Poland and if they had not been distracted and divided by the Eastern question. Without this respite, the Revolution would not have been able to crush its enemies within. The effects of the military reorganization to which Carnot was devoting himself, could not have made itself felt and the levy *en masse* would have been merely the levy of a rabble incapable of resisting a coalition.

Desperate as it was in July 1793, the situation was reëstablished in October by the victory of Wattignies which broke the blockade of the northern frontier. The insurrection in La Vendée subsided and that at Lyons was put down. In December La Vendée was definitively conquered and Bonaparte appeared

upon the horizon through the recapture of Toulon. Alsace was delivered and Belgium was again open to France. Certain historians have wondered why the Revolution did not, at that moment, become more moderate. They excuse the Terror as long as the "country was in danger." Then they recoil in amazed horror at its excesses. A wider view of the necessities with which Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety found themselves confronted, will explain the continuation of terrorism. We forget that the state of the finances was becoming worse and worse; the abyss was deepened still more by the enormous military expenditures. Money must be had at any cost; war had to feed war and it had become a system "to conquer the enemy and live at his expense," to conquer in order to enrich the Republic. As long as war continued, the Terror had to continue also. But it served another purpose now; it was an instrument of confiscation. It was a means of seizing the property of the *émigrés*, of despoiling the suspects and the rich, in the illusion which had lasted since the Constituent Assembly, that there would finally be furnished a solid guaranty for the assignats.

The Terror could not be stopped at the raising of a hand. Robespierre was brought to the point of acting like a leader. He began to be afraid of anarchy abroad. He was the first who dared to strike a blow at the Parisian rabble in the person of Hébert and his followers. Immediately after it was Danton and the Dantonists, the "weaklings," those who were leaning towards a premature peace, whom he sent to the guillotine. The exaltation of Robespierre and his pretentious, mystical jargon need not deceive us. Behind it all there is to be noted the insistence with which at each of the great political trials, he spoke of the traitors, the English agents, of the rôle of the bankers, of the foreign suspects like Anacharsis Clootz, who had been raising their heads ever since the beginning of the Revolution. This incongruous, disquieting society which he says he is "cleaning up" without pity but perhaps sometimes with discernment, he sent to the guillotine side by side with the noblest and best of France, pell mell with persons who were in-

nocent, with scholars, and with poets. Robespierre had styled himself "the incorruptible." He implied therefore that there had been corruption. It brings to mind the tales of money, of police, of spies which are the ordinary accompaniments of all revolutionary movements.

In April, 1794, the Terror still existed. Danton had been suppressed as well as Camille Desmoulins and his wife, Lucile. The men of the Revolution had been devouring each other. Only the prudent and the skillful had escaped; those who, as Sieyès said, had a talent for living. But by dint of purifying the Revolution, Robespierre had exhausted its strength. He himself and Jacobism are the essence of the Revolution. One could not go beyond the opinions of Marat. As a revolutionary character Robespierre also represents a limit. Since the time of the Constituent Assembly he had been increasing his demands, which the political principle, in force since 1789, had favored—to have no enemies on the Left. And now what were his ideas? What did he want? Whither was he going? He did not know himself. Strange projects were accredited to this man and the court of Vienna began to take an interest in "Monsieur de Robespierre." However, he instituted nothing but the ridiculous "Fête of the Supreme Being" while the guillotine reaping its victims day by day, thinned the ranks of the Assembly, even picking its victims among his radical associates. Scarcely any one remained save those who through fear had said yes to everything. A supreme fear gave them the courage of despair. Robespierre felt that he was losing his hold on the Convention and he wished to use the ordinary method which up to that time had never failed, namely the intervention of the Commune. On the 9th Thermidor, therefore, this extraordinary thing occurred. The members of the Convention who had survived were the wisest and cleverest since they had succeeded in saving their heads. They perceived what no one had understood since August tenth, that the famous "days" were at bottom only small local affairs and that with a little method, tact, and energy, it would be possible to check the rioters. The Jacobin Commune depended upon the sections. To prevent a riot, and to

arrest Santerre and Henriot, therefore, it was a question of first protecting the menaced quarter by means of some of the moderate sections, and then of taking the offensive against the rioters. It was not sufficient, in order to overthrow Robespierre, just to vote an accusation against him. His accusers needed to be sure of what would happen outside the Assembly. Tallien and Barras took it upon themselves to handle the rioters. They succeeded, thanks to a single section, Le Pelletier, which gave the signal for resistance. Robespierre, having taken refuge in the Hôtel de Ville, understood the mechanism of the Revolution too well not to know that he was lost if the rioters and the Commune began to give way. He tried to commit suicide but failed and the next day was carried bleeding to the scaffold (July 27, 28, 1794).

After the fall of Robespierre, France breathed more easily. A strong public opinion demanded and obtained the punishment of those whom Chénier called "executioners who had been scribbling laws." The guillotine served once more for the execution of the most famous and abominable of the terrorists just as the Revolutionary tribunal had served to condemn the very men who had created it. But if this reaction was a relief it was not a solution. From the beginning, the Revolution had been trying to form a government. It had had three or four constitutions which were not workable and which had hardly even been tested. The Terror was a state of madness which left in its train only impotence and disgust. From the 9th Thermidor to the 18th Brumaire (the two most famous dates of the new Republican calendar) the Revolution had sought to form a government which should be free and should conform to its principles, and it had failed.

When the moderates of the Convention had, through a final purification, rid themselves of Robespierre and his followers, the "*queue de Robespierre*," they were confronted with the same difficulties as their predecessors. Financial difficulties had increased with the rising flood of the assignats; France was at war with her neighbors and there was intense confusion everywhere within her borders. Many of the French, worn out by

the anarchy, the misery, and the suffering caused by the depreciation of the paper money, ardently desired order and thought it could best be attained by a return to the old monarchy. Many, on the other hand, were too much engaged in the Revolution and had too many interests involved not to fear a return to the old régime. This was especially true in the case of those responsible for the death of the king, of those who had acquired state properties, and of the military. Moreover, Jacobinism was far from dead. For five years Revolutionary France had struggled to maintain a middle course between royalism and terrorism and had succeeded only in continuing the disorders, thus preparing for that autocratic government which was to arise from its own midst.

The genesis of the 18th Brumaire is simple. What took place after Thermidor? From that time on, the Convention knew what measures it must take to avoid the retaliation of the Jacobins. On the 12th Germinal and the 1st Prairial, rioting began again, but proved only abortive because it no longer had leadership or organization, the Commune of Paris having been suppressed. However on the 1st Prairial a violent attack occurred. The mob again invaded the Assembly, killed the deputy Féraud and paraded his head on the end of a pike. When this insurrection had been put down, thanks to the moderate sections, the Thermidorians finally decided to adopt the measure which had always daunted the revolutionists. They took away the autonomy of the national guard and put it under the direction of a military committee. Political influence then began to sway towards the army, a victorious army which under General Pichegru had just conquered Holland in an astoundingly courageous campaign. Whoever had the support of the army would be able to control the government. The era of the great generals was beginning. On the 13th Vendémiaire it was necessary to call Bonaparte and his artillery to crush a royalist movement in Paris. On the 18th Fructidor, the Directory was to call Augereau. These two operations, necessary to safeguard the Revolutionary ideal, were the training school for Napoleon's later coup d'état.

The 18th Fructidor is of special importance in the light of what followed because it was the link which united the Revolution to the Empire. It is therefore necessary to examine the origins of this event, this swing to the Left which was destined to prevent both reaction and peace. In 1792 the revolutionists had desired war in order to establish their own position. To such an extent had the Revolution profited and been nourished by its external conflicts, that it could no longer cease waging war without imperiling its own existence. It, like Napoleon a little later, was caught in the clutches of the war it had itself started and there was no turning back, for it had provoked an enemy, England, who was determined not to lay down her arms until she should be victorious.

In 1795, after two successful campaigns in Holland and the Pyrenees, the Convention had seized the opportunity for concluding peace with Prussia. In the true spirit of eighteenth century diplomacy, the French leaders reluctantly fought against this neighboring German state and were ever hoping to have it as an ally. The Convention had likewise made peace with Spain, the only one of the powers of whom it can be said that it entered the struggle to avenge Louis XVI. Prussia had gained what she wanted in Poland and she was becoming anxious about the projects of Austria and Russia in the East. In order to regain her liberty of action in the latter sphere, she had signed the treaty of Basle and gave up all interest in the left bank of the Rhine, in return for advantageous compensations in Germany. The Bourbons of Spain perceived, on their side, that they were solely playing into the hands of England and allied themselves with republican France in the spirit of the former dynastic alliance. The Convention signed this double peace alleging that it enabled France to pursue the war with greater vigor against her other enemies. Hostilities with England and Austria continued.

However, the Convention, which had abolished the terrorist dictatorship and which had condemned the absurd constitution of the Jacobins, found itself obliged to construct a regular government and to hold elections. It was probable that these

elections, no longer controlled by the Jacobins, would be moderate if not reactionary and would consequently favor peace. The Constitution of the Year III attempted to reconstitute a regular executive power by creating a directorate of five members and a balanced legislative power composed of two assemblies or councils, that of the Ancients and that of the Five Hundred. In this constitution the wisest provision was that which stipulated that the legislative body should be elected only by thirds. The old Convention was thus sure of keeping a majority for some length of time. It thus avoided sudden reversals of opinion and was free to continue the struggle with the enemy even if the first partial elections should show a tendency in the country towards peace.

Pitiable as the government of the Directory may have been, it is not just to accuse it of having continued the war at a moment when the finances were at their worst. This very condition persuaded the enemy, that with a little patience, he could wreck France. Forty-five million worthless assignats had been printed. The Directory decided solemnly to burn the plate which was used in printing them, but, finding itself without resources, replaced this paper money by another, the territorial mandates, which quickly suffered the same decline. If some speculators were enriched, the bondholders and the government officials were starving. The French soldiers, whose numbers were increasing through conscription, were without shoes. The general misery helped the socialistic propaganda and the socialist conspiracy of Babeuf. It is therefore natural that the Directory should have continued to look upon the war as a means of levying contributions upon the enemy and of finding resources; and also that it should have feared the return after an empty-handed peace, of a ragged and famished army and that it should have finally approved Bonaparte's bold plan, the conquest and pillage of Italy. The destruction of the plate of the assignats, symbol of the bankruptcy which the Revolution flattered itself it could avoid, took place on February 19, 1796. On the twenty-second, Bonaparte received command of the army of the Alps, which he was to lead into those "rich provinces" where

it would find "honor, glory, and wealth." Bonaparte kept his word. A campaign marked by a series of victories, Castiglione, Arcole, Rivoli, allowed him to accomplish his program. From henceforth he will not diverge from it. He will make his battles a source of profit. For fifteen years, he will so conduct the war that not only will it cost France nothing but, through it, he will restore her finances.

A victorious general, who was furnishing the state with money, made himself indispensable and the popularity of Bonaparte increased. It is none the less true that many of the French were wondering if there was always to be war, conscription, and conquests. It was well-known that the most ardent partisans of the war were Jacobins. It was feared that the situation which had led to the Terror might be repeated. In 1797, at the moment when Austria, driven out of Italy and menaced even within her borders, was signing the preliminaries of Léoben, the elections had sent to the Councils a new batch of moderates who were opposed to the policy of war. Considering the state of misery and anarchy in which France found herself—with her weak government, the Directory divided and despised—the continuation of the war seemed, in the eyes of reasonable men, absurd, and sure to bring disaster. In their opinion France should take advantage of the defeat of Austria and the weariness of Pitt. The latter was making overtures for peace at Lille and seemed disposed to recognize the conquests of the Revolution, Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, the Batavian Republic of Holland and the Cisalpine Republic of Italy as annexations of the French Republic. One of the Directors was of the opinion that this occasion ought not to be lost. This was Barthélemy, the negotiator of the treaty of Basle, a diplomat of the old régime, a disciple of Vergennes. Carnot hesitated, fearing the return of the Bourbons as much as a military dictatorship. The three others, Rewbell, La Reveillère and Barras (although the last, venal and corrupt, was unstable) thought that peace offered more difficulties than the war and that the government would either have to cope with insoluble problems or that it would be overturned by the reac-

tionaries for whom the making of peace would be a triumph. They thought also that the authors and beneficiaries of the Revolution would have some accounts to render, especially the regicides; and they said to themselves, and probably not incorrectly, that the attitude of Pitt would not last; that an England leaving France her conquests from the Rhine to the Adige was too good to be true; that war would soon break out anew and under conditions less favorable to France once the tension was relieved.

The partisans of peace were in the majority in the Councils but no organized force was with them. The partisans of the war could count upon the Jacobins, the "patriots," and the soldiers. They violently attacked the royalists and the moderates, confounded with them under the name of the "faction of the old frontiers," and with the connivance of the young generals, caused addresses against the enemies of the Republic to be delivered to the army. To deal with the situation, a man with a strong hand was needed. Bonaparte sent Augereau to Paris. He invaded the council hall accompanied by Rossignol and Santerre, returned ghosts of Jacobinism, arrested the deputies who were protesting and boasted the day following, the 18th Fructidor, that his expedition had been as successful "as an opera ballet" (September 4, 1797).

The moderates had been "fructidorized." It was a bloodless Terror, hardly less cruel than the other, the scaffold being replaced by deportation. Some of the deputies, the Director Barthélemy himself, were sent to Guiana with a number of priests, many of whom perished. Arrests, proscriptions, persecutions began again under the influence of the Jacobins whose power had been resuscitated by this coup d'état.

From his "proconsulship of Italy," General Bonaparte, the great favorite of the Directory, watched events. He had approved and aided the 18th Fructidor. He profited by it. He saw that henceforth the soldier would be the master, that the Directory would become unpopular through its violent return to the Left, and that the need of a stable government, protecting both people and property, would soon be felt. This government,

the restorer of order and authority, leaning for support upon men who had no other means of existence than the military profession, would also have to preserve the results of the Revolution. Bonaparte himself was merely its greatest parvenu. Thus he speculated upon the two tendencies between which the French were divided. Before Fructidor, General Bonaparte, who already was playing politics, was among the most ardent in accusing the peace party of compromising the fruit of his victories in Italy. After Fructidor, he changed his attitude; he signed with Austria the peace of Campo Formio, a peace for the sake of policy, which put off the most difficult matters, those concerning Germany, to the future Congress of Rastadt.

If Bonaparte, as early as 1797, had decided on what policy he would follow in case circumstances should offer him a political rôle in France, he had more immediate problems to solve. Times were hard and one had to live. Generals, like others, were endeavoring, more or less adroitly, to insure themselves against the morrow. Dumouriez had already misjudged the situation; Pichegru, involved in his intrigues, was to commit suicide. Bonaparte had vision and saw correctly. His proconsulship of Italy would not last forever. He found something else: an Egyptian expedition, a campaign in the Orient—glorious and fruitful—a means, of which Frenchmen had thought during the whole of the eighteenth century, of striking the English Empire in India. Hoche had been carried away by projects, always fruitless, of landing in Wales and Ireland. These projects were not abandoned, but to conquer the English completely, it was necessary to try something else. Venturesome as it was, Bonaparte's proposition was accepted by the Directory.

The Egyptian campaign was undertaken with a badly reconstructed navy, while the English fleet had become more formidable. Although Bonaparte had the good fortune to land his expeditionary forces safely, Nelson shortly after destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir (August, 1798). The squadrons of Spain and of Holland, allies of the French, were also defeated. Bonaparte had conquered Egypt but he was blockaded. Russia

and Turkey declared war against the Republic. Austria in turn broke off the negotiations of Rastadt; she even had the French plenipotentiaries assassinated, and entered into a coalition stronger than the former one by the addition of Russia. Affairs then began to go badly for the Directory. To attentive observers it was evident that the conquests of the Revolution were secured to France by the frailest of attachments; that the combination of vassal republics was a house of cards; and that this war with Europe, directed by England, was bound to end badly for France. Championnet succeeded in getting as far as Naples, as in the time of Charles VIII. The Pope was seized and carried away to Valence. But insurrections broke out in Italy. Suvóroff, together with the Austrians, entered Milan. In France these reverses were increasing the unpopularity of the Directory, an incapable government which was given over to the Jacobins. In June, 1799, a revolt of the Councils undid what the coup d'état of Fructidor had accomplished, and reorganized the Directory without making it any better than it was before. On the other hand, reverses were following each other in rapid succession. After the defeat of Novi, Italy was lost to France. Without the victory of Masséna at Zürich and Brune's success, which checked the enemy in Holland, the plight of France would have been desperate. Confusion reigned in the political assemblies and the Directory, forced to oscillate from Right to Left, and Left to Right, no longer knew what stand to take. Bonaparte, on his side, had just failed in Syria where he had been trying to open up a way for the army. The Egyptian campaign yielded nothing. Informed of the events in France, he decided to return; through most extraordinary good fortune he evaded the English ships and on October 8, 1799, he landed at Fréjus.

One month later, November 9, 1799, the 18th Brumaire, the Directory was overthrown by one of those coups d'état for which he had set the model and which every one had come to regard as quite ordinary affairs. The Revolution—or rather the Revolutionary period properly so called—ended with the admission that its leaders were incapable of founding a government.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

THE coup d'état of Brumaire, far from being directed against the Revolution, was destined to save it. On his return from Egypt, Bonaparte appeared as the savior for whom every one had been looking. Immediately upon his arrival at Fréjus he was welcomed with the cry of "Long live the Republic!" He journeyed through France as a victor. An ardent republican, Baudin, a deputy of the Ardennes, died of joy upon hearing of his return. Baudin was one of the authors of the Constitution of the Year III; he saw it on the verge of perishing and put his hope in the young general who on the 13th Vendémiaire and the 18th Fructidor had lent a strong arm to the cause of the Revolution. We must not lose sight of the fact that the 18th Brumaire was organized from within the government itself. Two out of the five directors, Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, were for Bonaparte and Sieyès was one of the fathers of the Revolution. He was at the head of the Council of the Ancients. Lucien Bonaparte presided over the Council of Five Hundred. The coöperation of these men made it possible to remove the legislative body from Paris and to send it to Saint-Cloud, on the pretext that it was threatened by a Jacobin movement. Nevertheless there was violent opposition among the Five Hundred who wished to outlaw Napoleon. While he was being surrounded and threatened with assassination, his grenadiers rushed in and parted the groups. Their entrance into the hall put to flight the representatives who had treated him as a seditious person and a dictator.

"Bonaparte," said Thiers, "preserved the ideals of the Revolution under the form of a monarchy." As a matter of fact, some of the revolutionists and regicides, like Sieyès, felt that it

had been compromised. Nothing succeeded; no constitution could survive; order was not reëstablished. Brune and Masséna had barely managed to halt the Coalition by a hair's breadth and no one knew whether the respite would be a matter of months or weeks. Such a state of affairs could not be prolonged without great danger for France and for the Republic, and might end in a return to the monarchy or in invasion. Except for the royalists and the Jacobins, all of the French, both those who desired either the safety of France or the safety of the Republic and those who desired the safety of both, were in accord in seeking the aid of the victorious general. The directors had already thought of Joubert. In every way, the Republic was abdicating. Anarchy, financial ruin, the possibility of military disaster—this was what France had to face. As an example of the disorder which reigned everywhere, we have only to note that no one in the war office even knew the number of soldiers under arms. These soldiers, "naked and starving," after having lived at the expense of the enemy, were now crowding back into France and were beginning to exercise their requisitioning right upon the French themselves. Thus, ten years after 1789, the situation was no longer possible. Those who had profited by the Revolution, especially those who had bought the national lands, were among the most anxious. Every one became conservative. Some had long been weary of the disorders and excesses. Others wished to consolidate the new régime, and understood the necessity of a return to authority and order. Disgust and anxiety delivered France into Bonaparte's hands. But his dictatorship arose out of the very principles of the Revolution itself which had ended by seeking refuge in personal power.

Some historians have tried to explain Bonaparte by referring to his Corsican and Italian origin; but, entirely French by education, he was above all else a man of the eighteenth century. He had its ideas, its turn of phrase; he liked declamation and the style of Rousseau, maxims and the style of Chamfort. In his monologues, written at Saint Helena what do we always find? The man who was twenty years old in 1789. Formed

under the old régime, he himself recognized what he owed to those who had taught him. He spoke with gratitude of his masters at the military academy. Like others of his time, he rather continued the old ideas and customs than introduced new ones. He belongs so much to his own time that we are sometimes astonished, as for instance in his cult of Frederick II, the hero who had preceded him and whom he had effaced in the memory of Europeans. As for the Revolution, whose language he spoke and to whose philosophy he subscribed, he went through it as a soldier who had his career to make, quick to seize the opportunities that it offered him. He served all parties without belonging to any. On the tenth of August, the resignation of Louis XV angered him because he himself had a gift for commanding and a sense for authority. An instinct for politics, a relish for taking risks, a growing confidence in his lucky star, a remarkable aptitude for understanding men and their needs, of finding the words and the action which each situation demanded—these were the elements of his success. And why did this extraordinary fortune end in a catastrophe? Because Napoleon Bonaparte was burdened by the heaviest part of the revolutionary inheritance, a slave to the war of 1792, a slave to its conquests. Like most of his contemporaries, he forgot only one thing; England had never permitted and never would permit the French to be the masters of the Low Countries. To drive them out, no effort would be too costly for her. The Revolution had done nothing to change this long established law and the coming of Napoleon did not change it.

At first everything was easy. France threw herself into the arms of this extraordinary man who seemed to divine her desires. Circumstances conspired with his prestige and his address to give him undivided power. According to revolutionary tradition the Directory had "purged" itself, and having need of the name and sword of Bonaparte for this purgation, Sieyès and Roger-Ducos had made a place for him with themselves. From five directors, the government passed into the hands of three consuls. Immediately General Bonaparte became First Consul, the only consul. It was he who governed and who

reassured those committed to the Revolution as well as the peaceable mass of the population. He wiped out the remains of Jacobinism, the compulsory progressive tax, and the hateful law of hostages. He restored worship in the churches and pacified the Vendée by stopping the religious persecutions. He promised to end the frightful misery caused by the assignats, the misery which the Directory in spite of its promises had been powerless to cure. The Revolution, born of the fear of a deficit, had opened a gulf. The destruction of the paper money had been no remedy. For the first time it was understood that a reorganization of the finances and a return to prosperity depended upon political reorganization and a strong government. Under the old régime the finances had been only embarrassed by the resistance of special interests defended by the parliaments. They had been ruined by revolutionary demagoguery. A strong authority was necessary to reestablish them. Without delay Bonaparte called in an old official of the monarchy, Gaudin, later Duke de Gaëte, who founded the direct taxes on the model of the twentieths and reestablished on the model of the *aides* the indirect taxes abolished by the Revolution. Without confessing it, the French began to realize that things had not been so bad under the old régime and that the worst evil was anarchy.

However, the government which had been formed the day after the 18th Brumaire was provisional. According to custom one more constitution had to be given to the Republic. General Bonaparte waited patiently for the chef d'œuvre which Sieyès was preparing. He reserved to himself the privilege of making any necessary alterations. Sieyès meditated long over it. He conceived a system in which the elections passed through a series of siftings—a system which was neither a monarchy nor a republic, neither a dictatorship nor a régime of assemblies. It was a vast pyramid whose base was the populace, and which grew smaller and smaller until it reached the Great Elector, a sort of constitutional though not hereditary king who was to be subject to recall by a senate. There were besides to be two consuls, one for peace and one for war, chosen by the Great

Elector. As for the legislative body, it was reduced to a silent rôle. It was to reply by yes or no after the Council of State and the Tribune had spoken. The latter, designed to represent the opposition, alone had the right to protest. Bonaparte examined the system, kept what seemed to him good, ridiculed and suppressed the Great Elector, that is the head of the pyramid, and replaced him by a First Consul named for ten years, which was himself. He had nothing further to do but to reduce (while waiting to suppress it in 1807) the independent Tribune and thus from Sieyès' harmoniously balanced system, the dictatorship pure and simple was born. The two consuls whom Bonaparte associated with himself for the sake of form, were two men of ripe age, Cambacérès and Lebrun. The latter, and this may not have been a chance selection, had been secretary to Maupeou under Louis XV, at the time of the coup d'état against the parliaments. The rallying of the Catholics was already nearly accomplished. The rallying of the royalists, of whom Napoleon was thinking, would be easier with these men to help him.

The Constitution of the Year VIII, thus made over by the First Consul, was approved by three million votes. Many projects had already been submitted to the people but never had such a large majority been obtained. We may perhaps wonder whether France in 1789 did not deceive herself as to her real desires and if she had not aspired to authority rather than liberty. Napoleon Bonaparte completed the government, of which he was the sole master, by institutions which all tended to maintain society and property just as the Revolution had left them, and to preserve the spirit of the Revolution in the laws, but to cast them all in authoritative forms. One would have said that the First Consul had kept before his eyes both the old régime and the revolutionary democracy in order to retain the strong portions of the one and to eliminate the weaknesses of the other. The Revolution had introduced the elective system everywhere, in the administration as well as in the magistracy and in the police departments; it all but introduced it into the army, and it was the cause of the anarchy through

which its governments had perished. Bonaparte substituted prefects and subprefects for elected committees; that is, he reëstablished and multiplied the intendants of the old régime. Only, as the Revolution had made a clean sweep of the old franchises and liberties as well as of the parliaments which opposed them, the new intendants governed without hindrance in the name of the central power. As for the magistracy, Bonaparte was careful not to restore to them the independence which they had so abused under the monarchy. The Consul Lebrun, the former collaborator of Maupeou, could offer many useful suggestions in this respect. A system very like that of 1771 was adopted. The magistrates were appointed by the government and, as a guaranty against their being controlled by it, the judges were appointed for life and could not be removed. Thus utilizing the experience gained from the monarchy and from the Revolution, together with the remains of both, Bonaparte composed the Institutions of the Year VIII. These were founded upon the idea of a strong central administration which placed the nation in the hand of the state. So convenient was the plan of government that all the régimes which followed adhered to it. It still exists, hardly modified even as to details.

Everything was going well for the First Consul. But it was necessary to restore not only order in France. She had been at war for eight years. It was necessary to restore peace as well. The Emperor of Russia, Paul I, dissatisfied with his allies, had withdrawn from the struggle. England and Austria still remained hostile. Bonaparte made overtures to them to lay down their arms. That peace with England was possible, so long as the French held the mouth of the Scheldt and the English controlled the seas, was a great illusion. Bonaparte harbored one other illusion which was responsible for everything that followed. Pitt rejected his offer. The government at Vienna, allied with that at London, having also rejected it, Napoleon believed that by a decisive victory over Austria he could force England to yield. This error, in which he persisted until his final overthrow, started here. We must, however, remember that the Revolution had made the same mis-

take before him. Bonaparte received from it this inheritance and this necessity. France would never give up her chief and most cherished conquest, Belgium, until she was prostrate under the knee of her adversary. It was certain suicide for any government, born of the Revolution, to renounce it. Bonaparte's hands were therefore tied. And his story is that of a man seeking an impossible thing, namely, the capitulation of England regarding the annexation of Belgium, a point on which she would never yield, so long as France was powerless on the sea. Napoleon might overturn the continent; in the end, France would be pushed back to within less than her former limits.

To force peace upon Austria, the First Consul decided upon a daring plan. While Moreau was carrying on a successful diversion in Germany, he boldly crossed the Alps through the Great Saint Bernard Pass, defeated Mélas at Marengo, a disputed victory in which Desaix fell (June 14, 1800), and once more became master of Italy. After some fruitless parleys, one more victory, that of Moreau at Hohenlinden in December, was necessary to force the emperor, Francis II, to yield. In February, 1801, the treaty of Lunéville was signed. Austria gave up Italy, recognized all of the French conquests of the Revolution and the four associated or rather vassal republics—the Bavarian, the Swiss, the Cisalpine, and the Ligurian. The left bank of the Rhine became French and was divided into departments. This was the triumph of Napoleon and of the Revolution. For the first time in her history, France had attained her so-called “natural” frontiers. The Gaul of Cæsar's time was reconstituted. It came as the result of the defeat of the traditional enemy, the house of Austria, and it seemed as though the republican policy, heir of the anti-Austrian tradition, the policy of 1741, were sounder than that of the Bourbons. Already Bonaparte was planning to remake Europe, to reassemble the still divided people, the Germans and the Italians, and to create in place of the old historical divisions, some new “natural” states, of which he was to be the head. He wished to abolish everything that was “gothic,” everything that the treaty of Westphalia had been designed to preserve, lest

the nationalities should band together against France and especially lest Germany should become unified. To sweep away the old institutions without as well as within—that was the program of the First Consul. It was an attempt to realize a dream of a universal republic under the presidency of the French people. It was also one of the dreams of the Revolution. We find the origin of it in the speeches of its orators as well as in the work of the publicists of the eighteenth century of whom Bonaparte was the spiritual heir. No one can say what would have become of this system, in which France was to have first place, if England had been defeated. But England was not. And the system, having destroyed the security and safeguards of France, was very soon to turn back against the French themselves.

Austria had signed the treaty of Lunéville in the same trafficking spirit in which she had already, together with Prussia and Russia, divided Poland. Perceiving that times had changed, she herself put up the old Germanic Empire at auction, divided the spoils with France, and sacrificed the German princes in order to fortify herself by certain annexations of territory which would enable her later to resume the war. In the same calculating spirit, England, who alone still remained hostile, entered in her turn into negotiations with the First Consul the following year.

Everything that happened in 1801 goes to prove that England, deprived of allies, could make no headway against France on the continent, but that by sea, Bonaparte was powerless to touch her. If he had ever had the opportunity to succeed, it was however at that very moment. The ships and ports of Spain and Holland were at the disposition of France; Russia was friendly; and the Scandinavian countries, united in a League of Neutrals, were keeping the Baltic closed to England's commerce. From these elements, it would have been possible to realize great results, if the French navy, which had been ruined by the Revolution, had been refitted. But it was not. What remained of it had been put *hors de combat*, together with the Spanish and Dutch ships; Russia withdrew her support

after the mysterious assassination of Paul I; and the bombardment of Copenhagen dispersed the League of Neutrals. Although the First Consul succeeded in obtaining the peace of Amiens, it was only by craft and calculation. He knew that England was tired of the war and of its great expense. By resuming, ostensibly, the plan of landing on English soil and invading Great Britain, preparations for which had already been made in 1797, he frightened the English public and, negotiations having been offered, he directed them towards a compromise which made the peace of Amiens very similar to that of Lunéville. Just as he had compensated Austria at the expense of the German princes, he compensated England at the expense of the French allies. Ceylon was taken from Holland and Trinidad from Spain. By this transaction, through which France also gave up Egypt which had been lost to her since communication by sea had been cut, the maritime and colonial supremacy of England was increased. The treaty of Amiens (March, 1802) was for her to a great extent a retaliation for the treaty of Versailles of 1783.

A peace concluded under such conditions could be no more than a truce. In spite of Pitt's overthrow, the dominating ideas of English politics were the same. In a country where public opinion carried much weight, the government had yielded to internal difficulties and to the discontent of the merchants who attributed the closing of the continental markets to the prolongation of the war. When, after a few months, the English business men realized that these markets were closed to them because France, with Belgium and Holland, held the mouth of the Scheldt, the war was speedily resumed.

France, however, after the treaty of Amiens believed that the peace would be lasting. The First Consul himself shared this belief. He worked to create a durable state of affairs; he organized the country and its conquests in the same spirit that he had shown from the beginning of his rise to power. As we have seen in other epochs of French history, it was necessary to repair what a long anarchy had destroyed. On that score, the rebuilding of the roads alone showed the extent of the damage that

had been accumulating and the task that was to be accomplished. During this work of restoration, similar to that which the monarchy so many times in the course of centuries had had to undertake, Bonaparte gradually turned his back upon the Revolution. In this rôle which Charles V or Henry IV had played before him, certain monarchic sentiments and ideas were forming in the mind of the First Consul. At one time the royalists thought that he was considering recalling the Bourbons. Louis XVIII, from his exile, wrote him a letter to which he replied in such terms, however, as to leave no illusions on that subject. If he was thinking of a monarchy, it was for himself alone. A plot of some of the Jacobins to assassinate him had increased his horror of the revolutionists. A short time later, in December, 1800, he had barely escaped the explosion of a bomb in the rue Saint-Nicaise. The terrorists and the Septembrists were accused of this crime and more than a hundred names of former members of the Convention and the Commune were inscribed on a proscription list. Fouché, the minister of police, soon discovered that the authors of the plot were royalists this time, agents of the irreconcilable Georges Cadoudal. They were executed but the policy of the First Consul was not changed. He then prepared for the official reëstablishment of the Catholic religion, in spite of the difficulties which he encountered and in spite of the protests of the military party itself, for religious passions had been the most violent of the Revolution. On July 15, 1801, he succeeded in signing a concordat with Pius VII and Cardinal Consalvi. Thus at the time of the peace of Amiens everything was conspiring to restore tranquillity and prosperity in France. The popularity of the First Consul was so great that he was regarded as indispensable and the threats against his life only tended to increase his prestige.

In the meantime, with the astonishing faculty which France possesses for rising from her ruins as soon as order is established, wealth began to appear, business and industry were flourishing, the national finances themselves were coming back to a sound state. The unfortunate bondholders, who had been waiting since 1789 for reimbursement of their loans, payment

of their claims against the state, and who had seen nothing but continued bankruptcy, at last began to receive some of their money, though at a great reduction. The Directory had promised to recognize a third of their interest, the "consolidated third" which had been used to disguise the government's financial embarrassment. It was only under the Consulate that even this promise was fulfilled. Thus, through a great sacrifice on the part of the capitalists, the bitter conflict ended which under the old régime had brought them to grips with the state and had been one of the causes of the Revolution.

In the midst of this grandeur and prosperity the First Consul had, however, one anxiety, and it was a legitimate one. After all, his power lacked a solid foundation. He possessed it for ten years; three of them had passed, and the Constitution of Sieyès, even revised and corrected, was not very reassuring for the stability of the régime. A lively opposition had already manifested itself in the Tribune and had not taken kindly to any of the projects which Bonaparte had most at heart, the Concordat, the formation of the Legion of Honor, and the Civil Code. This opposition would become more dangerous with time and in proportion as the end of the ten-year term approached. It was clear that, just as under the Directory, France would again oscillate between the royalists and the Jacobins and that there would be a return of agitation and anarchy. To establish the new régime firmly, the elimination of the objectors, an attenuated form of the purgations of the Revolutionary period, would not suffice. It was naturally desirable to give this régime the benefit of a reasonable tenure of office in order that the power of the government might be less liable to be contested. Thus arose the idea of reëstablishing the monarchy in favor of the First Consul. He himself dissimulated his desires and ambitions. He asked for nothing, he merely allowed his friends to act. After the triumph of the peace of Amiens they proposed to present him with a national reward, but the senate only voted another period of ten years. It was, in spite of everything, a discomfiture. Then Cambacérès thought of submitting to the people the question as to whether or not

Napoleon Bonaparte, (his first name was beginning to appear officially) should be named First Consul for life, and three and a half million votes against less than ten thousand responded in the affirmative. The Constitution was revised in this sense and the First Consul received besides the right to choose his successor (August, 1802). Although he had as yet no children, there was nothing to prevent his son, in case he should have one, from being his successor.

Thus the hereditary monarchy was on the point of being reëstablished after so many vows never to return to royalty. This movement was brought about in the most natural manner in the world, and there remained in France such an insignificant number of doctrinary republicans that there was no fear of resistance. It needed only the right circumstances for Bonaparte to take one more step and assume that title of emperor of which he was now dreaming and which was pleasing to the French because it evoked the memory of ancient Rome, and corresponded to the extent of their conquests. It would, however, be as false as unjust to attribute to the First Consul the idea that war was necessary to arrive at supreme power. It would be no less so to attribute to him the ambition to dominate all Europe. As we shall see, the Empire was founded in quite a different manner. As soon as he had been made consul for life, all the sovereigns looked upon Bonaparte as one of themselves. They saw him "mount step by step towards the throne," every one accepted his elevation and the European monarchies, showing once more how little they cared for the cause of the Bourbons, bowed before this formidable power. They sought only to conciliate his good will and, to the best of their interests, adapted themselves to a situation which they could not change.

In 1802 and 1803 the policy of the First Consul tended only to the pacific consolidation and organization of Europe into the new form which ten years of war had imposed upon her. When he had himself proclaimed president of the Cisalpine or Italian Republic, whose center was Milan, and when he annexed Piedmont to France, not one soul protested because according to

the ancient custom, every one had received compensations. Austria herself consented because she had Venice. This principle of compensations, in keeping with the treaty of Lunéville, was applied to Germany, and the revision of 1803, by suppressing a large number of ecclesiastic principalities and free towns, prepared for the concentration and unity of that country. Catholic Austria no more hesitated to receive from the heir of the Revolution the spoils of episcopal princes, than liberal and Protestant Prussia did to take from the same hand the independent cities. This simplification of the German chaos, which began the destruction of the treaty of Westphalia, and which reserved a great rôle for Prussia, was to have fatal consequences for France because it increased the power of the stronger elements at the expense of the weaker. Napoleon no more thought of a possible return blow than of the danger of bringing together the scattered members of the Germanic nations. This transaction implied on the part of Napoleon a belief in the stability of European affairs. Still more significant was his preoccupation with restoring her colonies to France. It shows his confidence in the solidity of the treaty of Amiens. He had obliged France's ally, Spain, to cede back to her Louisiana in exchange for Etruria which was transformed into a kingdom for an infanta of Spain. He undertook to reconquer Santo Domingo, to-day Haiti, the jewel of the Antilles, which for so long had furnished France with sugar and coffee and which under the Revolution, after a period of anarchy and terrible massacres, had passed into the hands of the blacks. All these projects bear witness to but one plan, that of installing himself in peace, and of enjoying the immense acquisitions which France had received.

But it was completely to misunderstand England to imagine that she would resign herself to allowing France to build up a colonial empire, and to reappear upon the seas as the possessor of the most beautiful coasts and the finest harbors from Rotterdam to Genoa. As soon as France had a navy, and she was working to rebuild one, she would become a formidable competitor. One would think, and it was what the French govern-

ment did not fail to repeat, that these reasons and these fears would have prevented England from signing the peace of Amiens, and that nothing had changed since 1802. What had changed was the disposition of the English people, especially of the merchants who perceived that the growth of France had taken away from them a vast clientèle in Europe. Unemployment, that old nightmare of the English, appeared again and terrified them, while the politicians, of whom Pitt remained the leader, were determined never to allow this expansion of France. They profited by this state of mind to bring pressure upon the Addington ministry and, seeking a pretext for a break and for war, they prevented the evacuation of Malta, although by the treaty of Amiens they were bound to it. For several months the affair of Malta gave rise to stormy negotiations. The First Consul, to whom the renewal of hostilities now seemed inevitable, would have liked at least to defer them. In agreement with Talleyrand, his minister of foreign affairs, he offered several compromises. The British government remained obdurate; it had taken its stand. Even if Malta were ceded, an act that would open a breach in the treaty of Amiens, the conflict would be renewed on some other pretext. In May, 1803, the rupture took place.

We are touching here on the chain of circumstances which was to make the establishment of the Empire possible. France and England were in a state of war but without means of reaching each other. The French coasts were being uselessly cannonaded and the First Consul, taking up again the project that had already been twice abandoned, of invading England and transporting an army thither by means of flotillas of flat boats, formed a camp at Boulogne. These preparations required time; meanwhile the struggle began with the ordinary weapons. Those royalists who remained unreconciled received encouragement and subsidies from London. Georges Cadoudal landed in France and in an agreement with General Pichegru plotted to kill Napoleon. He even succeeded in winning over another general who was jealous of Bonaparte, the illustrious Moreau. This conspiracy was discovered, and it profoundly

irritated the First Consul. It also enlightened him. He complained openly of the ingratitude of the *émigrés*, assumed a republican turn of speech, and let it be understood that there was a desire to strike at the Revolution through his person. He even conceived an idea which was just the opposite of the policy that he had hitherto followed. The conspirators had all declared that a prince was to join them, and the First Consul decided to set an example. Although on every occasion he had expressed his horror at the execution of Louis XVI, it was to the equivalent of regicide that he resorted in his turn, to give his throne a republican baptism of blood. Although the prince announced by the conspirators did not appear, Napoleon nevertheless did not wish to abandon the plan he had made. The young Prince de Condé, Duke d'Enghien, was in Baden at Ettenheim just across the frontier. He had him seized, and after a mock trial had him led out and shot.

This crime was certainly not necessary to enable Napoleon to become emperor. The hereditary monarchy would be his naturally by virtue of the same conditions that had already made him consul for life. But the attempt at assassination by means of an infernal machine had aided the successes of the first plebiscite. The last step was taken, thanks to the conspiracy of Georges Cadoudal and Pichegru. Observing the general revival of the monarchic idea in France, the royalists thought that the person of the First Consul was the only obstacle in the way of a restoration. In order that the way might be clear for the Bourbons, it was necessary to do away with him. Napoleon having escaped the conspirators, the danger that he had run only served his cause. It began to be believed that the consulship for life was precarious and that a form of government liable to perish with its chief was not secure enough. Bonaparte might disappear overnight, but a Napoleonic dynasty would survive him and continue the government. Therefore this man whom his enemies, who were also the enemies of the Revolution, wished to destroy, "had," said Thiers, "to be made king or emperor, so that heredity, added to his power, would assure natural and immediate successors and violence against

his person having become useless, there would be less temptation to commit it. To place the crown on this precious and sacred head, upon which reposed the destiny of France, was to provide a buckler which would protect her against the blows of her enemies. In protecting him, France would be protecting all the interests born of the Revolution; she would save from a bloody reaction the men compromised by their own mistakes (the Jacobins and royalists). She would conserve their property to those who had purchased the national domains; their grades to the military; their positions to all the members of the government and to herself, a régime of equality, justice, and grandeur which she had acquired." Conservation came to be the leading idea. The Revolution had become conservative of itself and of its results. In order to save itself, to last, it had resorted, on the 18th Brumaire, to personal power. It now resorted to the hereditary monarchy. To accomplish this last step, Napoleon had calculated that the execution of the Duke d'Enghien would be useful because it would remove the last republican scruples and would act as a guaranty to those who had been most compromised in the revolutionary excesses and who would rejoice "to see General Bonaparte separated from the Bourbons by a trench filled with royal blood."

To a former revolutionary, known for the vigor of his opinions, the tribune Curée was delegated the task of proposing the establishment of the Empire. There was but one declared opponent. This was Carnot who, however, was afterwards won over. A few manifestations by the electoral colleges and a few addresses to the army paved the way for the operation. After an unanimous vote of the senate a second plebiscite ratified, by millions of votes, the third change made in the Constitution of Sieyès. And although from this Constitution there had arisen a sovereign far more absolute than any of her kings, the country still solemnly vowed never to recall the Bourbons to the throne. Thus ended the movement which had so rapidly led France back towards monarchy and which Thiers sums up in striking terms, "From five directors, named for five years, the country passed to the idea of three consuls

appointed for ten years, and from the idea of three consuls to that of one supreme consul and he, appointed for life. Once started on such a path it was impossible to stop until the last step had been taken, that is, until they had come back to the idea of hereditary power." This return was not difficult for the French. According to Thiers, who is illuminating in this part of his history, although it had taken several generations after Cæsar's time to accustom the Romans to the idea of a monarchic power, "So many precautions were not necessary in France for a people who had been accustomed for twelve centuries to a monarchy and only ten years to a republic."


The Empire was proclaimed May 18, 1804, and the name of emperor was chosen because that of king inseparably connected with the Bourbons. Furthermore, this title seemed more august, more military, more novel, while at the same time it evoked imperishable memories. Up to this time, the emperor had always been Germanic. To transfer the imperial title to France was to bear witness to the defeat of the Hapsburgs, who recognized this soldier of fortune as Emperor of the West and would soon content themselves with the title of Emperor of Austria. It also meant restoring to France the scepter which Charlemagne had borne. Like Charlemagne also, Napoleon wished to be crowned by the Pope and not at Rome but at Paris. Pius VII after some hesitation, acceded to his wish and on December second, at Notre Dame, took place the extraordinary spectacle of the coronation by which the soldier of the Revolution became the anointed of the Lord. To those who had been disturbed by the Concordat and who had been even more frightened by this apparent subordination to the papacy, Napoleon replied that he was protecting the new régime from all religious opposition and was rather attaching the Church to the government than the government to the Church. This measure was legitimatizing the Empire, so he said, in the eyes of all the Catholics in the world and at one stroke was making him the equal of the sovereigns of the oldest houses of Europe. He was careful, moreover, to take the crown from the hand of Pius VII and to place it upon his head himself. But did

he not dare do anything he wished? He reconstituted a nobility, he surrounded himself by a court; there was nothing that France did not approve.

The Empire, born amid this general satisfaction and such benediction and which realized the marriage of the revolutionary and monarchic principles, seemed to the French to be the port in which they might be sure of repose after such wracking and terrible convulsions. By the strangest of phenomena, no one was alarmed over the one thing that rendered all this brilliancy fragile. The Empire could never be firmly established and the conquests of the Revolution assured until the day when the power of Britain should be laid low; and France almost forgot that she was at war with England.

Napoleon did not forget it. At the time that he was distributing offices and titles, his thought was ever on his camp at Boulogne. He was convinced that to conquer the English it was only necessary to deal them an overwhelming blow in their own territory and that to strike this blow he must be free, if for no more than a day, to cross the Channel. He saw clearly that England was working to form a third coalition. He was sure that he could defeat it and at this moment he did not deceive himself by the idea that this new victory on the continent would solve the problem, any more than the others had done, so long as England's great maritime power remained intact. The French navy had been ruined by the Revolution. Hardly had it begun to revive than it was again badly shattered at Aboukir. Napoleon, aided by Decrès had undertaken to restore it. But a navy is not the work of a moment. Although the coalition, because of the lively fear inspired by France, was slow in forming and thus allowed him some respite, still he had to act against it before his squadrons were ready; and he was compelled to turn his attention toward Germany without even having shaken the power of England. The failure of the Boulogne plan was to change the entire fate of the Empire.

This plan was simple and daring. France had two fleets; it did not matter greatly if one were destroyed if only the other,



*Napoleon
the
First*

free to move, could enter the Channel and protect for only twenty-four hours the transport of the army from Boulogne. This immense stake rested on a throw of the dice and it was lost. Just as at Waterloo Napoleon was to wait in vain for Grouchy, so at Boulogne he waited in vain for Villeneuve. But this admiral distrusted the instrument that he had in his hands, the imperfect material, the officers, and the inexperienced crews. The fleet of Spain, the French ally, had been severely battered and was lacking in military spirit. Villeneuve feared a disaster and, as often happens, his very apprehensions were driving him on toward catastrophe. Decrès, the minister of the navy, shared his fears. "It is unfortunate for me that I understand the sailor's profession," he dared to tell the emperor, "since the knowledge can produce no result in the plans of Your Majesty." The days of August, 1805, were ones of cruel waiting for Napoleon. Would Villeneuve report at Brest to enter the Channel? He learned finally that Villeneuve had sailed towards the south. All the plans of the emperor were destroyed. Once more it was necessary to abandon the invasion of England, or at least to defer it. Austria, who had yielded to the solicitations of the British government, became openly hostile. Russia followed her example. Prussia, in spite of the traditional illusion that she was the neutral ally of France, was not to be relied on. The only thing to do was to defeat the Austrians before they could effect a junction with the Russians. Then, having imposed peace upon the continent, Napoleon would turn his attention to the sea to obtain a maritime peace. Therefore he did not entertain at this time the fatal idea that England would confess herself beaten as soon as the forces on the continent had been overcome. However, constrained and forced to it by the catastrophe, the fear of which had paralyzed his admirals, Napoleon was finally to return to that idea—the idea which had already proved so costly to France under Louis XV. The emperor's magnificent victories would later be annihilated by a naval disaster.

The day after the capitulation of the Austrians at Ulm, Villeneuve attempted to evade the English fleet which was

blocking him at Cadiz. Although inferior in numbers, the English destroyed the French-Spanish fleet after a terrible combat in sight of Cape Trafalgar, October 20, 1805. That day, although it was not immediately apparent, the game was lost for Napoleon. Nelson had neutralized the effect of the surrender of Ulm; and all the other victories of the Empire would henceforth be useless. After this catastrophe the project of a descent upon England was no longer realizable. Napoleon effaced it from his mind. The defeat at Trafalgar had the same effect as that of La Hogue; France lost interest in the sea and abandoned it to the English. Everything was promising, however, for a continental victory, and Napoleon set out to achieve it, calculating that after his triumph he would find England conciliatory. As he had anticipated, he defeated the Austrians before they joined the Russians. The latter had then offered battle and he won over them and a second Austrian army his most brilliant victory, that of Austerlitz, December second. In a few weeks the Third Coalition had been crushed. Napoleon at the head of the Grand Army, and master of Vienna, could impose his will upon Europe. Directed solely by the hand of this captain of genius who was at the same time a dictator, the forces of France seemed invincible.

It was only necessary to decide what use should be made of this military triumph. Talleyrand advised a reconciliation with Austria. This was a return to the policy of Louis XIV, Choiseul, and Vergennes; Austria would serve as a balance. Extending towards the Orient the length of the Danube, she would be a means of conservation and equilibrium; she would keep Russia within bounds and act as a buffer against her. But Napoleon had other ideas. He understood perhaps better than the others how fragile were his victories, as fragile as the territorial conquests of the Revolution which it was his mission to defend. As long as he did not have England at his mercy, nothing was lasting; and he had turned his back on the sea. Another plan had taken possession of his imagination. He was coming back to the policy whence had sprung the Egyptian campaign—to strike at England and make her capitulate

through the Orient, perhaps by the taking of Constantinople. The peace of Pressburg, signed by a crushed Austria, marked a considerable extension of the Napoleonic Empire towards the east. Napoleon had already exchanged the presidency of the Italian Republic for the crown of Lombardy. In place of the Bourbons, at Naples, he installed his brother, Joseph. He took back from Austria, Venice and the former possessions of the Venetian Republic as far as Albania. Austria, humbled, very much reduced, and expelled from Germany, was no more than a road of communication with Constantinople. It was there that Napoleon wished to strike at England.

Here the impossible task began. To execute so vast a project, it was necessary to dominate all Europe. Starting with the conquest of Belgium, the Revolution had led on to more and more extravagant undertakings. Neither the military genius of Napoleon nor his political combinations were to prove themselves sufficient. The very logic of his plans pushed him to dangerous revisions of the map, and to greater and greater additions to the Prussian state. He hoped to retain the latter as an ally and promised her Hanover which had been taken from the King of England. Disposing of Germany at his pleasure, he destroyed the last vestiges of the empire and its elective constitution which had formerly been guaranteed by France. He carved out kingdoms which he distributed to his relatives as he had put his brother, Joseph, in Naples and Louis in Holland. Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt he formed into a Confederation of the Rhine under his presidency. That is, it became a barrier against Russia, a barrier protected in turn by Prussia, an advance bastion, charged moreover with closing the Baltic to the English. During the first month of 1806, Napoleon, master of Germany, seemed so powerful that his enemies hesitated. The Emperor Alexander wondered, for the first time, if it would not be better to come to terms with this Emperor of the French, and to share the Turkish Empire with him. England, seized with an attack of weakness, was thinking of peace. The irreconcilable Pitt was dying, but the pacific Fox died in his turn and out of all

these futile schemes, there resulted only a vast diplomatic muddle in which Napoleon himself became embarrassed and through which he created new enemies.

Alexander I, at the last moment, changed his mind. He had refused to sign the treaty negotiated by Oubril. The burden of this treaty was to have been borne by Spain, the Balearic islands indemnifying the Bourbons of Naples. This deal was immediately revealed by the Russians and English, at the court of Madrid, and the Spanish, already demoralized by Trafalgar, finding themselves duped, withdrew their alliance. The conquest of Spain, therefore, would soon be a necessary part of the Napoleonic plan. In order to tempt England, Napoleon had offered to restore Hanover to King George. The English, with the same perfidy as before, disclosed this to Prussia who previously had entered into an understanding with the Czar.

On top of all this, the French party at Berlin was swept away by a new sort of movement, the national movement of the young intellectuals which was the forerunner of the uprising of 1813, whose origins were to be found in the ideas of the French Revolution. Thus at the moment when Napoleon believed that in controlling central Europe he was preparing for peace, a new adversary presented itself, Prussia, whom France had so long persisted in considering as her natural ally.

Napoleon's reply was crushing. Before Russia could come to its aid, the Prussian army which was still living on the reputation of Frederick, was crushed at Jena, October, 1806, just as the Austrians had been at Ulm. In a few weeks Napoleon had become master of most of Prussia which had suddenly collapsed, while her king and queen took refuge at Königsberg. He had already entered Vienna and he was now to enter Berlin. Since Prussia refused to aid his policy, he resolved to do with the north of Germany what he had done with the Confederation of the Rhine—make it an annex of his empire; he himself would close the ports of the Baltic, and with them all Europe, to English commerce. It was from Ber-

lin that the continental blockade was dated. This blockade which was intended to overwhelm England, only led France to more extravagant efforts without settling anything. After Ulm, Austerlitz had been necessary and after Austerlitz, Jena. After Jena it was necessary to penetrate farther to the east, to cross the Vistula and go in search of the Russians, who this time were not offering battle. At Eylau, three hundred leagues from France, a battle in the midst of a snowstorm resulted in a bloody and contested victory (February 8, 1807) and still did not bring peace. Napoleon, who was beginning to be anxious, then proposed a bargain, an alliance with Prussia and Austria. They held off and refused to play the rôle of buffer against Russia, and were furthermore like many Europeans and even many French, beginning to doubt whether his enterprise would have an issue. Not being able to use Prussia and Austria for the purpose of isolating Russia, it was then necessary for Napoleon to conquer the Czar. A new military effort, the levy of the conscripts of 1808, was demanded of France, "for the sake of peace." At Friedland in June, 1807, the Grand Army was again victorious. Königsberg and the rest of Prussia fell into the emperor's hands.

Napoleon then felt that he had attained his end, that he dominated Europe, and that dominating Europe, he could hold England at his mercy. The Czar, changeable, impressionable, even sly, "a shifty Greek," returned to the idea that he had abandoned the year before. Why should the Emperor of Russia not come to an understanding with the Emperor of the French in a policy of partition quite on the eighteenth century model, only this time it would be a more glorious partition than that of Poland, since it was a question of the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon then conceived the hope that, allied with the Russians against England, closing all the Mediterranean to her, and threatening her even as far as India, he could force her to submit. In 1807 the interview at Tilsit, the pact of friendship concluded between the Emperor of the West and the Emperor of the East, seemed the reward for the costly victories which had led the French soldiers to the banks of the Niemen.

The first disillusionment was that this French-Russian alliance instead of discouraging England only made her the more determined to sustain, with all her energy, a struggle whose outcome would mean either life or death. The British government declared war against Russia and in order to shut her up in the Baltic and get possession of it herself, as well as to terrorize the neutral states, she proceeded to attack Denmark even more brutally than in 1801. The bombardment of Copenhagen caused great indignation in Europe, but it was one of those passing indignations which success effaces. In this struggle between France and England, it is difficult to say who was wrong. The continental blockade was a reply to the tyranny which the English were exercising over navigation, but the continental blockade itself, as well as his project in the Orient, was leading Napoleon to more and more extensive occupations and annexations. This fatal necessity had left France no peace since the day when the Revolution had first desired the war.

Everywhere the continental blockade became the source of difficulties which were one day to overwhelm Napoleon. There was one country which was not eager to shut out English merchandise. This was Portugal. Napoleon found himself obliged to send Junot there with an army. At the same time he was displeased with Spain—felt that she was not to be relied upon—and furthermore he had no confidence in the Bourbons in Madrid whom he despised. Little by little, the idea occurred to him to drive them out as he had already driven the Bourbons out of Naples. In order that the Spanish alliance, still more necessary to him after Junot's expedition, might be more secure and give him what he expected, he needed at Madrid a government wholly loyal and active. Such a government could only be an emanation of his own. A domestic drama at the Spanish capital decided him. After hesitating between several possibilities, Napoleon finally chose that of making one of his brothers King of Spain. This seemed logical since, as he was reigning instead of Louis XIV, he would be putting at Madrid a Bonaparte instead of a Bourbon. Moreover, he despised the Spaniards as much as he did their dynasty,

and considered them a degenerate people. In case they did not accept Joseph as they had accepted the Duke d'Anjou, a hundred thousand young French soldiers would be sufficient to hold the Iberian peninsula which was indispensable to him. At this same moment also, after having favored the papacy to such an extent, the emperor quarreled with the Pope. General Miollis occupied Rome in order to close the papal states, like the rest of Europe, to English commerce and to force Pius VII to become a belligerent. Thus the continental blockade was forcing the emperor to increasing violence and excessive efforts because soon, in order to hold all of Germany and all of Italy, with the two shores of the Adriatic, as well as Spain and Portugal, he would need a million men continually under arms; and in proportion as his forces became scattered, his violence, like his conquests, would be less patiently endured.

In Spain it was a simple matter to dethrone the Bourbons. Having been brought to Bayonne, Charles IV was tricked into abdicating and his son, Ferdinand, renounced the throne which was then given to Joseph Bonaparte, who in turn ceded Naples to Murat. Napoleon distributed kingdoms like duchies and prefectures. The troops who had been brought together under the pretext of furnishing reënforcements for the expedition of Junot were to preserve order during the changing of dynasties. To this operation the essential thing was lacking—the consent of the Spanish people. A general insurrection broke out to which England hastened to give her support. In July, 1808, a serious error committed by General Dupont led to the amazing capitulation at Baylen. Following this reverse, the first military check of the Empire, Joseph, who was barely installed at Madrid, took the still more serious step of evacuating his capital and falling back with his troops towards the Pyrenees. In the meantime, the French communications with Portugal had been cut. The Portuguese population who had at first been submissive had risen in its turn. An English army having been landed, Junot, after some heroic battles, obtained by an honorable capitulation, the concession that the French soldiers should be returned to France in English ships.

By dethroning the Bourbons in order to be surer of Spain, in order to administer her government directly and, as he said, in order to regenerate her, Napoleon had only succeeded in attracting the English there who were received as allies and liberators. He thereby condemned himself to a difficult and constantly recurring conflict against an insurgent people. Furthermore, the uprising of the Spanish nation became contagious. In Prussia, in the Tyrol and in Dalmatia, patriotism was exalted, the idea of a holy war for the sake of independence was born and grew apace. As the emperor recognized in his *Mémorial*, Spain was thus his first stumbling block. At the same time his policies were becoming more complicated. The alliance with Russia was languishing. The partition of Turkey had been abandoned. Napoleon could not leave to the Russians what he himself so ardently desired, that is, Constantinople; nor could they accord it to him. In 1808, at the interview of Erfurt, following that of Tilsit, the two emperors, before a "parterre of kings," were most profuse in their professions of friendship. Napoleon permitted Alexander to take possession of Wallachia and Moldavia (the present Roumania), then Turkish provinces. At the request of the Czar he also agreed to evacuate a great part of Prussia, an evacuation, however, which the Spanish insurrection and the levies of troops which it demanded, rendered necessary. The French were gradually coming to the end of their forces. In the meantime Austria was taking courage; England, always generous of subsidies, was forcing her into the conflict and the Czar refused when Napoleon asked him to join the French in order to intimidate Austria. The interview at Erfurt gave the impression that the French-Russian alliance was not solid and Napoleon, feeling that the affairs in Spain were ruining his prestige, decided to cross the Pyrenees himself in order to install his brother, Joseph, at Madrid.

It would take many volumes to tell the story of these campaigns, which were engendered one by the other, and none of which decided anything. Hardly had Napoleon restored the military situation in Spain and brought back Joseph, than he

had to leave his lieutenants there at grips with the rebels. Austria, encouraged by the difficulties of France, had again entered the war, and the emperor had to betake himself from the borders of the Ebro to the banks of the Danube. Austria's preparations had been serious. She was not a negligible adversary. The battle of Essling was won with difficulty and the victory of Wagram was costly (July, 1809). But another complication arose from this victory. In order to deal Austria a surer blow, Napoleon had sent against her Poniatowski and some of his Poles. Now, as in the eighteenth century, the question of Poland entered into French politics and alliances, and since the partitions, any Polish situation always involved Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Alexander, who had remained neutral during the Austro-French war, was keeping his eye on Galicia, and already disappointed by the abandonment of the plans concerning Turkey, was becoming anxious over a possible reconstruction of Poland. Napoleon then saw that if Russia was no longer a faithful ally, if she refused to join the continental blockade, she would become an enemy and it would be necessary to defeat her in turn. The idea of conquering England through Europe and Asia, of conquering the sea by means of the land, led to these consequences which at first view seem absurd, but which are however, logically bound together.

It was not with a light heart that Napoleon decided to cross the Niemen and carry the war into Russia. He was continually hoping not to be obliged to come to it, if Spain were submissive and if the United States, to whom he was promising Florida after having ceded Louisiana, should declare war on England. His hope was that the latter, her interests and her very existence even, menaced by the continental blockade, would end by asking for peace. Doubtless this blockade did strike a terrible blow at British commerce. It was not less serious for the commerce of other nations. Holland did not submit to it, and Napoleon had to take that country away from his brother Louis who had espoused the cause of his new subjects. Napoleon annexed it to France and divided it into departments. This

gave England one more reason for not disarming. Thus the continental blockade led either to new wars or to such an expansion of the Empire that, the English having refused to recognize the conquests of the Revolution, were also resolutely to refuse to recognize the new conquests, necessitated by the first and intended to guarantee them.

The French were beginning to be anxious. Common sense told them that this extension of territory and of the war could not go on indefinitely, and yet no one could see the end. Even in the emperor's own circle, certain perspicacious men, like Talleyrand and Fouché, began to feel that all this would end badly. And yet the Empire never seemed so great, or the future so sure as in 1810 when Napoleon, having divorced and sent away Josephine who had borne him no children, married an archduchess of the house of Austria. In this he was repeating the marriage of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, into whose family he was thus entering. The following year Marie Louise bore him a son; the hereditary Empire had an heir, and this son was called the King of Rome just as the heir of the Holy Roman Empire had been called King of the Romans. But Rome in 1811 was no longer anything but the capital of the department of the Tiber. The Pope had been deported to Savona and was later to become a prisoner at Fontainebleau. Through the continental blockade, the restorer of catholicism in France had alienated from himself the Catholics of the entire world. And yet, excommunicated, having dethroned the Bourbons at Naples and at Madrid, he had married a daughter of the Hapsburgs. His extraordinary fortune carried everything before it.

Napoleon had not decided upon this Austrian marriage, which was almost in defiance of the Revolution, until after he had been unsuccessful in contracting a marriage with the sister of the Czar. Alexander was withdrawing from the alliance and Napoleon was already losing faith in it. He believed war was inevitable. Putting himself in the Czar's place, he could not see how the Russian Empire would ever accept such extension of the French Empire. Through the necessity of maintaining a

blockade, Napoleon had ended by annexing the Hanseatic towns of Bremen and Hamburg, which became the centers of two of his 130 departments. France now reached as far as the Baltic and the nearer she approached Russia the more a great conflict was to be expected, for difficulties were arising constantly over Oldenburg, Poland, and the East, and Russia was, moreover, reluctant to shut out English commerce. Although they were still allies, the two emperors were arming against each other. This arming in itself constituted a grievance and Napoleon, henceforth convinced that this new war was bound to come and that he would attain his ends only after having conquered Russia, as he had already conquered Prussia and Austria, prepared for the year 1812 the greatest army the world had ever seen. This army, composed of men from all the allied or subjugated countries, was called the army of "twenty nations" and its march was a sort of crusade of the West against Asiatic Russia.

Napoleon, as much by reason of his natural bent as for the sake of policy, gave to this crusade the watchword of the Revolution, the liberation of the peoples; and the pledge of his sincerity was to be the reconstruction of Poland. He disregarded the fact that the Spanish were fighting against him to gain their independence and that the spirit of nationality inspired by the principles of the Revolution was agitating the masses of Germany. Alexander, skillful at playing all rôles, was, on his side, talking in terms of liberalism, was invoking the cause of justice, and bespeaking the interest of all the countries conquered or subjugated by France or insurgent against her. He was also preparing for a reconciliation with Prussia and Austria, the accomplices of Russia in the partition of Poland. Napoleon, therefore, was staking everything on this Russian campaign from which he could not escape. Victorious, he would be master of the East, of Constantinople, of all Europe and he would then oblige England to capitulate. Conquered, we shall find him himself giving the signal of disaster when he deserted the army in Russia. Thus the war, begun in 1792, after having carried the French on its flood tide to Moscow, was to return in its swift and cruel ebb to the gates of

Paris. Because France had thought to conquer Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine in one fell swoop, she had been obliged to enter on the Russian campaign and both undertakings were equally senseless.

In June, 1812, the Grand Army crossed the Niemen but the Russians still avoided giving battle. Alexander had said that, were it necessary, he would retire beyond Tobolsk. Napoleon fully expected that, from Moscow, he would dictate peace to Russia. The Russians burned the city and did not make peace. Then commenced a retreat which after the passage of the Beresina wrecked his army. In the month of December, Ney and Gerard arrived almost alone, at Königsberg. The Grand Army had melted away. The emperor himself had secretly abandoned it, knowing well the extent of the catastrophe and fearing the effects it would have in Europe and even in France. The conspiracy of General Malet, news of which had reached him in Russia, had shown him how precarious was his hold on the government and how weakened his prestige.

From this time on, the history of the Empire is that of the rapid return to conditions such as they were when Napoleon became dictator in 1799. In order to save the Revolution and its conquests, the task with which the republicans had charged him on the 18th Brumaire, he had received permission from France to take the crown, to found a dynasty, to take possession of a half of Europe, and to levy and kill men without number. All this was to be in vain. In a few months France was to be brought back to the point from which she had started.

If, in 1809, the success of the Spanish insurrection had encouraged England to persevere and had revived the courage of the conquered peoples, the disaster of the Grand Army in 1813 was, to a far greater degree, to strengthen the enemy's determination to bring France to her knees. The English said to themselves that it was now only a question of adding a few more sacrifices to those they had already made, before they would reap their reward. The declaration of war by the United States, so long hoped for by Napoleon, came at this moment, caused far more by the maritime tyranny of England than by

any efforts of French diplomacy. But even this could no longer change the resolution of the British government. Moreover, everything indicated a general turn of events in favor of the cause of which England, at one time, had remained almost the only champion. The nationalistic propaganda was bearing fruit in Germany. Prussia, while protesting her loyalty to France, had evaded her obligations and was secretly reorganizing her army. A Prussian corps, fighting in the French ranks and commanded by General York, went over to the Russians. This defection caused an immense sensation in Germany, and hastened the retreat of the last remains of the French army, which did not stop till it reached the Elbe. The Prussian government dropped its mask and yielded to public opinion which desired a war of liberation and independence.

Napoleon wished to consider his Russian defeat as a mere accident. He thought that in Germany it would still be easy for him to defeat the Prussians and Russians. Having levied and organized a new army, he did, in fact, defeat them at Lützen and at Bautzen. The campaign of 1813 began well. However, he distrusted Austria, not without reason, and instead of following up his first successes, he accepted an armistice in order to be ready to fight a third adversary. He did not fear this coalition of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and he preferred to finish with it at one blow thinking that he had sufficient guaranties in his hands to obtain, even from England, a general and advantageous peace. The victory at Dresden, August twenty-seventh, still seemed to justify his expectations. But several of his lieutenants, poorly supported by their contingents from the German Confederation, were one by one defeated and thus destroyed his plans. Coming back upon Leipzig in order to prevent the members of the coalition from uniting there, Napoleon waged a three-day battle in the course of which the Saxon auxiliaries deserted to the enemy. This great battle lost, and all Germany with it, it was necessary to fall back on the Rhine. In November, what was left of the Grand Army entered Mayence after having had to fight its way to Hanau through the Bavarians who had likewise deserted.

Once back on the Rhine was it possible to sign a peace that should at least preserve the natural frontiers? It was the old question of the Revolution. While Prussia had finally revealed that of all the German powers she was the most bitter enemy of the French, the English did not wish to allow France to retain Antwerp. This had always been the stake of this war which had lasted for over twenty years. And now Holland had just risen against the French domination. Belgium was tired of conscription and taxes and within her boundaries also an old and unconquerable national spirit was awakening. Kept informed of the state of things in France, the English government knew that she was exhausted. She knew that everything had been organized for conquest and nothing for defense; that the numerical superiority of the coalition was considerable; and that, furthermore, the Napoleonic Empire was tottering within. England's determination to put an end to the Empire was of even greater weight than the hatred of Prussia and that is why the parleys, which took place before the allies entered Paris, were not sincere. Since 1793 it had been written that, if England were not vanquished, France would have no peace unless she returned to her former limits. As for Napoleon himself, no one understood better than he that, like the Convention and the Directory, he was the slave of his own war and his own conquests. He had to defend these conquests or fall with them as the Revolution had fallen. The very nature of his power, the conditions under which he had received it, forbade him that honorable and political peace for not concluding which people have so foolishly reproached him. In the first place the Allies did not wish it, although they took pains to make the French believe that only the insane ambition of their emperor prevented them from having it. In the second place, no government of revolutionary origin could accept the old limits. "Considering the point to which affairs have now come," said Napoleon, "only a Bourbon can succeed me."

Nevertheless, the Bourbons did succeed him for another reason. In 1814 the Allies had invaded France and they did not agree among themselves as to what form of government they

preferred for her. It was not for reëstablishing her monarchy that they had made war now or at any other time. The Emperor of Austria preferred the regency of his daughter, Marie Louise, which would have given him control of French affairs. The Russian emperor was dreaming of a king of his own making, Bernadotte, for instance, one of the most fortunate adventurers of the Revolution. Through a combination of extraordinary circumstances, the latter had become a prince royal of Sweden, and had betrayed the cause of Napoleon. Prussia, always with an eye to her own aggrandizement, was indifferent to what régime France had, provided she had a share in the spoils. There remained Castlereagh who wished to see France reduced but independent, subject to neither Austria nor Russia. He was of the belief that only a Bourbon could fulfill the conditions that England desired, because, as Albert Sorel says, this "government by principles and not by expedients would not be under obligation to any of the allies." France either did not know or misunderstood all these calculations by which her monarchy was to be restored. The French thought it had been brought about and imposed by the enemy. As a matter of fact, according to the system of European balance which England followed, the restoration was destined to preserve France's independence against foreign powers. The campaign in France, the most admired of all Napoleon's campaigns, was a useless masterpiece. His victories at Brienne, Champaubert, Montmirail, and Montereau, Albert Sorel compares with those of Valmy. The Allies occasionally hesitated and wondered if the moment had not come to make peace. But just as the Revolution had insisted that the enemy should first leave French territory, Napoleon wished to guarantee the natural frontiers of France—he could not do otherwise—and the Allies were only fighting to take them away from her. "We have got to put on our boots and go after them with the courage of '93," said Napoleon in February, 1814. Instinctively he turned back to the Revolution and recalled Carnot, the former collaborator of Robespierre who had remained apart from the Empire, but who now gave him his support. The Allies, on their side, had

not forgotten that after Valmy, the invader having withdrawn to the other side of the Rhine, the Revolution had decided to pursue him there. This vision strengthened their determination and tightened their alliance. After having concluded among themselves the agreement of Chaumont, the four powers resumed the offensive, resolved to dictate peace.

In the meantime, everything was crumbling about Napoleon. With his improvised soldiers, almost children, and the last that France could furnish him, he tried again to stop the enemy and then outflank him in order to defeat him. Through the lack of troops his last plans failed. On March 30, the Allies were masters of Paris and from Montmartre one of the Germans wrote: "It is nine centuries and a half since our Emperor Otto planted his eagles on these hills."

On April 11, 1814, Napoleon abdicated at Fontainebleau. Not only his senate, which owed its existence to the Convention, abandoned him and called for the return of the Bourbons, but even his marshals urged him, in many violent scenes, to give up the government and leave. France had returned to the state of affairs which existed before the 18th Brumaire and from which the Directory had wished to escape. It is again Albert Sorel who remarks that the Empire ended by one of those riotous "days" which had overthrown so many revolutionary governments. On May 5, Louis XVIII entered Paris while the fallen emperor was landing on the island of Elba.

The emperor's story which is to have a lamentable epilogue at Waterloo is not yet finished. One thing, however, is ended and the return from Elba will in nowise change it. The Revolution, in spite of the imperial metamorphosis in which it had taken refuge, had not succeeded in giving France the extension which she had dreamed. It ended in a defeat. In the midst of the confusion it had multiplied in France, it was now a question of restoring to the conquered country her rank and her security.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RESTORATION

ALL these events, the most concise recital of which requires so much space, took place within twenty-five years. A Frenchman, a youth in 1789, was in full maturity in 1814. A quarter of a century is not very long, yet much had happened. In that part of its program which concerned the republican régime and the natural frontiers, the Revolution had twice miscarried; first, when in order to preserve itself, it had to resort to the dictatorship, to absolute power, to the Empire; and second, when instead of keeping the Rhine and the Scheldt as its frontiers, the Empire had finally opened the old territory to invasion. What could France do then, what solution was there for her plight? The only possible one, and there were few who did not rally to it, was the recall of the Bourbons. Although he had little love for them, Talleyrand had been one of the chief workers for their restoration; because after taking stock of the situation, he saw that every other plan was impracticable. Any régime, republican or imperial, which had its origin in the Revolution would have to continue the war and France had come to the end of her resources. There is nothing more significant than the eagerness with which Napoleon's marshals rallied about Louis XVIII. Since 1812, they had foreseen that the greater part of "all this" would end badly. It had ended badly and any régime whatsoever would have great difficulty in governing. But the Republic had abdicated on the 18th Brumaire; the Empire had gone to pieces after its defeat and neither the Republic nor the Empire could conclude peace. The monarchy had to assume this responsibility.

It had been repeatedly said that the Bourbons, during their exile, had forgotten nothing and learned nothing. It would

be more just to wonder that they should have forgotten so much of the old and found it easy to accept so much of the new. The brothers of Louis XVI thought of reëstablishing neither the former Constitution nor the former physiognomy of the kingdom. They accepted the situation as it was, with its administration of the Year VIII, and the Codes; even leaving at their post a great part of Napoleon's prefects and subprefects. Never, in the history of the dynasty, had there been so long an interregnum and we may well be surprised that royalty should have returned from exile with so small a bundle of prejudices. The *émigrés* had brought back many more. One of the most annoying things for the monarchy, and one which was new to it, was the existence of a royalist party. Formerly it was only those who were not royalists who formed themselves into parties. The most delicate task for the restored Bourbons was to disengage themselves from their partisans, men who had suffered and fought for them and whose devotion, if only for the sake of the safety of the royal family, was still useful. Although the royalists had a claim to just treatment, as did other Frenchmen, the king could not govern for them alone. Nevertheless, they expected reparations and rewards. On the other hand, it was necessary to reassure the large category of those who held property which had been purchased from the state. Besides this, from all parts of the great Napoleonic Empire, from the interior of Germany and Italy, where isolated corps of the Grand Army had held out in spite of the fall of the Empire, soldiers, officers, and government officials were returning by thousands. All this body of men whose sole occupation had been war, and for whom there was no longer any employment, were forming a class of malcontents. Among them Bonapartism was to find its recruits. There were also what remained of the Jacobins who had been silent during the Empire but whom its fall had brought to life. It was to be difficult to find a middle course in the midst of so many diverse elements and interests.

Louis XVIII was aware of the dangers which surrounded a monarchy restored after such a long interruption. For the moment, things were simple enough. The Bourbons had not

had to offer themselves; they had been asked to return. France was weary of the war, weary also of what was called imperial despotism. Louis XVIII, who was a man of experience, education, and tact, and who had seen much, understood the conditions to which he was returning. He had to use his authority carefully and it would not have been prudent for him to begin his reign by humiliating the principle from which he derived his power. It was necessary for him to respect the ideas of the time. The Senate, in calling him to the throne, had made certain conditions, had fixed certain guaranties concerning persons and properties, and had drawn up a program of constitutional government. Save for one point, Louis accepted everything. The system of having two Chambers or Houses as in England, seemed to be the best and even most convenient for a monarchy. There was no longer any reason why civil equality should be displeasing to a king of France. The brother of Louis XVI knew how fatal the resistance of the privileged classes, which blocked all reforms, had been for the old régime. The guaranty of property rights, of incomes and pensions, went without saying. To reign over France it was necessary to take her as she was. There was only one thing which Louis XVIII did not accept; it was the conditional character of this constitution. Instead of an imposed charter which would have diminished his power, which would have subjected his government to all sorts of exigencies and continual capitulations, as happened to Louis XVI, he insisted upon a charter, granted by himself. Without this it would not have been worth while to restore the monarchy. Thus the transition was assured from an "absolute" to a "constitutional" monarchy. Louis XVIII gained by this the respect both of the new constituents and of the enemy sovereigns. "One would have said," remarked Alexander, "that it was he who had just replaced me upon my throne."

The monarchy, with the Charter, was then the most favorable and most natural form that could have been found. It reconciled the past with the present, order with liberty. But, above all, without the Bourbons, France would have been condemned,

as Talleyrand said, to servitude or partition. A victorious enemy was on French soil; it remained to conclude peace. This was not easy. The disaster was not the fault of the monarchy. The thing which had dealt the final blow to Louis XVI was his opposition to the war of 1792, the war which had just ended with the entry of the Allies into Paris. The task of the monarchy was to liquidate this long adventure. The French perceived then that the Allies had been fighting neither the Revolution nor Napoleon, but France. The peace which they had made was hardly less severe than they would have imposed upon the Republic twenty years earlier had they been victorious. It was a matter of indifference to them that their demands reacted upon the popularity of the Bourbons who were made responsible for a situation which they had not created.

Louis XVIII had not yet returned to France when the true intention of the Allies became apparent. What France most ardently desired was to be delivered from the foreign occupation. By the agreement of April twenty-ninth, the Count d'Artois had received the promise of an immediate evacuation in exchange for the surrender of the isolated French troops who were still defending themselves in Italy, Germany and Holland. France held to her agreement but the Allies did not hold to theirs. They had vaguely agreed that they would recognize certain extensions of the French frontiers beyond what they had been in 1792. The treaty of Paris, of May 30, 1814, accorded her only a slight rectification of her frontiers, with Philippeville and Marienburg. Landau, which under Louis XVI had formed a French enclave, was restored to France and she now received the Queich, a tributary of the Rhine, as boundary. This boundary was one of the things demanded by Marshal Foch but decisively refused by France's allies in 1914. Louis XVIII held above everything to the doctrine of national security, a doctrine as immutable as geography itself, and wished to set a greater distance between Paris and the gates of invasion by keeping, from Dixmude to Luxemburg, the lines and the strongholds which protected her. Thereupon he ran counter to an inflexible will. It was indeed for the pur-

pose of driving France out of Belgium that England had so prolonged the war. Her idea had not changed. As in 1713, it was a question of erecting a "barrier" between France and the mouth of the Scheldt and that barrier was again to be Holland. Belgium became once more the object of those diplomatic and strategic calculations of which she had so long been the victim, and was united to Holland without even being consulted. At the same time England drew a vast network about certain naval bases and colonies which had nothing to do with this war of principles which she had pretended to be waging against the Revolution. When she took the Ile de France (re-baptized Mauritius) Tobago and Santa Lucia in the Antilles; when she forbade the French to enter San Domingo; when she kept the Cape which was taken away from Holland; and when she took possession of Malta and the Ionian Islands, she was only continuing the plan of maritime domination which she had pursued throughout the eighteenth century. Likewise, Prussia, Austria, and Russia by their partitions of Poland and their acquisitions in Germany and the East, betrayed the real significance of this war. These conquests were its veritable object.

They had been made possible by the upheaval in Europe which the Revolution had provoked, which the Empire had accomplished, and through which France had lost the advantages she had possessed ever since the treaty of Westphalia. To what a dangerous state of instability this new Europe was condemned, we can judge from the Congress of Vienna in which all the European states, France included, were called upon to construct a system of equilibrium to replace that which Napoleon had just destroyed. Hardly had the Congress assembled than talk of war was resumed. The Allies quarreled among themselves over the spoils of the Napoleonic Empire. Austria and England, with whom France took her stand, opposed Prussia and Russia who were united by their common greed. In the midst of these rivalries, the instructions of Louis XVIII, skillfully carried out by Talleyrand, immediately established France's European situation. France, to whom everything had

been refused, assumed the attitude of a disinterested country, defender of public rights and legitimate sovereignties, the opponent of conquests and cynical partitions. The Allies pretended to be fighting against her for the sake of a principle. France now armed herself with this principle to prevent the dangerous expansion of the other countries, those vast agglomerations which Napoleon had only too greatly favored. She used it to protect Germany from Prussia, Italy from Austria and finally Turkey, where she had to look out for her own former privileges, from Russia. This policy, in keeping with the best diplomatic traditions, recalled the spirit of Vergennes. It was the policy of national security. It placed France at the head of the moderate party, and restored to her the rôle of protector of the small and middle-sized states. It was in this spirit that Talleyrand defended the King of Saxony who had remained loyal to Napoleon and whose kingdom Prussia, on this pretext, wished to keep. The independence of Saxony guaranteed that of the other Germanic states and, as far as was possible after the changes made in Germany by Napoleon, restored the conditions of the treaty of Westphalia. In exchange for Saxony, which the King of Prussia ardently desired because it made of his territory a homogeneous unit, he received the Rhine provinces which he did not want because they were too far removed from the center of the Prussian state. They were separated from it by the other German states and being Catholic were difficult for a Protestant country to assimilate. In our day, Talleyrand is still accused of having installed Prussia at the gates of France. "Nothing," he replied, "would be simpler or more natural than to take back these provinces from Prussia, while if they had been awarded as compensation to the King of Saxony, it would be difficult to despoil him of them."

A year had hardly passed since the Allies had entered Paris and the situation of France in Europe was reëstablished beyond all expectations. The Bourbons had rendered the service that had been expected of them. The proof of it lies in the disappointment of Prussia, France's most hated enemy. German

nationalism, wakened from its long slumber by the principles of the Revolution, and then roused against the Napoleonic domination, had dreamed of a great Germany extending to the Vosges mountains, united by the country of Frederick and the liberal and patriotic reformers who had prepared the war of independence. But Germany remained divided, a confederation of states in which Austria balanced Prussia, as much like the former Germanic Empire as it could be after the territorial changes made by Napoleon.

As for France, she did not appreciate this sort of miracle of political art which had allowed her to escape from the alternative of servitude or partition. This redress was only understood and appreciated later after the severest trials. It was only after the treaty of Frankfort that history did justice to the treaty of Vienna. Unconscious of the advantages gained and of the purposes involved, because they were beyond the comprehension of the masses and could not be explained openly without compromising their success, France had seen only the curtailing of her frontiers. And she imputed to the Bourbons, brought back, as people were beginning to say, "in the caissons of the enemy," a fault which was not theirs. Thiers repeats with an insistence which is remarkable considering the time in which he wrote and the public by whom he was read, that the whole fault was Napoleon's.

It was only necessary, however, for Napoleon to return from Elba with an audacity which recalls the return from Egypt, and for him but to appear, to rally almost all of France to his standard. There is perhaps no more extraordinary phenomenon in French history. All thinking men foresaw that a new attempt on the part of the emperor would end in a catastrophe worse than that of 1814. Even the liberals were sorry to see the Charter fall. France was tired of war and what she had most insistently demanded of the Bourbons was that conscription should be abolished. Napoleon pretended that he had been recalled by a general discontent with the restored monarchy. There was to be sure, between the old society of the returned *émigrés* and the new society, a certain friction which

it was difficult to avoid. Above all, the returning soldiers, with their officers irritated at being put on half pay, who had only returned to France after the Convention of April twenty-third, and who had not seen the invasion, felt that they were the victims of an unmerited misfortune, because it had been impossible to preserve the framework of the Napoleonic Grand Army. However, nothing in all this was very serious. A few plots had been uncovered and swiftly suppressed. When, however, Napoleon himself returned, his presence was sufficient to create such a change of public sentiment that in three weeks he reconquered France. As soon as he appeared, everything was forgotten—the disasters of yesterday, as well as those of which his return was the forerunner, the slaughter for which the people had cursed his name, and the abhorred conscriptions. Officers and soldiers alike rallied to him. Knowing so well how to address his soldiers, he touched their hearts by recalling their military glory, and the first detachment sent to bar his route acclaimed him after a brief moment of hesitation. Grenoble and then Lyons opened their gates to him. Marshal Ney, who had promised to arrest and bring him back “in a cage if necessary,” weakened in his turn and yielded to the general enthusiasm. Landing with a handful of men, near Cannes in the Gulf of Juan on March 1, 1815, Napoleon was at the Tuileries on the twentieth, while Louis XVIII retired to Ghent.

One hundred days—the adventure lasted no longer, but that was sufficient to cause incalculable havoc. First of all, within, it made more difficult the reconciliation of the diverse French elements. Napoleon was not only past master in the art of war, he knew that of politics, for he had learned from experience during the Revolution. And it was above all the memory of the Revolution that he awakened, talking of glory to the soldiers, and of peace and liberty to the people. The authoritarian emperor had come back as a demagogue. Two things might still injure his cause—the fear that the Allies might renew hostilities and the fear of imperial despotism. He quieted the one by assuring the people that his father-in-law,

the Emperor of Austria, would not permit a renewal of the war; he quieted the other by telling the peasants that they "were threatened with the return of tithes, privileges, and feudal rights," and that he had come "to wrest them from their bondage to the soil and their serfdom." This restorer of religious worship and founder of a new nobility was now inciting the masses against the nobles and the priests. To the liberals he promised a Chamber of Representatives and the liberty of the press, which Louis XVIII had already given them, but Napoleon promised to give them, in addition, the spirit of the Revolution. "If it was a crime to recall Bonaparte," wrote Madame de Staël who could not forgive him, "it was nonsense to disguise such a man as a constitutional monarch." However, the greater part of the liberals wished to be duped. Benjamin Constant, a few days after he had called Napoleon the "usurper," drew up the *Acte additionel* to the Constitution of the Empire. The old imperial Constitution by virtue of this act was to return to force during the Hundred Days. Constant himself, in his first interviews with the emperor, had "recognized his scorn for discussions and debates," a disposition which "seemed to await only victory to become more pronounced." But defeat came first. In spite of it the figure of a liberal Napoleon confounded with the cause of the Revolution remained. From this time dates that alliance of the Bonapartists and the liberals which was to disturb the Restoration and the monarchy of Louis Philippe and prepare for the reign of Napoleon III.

Outside of France, the consequences of the return from Elba were no less serious. The Allies were informed of it in Vienna on March thirteenth. They immediately declared the emperor "an outlaw of the nations." The pact of Chaumont was renewed. The resumption of the war was certain and new misfortunes likely to fall upon France. Talleyrand, who represented her at the Congress, found himself in a most cruel situation. Foreseeing what was going to happen, he decided to join with the Allies in order to preserve at least the conditions of the treaty of Paris lest a future treaty might be

worse. But it was easy to misinterpret this act of prudence and to maintain that the monarchy had allied itself with the enemies of the French nation. And when the men who had been involved in the Hundred Days were to look for an excuse, it was this perfidious argument of which they made use.

At no moment had Napoleon believed that the Allies would allow him to reign or that he would be able to reign over a France reduced to her former limits. He was ever a slave to the law which pushed him unceasingly into war. Banned by Europe, he prepared to fight. The people followed him but many of the French were filled with sinister presentiments and the enthusiasm of the first days of his return had subsided. In the plebiscite which took place, as formerly, to approve the *Acte additionnel*, there was a large number of abstentions. An Assembly on the Champ de mai, a new form of the Fête of the Federation, was not a gay event. The energy of the nation flagged; the minds of the people were troubled; Napoleon's lieutenants were anxious. Desirous of preventing a new invasion, the emperor left on the twelfth of June for Belgium with the design of separating Wellington and Blücher, who had one hundred thousand men more than he, and of defeating one after the other. In spite of a success at Ligny, he was not able to prevent the junction of the English and the Prussians. What people call adversity, and which is only the effect of a combination of causes, attended the French. Grouchy, to whom the emperor had confided an army as a reward for political services, blundered in trying to help, and remained useless during the great battle waged on the eighteenth of June. The defeat of Waterloo resounded throughout the world and was only equaled by that of Trafalgar. Returning to Paris on the twentieth, there remained nothing for Napoleon to do but to abdicate a second time. He took this resolution after a vote of the Chamber which he had had elected and which now speedily abandoned him.

All these events have a romantic coloring and an impassioned character. They surpass comprehension. A folly of three

months brought back the enemy and again put in question what had been so painfully obtained in 1814. This time the Allies demanded still more, and Talleyrand, through his precautions at Vienna, was only able to prevent those most serious projected mutilations of her territory—the ones which were demanded by Prussia, the most implacable enemy of France. However the price of Waterloo through the second treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815, was the loss of more than five hundred thousand souls. France lost Philippeville, Marienburg, and Bouillon; that is, the strongholds protecting her northern frontier, which was thus made more vulnerable to invasion. She lost Sarrelouis and Landau; the gap through which the Prussians were to enter in 1870 was opened and the treaty of 1919 did not restore the limits of 1814. She again lost Chambéry and Annecy which were taken back by the house of Savoy. Finally, she had to endure an occupation of five years and pay a war indemnity of 700 millions. These misfortunes, France had brought upon herself; she had provoked them, when, yielding to a sentimental impulse, remembering the days of glory, she had forgotten everything else and thrown herself into the arms of the emperor. And yet the Napoleonic legend grew apace. Deported to Saint Helena by the English, Napoleon continued to act upon the imagination of the people. The hero became a martyr. His cause was confounded with that of the Revolution and the literature of the day, from the highest to the lowest, propagated this mysticism. The treaties of 1815 had left France crushed from her fall after her brief and amazing dream. Through a crying injustice, but one natural to man, who loves to put upon others the responsibility for his own faults and ills, it was neither to Napoleon nor to themselves that the French people imputed the treaties of 1815, but to the Bourbons who had done their utmost to soften their conditions.

After the disaster of Waterloo it was again Louis XVIII who returned; because it was he alone who could do so. There had been talk of the Duke of Orléans and even of the Prince of Orange. A sentiment which had not been apparent in 1814

had developed as a result of the fact that the Bonapartists and the liberals had been responsible for the Hundred Days and sought some excuse for their error and their defeat. It was a sentiment of hatred towards the Bourbons of the elder branch, a hatred which was not to be appeased since they were a living reproach to those who had made such a serious mistake. In the meantime, the reconciliation of the parties in France had been made still more difficult because Napoleon had revived the passion of the revolutionary period. During these three months, the Jacobins, united with the Bonapartists, had taken revenge upon the royalists, a revenge which in its turn led to reprisals. In the south, especially, which was exceedingly anti-Napoleonic, there had been violent popular riots which, at Avignon, had cost the life of Marshal Brune. The government of Louis XVIII suppressed them by force of arms; and this "White Terror" became a new source of grievance for the liberal opposition. It was, on the other hand, necessary to hunt out and punish the men who had made themselves responsible for the new calamities to France, by joining with Napoleon instead of arresting him as was their duty. The trial and execution of Ney was one of those "cruel necessities" which are imposed upon governments and the sentimental enthusiasm to which the marshal had yielded had cost too dearly for him not to be made an example. However, Ney in turn became a victim and a martyr, as though his weakness on the day when he threw himself into the arms of the emperor had not been the cause of a new war, an absurd and hopeless war, in which Frenchmen had perished only to invite invasion and aggravate the demands of the enemy.

The second restoration thus had a more painful task than the first, inasmuch as it had to punish and be cruel and had also to reckon with its own partisans. The parliamentary régime was new in France. Its beginnings are so unique that it is worth while to consider them for a moment.

The assembly which was elected after that of the Hundred Days was intensely royalistic, so much so that Louis himself did not believe that its like could be found (whence its name,

the Undiscoverable Chamber, *Chambre introuvable*) and the members of its majority were called the "Ultras." Elected while the shock of Waterloo and the public misfortunes were fresh in the minds of the people, this Chamber was passionately reactionary; it hated the Revolution as much under its republican as its Napoleonic form, and yet it was for all that no more docile to the government of Louis. It is of this Chamber that it was said that it was more royalist than the king, which should be taken in the sense that it wished to dictate his policy. Louis XVIII thought that France needed tactful handling and the Chamber was using language that might alarm many people and many interests. The government intended to remain the judge of the measures to be taken to punish the Bonapartist plots and to prevent Napoleon's return. It had to reconstitute the finances that had been shaken by two invasions, the reëstablishment of which had been prepared for, after 1814, by Baron Louis, through basing credit upon the fulfillment of the engagements entered into by the former régimes. It was especially necessary to reassure the possessors of the nationalized properties. A royalist Chamber would then have been wise not to increase the embarrassment of the government. It attempted, however, for the sake of imposing its own views, in a word, for the sake of governing to extend the prerogatives of parliament, to the detriment of the prerogatives of the crown. It wished the ministers to be its representatives to the king rather than the king's representatives to them. This counter-revolutionary Chamber behaved very much like the Constituent Assembly. It would not consent to be an auxiliary to the royal authority, as the Charter had intended. It aimed at possessing the government. Chateaubriand, a rebellious royalist, published a sensational brochure, *The Monarchy According to the Charter*, in an attempt to bring back an entirely parliamentary régime, without reserves and with the right to overturn ministers instead of merely to control them. These ultra-royalists, having become deputies, were ultra-liberals and they opened the way to the demands and agitations of the Left. We find here an old and well-known phenomenon; the Duke de Saint-Simon, if he had

lived one hundred years later, would have belonged to this opposition.

Thus there was in 1816 the strange spectacle of a Chamber of the Extreme Right in conflict with the king. It cost Louis a great deal to break with it, with what was most royalistic in France. But it was impossible to allow his sovereignty to be displaced. In 1814 the king had not yielded to the Senate of the Empire. He had held firmly to the principle that the Charter had been "granted" by him. If the Charter were to be revised on the initiative of the deputies, no matter what opinions they might hold, the work that Louis XVIII had accomplished would be undone. In 1816, as the Chamber remained obstinate in opposing the ministry of Richelieu and determined to modify the electoral law, he decided to dissolve it rather than recognize the rule of the majority. It was a rupture between the crown and the Extreme Right. Then began the great strife between the different parties. At the elections which were conducted by Decazes, the king's confidential adviser, the ministerial center triumphed with the support of the liberals, who were only too happy at this unexpected chance which the ultras had furnished them. But the Left immediately became openly anti-dynastic, and showed Louis no gratitude for his policy of national unity and soon detached itself from the Center, upon which the government had hoped to rely. The representative régime was ushered in by many storms. Then the government was forced to perceive that in making use of the Left to oppose the Right, in order to follow a middle course, a moderate "middle of the road" policy, it had emboldened and fortified the liberal party, which was a coalition of all the adversaries of the dynasty. The Left immediately combated such ministers as M. de Serre whom the Right accused of giving too many pledges to liberalism; and in this struggle the more or less avowed republicans and the Bonapartists were sometimes allied with the ultras. This agitation in parliament and the press had as a consequence, in 1820, the assassination of the nephew of Louis XVIII, the Duke de Berry by Louvel. This revealed the actual danger to the Republic and

the government was led to become reconciled with the Right. To this change of attitude, the liberals responded by a new form of opposition, secret societies and the "Carbonari," rioting and military plots in which some unfortunate noncommissioned officers, such as the four sergeants of La Rochelle, allowed themselves to be involved. The military elements, the former generals of the Empire, were thinking of a new Vendémiaire or another Fructidor. The aging La Fayette himself, returning to the enthusiasms of 1789, dreamed of a pronunciamiento, after the manner of the Spaniards. The coup d'état of December second, was in preparation from that time. The death of Napoleon at Saint Helena in 1821, moreover, served to unite, even more solidly, the republicans and the Bonapartists. The emperor became a legendary personage whose name was synonymous with liberty in spite of the "imperial despotism," and with grandeur in spite of Waterloo. Five years after her disasters, France had begun to forget their lesson.

If we judge the Restoration by its results, we find that the French had had peace and prosperity and that they had been well-nigh insensible to these benefits. The Restoration had been an honorable and wise régime which had twice merited its name since France, after having received some very severe shocks, had quickly righted herself. Many of those who had helped to overturn her, regretted it later. But there was no more good will toward the monarchy than there had been before. The government learned one thing which was not understood until long after; it was that a Chamber, elected through a very restricted suffrage (many of the departments had hardly one hundred electors), is no more docile than others; it is rather less so. No one at that time wanted universal suffrage; some because they thought it revolutionary, others because they thought, like the Constituents of 1789, that only a rich man could have an independent opinion and that wealth alone would assure an honest and free vote. Indeed, the rate-paying electors were less tractable than other bodies had been, and the fact that the government had expressed its preference for a particular candidate had no influence upon them. The spirit of opposi-

tion which was steadily growing in the "*haute bourgeoisie*," together with the hatred of the nobles and the "priest party," was of the same nature as that of the former parliaments and of the former feudal aristocracy. Among these malcontents it will suffice to mention the financier, Lafitte, a man who had met with extraordinary success.

Louis XVIII died in September, 1824. It is due him to admit frankly that he had fulfilled the task for which he had been twice recalled to the throne. After having prevented the dismemberment of France, he had restored her to her rank. In 1818, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, France had joined the Holy Alliance, created as a safeguard for the treaties of Vienna just as the League of Nations had been created to safeguard the treaties of 1919. Three years after Waterloo the French territory had been evacuated by the foreign armies and the indemnity reduced by more than four hundred millions, in spite of the rage and violence of Prussia. Louis XVIII was aware that France had always regretted the disappearance of the unstable conquests of the Revolution, the loss of Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. He knew that a longing for military glory was making a part of the French restless and was leading them towards liberalism. Nevertheless he resisted royalists like Chateaubriand who were urging him to a venturesome foreign policy, as well as the Czar Alexander who in return for the services which he had rendered France in reducing the demands of the other Allies, was attempting to induce France to follow him to the East. The only undertaking which Louis did decide upon was the intervention in Spain in 1823, for the purpose of putting an end to a revolution and reëstablishing Ferdinand VII upon the throne. His policy in doing this was to continue that by which France had formerly established a Bourbon at Madrid, in order that Spain might not fall under the influence of an enemy power. This expedition, conducted with sufficient skill to draw a large part of the Spaniards to the side of the French, was consequently not very costly and contrasted so strongly with the failure of Napoleon in the Peninsula that it restored confidence to the country and to the army which

became reconciled to the white flag, that is, with the king. It had been said after the taking of the Trocadero that this time the "Restoration was accomplished." Louis had perhaps failed in only one thing; that was when he believed that through the Charter he would be able to give to France a parliamentary régime like that of England, leaving the monarchy and the sovereign aside from and above all parties. It was not thus that the French bourgeoisie conceived and conducted parliamentary struggles. Its inevitable tendency was to drag the king into them. Louis had already come to know the extent of his illusion. His successor was to be even more unfortunate.

More attractive than Louis XVIII, but less prudent also, his brother, the Count d'Artois, Charles X, did not know, as he did, how to be patient. He suffered and grew impatient over the reproach that liberals hurled at the monarchy, and which was their most efficacious weapon, that it had returned in "the caissons of the enemy," and that it had given its support to the shameful treaty of 1815. To efface these treaties as much as possible and to give grandeur and glory to France was the dominant idea of Charles X. He believed that he could in that way disarm an opposition whose "systematic" character he did not perceive. There then came a new generation who had not seen the Revolution, and hardly the Empire, the memory of which was transfigured and poetized with the receding of the years. To this eager, impatient, ambitious generation, of which Thiers was the representative, it would have been necessary to give immediate satisfaction. It would have at least been necessary, in order to take away its strongest argument, the "national" argument, to tear up the treaties of 1815 and take back the natural frontiers. This was the policy which Chateaubriand recommended without considering the external obstacles; and when he was not the minister, Chateaubriand did not fear as in the *Chambre introuvable*, to take the rôle of the opposition. This policy was, however, the one which Charles X attempted to apply. His failure started the Revolution of 1830.

Six months before the death of Louis XVIII, the Right had won a great victory in the elections. Villèle, who had been made

prime minister, was a wise, experienced and an excellent administrator; just the minister for this time of restoration. The opposition which he encountered not only from the Left, but from such royalists of the Extreme Right as Chateaubriand, was a crying injustice, the manifestation of an incurable party spirit. Villèle governed with a majority of the Right, among whom were some violent ultras. Some of them went so far as to demand the reëstablishment of the parliament of the old régime, which had contributed so much to bring on the Revolution. Among the Catholics a few of the most extreme demanded an out and out theocracy of which Lamennais, before he broke with the Church and became a demagogue, was the theorist. Of all the unreasonable conceptions which can form in the mind of man, there were few which had not appeared during this time of literary and political romanticism. And there were as many romantics of the Right as of the Left. Villèle, a man of common sense, opposed to all exaggeration, disregarded the demands of the hot-heads, and when it was necessary to yield to the majority, took care that his concessions should not be harmful. A project for the rehabilitation of the law of primogeniture was imposed upon him, but it was killed by the Chamber of peers themselves; although it was only a question of avoiding the dismemberment of the great landed properties, and although the example of the English was cited, this abortive project was none the less represented by the Left as a menace to all the families of France. The law of sacrilege, which was voted but never applied, became another grievance of the liberals against Villèle. This very politic idea, endorsed by all thinking men, of indemnifying the French whose property had been confiscated for the crime of emigration, was opposed under the party cry "a billion for the *émigrés*," although this billion had been reduced to 625 millions. It had been an attempt to settle an irritating dispute and definitively to reassure the holders of confiscated property, always fearful of the claims of the former proprietors. This measure of social peace which was deemed insufficient by the Extreme Right, was denounced by the Left as a provocation. Another

thing still more unbelievable was that the conversion of *rentes* rendered possible because the public funds, thanks to the order of the finances and to prosperity, had reached par, loosed against Villèle the fury of the bourgeoisie, although this operation, often resorted to since, was perfectly regular and in keeping with the interests of both the state and the nation. We see in this something akin to the blind passion of the *rentiers* of 1789.

But it was not for these reasons that Villèle was most violently attacked. His moderation and his prudence he carried into his foreign policy. He remained faithful to the method which, after 1814 and 1815, had allowed France to resume her rank and establish her security. If the treaty of Vienna was cruel for her, her own losses had for counterpart that expansion had been denied to other powers. To overturn Europe, to enlarge Prussia and Russia, in order to establish her own natural frontiers, a policy taken over from 1795, seemed bad to Villèle. He tactfully refused when the Czar urged him, in the name of the principles of the Holy Alliance, to intervene in the distant Spanish colonies of South America in order to bring them back under the authority of Spain. He resisted when Nicholas I was asking for French aid in dismembering the Turkish Empire. The Greeks had revolted against the Ottoman domination and we can hardly understand to-day the philhellenic enthusiasm of France at that time. Villèle had sent a squadron to keep watch of Russia and check any move on her part and to hinder any reopening of the Eastern question. The battle of Navarino (1827) in which the Turkish fleet was destroyed, was fought against his will and his instructions. That day determined the fall of Villèle. The person who was defeated was far less the sultan than the French minister, who was too pacific for those of both the Right and Left, who confounded with the romantic cause of Greece, that of glory and liberty. It had been said that the victory of Navarino was the victory of French public opinion. It carried with it a new orientation both within and without. Navarino occurred in October. In November Villèle was defeated in the elections and not only the

liberals gloried in his fall. Many of the royalists rejoiced as well and Chateaubriand, always a partisan of grandiose action in Europe, overwhelmed this really reasonable minister who "wished to attach this nation to the soil and set it firmly upon its foundations."

From then on, the advance toward the Revolution of 1830 was rapid. To the new Chamber, with a majority of liberals, Charles X gave a minister who ought to have satisfied it. Martignac resumed the "middle of the road" policy, which had been that of the Duke of Richelieu, of Decazes, and of Serre. Bitterly opposed by the Extreme Right who treated him as a revolutionary, and by the Left who regarded him as a reactionary, no matter what concessions he made, Martignac finally quitted the ministry in 1829. And it has been said of this period that, in differing degrees, "all the parties had committed faults." In the meantime Charles had made up his mind. He was convinced that it was impossible to govern with the Chamber. Observing public opinion, he had remarked a growing return to the spirit of glory and of conquest. His plan was to satisfy this desire of the French nation, to wipe out the treaties of 1815, and regain the national boundaries. Then the monarchy, freed from a persistent but unjust reproach, would be sufficiently glorious and sufficiently popular to impose its will upon the Assemblies or even to govern without them. A great success outside of France would restore the king's authority and would avert the danger of revolution. Charles X forgot that the treaty of Westphalia had not prevented the Fronde and that revenge for the treaty of Paris had not saved Louis XVI.

It was to Polignac that the king confided this plan. In 1829 the moment seemed propitious for a revision of Europe. The Belgians, forcibly united with Holland, were rebelling. Nicholas I pursued his ideas of conquest in the Orient. Through an understanding with Russia, which would abandon to her the Balkans and the Turkish Empire, France would be able to regain the left bank of the Rhine and she might perhaps be able to reannex Belgium. Whatever may have been the advantage

of this plan, so dangerous from many points of view, it was practically that which Villèle had cast aside. It fell through because of the refusal of Prussia who, always jealous of any expansion on the part of France, anticipated Charles X and joined forces with the Czar against Austria. The latter on its side had shown itself hostile to the expansions of Russia.

Even if Charles X and Polignac had succeeded in their vast undertaking, they would hardly have been sure of disarming their enemies within France. They would always have encountered increased demands. A new opposition had appeared, almost openly anti-dynastic. It was no longer, as under Louis XVIII, to plots that they had recourse. They addressed themselves to public opinion through a campaign of the press which Thiers was directing in the *National*, a title which was as good as a program, nationalism and liberalism then being merely one and the same idea. They pretended to be defending the Charter against the king. Above all, in order not to frighten people by a threat of a return to the Revolution or to the Empire, they recalled the Revolution of 1688 and the substitution of William of Orange for the Stuarts and suggested a simple "changing of persons."

The ministry of Polignac had been formed in the absence of the Chamber. When on March 2, 1830, the session opened, the Chamber definitely demanded, in its Address to the king, the dismissal of the cabinet, the same thing that the "undiscoverable Chamber"—the government of the majority—had demanded. The Chamber "was letting the king down." He replied by dissolving the Chamber. At the elections which took place in June and July, the rate-paying bourgeoisie returned out of 428 men elected, 274 partisans of the Address. These elections did not disturb Charles X. If he could not announce that France had regained Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, he offered a splendid compensation—the conquest of Algiers, a forerunner of the conquest of Algeria, which had been decided as early as the month of March in spite of the remonstrances of England. On July fifth, the French troops were masters of Algiers; the elections had shown no effects of

this news. However, Charles X and Polignac believed themselves sufficiently strong in their success to break the new Chamber and govern according to article 14 of the Charter, by "certain ordinances for the safety of the state." They took especial measures against the press which did not hesitate, even the "National" press, to publish information liable to injure the African expedition. The war censorship, which seems so natural to us now, in 1830 made people cry out against an attempt to restrain public liberty.

The king and his minister, by a strange imprudence, took no notice of the agitation which was beginning to appear in Paris. Charles X was convinced that it was only a matter of legal resistance, as he himself, supported by article 14, was within his legal rights. The very day that the rioting broke out, he left unconcernedly for the chase. No precautions had been taken. The minister of war was at some watering place. The garrison of Paris had been reduced to fourteen thousand men, some of the troops having been taken for the campaign at Algiers. Regiments that could be counted on were at Saint-Omer because of certain affairs pertaining to Belgium and still others were attending ceremonies in some of the provincial towns. On July twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth, the insurgents, coming from the suburbs and the section of the schools, took possession of Paris, put up barricades, and hoisted the tricolor, while the bourgeoisie allowed them to do it. This insurrection had something in common with the ideas of the doctrinaires, of the liberals who had drawn up the Address, and of the middle classes who had elected them. It was an explosion of sentiments which Charles X had wished to appease through the glory of conquest; but Algeria was a ridiculous diversion for a people so addicted to tradition. The republican and Bonapartist ideas were confounded with the hatred for the treaties of 1815. "The combatants of the days of July," said Emile Bourgeois, "were not engaged in a riot like that of 1789. They had taken up arms against Europe at least as much as against Charles X and dreamed, above all, of a victorious Republic and of the Empire."

The king, having retired to Rambouillet, abdicated in favor of his grandson, the Duke of Bordeaux, and named the Duke of Orléans lieutenant general of the kingdom. That would have been the politic solution, and Guizot realized it later. It would have avoided a division which was immediately to weaken the new monarchy—the division between the partisans of the elder branch of the Bourbons and those of the younger branch. But the precedent of 1688 haunted the spirits of those who, like Thiers, had fanned the flame and were holding themselves in reserve for the moment when the insurrection should have triumphed. These were the ones who offered the crown to Louis-Philippe, Duke of Orléans. This solution, in keeping with their tastes, had for the politicians, the advantage of setting aside the republican régime, which would unquestionably have meant war even more than anarchy did, and would have brought France into a disastrous conflict with Europe. Thus the republicans and Bonapartists had made the revolution and the constitutional party had confiscated it. The insurgents submitted to another monarchy. And, as one of them said, whatever the victors of the “three glorious” days had hoped for, Republic or Empire, it would have “to be postponed.”

CHAPTER XIX

THE MONARCHY OF JULY

ONE of the greatest illusions in politics is to believe that one has built for eternity. The men who had called to the throne a Bourbon of the younger branch were convinced that they had found the ideal solution. The Duke of Orléans was the son of Philippe Egalité. His father had been a regicide. He himself had fought at Jemmapes. In his person he reconciled the Revolution and the old régime, the past and the present. France thought that she had reached port. An historian, much admired by the middle classes, Augustin Thierry, published a work in which he demonstrated that the whole history of France had been tending towards the coming of this bourgeois royalty.

The July Monarchy bore within itself one great weakness. It was born on the barricades. It had arisen from a riot that turned into a revolution. And this revolution had been taken away from those who made it by men of politics who had not appeared in the scuffle, who even had a horror of it, but who, having a ready-made plan, had profited by events to impose it upon the country. This plan was an artificial one. The riot had broken out in Paris and although it had been understood since 1789 that Paris gave the tone to France, the great mass of the country had had no hand in the overthrow of Charles X or the founding of the new régime. As for the liberals who had substituted the Duke of Orléans for the dethroned sovereign, they represented the "party of law," the tax-paying electors, that is about two hundred thousand people in all. This then is what was to happen: the victors of the Days of July, republicans and Bonapartists together, were to be disappointed and there would remain the possibilities for agitation and rioting. On the other hand, the Charter of 1814, slightly revised, was

considered as the ultimate truth, and the régime remained faithful to the system which accorded suffrage only to the rich. Louis-Philippe not being the legal hereditary sovereign like Louis XVIII, did not, however, lean for support upon the plebiscite as Napoleon had done. This is the essential point in the understanding of what was to follow, because it is upon the question of the right of suffrage that the Monarchy of July fell after eighteen years.

Theories change and it seems surprising that authentic liberals should have been so obstinately hostile to universal suffrage. In general this hostility has been attributed to a spirit of distrust and fear with regard to the masses, and to the idea that the bourgeois electors, those "citizens who possess," are more conservative than the others. This opinion was undoubtedly in favor with those who considered universal suffrage as a revolutionary force and restricted suffrage as the lesser of two evils; in which matter they were greatly mistaken. It is surprising that after the stormy experience of the parliamentary system under the Restoration a spirit as penetrating as that of Louis XVIII, a character as enterprising and even adventurous as that of Charles X, and an intelligence as subtle as that of Louis-Philippe should not have discerned this error. But the liberals reasoned otherwise, and from their point of view they reasoned better. Universal suffrage seemed to them like an immovable weight, if not a retrograde force. They entertained the same opinions as the Constituents of 1790 who had divided the French into active citizens, or those who voted, and passive citizens, or those unworthy to vote because of their condition. Robespierre himself had refused the right of suffrage to "servants," in such a way as to exclude especially the wage-earning farmers. Now France was in great part rural. It seemed impossible to the liberals to conduct a new, bold, and generous policy with these people of the soil who were necessarily attached to their material interests and who were limited to the horizons of their villages. In order to understand and love progress, to follow a régime of discussion, it was necessary to have men who were free from the vulgar preoccupations of

life, and inaccessible to such paltry considerations as those to which the ignorant and needy are subjected. A man votes according to principles only when he is independent, so they reasoned. And whence comes this independence if not from wealth? In virtue of this axiom, they came to the conclusion that those who were soldiers, lacking money to buy a substitute, had no free judgment and should not vote concerning peace and war.

In the meantime, Louis-Philippe was pursuing the same policy of peace in foreign matters that the Restoration had inaugurated. He was to be accused in the same way of humiliating France and of being the slave of the treaties of 1815. The Revolution of 1830 had hoisted the tricolor which signified the natural frontiers, the liberation of the peoples, revenge, and glory. Hence came the name, the "*trois glorieuses*," given to the three days of July. Edgar Quinet was to say later, "The Revolution surrendered its sword in 1815; it was thought that it would regain it in 1830." Once more feelings were bruised and hopes deceived. The men who were responsible for this revolution wanted action, "movement," within and without. Louis-Philippe, who knew his Europe, saw that the danger of a rash foreign policy would be that it might reunite the Allies and restore the vigor of the pact of Chaumont. He took the part of moderation, of order, and of prudence, a policy which was called that of "resistance" as opposed to the policy of "movement." The July Monarchy had arisen from a revolutionary movement, that is, it was warlike (for the two things are confounded), yet it was to be conservative and pacific. It was to give satisfaction to the need for tranquillity, to the material interests which dominate the majority of men. But on the other hand it was to disappoint the eager spirits who were living on the memories of the Republic and the Empire. Nor could it count for support on the masses, especially the rural communities, to whom this policy should have been pleasing, in so far as it was they who at that time paid the costs of war much more than they do now.

Thus in obstinately rejecting universal suffrage, the July

Monarchy deprived itself of the large and solid base which the Restoration had also lacked. It deprived itself of the support of the most conservative part of the population at a time when its policy was to be conservative; and of the most pacific part when its policy was to be founded upon the maintenance of peace. Moreover, the Monarchy, through its attachment to a narrowly restricted suffrage, wounded the feelings of a large part of the middle class in whose image this régime seemed to have been created. The national guard, destined to defend and maintain it, was composed of men who paid a direct tax but did not all pay enough to become electors. In the case of the small merchants, the doctors, the lawyers, and the intellectuals, this policy wounded the sentiment of equality, so dear to the heart of the bourgeoisie. They were driven to desire, at least for themselves, the right of suffrage from which they were separated by a few francs' worth of taxes. Thus the government was making malcontents while the electors and the elected of the rich bourgeoisie were returning Chambers just as intractable as those of the Restoration. As we shall soon see, this combination of errors caused the Revolution of 1848.

The beginning of this new régime was troubled. The disturbances amidst which it had arisen oppressed it and were begetting consequences. It was at first necessary to yield to the demands of the insurgents and Louis-Philippe gave the ministry to the banker, Lafitte, and to the party of "movement." But already Louis-Philippe had to resist the pressure of the mob who were demanding capital punishment for the ministers of Charles X and it was only through great effort that their lives were saved. They were finally only condemned to prison. But it was, above all, in the matter of foreign affairs that the government had to be on its guard. Considering the language of the revolutionaries of 1830, the Allies might very well fear that France, having returned to the tricolor, would very soon resume her former career of conquest and they were resolved to keep her within the frontiers of 1815. Louis-Philippe had to reassure them in secret.

Already a serious question had arisen. Before the Days

of July, the Belgians had revolted against the Dutch domination. The events at Paris had encouraged them to free themselves from their masters and they had even gone so far as to seek the aid and protection of France. Had the moment not come to end, under the best conditions, one of the greatest questions of French history, and one that had never been settled, that of Flanders? Was it not the moment to annex Belgium since she seemed to wish it? But England would not have permitted this annexation now any more than in 1792 or at any other date whatsoever, and although the masses did not appreciate this fact any more than the Revolution had, Louis-Philippe understood it perfectly. He had immediately sent to London, as ambassador, the man whom Louis XVIII had chosen for the Congress of Vienna. Talleyrand was again to find a solution and to reconcile peace with the dignity and security of France, a task rendered difficult by the "ardent party" which was agitating Paris. The policy of Louis-Philippe and Talleyrand has rightly been compared to that of Fleury who, a century earlier, in spite of intrigues, indignation, and scorn had safeguarded the peace of the country.

These two men managed this old Belgian problem, this "stumblingblock of Europe" in the most satisfactory manner for all concerned. In spite of Belgium herself, who had forgotten for the moment (through her hatred and fear of Holland) that she never wished to become a French province, they made her into an independent nation. The Belgian national congress wanted a French prince, the Duke of Nemours; or failing this, the son of Eugène de Beauharnais. The Duke of Nemours was elected king, February 3, 1831, but Louis-Philippe refused this crown for his son. To accept it would have meant a disguised annexation and certain war with the other powers. It was already difficult enough to revise the treaty of 1815 on this point and relieve Belgium of the Dutch domination. If an insurrection of the Poles had not broken out at this moment, paralyzing Russia and with her, Prussia, it is not even certain that the Belgians would have been freed. Poland was crushed, but this diversion had saved Belgium just as, under

the Revolution, it had saved France. An independent Belgium was formed, and because the July Monarchy, at the Conference of London, had played the same rôle and followed the same policy that the Restoration had followed at the Congress at Vienna. The powers had wished this free Belgium to be neutral and her neutrality guaranteed by Europe in order to prevent France from ever annexing her. This neutrality was directed against France and, in keeping with the old treaty of Utrecht, was to serve as a "barrier" to her ambitions. Louis-Philippe accepted it, signed it, and respected it. Eighty years later it was to be Prussia, also a signatory and guarantor, who violated it. Thus the precaution taken against France turned against Germany by determining England, who was hesitating, to intervene. In the end it worked to the profit of France. It has taken nearly a century for the service rendered by Louis-Philippe to be understood and appreciated. In 1831 his renunciation of Belgium was considered as treachery and a cowardly abandonment of the revolutionary and Napoleonic traditions. In accepting Leopold I, a Coburg, and England's candidate, as King of Belgium, the French king reserved for himself the right to give him his own daughter, Louise, in marriage. In 1832 he again saved Belgium, threatened by a return offensive of the Dutch, and a French army delivered Antwerp. All sorts of friendly bonds were being formed with the young nation. In the meantime, England's attention had been diverted from the French occupation of Algiers by her anxiety over the fate of the mouth of the Scheldt and France had been able to get a foothold on the other shore of the Mediterranean, and to organize the conquest undertaken by Charles X. Algeria at that time seemed a very weak and ridiculous compensation for the lost conquests of the Republic and the Empire, and Charles X received little gratitude for it.

Louis-Philippe had accepted the throne—his adversaries both of the Right and the Left said that he had usurped it—in order to save France from anarchy and war and to preserve the dignity and future of the nation. He continued the Restoration with the tricolor. Eight months after the Days of July, Lafitte

and the party of "movement" were exhausted and gave way to Casimir-Perier, of the party of "resistance." The new monarchy had maintained peace with its neighbors. Within, order was fast being restored although not without trouble and some violent shocks. The rioting, frustrated in its victory over Charles X, broke out several times. The break with the forms and signs of the old monarchy, as shown by the name Louis-Philippe I which the king had adopted instead of that of Philippe VII advised by the doctrinaires, as well as many other details intended to show that this monarchy of the Bourbons of the younger branch did not resemble that of the Bourbons of the elder branch, together with numberless concessions to liberal and anticlerical opinion, still had not been enough. Veritable insurrections followed the pillaging of churches and the sacking of the archbishop's residence. The fire of 1830 was still unquenched. The funeral of General Lamarque was made the occasion, by the republicans and Bonapartists who were still united, for taking up arms. Almost at the same time the Duchess of Berry had attempted to stir up the Vendée. The legitimists were as irreconcilable as the revolutionists. At Lyons, a first insurrection of a socialist character had been repressed. Another, much more serious, broke out in 1834 and was crushed in its turn, not without a loud cry from Paris where the Society of the Rights of Man aroused its adherents. Paris then saw what should have happened during the Days of June and under the Commune. The anger of the threatened bourgeoisie, the fury of the national guard, joined with the regular army, gave no quarter. The insurgents were cut down as malefactors.

The "massacre of the rue Transnonain," memory of which long remained, was the forerunner of social wars in which the middle class defended itself with energy. This violent and spontaneous reaction had its influence upon the Monarchy. The government also defended itself and withdrew more and more from its revolutionary origins, just as the French bourgeoisie, in spite of its liberal opinions, had shown an aversion for disorder. The king then set about pursuing the republicans and

punishing their conspiracies. In 1835 the unsuccessful attempt of Fieschi against the life of the king justified new measures of repression. As after the assassination of the Duke of Berry, the liberty of the press was restricted.

However, this bourgeoisie, so resolved to defend itself, was very undisciplined. The Chambers which it elected, which represented only the rich, were no more reasonable than those of the Restoration. The battle of ambitions and of parties and the opposition to the government continued as before. Speaking after 1848, Sainte-Beuve said: "After all has been said and done, it would still be interesting to examine whether the catastrophe was not provoked by these obstinate and noisy quarrels inside an assembly against whose doors there was often pressure exerted but which were never opened or even half opened." This Chamber, the result of a suffrage restricted to only the propertied classes who wished to yield nothing of their moneyed privilege, was above all the scene of personal rivalries and bitter conflicts for the control of the ministry. Within a few years there was a succession of men ambitious to shine; Broglie after Guizot, Thiers after Broglie, all those who had contributed to the downfall of the other monarchy because they did not find their place in it sufficiently illustrious. To the new monarchy they had given the motto and condition, "The King reigns but does not govern." After six years of this dangerous instability, Louis-Philippe undertook to correct the effects of the parliamentary régime and to govern himself through men who were in his confidence. The last experiment of a cabinet designated by the majority was that of Thiers in 1836. Won over to the idea of conservatism not only in France but in Europe, Thiers attempted a reconciliation with Austria which was to be crowned by the marriage of the Duke of Orléans with an Austrian archduchess. The refusal of the court of Vienna was viewed in the light of a personal check by Thiers and had the effect of turning him towards liberalism. Changing his policy from top to bottom, he was ready to enter into a conflict with Metternich for the sake of intervening in favor of the Spanish liberals when Louis-Philippe, always anxious to main-

tain peace, stopped him. Thiers fell in his turn. Then the king called to the ministry a man after his own heart, Molé, who would carry out his plans. A régime of what was immediately called personal government began and the systematic opposition which the Bourbons of the elder branch had encountered, began also. Six years after the barricades, France had progressed only thus far.

Through a curious coincidence, this was the year in which a man appeared who was one day to govern France much more personally than Louis-Philippe and that with the consent of the country. The King of Rome, who had become the Duke of Reichstadt, died in 1832 and the heir to the Napoleonic name was a nephew of the emperor, son of Louis, King of Holland, and of Hortense de Beauharnais. Who would have dreamed of a political future for Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, an obscure young man, whose existence was scarcely known? When he attempted to start a revolt in the garrison at Strassburg, his attempt was not even taken seriously. The government contented itself with sending the pretender to America and the jury acquitted his accomplices. The Napoleonic idea seemed to be dead and its representative a ridiculous adventurer. If any one had prophesied the restoration of the Empire, he would have been thought a madman.

This was the time when the parliamentary chiefs, the Duke de Broglie, Guizot, Thiers, and Odilon Barrot, supported by the legitimists and the republicans, were carrying on a campaign against Molé, the "favorite," the man of the "palace." This was the "immoral and fatal coalition" regretted later by those who had formed it. After ten years had passed, the same men, with few exceptions, were weakening the régime which they had founded just as they had undermined the Restoration and by the same methods. The theme had not changed; the Monarchy was accused of humiliating France before the other nations, of "weakening the national policy." Contemporaries themselves were struck by the similarity. When Molé in 1839 had been beaten at the elections, and, instead of obtaining a majority, lost thirty seats, everybody recalled the case of Martignac.

The people thought there was to be another 1830 and the revolutionaries, led by Barbès, attempted to arouse Paris. The barricades lasted no more than a day but it was evident that the parliamentary agitation had aroused the revolutionary party. This alarm did not serve as a lesson to the Chamber who were opposing Marshal Soult, chosen by the king, just as they had opposed Molé. The latter, strange to say, became reconciled with Thiers and joined the opposition. There were a few months of open warfare directed not only against the cabinet but against the crown. The king was reproached for the weakness, that is to say the prudence, of his European policy and they haggled with him, even over the civil list. Thus the July Monarchy was discredited and weakened by those who had made it, by those propertied office holders who were sawing off the branch upon which they were sitting.

Louis-Philippe had been driven back to his entrenchments just as Charles X had been. More prudent than he, he yielded and in 1840 recalled Thiers who had conducted this campaign. A new experiment was beginning and was to lead to a serious crisis, through the spirit of adventure which the king had so feared in this minister imposed upon him by the Chamber. Thiers, an historian, had revived the memories of the Revolution and of the Empire. He wished to make himself illustrious by an active foreign policy whatever might be the risk of a European conflict. Like Chateaubriand, under Louis XVIII, he urged the Monarchy to rival the glory of Napoleon. Thiers immediately proposed to bring back from Saint Helena the remains of the emperor and charged the Prince de Joinville with this mission as though to associate the royal family itself with the rehabilitation and exaltation of the Empire. The return of the emperor's body thrilled the imagination of the people. It added, as Lamartine had prophetically announced, another element to the almost general conspiracy of literature which had given itself up to the cult of the emperor. The return of these ashes was also part of a program, that of an "energetic" attitude, a sort of defiance to the foreign powers, a revenge for the treaties of 1815.

This policy, so rash, and so dangerous that Thiers' party was called the party of bravado, was nevertheless supported by public opinion. But by public opinion was meant the bourgeoisie, the deputies, and the newspapers. The great mass of the country remained unchanged and quite removed from these debates. It was not even consulted. We can well understand that Thiers, at this moment more than at any other, was hostile to universal suffrage. He knew that rural France would give its support to a pacific policy—that of the king—because it was not possible to interest the peasant in the Egyptian Pasha, Mehemet Ali, whose cause was arousing almost as much enthusiasm as that of Greece had done. For several years now the exploits of Mehemet Ali, the Oriental conqueror, had resounded throughout Europe adding to the Eastern question, which had been open ever since the eighteenth century, a dangerous element by menacing Turkey in the south while Russia was threatening her from the north. Until this time the July Monarchy had attempted to play the rôle of mediator between Russia and England, always rivals in the Orient. The French made a principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as an element of European equilibrium, the idea which had been that of Talleyrand since the Congress of Vienna—to compensate France for the abandonment of her conquests by forbidding conquests to the other powers. Thiers radically changed this method. What he wanted in the Orient was a success through the victory of the hero Mehemet Ali, by persuading the Sultan of Constantinople to give Syria to the Egyptian conqueror. This independent action, immediately discovered by England, brought from her a violent response; a coalition against Mehemet Ali, but in reality against France, who was accused of disturbing the peace of Europe. And this coalition was of the four great powers: England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The treaty of July 15, 1840, renewed the pact of Chaumont. It meant war, the war which Louis-Philippe had feared, the unequal conflict "of one against four." By the explosion of war-like sentiments which took place among the French, we can judge of their illusions and of their ignorance of their danger.

Heinrich Heine observed in Paris, "a joyous enthusiasm for the war rather than any consternation; the common watchword is 'war against perfidious Albion.'" Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, a no less keen observer, chose this moment for a new manifestation; he landed at Boulogne whence his uncle had formerly threatened the English power. This time he was imprisoned in the fortress of Ham from which he soon escaped. From this second foolish enterprise, his star was not to suffer. Thiers continued to work for him.

However imprudent he may have been, Thiers understood that a conflict with England would be serious. He flattered himself that he could appease her and turn all of the efforts of France towards a war against Prussia and Austria, in which some easy victories would bring a revenge for Waterloo and destroy the treaty of 1815. At this time a German nationalism, as violent as in 1813, and at least equal in intensity to the French national sentiment, was an advance signal of the coming blows and invasions. In the same way, a hundred years earlier the anti-Austrian party had thrown France into a useless war. It was thus that in 1792 the Girondists had opened the doors of war from people to people. In the meantime the enthusiasm among the French was such that it even affected the royal family itself. "It would be better," said the Duke d'Orléans, "to perish on the Rhine or on the Danube than in the gutter of the rue Saint-Denis." Almost alone, in spite of his minister, in spite of opinion, and in spite even of his own *entourage*, Louis-Philippe stood firm for peace, knowing that England would not permit him any more than she had permitted the Revolution or Napoleon I, to resume a policy of conquest. Defying unpopularity he interposed, reproved the warlike language of Thiers, and in the month of October obliged him to resign.

This service which the king had rendered the country, the second after the founding of Belgian independence, exposed him more than ever to the reproach of having humiliated the nation. However, Louis-Philippe had spared it a continental war coupled with a naval one in which disaster would have been cer-

tain. Scorned and insulted, the king would not even have received the support of the Chamber had not Guizot and a few men more clairvoyant than the rest, who understood the peril from which France had just escaped, been visited by remorse and renounced their opposition. Henceforth during the years which remained to the Monarchy of July before its downfall, it was with Guizot, who was resolved to repair the evil he had done, that Louis-Philippe governed. In the Chamber itself the king and his minister were supported by a majority which never surpassed a hundred votes. The opposition which their foreign policy encountered, based upon the "entente cordiale" with England, was of such violence and bad faith that we of to-day are astounded by it. Guizot, who understood the English and who had been ambassador at London, defined the entente cordiale as, "Independence with good understanding." But the country did not forgive him for this agreement. Every incident, whether it had to do with the right-of-search or the Pritchard Affair (Pritchard was an English missionary who had been expelled from Tahiti and England was claiming an indemnity) was the occasion for the most violent accusations. This Tahitian incident aroused public opinion to an unbelievable degree; in 1844 the two countries were within a hair's breadth of war "for the Queen Pomaré." It was the same year in which Marshal Bugeaud, completing the conquest of Algeria, defeated at l'Isly the Moroccans who had come to the aid of Abd-el-Kader, the year in which the French fleet bombarded Tangiers. A colonial dispute in Oceania would have been absurd while England still remained so hostile to the French establishment in northern Africa. For the first time the public began to interest itself in Algerian affairs, in this slow and painful acquisition, and it was not even finished before the French people were demanding all of Morocco. Here again Louis-Philippe was accused of cowardice. A man of intelligence has said of this epoch, "France was in a sentimental rather than a rational state of mind." These misunderstandings were to become more and more aggravated while the Monarchy, already weakened from so many causes, was to receive still another blow. In 1842 the

Duke of Orléans had been killed in a carriage accident. The king was seventy years old and the heir to the throne, the Count of Paris, was four. In case anything happened to the old king, the régime would no longer have any one to support it.

If Louis-Philippe fell as Charles X had fallen, unexpectedly, his misfortune was nevertheless the effect of complex causes which had their origin in the rupture of the *entente cordiale*. Louis-Philippe and Guizot, following Talleyrand's idea, had conceived this agreement as a guaranty of the stability and peace of Europe. But with the liberal party, a new minister, Palmerston, had come to power in England, who, abandoning the policy of conservatism in Europe to which England had been pledged since 1815, favored everywhere on the continent the revolutionary movements and the idea of nationality, in the thought that it would be to England's advantage to take the lead. Thus Great Britain, after having so long held France in suspicion as the country of revolutions bent on conquest, now favored agitations which tended to overthrow the treaty of 1815 in just those points which gave security to France. To arouse Germany and Italy and to work for the unity of those countries was to open a series of crises and create new perils from which the French would be the first to suffer. The situation had changed from beginning to end. The *entente cordiale* lost its reason for being. It split over the affair of the Spanish marriages, Louis-Philippe and Guizot refusing to allow the Spanish throne to be taken away from the house of Bourbon, while Palmerston wished to set up a Coburg there, and was supporting the radical party in Spain. This party was long to cause much trouble in that country. The July Monarchy was wise in opposing the Spanish revolutions, since it was from them that was to arise the pretext, if not the cause, of the war of 1870. When France had won the day and when in 1846 the young queen, Isabella, married the Duke of Cadiz and the infanta, the Duke of Montpensier, the *entente cordiale* was broken.

It was then taken up again and adopted by the opposition, since England was putting herself at the head of the "free

countries." Thiers, exalting the policy for which he will a few years later reproach Napoleon III, flattered the public sentiment by proclaiming himself a partisan of the liberation of the peoples. Of this campaign in which Thiers had the support of the republicans, M. Emile Bourgeois has justly said, "The adversaries of the Guizot cabinet did not perceive that, behind the ministry, they were dealing a blow at the dynasty and above all at France herself, and preparing for a European revolution more dangerous perhaps for an old nation through the unbridling of the races, than the coalition of the people and the statesmen had been for Napoleon." The Monarchy now sought peace and security through the aid of Austria. The warning of 1840 had revealed the true sentiments of Germany and now it was the King of Prussia who, making use of the language of liberalism, was openly putting himself at the head of a national movement for German unity, the greatest danger with which France could be menaced. Austria was anxious to prevent Prussia from dominating Germany, just as she was anxious, on account of her possessions in Italy, to prevent the union of Italy, in favor of which a movement was just starting. In order to prevent the unity of Germany, which Austria as a Germanic power could oppose better than France, without declaring her intentions, it was necessary to sacrifice the question of Italy. This was the policy upon which Metternich and Guizot agreed.

Europe in 1847 was filled with symptoms of revolution, accompanied by the awakening of nationalities, even before there had been any signs of revolution in France. The opposition accused the king and his minister "of betraying, through a new sort of Holy Alliance, the hopes and desires of the free peoples." What the Monarchy was working for, above all else, was to preserve peace. But where could it find partisans for this pacific policy? In the masses which furnished the soldiers; and the masses were excluded from the vote, their influence did not count in public affairs. At the same time a campaign began for the extension of the right of suffrage, a right then reserved to the rich bourgeoisie and now demanded by the intellectuals, the "men of capacity," as they were called. Attacked

every day for his foreign policy, and keeping his eye only on a Chamber where he had a majority, Guizot was not anxious to increase the opposition by the voices of those who represented especially the opinions of the liberal and the war party. He never thought of the antidote, of universal suffrage, nor of the support which a policy of peace would have found in the peasant masses.

The unpopularity of Guizot among the bourgeoisie and the population of Paris was caused in the first place by his attitude on foreign matters. He increased it by his hostility to the electoral reform. Louis-Philippe, consulting only the Charter, kept a minister whom the Chamber did not overturn just as Charles X, invoking article 14, had kept Polignac. The Revolution of 1848, like that of 1830, broke out and succeeded by surprise and it was the bourgeois who had worked for the fall of the Monarchy created by them in their own image. The campaign for electoral reform had begun under the inoffensive form of banquets in which more and more seditious speeches had been delivered. Lamartine, at Mâcon, prophesied "the revolution of contempt." One of these banquets, having been forbidden at Paris, gave place to a manifestation which the leaders of the Left, having become alarmed, vainly tried to suppress; the Parisian crowd was already getting beyond their control. The government, however, was taking no extraordinary precautions against this trouble that was brewing. For its own defense and that of the régime it counted upon the national guard. But while the barricades were being raised on February twenty-second, the legions of the guard took their posts, crying "Long life to the reform." The guardians of order, instead of combating the rebellion, reënforced it. When Louis-Philippe was enlightened as to the disposition of the bourgeoisie, whom he had persisted in believing loyal, he decided to discharge Guizot, but it was too late. The insurrection, left to itself, had grown. It could be met only by force of arms, and that was not sufficient. A fusillade in the boulevard des Capucines before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that of Guizot, killed fifteen of the insurgents and the parade of the bodies through the streets of

Paris increased the excitement of the mob. From that time on, a Thiers ministry and an Odilon Barrot ministry, proposed by the king, were of no avail. On February twenty-fourth, Marshal Bugeaud, who attempted to restore order, could not dominate the mob and the Tuileries were menaced. The parliamentary leaders involved in the disorder were as much surprised as the king himself by this accident. No more than in 1830 had the government foreseen the attack or prepared for its own defense. Like Charles X, Louis-Philippe renounced the throne without appealing to the country, as soon as Paris had pronounced itself. Like him, also, he abdicated in favor of his grandson when a new régime had already been prepared in advance. The Chamber was invaded at the moment when it had just acclaimed the Duchess of Orléans as regent and Odilon Barrot had just said, "Is it possible that any one would pretend to put again in question what we decided by the Revolution of July?" A few moments later the Republic was proclaimed.

CHAPTER XX

THE SECOND REPUBLIC AND THE SECOND EMPIRE

IN 1848, as in 1830, the Monarchy yielded without resistance to the Paris uprisings. In both cases it was not only the king who had abdicated but authority itself. But while, in 1830, the liberal bourgeoisie had been able to substitute Louis-Philippe for Charles X, in 1848 it had been taken unawares and this time the rebels had not allowed it to discount their revolution. Whether it liked it or not, it had to accept the Republic, the very name of which evoked sorry enough memories in the minds of men who loved order. Thus there was panic side by side with extraordinary enthusiasm. Trees were everywhere being blessed in the cause of liberty, but prices on the Bourse collapsed and, through fear of worse, every one sold what he could. What perhaps inspired most fear was the socialism which had been developing during the Monarchy with the growth of industry and the increase of the working population. The Republic which the insurgents had proclaimed was a social and democratic one, slightly tinged with red. With moderates, like Lamartine, there entered into the provisional government some advanced republicans, like Ledru-Rollin; a theoretical socialist, Louis Blanc; and a workman, Albert. According to a conviction that was almost general, this was only a beginning and France was on the way to a radical social reformation. The electoral reform had been the cause of the insurrection; universal suffrage was inevitable and at that time people could hardly imagine that such a thing could be anything but revolutionary.

The very brief history of the Second Republic was that of an enthusiasm, swiftly disillusioned, and a prolonged fear. It was also that of a much more important phenomenon; governmental

authority, under the form of the two monarchies which had abdicated in succession, had not been sure of the country and that is why at the first sign of trouble it had not been sure of itself and had failed. We shall now see France setting out to find authority somewhere and, in a very short time, reëstablishing it. Those who, through the fear of disorder, had distrusted the French people had been as much deceived as those who, for the sake of gaining votes, thought a demagogic attitude was the surest means of winning them. Even Paris, the hearth of revolutions, was very quick to show herself hostile to the social revolution and she spoke in no uncertain terms.

The first weeks were tumultuous. The provisional government had constantly to parley with the insurgents who remained under arms and who demanded immediate satisfaction. It was necessary to promise them the "right to work," in the name of which the national workshops were created to give occupation to the unemployed. Lamartine succeeded not without difficulty in keeping the tricolor instead of the red flag. However, the demands of the workmen were less serious than their illusions. As the moderates had told them that progress could not be realized in a day, they had shown their good will, in placing, "three months of poverty at the service of the Republic." Three months to reform society! Universal suffrage had been proclaimed; entrance to the national guard, hitherto reserved to the middle classes, had been opened to all; the working day had been shortened; and a commission of social reforms had been created. This together with the creation of the national workshops was about all that it had been possible to accomplish.

But there were demands of another sort which were much more dangerous, those which were inspired by revolutionary idealism. Revenge for the treaty of 1815, the natural frontiers, and the hatred of the Holy Alliance had taken on a mystic character. The insurgents of 1830 were still thinking of conquests, of Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. Those of 1848 raised the banner of the oppressed peoples, especially of Poland, whose name was constantly appearing in their speeches. Revolutionary movements in diverse parts of Europe had pre-

ceded the Days of February. Others, at Berlin and at Vienna, followed them. People believed that a new era of peace and justice and liberty was going to open for all the world. Paris was full of refugees from all countries, who went about in processions acclaimed by the crowd, asking the help of the provisional government. Every day Lamartine had to reply to delegations of Germans, Hungarians, Italians, Poles, Irish, and even Norwegians. Pressure was exerted on the Republic to win it over to the war of propaganda. The doctrinary republicans, with Ledru-Rollin, were strongly in favor of it. Lamartine, who had become minister of foreign affairs, abounded in noble words, temporized as best he could, enlightened by his responsibilities and fearing to throw France into adventures which would again weld the coalition against her. He would perhaps have finally intervened in favor of Italy who had risen against Austria, if the Italians, remembering the French occupation at the time of the Revolution and of the Empire, had not feared the French republicans as much as the Hapsburgs and replied that Italy "would take care of herself." The spirit of the European revolutions was above all national. They foreshadowed the formation of those great unities of Italy and of Germany which were to be accomplished only by breaking the framework of Europe and by provoking great wars.

These consequences, of which Louis-Philippe and Guizot had had some misgivings when they were associated with Metternich in a policy of conservatism, escaped the French republicans. It is to the honor of Lamartine that he resisted their summons. But at the beginning of the Second Republic one anxiety dominated over the others. It was not sufficient merely to have proclaimed universal suffrage; that suffrage had to be consulted. And in proportion as the hour approached, it was the revolutionaries who were most afraid of it. They began to ask themselves if all of France were like Paris, whether it might not elect a moderate majority, even a reactionary one, and paralyze the Republic if it did not destroy it. It was the more advanced members of the revolutionists who then demanded an adjournment of the elections and the "dictatorship of Progress." In-

timidated by the manifestation on the seventeenth of March, the provisional government deferred the balloting until April twenty-third. The partisans of the socialist Republic profited by this respite to organize a "day," "*journée*," on the model of the Revolution with the idea of purging the provisional government and driving out Lamartine and the moderates. But just as in the time of the Revolution, when the Jacobins were beaten, it was through the legions of the national guard who had remained faithful to law and order, that the *coup de force* fell through. The Communists (for that was what people were beginning to call them) did not succeed in getting possession of the Hôtel de Ville and their manifestation met at Paris with only coldness and hostility.

The people of the provinces were even more hostile. Eight days before the election, this menace of a riot disquieted and irritated them. Through force of habit, they had followed the capital and accepted the change of régime and there was not, so to speak, any candidate who did not call himself a republican. But a very remarkable symptom was the calm which was preserved in the provinces, the almost complete absence of disorder.

Universal suffrage, this sphinx, this monster, was about to speak for the first time. People voted with a zeal that has never been seen since; 7,800,000 votes cast out of 9,400,000 inscribed voters, 84 per cent of the eligibles. The response was decisive; out of eight hundred deputies, there were less than a hundred advanced republicans. The remainder were for the most part composed of moderates, together with some more or less avowed monarchists. This was a crushing blow for the social and democratic Republic. A still more serious result was that even on the Left almost all those elected were from the bourgeoisie. The conservatives, who were afraid of universal suffrage, had expected to see a great number of men in peasant blouses; there were not more than a score of workmen. The direction of the affairs of the country remained in the hands of the middle classes, and this has been the case in all the assemblies up to the present day.

The Assembly of 1848 represented a general desire for order. The French people spontaneously followed the example of the bourgeois in 1830 who had substituted Louis-Philippe for Charles X. Although, like the July Monarchy, it had been born of revolt, the Second Republic immediately took its stand on the other side of the barricade. It was also like the July Monarchy to find itself in combat with the deceived revolutionaries and by a rapid reaction was marching towards the reëstablishment of authority.

The Assembly called itself "Constituent," but with this difference from that of 1789, that it was not friendly to the Left. While waiting for a constitution to be voted, it replaced the provisional government by an executive commission of five members, a sort of directorate from which the socialists were excluded. Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin alone were admitted and with a number of votes less than that of their three new colleagues, who were moderates. For the socialists thus eliminated from the government, it remained only to submit or to start a new revolt. This new Assembly opposed radical reforms within as well as foreign war without, for the liberation of nationalities. The Parisian democrats, excited by the clubs, tried to overturn it by a *coup de force*. On May fifteenth, the Assembly was invaded to the cry of "Vive la Pologne!" The insurgents took possession of the Hôtel de Ville. For a moment it seemed as if the revolution had triumphed. But once more the national guard, which had remained in great part bourgeois, rapidly restored order. This attempt alarmed both the Assembly and the country and increased their hatred of socialism. From this time on, war was declared against it. The Right and the moderates united forces. Fifteen days later the majority decided to close the national workshops, which had become a source of waste and a center of agitation. People began to feel that the morrow was not certain, that a serious conflict was coming, and that they needed a strong government.

These circumstances served the cause of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte marvelously. However, there was no organized

Bonapartist party. Personally, the adventurer of Strassburg and of Boulogne had no credit. His name, the Napoleonic memories which were mingled with the ideas of order, authority, and glory, were in his favor. Perhaps the weakness of the government, which so disquieted the country, was also in his favor. Still an exile, he was elected deputy by a partial election. It was a decisive experiment; his name sufficed, it was a pledge and a guaranty. Louis-Napoleon thought it more politic not to reënter France immediately, although the Assembly had opened its doors to him, believing that it had not the right to oppose a wish expressed by universal suffrage. The latter was still too new not to be respected.

This election came at a moment when the minds of the French were much agitated. The closing of the workshops was imminent. Every evening bands of workmen paraded the boulevards, acclaiming the democratic and social Republic. Counter manifestations were spontaneous and lacked only a motto and songs. One might say that the Empire began by a "saw" in a concert hall: "Poléon, we will have him!" and by sentimental ballads: "Napoleon, be a good republican!" A Bonapartist party began to form, and, what was still more important, a Bonapartist state of mind. A new socialist outbreak was to reënforce it.

This was more than a riot: a real attempt at social war, drowned in blood. The executive commission, in accordance with the vote of the Assembly, had fixed June twenty-first for the dissolution of the workshops. On the twenty-second, the decision having been published, a delegation of workmen presented itself before the government to protest. As the decision was, however, upheld, the insurrection broke out on the following day.

It was all the more violent in that it was anonymous. The only name connected with it was that of Pujol, a leader of one of the sections of the national workshops, who gave the signal for the uprising in an harangue to the workmen in the Place de la Bastille, at the foot of the Column of July. This "sedition," as the Assembly called it, took its precedent for overturn-

ing the bourgeois Republic, from the revolutions which had overturned the monarchy. By evening of the twenty-second, the working population of Paris was under arms.

Paris then saw what she had not seen either in 1789 or 1830; a government resolved to defend itself, a government which had taken all precautions, which had even determined upon a plan in advance, and which assigned to the regular army the duty of repression. Setting aside the five civilians of the Executive Commission, the Assembly delegated control to General Cavaignac, that is, to a republican dictator. In three days the insurrection which at first had controlled almost half of Paris was crushed. Wholesale arrests, condemnations by the courts-martial, deportations to Algeria, all followed this victory in the cause of order. The regular troops had fought with discipline; the bourgeois sections of the national guard, with fury. From the provinces, even, reënforcements had been sent to them. Instead of being honored the insurrection was cursed. The insurgents were no longer heroes but "barbarians." The assassination of General Bréa and the death of the Archbishop of Paris, Monseigneur Affre, killed at the moment when he was attempting to intervene between the combatants, were recounted with horror. Everywhere the impression was profound. From the moment that the revolution attacked the social order and property even Paris ceased to be revolutionary. Socialism emerged from those days of June, weakened and discouraged, while the reaction spread from the towns to the country with hatred for the "dividers-up."

From that time events marched rapidly. The constitution that was adopted by the Assembly read to the effect that the Republic should have a president and that this president should be elected by the people. There were very few republicans like Grévy who pretended that the plebiscite might be fatal for the Republic. Even the Left accepted it. Republican doctrine then held that the parliamentary régime was in its very essence conservative and monarchic and that the executive power, in order not to depend upon an assembly which might at any time restore the monarchy, ought to depend upon universal suffrage. All of

which goes to prove that political theories are as changing as the conditions which determine them.

The plebiscite took place on the tenth of December. Louis-Napoleon offered his candidacy with that of Lamartine and General Cavaignac. He had entered France a short time before; his presence in the Assembly had caused little comment and his attitude had been politic. He had denied that he pretended to the imperial throne. Instead of talking of social reforms as he had done in his first manifestoes, and as nearly all the world had been doing, a few months earlier, he had become conservative with a democratic vocabulary, a mixture of ideas such as was found in the Napoleonic traditions. To the general surprise, he was elected by a considerable majority, with five million and a half votes. More significant, more glorious than those of Cavaignac and Lamartine, his name had carried the day.

Here was an extraordinary situation. This prince-president who was nothing the day before, who had only a handful of partisans, had become the head of the state. The first movement of the deputies was to consider his election as an accident (since the president could not be reëlected) and to treat him as a negligible quantity. As a matter of fact, not having been initiated into affairs of state, he showed some embarrassment and even timidity. However, he already had a policy. He chose his ministers from among the conservatives, and, estimating that Catholic opinion was important, he gave it satisfaction by deciding upon the expedition to Rome to reëstablish the Pope in his states from which a revolution had driven him. To the end Louis-Napoleon will be conservative without and liberal within and inversely, in order always to give satisfaction to these two tendencies of the French.

However, his position was not secure. It was less so after the elections of the thirteenth of May, 1849, which showed that the president was isolated. A Bonaparte was at the head of the state and yet in France there were very few real Bonapartists. Moreover, the president would not have been able to have a program and candidates after his own heart without

violating the Constitution and exposing his plans. The new Assembly elected as he himself had been, under the impression of the Days of June, was conservative. It was no longer even republican. Fear of disorder and of anarchy, the discontent of the country districts over the forty-five centimes added to the direct taxes, had all turned France away from the republicans. The party of order was victorious and it was represented by the legitimists and the Orleanists, the two groups which formed the majority. From one day to the next this majority could reëstablish the monarchy if the two groups of monarchists became reconciled in one royal family. They had been divided since 1830. If this "fusion" fell through, the prince-president would only have to take advantage of the current which was carrying France away from the Republic, and, instead of royalty, there would be an empire. It was thus that the affair turned out. Louis-Napoleon had only to profit by the faults of a royalist Assembly which did not know how to bring about a restoration.

These faults were numerous and serious. Not only could the partisans of the Count of Chambord and those of the Count of Paris not succeed in coming to an agreement, which should have been easy since the elder branch of the Bourbons had no sons and would not have any, but they furthered the cause of the prince-president. What particularly preoccupied the minds of these conservatives, was the fear of the revolutionaries. In spite of their own large majority they were haunted by a fear of the "reds." A partial election which returned a few deputies from the party which called itself the party of the Mountain, evoking memories of 1793, deputies elected mostly from Paris, alarmed the Assembly. It blamed universal suffrage for this. Thiers, having become a reactionary, in one of his numerous avatars, spoke of the "vile multitude." After the passage of the law of May 31, 1850, which excluded three million electors, the policy of the president was clear; elected by the plebiscite, he would present himself as the defender and the restorer of universal suffrage. From this time on it was he who treated as a negligible quantity the inert Assembly, wavering between

a monarchy and a republic while he was preparing for the Empire. Already he had chosen his ministers outside of it, he was building himself a party, was showing himself in France, and was flattering and conciliating the army which at the presidential election had cast fewer votes for him than for General Cavaignac. Already, with Persigny and Morny, he was preparing his coup d'état. He had decided upon it when the Assembly had refused to revise the constitution, one article of which forbade the reëlection of the president. The coup d'état of December 2, 1851, was a reactionary operation, but directed against a monarchist Assembly in order to deprive it of the benefits of reaction, executed with the aid of the army and preceded by advances to the democrats to whom the prince-president promised amnesty and the reëstablishment of universal suffrage.

The invectives with which the republicans have covered this coup d'état make us forget that the Assembly, which was driven out by force and whose members were for the most part arrested, was a monarchist assembly. If France had not had Napoleon III, she would have had a Henry V or a Louis-Philippe II. To read *Les Châtiments* of Victor Hugo and *L'histoire d'un crime*, one would think that the prince-president had strangled the Republic. In truth, he was strangling a monarchy in the cradle. Only, this monarchy would have been representative whereas the coup d'état established a dictatorship and suppressed the parliamentary régime. In these conditions, at bottom very little different from those of the 18th Brumaire, the nephew of the First Consul substituted himself for royalty whose return was only a little more probable in 1851 than in 1799. But what did France want? She wanted what the Assembly had not been able to establish on a solid basis—authority and order. The French people received them from Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte. The coup d'état of December second, organized from within, executed in the most favorable circumstances, thus encountered only a feeble resistance, that of the republican minority of the country. This minority was still more weakened by the bitterness of the workmen who,

remembering the Days of June, defended very half-heartedly a Republic which no longer existed except in name. The deputy Baudin sacrificed his life in vain on the barricade in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. The tentative insurrection which took place at Paris was stopped in three days. As time went on the measures taken against street fighting became better organized and more severe. The government was no longer meek nor hesitating as it had been in 1789 and 1848. During the Days of June, General Cavaignac had already perfected what one might call the technique of repression. This time every one found carrying arms was shot. By the fifth of December Paris had become calm again. In the provinces there were only a few local uprisings which the troops had no difficulty in putting down. All of France had accepted the coup d'état. On December twenty-first, universal suffrage, reëstablished as the president had promised, was called upon to pronounce itself. By 7,000,000 yeas against 600,000 nays, it approved Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte for having violated and abolished the Constitution and conferred upon him a six-year term of office. The Empire was in reality accomplished.

"For half a century France has had the administrative institutions of the Year VIII," said a proclamation of the prince. "Why should she not also have its political institutions?" In fact, there was little change needed to return to a consular dictatorship. It sufficed to limit the powers of the Chamber, which was again called the *corps législatif*, and to deprive it of all right of initiative. The improvement was the election of deputies by universal and direct suffrage. But those candidates who would be agreeable to the government were officially designated to the voters and practically all of the seats were assured to candidates thus designated. If the parliamentary régime as well as the dictatorship superimposed itself upon the institutions of the Year VIII, it was to the dictatorship that the French now returned. A year later, after a swift preparation and a trip through France where he had been received as a sovereign, Louis-Napoleon announced his intention of re-establishing the hereditary Empire and of taking the name of

Napoleon III. On November 22, 1852, a new plebiscite approved it by a still larger majority than in the preceding year. The French people adopted the Empire by 7,880,000 yeas against 250,000 nays. The opposition no longer counted. The advanced republicans were in exile. Those who remained, frightened by the rigorous measures and the deportations which had followed the second of December, were reduced to silence. Victor Hugo, who had taken refuge in Guernsey, wrote *Les Châtiments* but found himself left alone "to defy Scylla." At the elections of 1857, only a handful of the opposition, the Five, were returned to the Legislative Corps. The firmness of the administration, the action of the prefects, and intimidation all contributed in part to this docility of the electoral body. However, the acquiescence of the rural masses and of the bourgeoisie to this dictatorial régime was spontaneous. Napoleon III had reason, then, to trust himself to universal suffrage. It remained only to give the country material and moral satisfaction; in other words, to govern. From the time of his election to the presidency of the Republic until the reëstablishment of the Empire, the thing which together with the glory of his name had best served Napoleon III, was the idea of authority and order. What might have hurt him was the idea of war associated with the Napoleonic name. But, during the Second Republic, the Assemblies, which had been either moderate or conservative, had followed a policy in European affairs very similar to that of Louis-Philippe. The program of the liberals and of the Bonapartists of the Restoration as well as that of the insurgents of 1830 and 1848, which included the abolition of the treaty of 1815, the establishment of the natural frontiers, and the liberation of the oppressed nationalities, had been allowed to lie dormant by Lamartine and his successors. Under the presidency of Louis-Napoleon there had been no other foreign expedition than the one to Rome for the protection of the Pope. This had satisfied the Catholics without necessitating a serious military effort. However, it might have been feared that, having become emperor, the prince-president might adopt a warlike policy. But he had reassured both France

and Europe when in his speech at Bordeaux sometime before the proclamation of the Empire, he pronounced those famous words, so often recalled since: "The Empire means peace."

This was not the only reason that Napoleon III was accepted by the four powers who in 1814 and 1815 had launched against the Bonapartes a decree of external exclusion. The revolutions which had overrun Europe in 1848, like an epidemic, had violently shaken the Prussian and Austrian monarchies and they were not sorry to have order established in France even through a Napoleonic coup d'état. Moreover, Prussia and Austria had just emerged from a conflict for domination in Germany. Without any blood having been shed, the Prussian royalty had been humiliated at Olmütz and as a result there remained between the two German powers a rivalry which prevented any concerted action against France. As for England, Napoleon III knew that all depended upon her. He had taken every pains to reassure the old enemy of his uncle, and during his reign he always attempted to maintain the *entente cordiale*. There remained the Czar who was very hostile to the reëstablishment of the French Empire. Alone he could do nothing. But Russia, whom the revolutions had not touched and who had, for the sake of Austria, even crushed a Hungarian insurrection, exercised considerable influence in Europe. It would be necessary to humble Russia if the treaty of 1815 was to be revised to the advantage of France. And this was one of the cherished things which the new emperor had in mind as one of his main purposes.

As heir to the Napoleonic traditions, and elected by the plebiscite, Napoleon III knew that his task was to satisfy all of the tendencies of the French people. The Empire, as Thiers said, "was a monarchy on its knees before democracy." What had given the government to Napoleon III was the aspiration for order and authority. But the republican spirit of 1848 would come to life and the longing for liberty would return in proportion as the memory of revolutionary danger faded. How could the autocratic Empire give satisfaction to the republican idea? By according to it what the July Monarchy and the

conservative Republic had prudently denied it: a return to the Revolution's foreign policy, the retaking of the natural frontiers and the liberation of the oppressed peoples. Reaction within, liberalism without; the Second Empire was to succeed in this policy for ten years or so up to the moment when difficulties were to arise for France out of the changes which she was to bring about in Europe.

Like Napoleon I, Napoleon III gave to his reign a character both monarchic and democratic, conservative and liberal. Not having found a princess of royal blood, he married Eugénie de Montijo thus recalling the memory of the Empress Josephine. The speech in which he officially announced his marriage was a sort of manifesto. He had not tried at any cost "to introduce himself into the family of kings." But he would be able to make himself respected by the "old Europe" by frankly taking "the position of a parvenu, a glorious title when one attained it through the free suffrage of a great people."

This old Europe Napoleon III was dreaming of revising. The return to the Napoleonic régime would only be complete, would only win the support of liberal opinion and escape the reproach from which the Bourbons and Louis-Philippe had never been delivered, when the work of the Congress of Vienna was undone. On the other hand, experience had shown that if France openly ran counter to the Allies of 1814, they would be likely to unite against her again. It was therefore necessary, in order to change the course of European affairs, to do it in such a way as to prevent a coalition. And as the head of the coalition would again be England, it was with England that it was important to keep on good terms. The Eastern question which had existed for a century and was always useful either as a diversion or a source of complications, offered to Napoleon III the occasion for which he was looking. Charles X had thought of wiping out the consequences of Waterloo by an alliance with the Czar on condition of giving the latter a free hand in Turkey. This was virtually the renewal of the agreement at Tilsit. Napoleon III overturned it. In 1854 he allied himself with England to defend the integrity of the Ottoman

Empire against Russia. From every point of view this war was good politics. It assured Napoleon III the alliance of England. It was favored in France by the Catholics because it had as pretext the protection of the Holy Places claimed by the Russian schismatics; and by the republicans because they hated this autocratic Czar, the "tyrant of the North" and the persecutor of Poland. Then, when finally the Russian power should be conquered, the field would be clear for France to intervene in favor of the oppressed nations.

The Crimean war was not to bring more than this to France. After a siege of a year in which the French army had played the greatest part, Sebastopol fell and Russia confessed herself conquered. At the Congress which was held at Paris in 1856 France appeared as the first power of the continent. Napoleon III seemed to have effaced both the reverses of Napoleon I and the failure of France in this same Orient in 1840. Russia was driven back far from Constantinople. She was humiliated and weakened; from this humiliation she retained a hatred for France. However, England would not permit the questions which most interested Napoleon III, those of Poland and of Italy, to be even touched upon. Satisfied with the weakening of Russia, England had already detached herself from France. Thus behind the appearances of glory and grandeur, there were hidden some bitter realities. In Prussia a formidable man was beginning his career and he had immediately seen the advantage that his country ought to derive from this new situation. This man was Bismarck. Prussia was the power most interested in a revision of Europe, because, without the suppression of the order of things created in 1815, she could not expel Austria from the Confederation and thus build up German unity to her own advantage. Russia had just been humiliated at Sebastopol as Prussia had been at Olmütz. Austria, "astonishing all the world by her ingratitude," had abandoned the Czar who had saved her from the Hungarian revolution. Prussia by approaching the sorely wounded Russia was preparing the means of freely dominating Germany.

In order to succeed, Bismarck's farseeing plan, which was

really a long chance, supposed that Napoleon III would reject the alliance which Austria offered him at the Congress of Paris. Napoleon III did not, in fact, want anything to do with this alliance which Louis-Philippe and Guizot had found useful in preventing dangerous upheavals; he could not desire it because it would have hindered him in liberating the Italian people. As early as 1855, when he parted with his minister of foreign affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys, a partisan of the understanding with Austria, Napoleon III had made up his mind. When, three years later, Orsini had thrown his bomb, this attempt on his life did not decide the emperor, as many have thought, to intervene in favor of Italian unity. It only served to convince those in his entourage who were opposed to war against Austria, that it was imprudent to resist the demands of the "Italian patriots." Soon after, at the interview at Plombières, the support of France was promised to Piedmont in the liberation of the Italian provinces from Austria and a year later, in 1859, hostilities began.

After having fought the autocratic Czar, the Emperor of the French turned against the Hapsburgs. In this way he fulfilled another item of the liberal and republican program, and disarmed the opposition. On his departure for the army of Italy, he was acclaimed in the very faubourg where the barricades had been raised on December second. He was, however, running into difficulties of which he had no suspicion. Although the Austrian army had been defeated, not without difficulty, at Magenta and Solferino, Napoleon III had the surprise of finding all Germany, which had been insidiously incited by Prussia, making common cause with Austria, a Germanic power. Threatened with war on the Rhine while the Austrians, driven only from Lombardy, were still resisting, and Russia and England were standing aloof rejoicing in his embarrassment, Napoleon III hastened to sign the armistice of Villafranca. In so doing he abandoned Victor Emmanuel, and the Piedmontese, the Italian patriots who at that moment were hoping to win their freedom and effect the unification of a divided Italy. National revolution broke out in the principali-

ties, menacing Rome and the Holy See. Thus the war against Austria for the liberation of the Italian nation took a sudden turn for the worse. It exposed France to a European conflict. It disappointed Italy herself, who resented being abandoned before the unity had been achieved and who considered that France was well paid for what services she had rendered, by the cession of Nice and Savoy. And finally, the question of Italian unity brought forward the question of the status of Rome and introduced a conflict between the foreign and domestic policy of Napoleon III. If he refused Rome to this new Italy he would be violating the principle of free nationalities and would alienate the French liberals. If he abandoned Rome, he would raise the opposition of the French Catholics who, ever since the coup d'état, had always lent him their support.

Nor were these the only consequences which were to follow the ephemeral success of this policy of the liberation of nationalities. The Italian stumblingblock which Metternich had predicted first obliged Napoleon III to transform his system of government. Within he wished to appease the liberals and inaugurated the "liberal Empire" through the reform of 1860 which increased the powers of the Legislative Corps, gave it a voice in the government again, and paved the way for another parliamentary régime. To the conservatives he promised peace, an end to interventions in Europe for the sake of principle, and the maintenance of the sovereignty of the Pope. But, even so, he had not succeeded in "uniting the parties beneath a cloak of glory." He had not been able to satisfy both "the reactionaries and the revolutionists." He had offended both camps while he flattered himself that he could solve the difficulties to which the preceding régimes had succumbed. By again adopting the policy of the revolution, he stirred up the dangers without, by which France was so soon to be again assailed.

The last ten years of the Second Empire were consumed in the vain attempt to reëstablish a situation that had been compromised. Ever since the Congress of Paris, Napoleon III's

hope of revising the treaty of 1815 had been fading. He declared, indeed, that the treaty had ceased to exist but this was true only in the sense that Prussia was attempting to suppress those parts of it which were inconvenient for her, which bound her and prevented her from unifying Germany. Because of the annexation of Nice and Savoy England suspected that France, under Napoleon, was preparing for further conquests. On the other hand, the principle of the rights of nationality to which the emperor had remained faithful, and which he could not have abandoned without arousing the liberals, involved him in new embarrassments besides those which he had already encountered in Italy. In 1863, Poland revolted against the Russian domination and Napoleon III attempted to intervene. He only succeeded in arousing the resentment of Alexander II with whom Bismarck made haste to ally himself in order to preserve the Prussian Polish provinces and at the same time to win the Czar over to his designs upon Germany. Suddenly, in the following year, the German question was brought to a head by the affair of Schleswig Holstein. This time Napoleon III refused the English proposition to intervene in favor of Denmark which had been attacked by Prussia and Austria. The emperor objected that as the defender of the nationalities in Italy he could not take another attitude in Germany, the duchies being claimed by the Germanic Confederation. The result was only to deliver the Danes of Schleswig over to Germany. This conquest was Bismarck's point of departure for the unification of Germany, the pretext for the conflict which he needed in order to expel Austria from the Confederation. His plan was evident. It could not escape those who were following the course of events. Napoleon favored it. Always looking for some success which should consolidate his throne, he returned to the system of the revolutionary epoch, that of compensations. He would leave Prussia a free field in Germany if in exchange France received certain territorial benefits. At the interview at Biarritz in 1865 with the envoy of William, the agreement was made on this basis but without any formal engagement on the part of Prussia. At the same time, to complete the chain,

Bismarck allied himself with Victor Emmanuel and promised him Venice in case of a common war against Austria. This combination, so dangerous for France since it allied the question of Italian unity with that of German, Napoleon III approved because he hoped that Venice would make the Italians forget Rome. When he finally perceived the danger it was too late, because he could no longer oppose the expansion of Prussia and support Austria without abjuring and destroying his work in Italy.

And this was not all. When war broke out in 1866 between Prussia and Austria, supported by the German states of the south, Napoleon III was entangled in an adventure in America. In 1864, having in concert with England and Spain sent a few ships and troops to Mexico to support the claim of the creditors of that country, which had been devastated by revolution, the emperor had been seduced by the idea of founding a monarchy there, the sovereign of which was to be a Hapsburg, the Archduke Maximilian, brother of Francis Joseph. The most dangerous of the Napoleonic conceptions centered about one idea; that of obtaining a foreign success which should fire the imagination of the French. It was always a question of satisfying a fraction of public opinion. After the Syrian expedition to protect the Christians, the Mexican expedition would, he thought, perhaps turn the thoughts of the French Catholics away from Rome. The Emperor of Austria, whose brother would receive a crown from the hands of France, might perhaps be disposed to cede Venice without a struggle. But Mexico swallowed up men and money. In 1866, France had weakened her army without result and soon Maximilian, abandoned by her, was shot by the Mexicans who had never recognized him.

This, however, was not the reason which hindered Napoleon III from intervening in Germany, when like a "thunderbolt" came the news that the Austrian army had been defeated by the Prussians at Sadova. As a matter of fact, his hands were tied; he had been allied with Prussia since the interview at Biarritz, and by his entire policy he was allied with Italy who,

at this very moment, had been defeated by the Austrians while trying to liberate Venice. If France interfered with the success of the Prussian army, she would be taking the side of Austria against Italy and would be supporting the state of things created in Germany by the treaty of 1815. The emperor thus would be cut out of the compensation which he had been hoping for. Furthermore the public which had applauded the Crimean war against the Czar, and the Italian war against the Hapsburgs, was rejoicing over the Prussian victory at Sadova as over a victory for liberalism, and would not have understood such a *volte-face* of the imperial government.

However, public opinion was not long in perceiving its error. When the people saw that Prussia was increasing her power in Germany, was annexing Hanover, was preparing military conventions with the South German states whom France had protected and who were now delivering themselves over to their conquerors, and when they saw that Bismarck at the treaty of Prague was conciliating Austria in order not to make her irreconcilable, they finally understood what was happening. Too late is a serious phrase, a terrible phrase in history. When Thiers, forgetting that in order to combat Louis-Philippe and Guizot he had recommended the policy which Napoleon had followed, showed the danger of a great Germany unified by Prussia, and when he launched his oft-repeated saying, "There is not one fault left for you to commit," the warning came too late. The press and public opinion now turned against the victors of Sadova, and forgot the favor which the Hohenzollerns, ever since Frederic II, had enjoyed among the French. This tardy revelation of the true state of affairs showed itself in a general nervousness which only hastened the conflict for which Bismarck was preparing. For the last ten years affairs had turned out well for him alone. At every move that France had made in Europe he modeled his policy accordingly and profited at once by all the faults which she committed. One might compare Napoleon III to a man walking with his eyes blindfolded while his enemy could see clearly.

From 1866, and the battle of Sadova, date the decline of

the Empire and the beginning of a new situation in Europe. In working to take revenge for Waterloo, through the destruction of the treaty of 1815 and through the principle of free nationalities, France had had from the Congress of Paris until the battle of Solferino a few years of illusion. In the end she had compromised her security and provoked danger. The appearance of an enlarged and fortified Prussia, who no longer had Austria as a counterpoise and who henceforward would dominate the German countries, was a considerable change. All the Napoleonic policy was thus overturned. When the emperor remembered the promises of Biarritz and demanded for France some compensation out of Prussia's conquests, Bismarck made fun of this "innkeeper's bill." Napoleon III had demanded Mainz. Not only did Bismarck refuse it but he put the German princes on guard against the ambitions of France. Pushed back from the left bank of the Rhine, Napoleon III, falling into the error which Louis-Philippe had been so careful to avoid, thought of annexing Belgium. Later Bismarck revealed the whole affair to the Belgians and to the English, thus surrounding France with an atmosphere of suspicion so that she might be left alone on the day when he should decide to attack her. Finally, when Napoleon showed himself disposed to be content with Luxembourg, there arose in the parliament of North Germany a furious protestation against France, a manifestation of national hate. Bismarck replied that the will of the people prevented him from giving up a German territory.

Disappointed and humiliated, Napoleon III felt within France the result of his failures. The time had passed when there were only five irreconcilable opponents in the Legislative Corps. At the elections of 1863, thirty-five were returned. Paris and the large towns voted for the candidates of the opposition. At the elections of 1867 it was still worse; the governmental candidates obtained in all France only a million votes more than the others. The saying of Henri Rochefort in the first number of his pamphlet, *La Lanterne*, was not without point: "France contains 36,000,000 subjects without count-

ing the subjects of discontent." The people were discontented over Mexico and Sadova. The Empire, after having promised that there should be peace, had made war, and the war had disappointed the liberals who desired it, since Poland had not been liberated and since Italy, although she had finally received Venice in 1866, still did not have Rome. The great mass of electors who wanted peace were anxious because there was beginning to be talk of increasing the French military forces in order to be ready to defend the country against Prussia. The principle of free nationalities, which had brought only vexations, no longer exercised the same attraction as formerly. A new school of republicans and socialists had arisen, and this, instead of being warlike, demanded the abolition of permanent armies. The military reform of Marshal Niel, moderately sustained by the government which was afraid of public opinion, was combated by the Left and came to nothing. Furthermore, the unhappy memories of 1848 and of the Days of June had become dim. The people were no longer grateful to Napoleon III for having reëstablished authority and order. Thus the last years of the Empire passed amid anxiety and trouble.

To overturn it, however, a catastrophe was needed. There were many revolutionaries but no one thought of a revolution. In proportion as the Empire became weaker, it became more liberal, and the former opposition became reconciled with the government. Only the young men like Gambetta still remained intractable. Emile Ollivier, who had been one of the Five, had already become reconciled with the emperor. On January 2, 1870, he was put in charge of the ministry, which contained eight deputies. The parliamentary régime, which had been abolished in 1852, had been reconstituted little by little. Again the emperor had these reforms and his power ratified by a plebiscite. We can therefore see, four months before the fall, how conservative was the majority of the French nation, how it respected the established order of things, and how little desirous it was of change. On the eighth of May, 1870, there were again more than 7,000,000 yeas against 1,500,000 nays. The country believed, Gambetta himself believed, "the Empire stronger

than ever." The burial of Victor Noir, killed in the course of an altercation by the prince, Pierre Bonaparte, gave place to some manifestations which seemed formidable but which were without consequences. A few insurrectional movements of no importance served the government and it was even accused of having provoked them. Better still, the Ollivier ministry prosecuted some of the republicans for a plot against the security of the state, imprisoned Rochefort, and condemned the International Association of Workers. This was in the month of June. But for the disaster which was approaching no one knows how long the Empire might still have endured.

A serious external difficulty had already arisen and was leading France back to a situation which was not new in her history. It is not astonishing that she should have entered into conflict with Prussia by way of Spain when we remember the place which Spanish affairs had held in French politics for centuries past. In 1868, a revolution had dethroned Queen Isabella and to replace her Marshal Prim in concert with Bismarck had offered the throne to a Catholic Hohenzollern, Prince Leopold. France could no more allow a relative of the King of Prussia to reign in Spain than she could have allowed a Hapsburg under Louis XIV. What had been said in 1700 was now heard again; the Empire of Charles V must not be reconstituted. Public opinion, which was already rising against Prussia, saw in this Hohenzollern candidature a provocation by Bismarck. Prévost-Paradol had written that France and Prussia were marching towards each other like two locomotives on the same track. One day or another the clash was sure to come. All that was needed for Bismarck to be sure that he had all Germany with him was that the war which he desired should be declared. He desired this war because it was necessary in order to consolidate German unity. He was holding himself ready to seize the opportunity and the Spanish affair offered it to him.

The Prussian government had pretended that it knew nothing of the offer of the Spanish crown to a Hohenzollern. It was the father of Prince Leopold who, in the face of the

French protestation, declined the candidature for his son. At Paris this renunciation, with which Bismarck and William refused to have anything to do, seemed insufficient and ambiguous. Four years earlier Leopold's own brother, Prince Charles, chosen as sovereign by Roumania, had paid no attention to the prohibition of a European conference and had betaken himself in disguise to Bucharest. Once there, he took advantage of an accomplished fact. The King of Prussia declared that his relative had acted without his knowledge, when in reality Bismarck had approved of the whole affair. The French government knew this story all the better in that it had been favorable to Prince Charles at the time. This is why in July, 1870, the minister of foreign affairs, Gramont, thought it indispensable to assure himself that France would not be tricked in Spain as Europe had been in Roumania. He ordered the French ambassador, Benedetti, to obtain guaranties from King William, who was then taking the waters at Ems. William I was as prudent and timid as his minister was bold. He contented himself with having Benedetti told that he considered the question as closed, and there was no reason to accord to the French ambassador the desired audience. The story of this refusal arranged by Bismarck in such a way as to be offensive to France, produced in Paris the impression that Prussia was trying to provoke war. The Chamber and public opinion were already in a state of irritation. The "Ems dispatch" produced the effect which Bismarck had calculated. At Paris the mob was clamoring for war and crying, "On to Berlin!" The words uttered by Emile Ollivier still weigh upon his memory: "This responsibility we accept with a light heart." Bismarck also accepted it. He had his war. It was declared against him as he desired it should be, on July 19, 1870.

Very few of the French had understood what this war signified or divined what it was going to be. They thought they had only Prussia to combat, after all a power of second rank, and a few small German states, her allies who were not taken seriously. As for Prussia herself, the French resented her

ingratitude even more than her ambition. In reality France was entering into conflict with the entire German people. No one even imagined what was going to burst upon her. She never dreamed of defeat and invasion. Although France had been invaded twice, in 1814-15, it was by a crushing coalition and after long years of victories. All the campaigns of the Second Empire had taken place beyond her borders. A Prussian victory seemed most improbable. We can understand the terrible shock which France received from the turn of events. Those who had not been observing the progress of German unity under the influence of the Prussian state, as well as those who looked upon the national movements as legitimate and peaceful, were totally unprepared for what happened. There were even those who declared that there would be no more wars, or that if there were still some between monarchies, there would never be any more between people and people.

The first disappointment came because of the isolation of France. She had not one alliance. Russia through spite was allowing Prussia to do as she liked. England feared that after a victory France would annex the left bank of the Rhine and perhaps Belgium. Italy was only awaiting her defeat to achieve her own unification and to enter Rome. Austria would have been glad to take revenge for Sadova but she had no confidence in the French and knew the force of Prussia. All the faults of the policy of the liberation of nationalities then bore their fruit. Napoleon III had thought it wise to carry out this policy by stages. Although he had avoided the coalition of which Louis-Philippe was afraid, in the end he had only succeeded in leaving France isolated and weakened in the face of a Germany organized and commanded by the Prussian monarchy.

The defeat came with terrifying suddenness. The enemy, ready before France, had entered Lorraine and Alsace. On the sixth of August the French had lost the battles of Froeschwiller and of Forbach. Twelve days later the army of the Rhine was blockaded in Metz. Another army formed at Châlons, having been set in march as reinforcements, was an-

ticipated and stopped by the Germans. It was immediately shut up in the little town of Sedan, with the emperor himself who accompanied it. There was nothing left but to surrender. On the second of September, Napoleon III and 100,000 men were prisoners.

On Sunday, September fourth, the news of the disaster reached Paris. At a single blow the Empire collapsed. In the Chamber, the republicans, Jules Favre and Gambetta were still hesitating, fearing the revolutionaries. They were trying to give the fall a regular and legal form, when, as in 1848, the mob invaded the Palais Bourbon and imperiously demanded the Republic. The leaders of the Left followed the people to the Hôtel de Ville, where a government of national defense was proclaimed, while the empress regent was leaving the Tuileries in a carriage.

No one even thought of defending the Napoleonic régime which the sovereign people four months earlier had again approved by 7,358,000 votes.

CHAPTER XXI

THE THIRD REPUBLIC

DEFEAT and invasion had overturned Napoleon III as they had Napoleon I. But in 1870 the situation was much less simple than in 1814-15. The events of September fourth, to a certain extent, resembled rather those of 1830. This point, too little understood, should at once be made clear.

The men who formed the government of the national defense, hastened to stop the rioting and to protect the government from it, just as the liberals had done after the Days of July. From the beginning, the break with the revolutionaries had been complete. But in this bourgeois directorate there were also two distinct tendencies. Some, like Jules Simon, Jules Favre, and Ernest Picard, were moderates and statesmen. Thiers, who still passed as an Orleanist, was already very close to them. All these understood that the war was lost and wished to liquidate it as soon as possible. The other group, at whose head stood Gambetta, was composed of ardent republicans who preserved the Jacobin traditions and wished war to the finish. The new government, exactly like that of Louis-Philippe, was destined to have one party of resistance and one of action. While it was subjected to revolutionary attacks, it was still divided on the question of peace. The Republic became stable and endured, because the insurrection was conquered and because the warlike party had the worst of it. Thiers, with his experience of politics and history, clearly understood this situation and it is thus that he became the veritable founder of the new régime.

The moderates had the illusion for a moment that as in 1814-15 the enemy was fighting the Empire above all else, and that, this once overturned, peace could easily be made. They were soon to perceive that Prussia was making war on France

and not her government. On the fifteenth of September at Ferrières, Jules Favre met with Bismarck, who demanded Alsace. The hope which the moderates had entertained vanished. The acceptable peace, the honorable transaction which the French had flattered themselves they could obtain after the fall of the Napoleonic dynasty, was not possible. Gambetta and the partisans of war to the limit were fortified by this check, and the organization of resistance was begun. From this another consequence was to follow. On one side, Bismarck did not wish to treat with anything but a regular government and that of the national defense was not such an one. It would be necessary to hold elections before it could become legal. On the other hand, Gambetta feared the election which might be both hostile to the Republic and favorable to peace. It was therefore decided to defer them.

Three days after the interview at Ferrières, the German army began the investment of Paris. Separated from the rest of France, full of illusions about the *sortie en masse* by the revolutionaries, the great city was to be besieged for four months. The majority of the government had remained shut up in the capital and had only one delegation outside, established at Tours, and this persisted in calling for the immediate convocation of the electors. This disagreement might end in a break. In order to prevent this and to direct resistance in the provinces, Gambetta left Paris in a balloon. Finding himself alone at Tours with a few colleagues without authority, he formed a veritable dictatorship and improvised armies with the idea of repelling the invader as had been done in 1793. These efforts were in vain. Since France had lost her regular troops the battle was too unequal. There was nothing left to save, but honor, and this was done. We may add that the prolongation of the resistance, by obliging the Germans to continue the campaign when they thought it finished, made them circumspect for a time because it gave them the idea that France was not a country which could be easily crushed.

However, the hopes which the government of the national

defense had conceived crumbled, one after the other. Thiers had been charged with a mission for soliciting the intervention of Europe. Everywhere he received rebuffs. No one then saw the danger of a great Germany, and, at bottom, no one was displeased at the reduction of France. Russia even profited by her disaster to undo what the Crimean war and the Congress of Paris had done. She discovered the possibility of resuming again in the East her policy against Turkey. Thiers came back from his tour of the European capitals, convinced that there was nothing left but to ask for an armistice. Moreover, along with this diplomatic check a serious event occurred. The army of Metz had capitulated on the twenty-seventh of October. Bazaine, who was commanding it, had thought that by keeping his 150,000 men, the last military force which remained to France, he would be the arbiter of the situation and would be able to negotiate peace in the name of the Empire. Bismarck, by a clever system of intrigue, encouraged him in this idea until at last without a stroke he obtained the surrender of the only French army which was still intact. In 1873 Bazaine was condemned for treason.

In Paris, which was surrounded on all sides, the news of the surrender of Metz, the rumors of an armistice and the failure of a few sorties which had been attempted by the besieged people, all tended to shatter the morale and to embitter a population which was beginning to suffer from scarcity of food. The feverish temper favored the revolutionary agitation. Already several manifestations had taken place for the purpose of forcing immediate elections, both municipal and legislative. The word "Commune" was heard again. On the thirty-first of October a veritable insurrection broke out, headed by Blanqui, a veteran of the old riots. The government, a temporary prisoner in the Hôtel de Ville, was released with difficulty. This was the forerunner of troubles that were to come.

The winter of 1870-71 was severe, and this year remained long in the memory of the French as *l'année terrible*, the terrible year. The untrained armies of reënforcement, raised in haste

to deliver Paris, were defeated one after the other. The army of the Loire, after a success at Coulmiers, had to fall back before the German forces which the surrender of Metz had liberated, and was pursued as far as Le Mans. A sortie of the Parisian garrison, which had intended to effect a juncture with the armies in the provinces, was repulsed at Champigny. Turn by turn, Chanzy in the west, Faidherbe in the north, and Bourbaki in the east failed. The occupation of France by the enemy was extended and the siege of Paris became more rigorous. On the fifth of January the bombardment began. However, Gambetta did not wish to give up the struggle, and opposition to his dictatorship increased. The discord in the government which had appeared in the month of September was to become more intense.

On the twenty-eighth of January, Paris having come to the end of her provisions and her resources, and two last sorties having failed at Buzenval, an armistice was signed at Versailles by Jules Favre and Bismarck. The elections had to take place at once in order that the Assembly should decide for peace or war. Ten days earlier, at Versailles in the Gallery of Mirrors, another great event had also taken place. January eighteenth, on the anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom of Prussia, William I had been proclaimed the German Emperor. German unity had been created to the profit of Prussia and the Hohenzollerns through France's defeat, and it was accepted by all of Europe which did not then suspect what a menace a powerful Germany would later be to her.

France herself had only a provisional government and it was not united. Gambetta, having come from Tours to Bordeaux, had disapproved of the armistice. When it had been signed in spite of him, he still wished that the suspension of hostilities should at least serve for preparing to resist to the point of "complete exhaustion." A national republican assembly was therefore necessary, one that should be resolved to reject any mutilation of territory and, if peace could not be obtained otherwise, "capable even of desiring war." Thiers, whose influence was growing daily, opposed Gambetta whom he soon

treated as a "wild man." The moderates disavowed their impetuous colleague and the "dictator" handed in his resignation. The republican party was thus going to the elections divided against itself. Its Left wing, the most extreme, was committing the Republic to the idea of an unending war which the good sense of the country disapproved. The insurrection of the thirty-first of October and the agitation which persisted at Paris also showed that the revolutionary danger was bound up with the protests against the armistice. Finally, in the great disorder which the disaster had caused, universal suffrage, disappointed in the Empire, naturally turned to the men who represented order and peace, the conservative monarchists whom it had already sent to the Assemblies of the Second Republic. It was to them that the elections of February 8, 1871, again gave the majority. Out of six hundred and fifty deputies, the National Assembly counted four hundred legitimists and Orleanists. The country thus found itself back to where it started in 1851 before the conservative Assembly had been dispersed by the coup d'état.

For other reasons the Assembly of 1871 was to be no more successful in restoring the monarchy. Everything paralyzed it. The two branches of the house of Bourbon, separated by the memory of 1830, had not yet become reconciled. Moreover, the royalists, in order to remove from the monarchy the reproach which had pursued the Restoration of having been brought back in the caissons of the foreigner, thought it more politic to leave the responsibility of a peace which would mutilate French territory to a transitional régime. They also perceived certain signs which were forerunners of an insurrection, and did not wish to hamper the beginning of a reign with the necessity of repression. Instead of immediately restoring the monarchy as in 1814, they postponed it for a future date. By common consent, by the "agreement of Bordeaux," the question of what form the future régime should have was temporarily laid on the table. The *de facto* government, which was republican, continued. And it was the Republic which signed the peace. It put an end to the Commune and reëstablished

order. It assumed all the responsibilities and reaped all the profits. And it carried out the program on which the majority of the Right had been elected. Thus the fears which the Republic had inspired—revolution, war without end—vanished. These combined causes were the reasons why the republican régime, at first provisional, became definitive.

The personal prestige and action of Thiers did much to bring this about. In the course of his numerous metamorphoses, Thiers, under the Empire and through opposition to the Empire, had become converted to the traditional foreign policy. He had combated the principle of free nationalities and had foreseen the disastrous consequences. He had seen the war with Prussia approaching but had advised France to avoid it because she was not ready. The memory of these things gave him an unrivaled authority, especially with the middle classes whose opinion in France is always decisive. Restless, adventurous, and blustering until a ripe age, Thiers, as an old man, seemed the incarnation of good sense. On the eighth of February, he had been elected in twenty-six departments. If Thiers became republican the bourgeoisie would follow him, and he already was one although he was sufficiently politic not to raise the question of the form of government. In this latter respect the monarchist majority agreed with him, and named him chief of the executive power. Republican by doctrine, Jules Grévy was elected president of the Assembly. He had said in 1848: "I do not wish the Republic to frighten people." He also had combated Gambetta. The Assembly was pushing to the fore the men most capable of having the Republic accepted by a country which distrusted it.

As the armistice was coming to an end it was necessary to negotiate immediately with Germany. Negotiate is not the correct word. There was nothing left but to submit to the conditions of the enemy. The elections had disarmed the negotiators for France, because they had emphasized a great desire for peace. The Assembly had received the mandate to sign this peace. It was not even possible to profit by the resistance in which Gambetta had persisted, and to menace Bismarck with

a national uprising if his demands were excessive. Neither could France count upon another Congress of Vienna to break up the tête-à-tête of victor and vanquished. England, Russia, and Austria had indeed given Bismarck certain counsels of moderation, but the Congress of London, which had met to consider the affairs of the Orient, had not wished to trouble itself about the Franco-German peace. France remained isolated. The principle of liberated nationalities had given her neither alliances nor friends. She had to cede Alsace and a part of Lorraine, while an indemnity of five billion francs was imposed upon her with the condition that the German army would continue its occupation until the debt was paid. The preliminaries of peace were signed on February 26, 1871, and three days later were ratified by the Assembly. The deputies of the ceded provinces protested that the populations of Alsace and Lorraine regarded as void an agreement which disposed of them without their consent. Only 107 votes were cast against the ratification and these were the votes of the advanced republicans. The radical Extreme Left remained the party of war to the limit, and several of its members, to emphasize their opposition against the signing of peace, handed in their resignations.

Among the conditions which Bismarck had imposed, there was one which was very serious, and it was the only one from which he himself reaped no benefit. He had demanded for the German troops a solemn entry into Paris. Nothing was better fitted to arouse the Parisians after the suffering and exhaustion of the siege and all the trouble which had overwhelmed the life of the great city. The revolutionary explosion which was then preparing was composed of many elements. Although the procession of the German troops was limited to the Champs Elysées and lasted only a few hours, the humiliation which the French endured is to be regarded as one of the causes of the Commune. Almost all the Paris deputies had voted against peace. Paris was for the Republic and for revolutionary war. Paris was hostile to this Assembly of "rurals" whose conservative and pacific sentiments were so different from her own.

The traditions of 1793 and the memories of 1830 and 1848 had not altogether disappeared. The rise of Delescluze, one of the leaders of the Commune, dated from the Days of July. The "patriotic" revolution, strangely enough, associated itself with the socialist Internationale; the old Jacobin conception of the Commune merged with the ideas of a communal federalism, which were far removed from the Republic, one and indivisible. The common basis for this régime was the spirit of rioting in a population which had been armed for the siege and which had kept its arms because the government had neither the desire nor the force to take them away.

The insurrection which had been seen coming began on March eighteenth, when the order was given to take away the cannon from the national guard. But another circumstance had arisen which gave to these events a curious resemblance to those of the Revolution. The Assembly, having met first at Bordeaux, had decided to sit not in the capital, where they were afraid of the agitation, but at Versailles as the States General had done in 1789. Even Bourges and Fontainebleau had been suggested. This mark of distrust was interpreted in Paris as the forerunner of a restoration or a coup d'état. A majority of the peaceable people had already left Paris, which was filled with a mass of idle and armed men to whom were to be added also European adventurers of all sorts. As for the regular troops, it was useless to count upon them to maintain order. They had almost ceased to exist and their morale was poor. Those who had been sent to Montmartre to take away the cannon fraternized with the crowd and abandoned General Lecomte, who was shot a few hours later with a former general of the national guard, Clément Thomas. Then the storm, which had been so long brewing, burst. After a few days of uncertainty and confusion, the insurrection took form through the creation of a communal government which broke with that of Versailles. It was no longer a riot. It was civil war, and more serious than that of the Days of June.

The imagination has been singularly impressed by the Commune. It has left a profound horror. It was, however, the

thing which consolidated the republican régime: first, as we have already said, because the Republic showed itself capable of establishing order; and, finally, because, from the first symptoms of insurrection which had appeared simultaneously in some of the large towns, Thiers, had ceased his attempts to conciliate the Right, being convinced that the Republic was needed to calm the minds of the people. Such was the true meaning of his saying: "The Republic is the régime which divides us least."

In the meantime it was necessary to defeat the insurgents. Thiers, taking his inspiration from the lessons of history and from the experience of the European reaction of 1848, especially from the method employed at Vienna by General Windischgratz, had decided to deliver Paris over to the revolutionists in order to shut them up there and crush them later. This plan succeeded because the insurrection proved abortive in the other large towns, and because France in general desired and supported the repression. This took two months, during which time Paris experienced a new Terror through the execution or massacre of hostages. The Archbishop of Paris was one of these. It was only the twenty-first of May, after a veritable siege, that the Versailles government entered the capital. During another week, the bloody week, the Communists were driven back while they in turn started fires to stop the soldiers. They burned the Tuileries and the Hôtel de Ville, and it seemed as if the revolution would destroy Paris before it would surrender. Fury raged in both camps. The rigor of this suppression had never been equaled. There were summary executions, more than 40,000 arrests, and 17,000 killed. The councils of war pronounced condemnations up to 1875. A few leaders of the Commune were executed and others deported, among whom was Rochefort. Far from injuring the Republic, this severity consolidated it. It gave the impression of a government with a strong hand, of a government of authority which had reversed the rule of 1789, of 1830, and of 1848, and which would not permit Paris to impose a revolution on all France.

This civil war went on under the eyes of, and in contact with,

the Germans, who in virtue of the armistice, were occupying the forts to the north and east of Paris. Bismarck had even offered to come to the aid of the French government, to suppress the insurrection. Thiers had refused this compromising offer. But peace was not yet signed and it was necessary to hasten the return of the prisoners in order to have enough soldiers to conquer Paris. If the Commune were prolonged, Bismarck might find a pretext in an anarchy which would menace the fruits of his victory, and he might become more demanding. As a matter of fact, he did profit by circumstances to aggravate the conditions of the preliminaries of peace. The treaty was signed at Frankfort on the tenth of May, immediately approved by the Assembly, and ratifications were exchanged between France and Germany on the twenty-first, the day on which the army of order entered Paris. The foreign and civil wars were ended at the same time.

Without doubt, there were many ruins to be rebuilt. There were the five billion francs of the treaty of Frankfort to be paid, and these were only a part of what the disaster had cost France. Her loss has been estimated at more than fifteen billions. It remained to liberate the country which was to be occupied until the payment of the indemnity. But the two principal tasks for which the Assembly had been elected were accomplished. Order was reëstablished and peace concluded. The "head of the executive power," which at the beginning was the noncommittal title given to Thiers, was entrusted with this duty. His personal credit had increased. The provincial régime which he represented ceased to terrify, because it took with him a conservative aspect. Thiers had said that the Republic "would either not be or it would be conservative" and he asked that the people should make "a loyal trial" of it. Moreover, at this moment Gambetta began to side with Thiers and recognized that the republican cause was lost if it did not free itself from its revolutionary and warlike traditions. Complementary elections had taken place on July 2, 1871. Gambetta, returning from Spain where he had taken refuge, offered himself as a candidate, and, in his profession of faith, announced that he

had become converted to the wisdom of Thiers. His program became "at once conservative and radical." The "opportunist" party was founded and the Republic with it. There were 111 seats to fill. A hundred republicans, almost all of them moderates, were elected. The current was now carrying the country towards the Republic.

This was the moment when the Right, still in the majority, was ready to restore the monarchy. The reconciliation, the "fusion" of the two branches of the house of Bourbon, was being realized. The grandson of Louis-Philippe withdrew in favor of the grandson of Charles X. It was not only a little late, but there was a misunderstanding between the Count of Chambord and the Assembly which wished to offer him the crown. Like Louis XVIII, the Count of Chambord intended to return on his own terms, without submitting to the conditions imposed by the parliamentarians. The question of the white flag, which he immediately brought forward, was a symbol.

For five years there was the strange situation of a royalist majority which was not in accord with the legitimate prince, the only one that it recognized. Failing to reestablish the monarchy, this majority wished at least to prevent the Republic from becoming permanent. However, this Republic, "without republicans," continued to exist and tended to become more and more liberal. It was swinging toward the Left, the propaganda of Gambetta was bearing fruit. At the partial elections, it was now the conservative republicans, the friends of Thiers, who were beaten by the radicals. The Right was melting from day to day. In 1873, a letter of the Count of Chambord, who persisted in his independent attitude, had again postponed the question of the régime. It began to look as though the Assembly and Henry V would never come to an agreement. At this moment the Right, finding a leader in the Duke of Broglie, tried to hasten matters. In order to defend itself against the progress of radicalism, the conservative union, a coalition of the legitimists, the Orleanists, and the Bonapartists, decided to take over the government itself. It was two years too late.

The operation was conducted by some skillful parliamen-

tarians, one of them, Buffet, who had already been substituted for Grévy, directed the debates of the Assembly and on the appointed day contributed powerfully to the fall of Thiers, May 24, 1873. All was ready and agreed upon. Thiers was replaced that very evening by Marshal MacMahon. Attached by his traditions to the legitimate monarchy, this loyal soldier, having become president of the Republic, was against his will to lay its foundations.

The Duke of Broglie was immediately chosen as the head of the government. Although he was disposed to establish the monarchy, he foresaw the possible check and had arranged for himself a line of retreat. The restoration was conscientiously prepared for. The Count of Paris, the grandson of Louis-Philippe, came to Frohsdorf to seal with the Count of Chambord the reconciliation of the two branches of the house of France. The groups of the majority formed the Commission of Nine which took the necessary measures for the Assembly in virtue of its constituent power, to vote the return to royalty. There was complete agreement among the members of the Right. Success was in sight, and the various republican parties, becoming alarmed, drew together and founded the union of the Left. They were much troubled at the idea of having to resort to insurrection against a legal restoration. There was in the Assembly a majority of at least twenty-six votes in favor of the monarchy. It lacked only the consent of the Count of Chambord. Would he persist in maintaining the white flag? He held aloof, a voluntary exile. The deputy Chesnelong sent to negotiate with him, returned, convinced that the difficulty had been removed. The rumor spread that the grandson of Charles X would accept the tricolor. The monarchy seemed to be achieved, when in an astounding letter dated the twenty-seventh of October, the Count of Chambord laid down his unchangeable reasons: "I wish," said he, "to remain entirely what I am. Restricted to-day, I should be powerless to-morrow." He preferred not to reign rather than to be "the legitimate king of the Revolution," and to keep intact the monarchic principle, rather than to compromise it by an ephemeral restoration.

This letter which spread consternation among the royalists filled the Bonapartists and republicans with joy. We may also imagine that it was a relief to the liberal monarchists whose ideas it would have been difficult to reconcile with those of Henry V who was planning a complete political and social reform for France for which the minds of the people were in no way prepared. In short, the parliamentary monarchy was impossible. Then the combination was brought forward which the Duke of Broglie had been holding in reserve. In order to gain time, to guard against disorder among the conservatives, and to make sure of the future, his solution was to consolidate the powers of the marshal, prolong them, and render them independent of the Assembly: to make the presidency of the Republic a sort of stepping-stone to the monarchy. It would then only be necessary, when the day came—that is to say, when the Count of Chambord had disappeared or abdicated—to put the king in place of Marshal MacMahon, a veritable lieutenant general of the realm. From this expedient was born the presidency of the Republic such as it still exists to-day. “Failing to create the monarchy, we must create what is most like it,” said the Count of Paris. It was voted that the powers of the president should run for seven years. If the Republic was only a régime of expediency, if it was not actually founded, it was very near to being so.

It was only in the first months of 1875 that the Republic may actually be said to have been founded. It was soon apparent that the seven-year term was not sufficient in itself, that it was a “rampart of clay.” It was necessary to organize the public powers, but these could not be organized without defining the political régime of France. There was an executive power; there was also an Assembly whose monarchist majority had called itself Constituent. Its term of office was not to last forever, and it could not adjourn without having given to the country a constitution marked with its own stamp. To vote constitutional laws was inevitable. It was no less so in voting them, to choose between the monarchy and the Republic. The majority hesitated and struggled for a long time. The

republicans hesitated no less to accept a parliamentary constitution elaborated by the conservatives and Orleanists. They had to accept not only a president, but a senate also, which would not be elected by universal suffrage. This was entirely against the democratic doctrine. Gambetta, then, always edging toward opportunism, and separating himself from the radicals, who held out for all or nothing, was taking the Left with him. Thinking that an intensely republican constitution would frighten the country and bring about a reaction, he persuaded the republicans to content themselves with what the monarchists and the moderates offered them. On January 30, 1875, by a majority of one vote, the Wallon amendment, which contained the name Republic and which inscribed it officially in the laws, was adopted. This amendment read that the president of the Republic was to be elected by the two chambers and was eligible for reëlection. Thus the powers of the president, personal in their origin, became impersonal. Marshal MacMahon might have successors. The Republic had come via the seven-year term of the president. It has always borne the mark of the men who founded it, whose ideal system was that of the July Monarchy. But these men were soon to be driven out.

This Republic, still provisional, since the revision of the constitutional laws was there provided for, this Republic, to a certain degree monarchical, was still a republic without republicans. It was understood that it was to be conservative. Thiers had already promised this, and when the majority took the power away from him, it was because they accused him of not keeping his promise and of not resisting the current which was carrying universal suffrage toward the Left. In order that the Republic should become republican it only remained to expel the conservatives with the president they had elected. This is what happened in a few months, through a combination of causes in which both foreign and domestic policy were involved.

Thiers, who had directed everything for two years, had only one item in his foreign policy, namely peace. After having accomplished this, he had fulfilled its conditions. In the first

place, it was necessary to deliver France from the German occupation. At any moment, and on the slightest pretext, Bismarck might make new demands. France would not be tranquil before the last German soldier had crossed the new frontier. To bring that about the five billions must be paid as soon as possible. The French like to meet their engagements. Nothing was refused to liberate the territory. Confidence in France's recovery was so great, both within and without, that a loan for three billions was oversubscribed fourteen times. Thus it was possible to pay in advance. In the month of March, 1873, a Franco-German convention had fixed the last payment for the fifth of the following September. In this way the occupation would come to an end before the date prescribed by the treaty and this actually happened. But, in the interval, Thiers had fallen and his fall had caused discontent and anxiety at Berlin. Bismarck knew that in his later years he had become as pacific as he had been warlike in his youth and middle age. As a matter of fact, Thiers, who in 1866 had prophesied the dangers of German unity, now saw France defeated, weakened, isolated, and he thought it was best to come to terms with the powerful conqueror. He had hastened to rebuild a military force because he knew that France could not live without one, but nothing was further from his mind than the idea of revenge. Bismarck understood this. In his eyes, Thiers was the guaranty of the peace that he had signed. When Thiers had been put out of the government, the German chancellor showed that he feared both the government of the conservatives, capable of making monarchic and Catholic alliances in Europe, and the government of the ardent republicans, those who, with Gambetta, had desired war to the last ditch and who had voted against the treaty of Frankfort. Moreover, at no moment had Bismarck ceased to distrust France and Europe generally. It had immediately appeared that the new German Empire, founded by force, could count only upon force to maintain itself. It was to impose upon all its neighbors the principle of the armed nation and the armed peace, which was big with another war, more terrible than any that the world had ever

known. This powerful Germany, formed through the errors and the defeat of France and the benevolent neutrality of Europe, was preparing the somber future which farsighted men of the nineteenth century had predicted.

In order to get possession more quickly of the balance of the five billions, Bismarck had accepted the agreement of March 15, 1873. He had hardly evacuated the last French village before he regretted it. Several times already, during the presidency of Thiers, he had threatened to keep Belfort. Once paid, he found that France was recovering too quickly and it would perhaps be better to "have broken her back." However, the foreign policy of France after Thiers as well as under his guidance, remained cautious. Duke Decazes, minister of foreign affairs in the Broglie cabinet, tried to avoid conflicts. Although the majority of the National Assembly was Catholic, the government refused to intervene in Italy in favor of the temporal power of the Pope. However, nothing could restrain Bismarck from taking an aggressive attitude and multiplying provocations. In the month of May, 1875, alleging that the French military reorganization was directed against Germany, he announced his design of "settling it with France." This time, first Russia, and then England gave Berlin to understand that they would not permit an aggression. The "old Europe has waked up," said Duke Decazes, who had been able to bring about these diplomatic interventions. It is none the less true that France had been or had seemed to be within a hair's breadth of war at the time when the republican campaign was growing. It received from it redoubled impetus. Among the masses, particularly the rural masses, the accusations brought against the conservative government of endangering the peace produced an immense effect. The republican party, led by Gambetta, put aside its warlike traditions as Thiers, after 1871, had advised. It turned the accusation of being the war party against the conservatives. And yet, the warning of 1875 was to be followed by many others, from the Schnæbelé affair up to 1914. It will not be long before the country will begin to see that Germany's ill will was directed against France herself and

not against her government; just as she had shown in 1870 that it was not the Empire that she was attacking.

In any case, the conservatives found themselves in a poor position for retaining power. They had now founded the Republic and the Republic must needs be republican. From that time on, it was a regular régime, and it profited by that respect for the established order of things which had formerly sustained the Empire. In trying to struggle against the current which was carrying the Republic towards the Left, the conservatives ended by ruining their own cause before the electoral body because it was they who seemed to be seeking a revolution. They had believed in their provisional combination which contemplated a revision in 1880 at the end of the seven-year term. They perceived that for the great mass of the French they had created at their own expense something that was not to be provisional but permanent.

The Assembly came to an end after the Senate entered upon its functions. The members of the latter body were then in part irremovable and named by the Assembly itself. The Senate thus had a conservative majority. But on February 20, 1876, the legislative elections after an ardent campaign by Gambetta against clericalism and against the war, were a disaster for the Right. The president of the Council, Buffet, was himself defeated, and the Left now became preponderant in the new Chamber. Another year passed in which Marshal MacMahon attempted to bar the way to Gambetta and to radicalism through moderate ministries. Finally, on May 16, 1877, availing himself of the powers given him by the Constitution, the Marshal dismissed his prime minister, Jules Simon. It was a question of saving the "moral order," of maintaining the spirit of the seven-year idea, and of giving the government back again to the conservatives. The Duke of Broglie was recalled to power and the Chambers were adjourned. The union of the parties of the Left from Thiers to the socialist, Louis Blanc, was immediately formed, and its manifesto to the country was signed by 363 deputies. A month later, after a stormy session in which the 363 defied the government, the marshal, again

availing himself of his constitutional rights, pronounced a dissolution of the Chamber with the assent of the Senate.

From that day, dissolution of the Chamber has been considered a reactionary measure. Although inscribed in the constitutional laws, no president has since had recourse to it. It has taken the aspect of a coup d'état. The sixteenth of May, however, was only a legal coup d'état, parliamentary, a false coup d'état. It was, above all things, a mistake. The marshal and the Duke of Broglie did not confront France with a *fait accompli*. They appealed from electors to electors. They called upon the people within eighteen months to admit that they had been wrong. The measure was ill advised and foredoomed to failure. The next thing in order was a union of the parties of the Right. Thereupon the union of the Left went them one better. It was now the Left which became the party to speak the language of conservatism. "They wish," said Gambetta, "to launch France, the country of peace, of order and frugality, into dynastic and warlike adventures." And these words found an echo in the hearts of the rural people. As Jules Grévy had desired, the Republic was no longer terrifying, and since the Commune, the revolution had been bled white. It was therefore the parties of the Right which were accused of compromising the peace of the country. The rôles were exactly reversed. At the elections of October 14, 1877, all the efforts of the marshal, of the Duke of Broglie and of Fourtou, the minister of the interior, could not succeed in returning more than 200 of their friends against 300 of the Left. The battle was indeed lost. Jean-Jacques Wiess had said: a republic of conservatives is "nonsense." The Republic was to pass into the hands of republicans.

This very experience tended to make it more moderate. The elections had shown that in the country as a whole, Right and Left were pretty well balanced in votes and that a slight displacement would suffice to change the majority. Thus, although the attempt of May sixteenth failed, it had lasting effects. On the one hand, until our own time, it has intimidated the followers of Marshal MacMahon and has pre-

vented them from making use of their constitutional powers. On the other, it has restrained the republicans by the fear that a party of order might form in turn against them. And finally, the pains that they had taken to turn against the Right, the accusation of being the war party, had led them into a certain understanding with Germany. Thiers, who died during these events, was in favor of it. Gambetta also was tempted in his turn by the advances of Bismarck who was at that moment fighting the German Catholics and feared their alliance with the French Catholics. Traces of these ideas were to persist. We shall henceforth find the republican party men who will have a leaning toward an entente with Germany and from that fact important consequences will arise.

The check of May sixteenth did not at first change things as much as one would have believed. There were ministries formed from the Left Center. Marshal MacMahon, whom Gambetta had summoned to submit or resign, remained in the presidency and did not resign until the month of January, 1879, when he did so in order not to have to sign the dismissal of several generals. Jules Grévy was elected in his place, in opposition to Gambetta and the radicals. With him was installed the great republican bourgeoisie, the people who represented law and business. His first declaration was to announce "a liberal and truly conservative policy." Thus, since the Republic had defeated and excluded the conservatives, it applied itself to reassuring the special interests. Neither reaction nor revolution was its formula. However, it already had divisions, divisions between men, tendencies, and doctrines. To the moderates of the Left Center, the opportunists of Gambetta's group, to the radical heirs of the Jacobins of whom Clemenceau became the head, were soon added the socialists. Bitter contests began and ministry after ministry fell in rapid succession. It became apparent then that anticlericalism cemented the various groups of the Left. This was manifested as early as 1880 by the decrees rendered against the religious organizations, and the Jesuits were the first to be expelled. This question was for a long time to occupy the attention of the régime and sometimes

it was to be used as a counter diversion, as under Louis XV when the ministers were in conflict with the old parliament. But, as in the eighteenth century also, anticlericalism, which was at first merely political, soon turned into a war against Catholicism and the religious idea.

From the early beginnings of this parliamentary Republic, and in the midst of the great confusion, two traits begin to stand out clearly. Jules Ferry came to power for the first time. He undertook the Tunis expedition with the authority which Bismarck had given France in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, with the idea that it would be a good thing for Germany to allow France to expend her energy as far as possible from Europe. A serious controversy among Frenchmen themselves was to arise from the Tunis affair and to recur with regard to Egypt and Tonkin. Did not colonial expeditions run the risk of dissipating the French strength, distracting public attention from her security on the continent and from the lost provinces? There lay the germ of future quarrels. There was another indication in the fact that at the elections of 1881 the republicans won another victory. But the Extreme Left was advancing. Gambetta, but lately the idol of Paris, was barely elected at Belleville; opportunism was injuring his popularity. It was to him, nevertheless, that it was necessary to entrust the ministry. President Grévy resigned himself to it although he retained a secret hostility, while that of the old radicals, enemies of opportunism, burst forth. Fierce accusations were launched against Gambetta: he was for war, he aspired to the dictatorship. At the end of three months, his ministry, which was to have been a "great ministry," was overturned. His conception of a national "Athenian" Republic, in which all parties would be reconciled, was also overthrown. Gambetta died in the following year.

We must give up trying to discern anything in the midst of the conflicts which followed, if we do not hold to the two principles which dominated them and which may be summed up in the following manner. On one hand, there was a conflict between those who accepted the defeat of 1870 and those who did

not abandon the hope of wiping out its effects; between those who publicly or in their secret thoughts believed with Thiers that there was nothing more for France to do but to come to an understanding with an all-powerful Germany and content herself in Europe with a rôle of second order (a misfortune which the colonial expansion was to remedy), and those who, refusing to accept the accomplished fact, thought that the policy of France should be continental, and that the danger of invasion, revealed first in 1875, still existed, and that to the German Empire, fortified by its alliances with Austria and Italy, the Triple Alliance, it was necessary to oppose a strong army and alliances if possible. On the other hand, the nature of things was ever leading a fraction of the republicans back to ideas of moderation, was inclining them to become reconciled with their adversaries of the Right, and to conciliate the conservative instincts of the country, while the advanced republicans rejected these compromises. The agitations of the street, the fall of ministries, the elections, all the internal history of the Third Republic has been influenced by these currents which were to dominate it in turns.

The Tonkin expedition following that of Tunis, was the origin of a long, serious situation. This new colonial enterprise in which Jules Ferry, a second time prime minister, had engaged, was unpopular. It was fought by the radicals with whom the Jacobin tradition of patriotism still persisted. Clemenceau, their leader, had voted against the treaty of Frankfort. At the same time, they attacked the constitution of 1875, accused it of having an Orleanist character and beginnings, and demanded its revision. They took the offensive in March, 1885, when the news of the disaster of Langson arrived. Jules Ferry, whom Clemenceau had already accused of "compromising the interests of France and the Republic," was overthrown. Tumultuous scenes took place in Paris against Ferry, "The Tonkinese," whose policy, according to another saying of Clemenceau, made of France "the tool of Germany." A spirit of opposition of a new kind was becoming apparent in Paris and was preparing the way for the influence of Boulangism. At the same time,

the unrest and anxiety were spreading to the provinces. At the elections of 1885, for which the *scrutin de liste* had been reëstablished, two hundred deputies of the Right were elected.¹

As on May sixteenth, a union of the Left formed against the union of the Right, but its effect was to make the government dependent upon the radicals. It was they who designated General Boulanger for the ministry of war. This republican militarist, who occupied himself with the reorganization of the army and who "revived the pompon of the soldier" quickly became popular with the Parisian population, the majority of which was radical and patriotic. He was acclaimed at the review of July 14, 1886, to such a degree as to give alarm to the republicans of the government. He was also in bad odor with the Right for having stricken the names of the princes of Orléans from the army lists at the time when the heads of families who had reigned over France had been driven into exile. At the same time, Bismarck, who was working unceasingly to increase the offensive power of Germany, used as a pretext the popularity of General Boulanger to obtain some military appropriations from the Reichstag. It aroused some diplomatic incidents, the most serious of which was the Schnaebelé affair which Jules Ferry managed with prudence and which again brought France within a hair's breadth of war. Boulanger then appeared to the men of the Left Center as a danger both within and without. But they could not rid themselves of him without breaking with the radicals and drawing closer to the Right, whose neutrality was necessary to them to preserve a majority.

By their campaign against France's colonial policy, in which they accused her of being dominated by Germany, by their opposition to the "opportunist" combinations, as well as to the alliance of the moderates with reaction, and by their attacks against the "Orleanist" Constitution of 1875, the radicals had themselves created the "Boulangist" state of mind which took

¹ In the *scrutin de liste* the elector voted for the general ticket, that is, for all the deputies to be elected by the voter's *département*; in the *scrutin d'arrondissement* the voter cast his ballot only for the one deputy who represented a smaller electoral district.

hold upon Paris and soon dominated it. The government, in order to rid itself of Boulanger, had named him commander of an army corps at Clermont; the Parisian mob wished to retain him. Although ineligible, his name had already been proposed at a partial election and he had received nearly 40,000 votes. He had become the leader of an opposition, when the radicals disavowed him, perceiving that they had themselves created a leader for the malcontents, an aspirant for personal power and the dictatorship, a danger for the Republic. However, the radicals, although they rallied the union of the Left, were not followed by all of their former supporters. Rochefort, the former adversary of the Empire, the old Communist, the popular radical journalist whose influence was strong in Paris, kept the advanced elements of the Left in the party of the general. Scandals, a trafficking in decorations, in which Wilson, the son-in-law of the president of the Republic, was compromised, gave new impetus to the Boulangist and anti-parliamentary movement. In December, 1887, the Chamber, seeing the danger, obliged Jules Ferry to resign and the Congress elected Sadi Carnot, a descendant of the Carnot of the Convention, to take his place. This sort of purging of the republican personnel did not terminate "Boulangism." The general, no longer in active service, had become eligible and two departments immediately returned him to the Chamber. The situation was reversed. From then on the monarchists together with the dissenting radicals voted for him. On January 27, 1889, Paris elected him in her turn by an enormous majority and with an extraordinary enthusiasm. By the admission of the government itself, on that day Boulanger would only have had to say the word to enter the Elysée and take possession of the government. He drew back before a coup d'état, trusting in the results of the general elections.

Saved by this hesitation, the republican party defended itself vigorously. The union of the parties of the Left was formed again as on May sixteenth. Actions against the most ardent of the General's partisans, Déroulède and the League of Patriots, were ordered. Boulanger, himself, brought before the Supreme

Court, took refuge in Brussels, as did Rochefort also. The *scrutin d'arrondissement*, unadapted to plebiscites, was reëstablished. But particularly the rural masses, always pacific, had remained strangers to this party movement of Paris and the large towns. It was sufficient, in order to turn them away from Boulangism, to tell them that it would bring war. At the elections of 1889, in all of France, hardly forty partisans of the general were elected.

The movement came to an end but it had lasting consequences. First, it discredited the idea of revision, and the attacks of the radicals against the Constitution of 1875 became less violent and less frequent. France did not go to the length of a direct and pure democracy, and the Constitution which the conservatives of the National Assembly had elaborated endured. Finally, the most clear-sighted men of the republican party understood the lesson of Boulangism. If on the evening of January 27, 1889, the parliamentary Republic almost perished, the fault went back to Jules Ferry and the policy of the effacement of France in Europe. Germany was continually growing and arming more and more; could France ignore this danger? On this point, the warning of the national instinct, as it manifested itself in its antagonism to Ferry and in Boulangism was so strong, that new thoughts were aroused in the government. Monsieur de Freycinet, who then became prime minister, bears witness to this in his memoirs: "The security of a great people," said he, "ought not to rest upon the good will of others; it ought to reside in the people itself and its own means, in the precautions which it is able to take in the way of armaments and alliances." The Russian alliance, sketched out in 1875 by the Duke Decazes and discussed more than once in the *entourage* of Gambetta, was called for by Boulangism. In 1890 the government of the French Republic began to draw closer to Russia. The following year the visit of a French squadron at Kronstadt prepared for the Franco-Russian alliance, a counterpart to the Triple Alliance. It was a "new situation," as Monsieur de Freycinet declared some weeks later. It was new indeed. Between the two ideas which

from the beginning her founders had entertained, the Republic had chosen and she had not voted for an entente with the German Empire.

The alliance with Russia rendered the republican government the service of disarming the patriot opposition, or, as they were beginning to call it, the nationalist opposition. To the country in general, it was presented as it had been conceived: a guaranty of peace through the balance of forces. The Republic was singularly strengthened by it. At this juncture some of the monarchists left their party and helped to form a republican Right. Again the régime was becoming conservative. A scandal of parliamentary corruption in which some of the radicals were involved aided this movement still more. After the debates, investigations, and prosecutions to which the Panama affair gave rise, some of the leaders of the Left, with Clemenceau and Floquet, left the political stage. There followed several years of moderate government, so moderate that after the assassination of Sadi Carnot by an anarchist in 1894, the president elected was Casimir-Perier, grandson of the minister of "resistance" under Louis-Philippe, who was a representative of the *haute bourgeoisie*. During this time a minister in charge of religion, Spuller, a former companion of Gambetta, was also talking of a "new spirit of tolerance, of good sense, of justice in religious questions." Casimir-Perier, violently attacked by the socialists, left after a few months complaining that "the presidency of the Republic was deprived of means of action and of control." He was followed by Félix Faure, representing a more recent but equally moderate bourgeoisie.

The republican conservatives like Charles Dupuy and Méline governed with a single brief interruption for almost five years. In spite of the attacks of the radicals and the socialists, the moderates, supported by the Right, seemed solidly installed in the government. It took two violent crises, one within and one without, to dislodge them.

The Dreyfus affair, through which the radicals, allied this time with the socialists, came again into power, and through

which Clemenceau returned to public life, was the equivalent of a veritable revolution. Around the case of this Jewish officer, condemned for treason in 1894 by a court-martial and whose innocence was passionately affirmed in 1897, two camps formed. His name became a symbol. France was divided into Dreyfusites and anti-Dreyfusites. This conflict of doctrines, sentiments, and tendencies, in which the conservative and revolutionary spirits struggled for supremacy, repeated in an attenuated and reduced form the great crises of the fourteenth century, of the wars of religion, of the Fronde, and of 1789, when, as in the Dreyfus affair, the "intellectuals" took part. Philosophy and literature again entered the battle. During three years the revision of the Dreyfus affair governed the policy of France and ended by determining its course. The polemics which it drew forth had defined the positions. Those against Dreyfus were classed with the Right; those who believed in his innocence, with the Left. The conflict became most acute in 1899 when the president, Félix Faure, suddenly died. He was replaced by Emile Loubet, whom Paris, nationalist for the most part, did not receive cordially. To add to the intensity of public feeling, Déroulède and the League of Patriots had attempted, on the very day of the funeral, a coup d'état which failed. As in the time of General Boulanger, and the Sixteenth of May, republican resistance through the union of the parties of the Left was also restored.

Only this union, baptized by Clemenceau as "The Bloc," was this time to go very far to the Left. The socialists had become the extreme wing of the republican party. The Republic could not be defended without them and it was necessary to give them a place in the government. When Waldeck-Rousseau organized his ministry of republican defense in June, 1899, he called to it Alexander Millerand, a deputy of the Extreme Left, a defender of the collectivist theories. This choice caused much scandal and anxiety among the French bourgeoisie. However, what had already happened in the case of some of the radical leaders, happened to the socialists. The leaders became more moderate and more and more assimilated by their con-

servative surroundings. It was not, therefore, the concessions to them personally which were most serious, but the concessions to their ideas. It was no longer only a question of anticlericalism, a program common to most republicans of conviction. With the Dreyfus affair, antimilitarism had appeared and had been one of the most active elements in the trial. Little by little, military obligations had been made very nearly equal for everybody, the young intellectual entered the barracks with the young peasant and the disgust at this servitude had favored the campaigns of ideas and of the press against the army and its chiefs. The republican party, victorious through Waldeck-Rousseau and through the High Court which judged the nationalists and the royalists during the revision of the Dreyfus case, and which in 1871 had been the party of ardent and even exalted patriotism, was at least inclined, under the influence of the internationalist Extreme Left, to neglect the national defense.

These events which gave preponderance to the advanced parties were, moreover, accompanied by another crisis, this time an external one, whose consequences were to bring France face to face with Germany again. The moderates, who had governed without interruption since the Franco-Russian understanding, had adopted in their turn a colonial policy, and the alliance of France with Russia had produced an unforeseen result. It had brought her nearer to Germany. Between St. Petersburg and Berlin good relations existed; William II, who had been reigning since 1888, had much influence with the young Emperor Nicholas II who had succeeded his father, Alexander III, in 1894. The year after his accession, France, in accord with Russia, had agreed to send war vessels to the opening of the Kiel Canal. This canal permitted the German fleet to pass freely from the Baltic to the North Sea and had been paid for out of the French billions of 1871. Behind the Franco-Russian alliance a three-power combination was foreshadowed at which the English government was to take umbrage because it had been conceived in view of the colonial expansion of the great powers of the continent. William II was giving Germany a fleet and was about to pronounce those astounding

words, "Our future is on the water." Russia was expanding in the Far East where she was soon to become involved with Japan in a disastrous conflict. As for France, it was especially in Africa that she was developing her power. In 1882, under the influence of Clemenceau and the radical party, the French government had lost interest in Egypt which England had occupied by virtue of a provisional title. Once there, however, she did not leave and it was from thence that she was preparing to dominate all eastern Africa from Cairo to the Cape. In November, 1898, the French Marchand mission, which started from the Congo to reach the upper Nile, had established itself at Fashoda. With this pledge in its hands, the French government thought itself strong enough to raise again the Egyptian question when England summoned it under a threat of war, to evacuate the place without delay. Thus, her colonial policy threatened France with another danger. It was necessary to choose between Germany and England.

Waldeck-Rousseau's minister of foreign affairs, Théophile Delcassé, was of radical origin. He kept the former tradition of the party, opposed to distant expeditions and to an alliance with the victors of 1870. He liquidated the Fashoda affair and France became reconciled with the British government. This reconciliation associated her with the interests of England and although it gave her a guaranty against Germany it was leading her into the danger of a continental war. Such was the situation immediately after the agitations of the Dreyfus case when the government of republican defense, dependent upon the Extreme Left, yielded to the anticlerical and anti-military demagoguery. Waldeck-Rousseau was succeeded in 1902 by Emile Combes who, supported by a new majority of radical-socialists and socialists as a result of the recent elections, passed from the attitude of republican defense to the offensive. Waldeck had prosecuted the congregations but not the Church. Combes went to the limit of anticlericalism, even to breaking off relations with the Holy See and to the separation of Church and State. This had long been a part of the program of the advanced republicans but had always been deferred. This re-

ligious war troubled and divided the country by reviving persecution for opinions and by creating among the French who did not share the ideas of the government, a category of suspects who were shut out of state offices and looked upon with disfavor by the authorities. Politics were even introduced into the army itself, which until then had held aloof from civil discord. A campaign of reporting officers who attended mass was organized. At the same time the most demagogic propaganda was spreading freely, even that which attacked the idea of the fatherland. The government and all of the officers were in the hands of a small number of men and of their protégés, while Emile Combes, a disinterested fanatic, sanctioned these abuses and disorders. In the majority itself a few republicans began to be anxious. Strangely enough it was Alexander Millerand who conducted the campaign against a régime which he himself called "abject." A socialist was the first to announce a return to moderation.

A still more remarkable thing was that during this period when the national idea was in eclipse Théophile Delcassé, isolated in the ministry of foreign affairs and working without any control, was preparing the very combination from which the alliances of 1914 were to arise. In 1902 he had assured himself of the neutrality of Italy in the case of a war provoked by Germany. In April, 1904, in agreement with Edward VII, all the colonial difficulties between France and England had been settled. France was to abandon Egypt to England and was to have the right to complete her empire in northern Africa through the protectorate of Morocco. Six months later Combes was overturned. Rouvier, an opportunist, replaced him. He continued the anticlerical policy with a little less severity but with the same indifference to foreign problems. At this moment, Germany, encouraged by the defeat which Japan had just inflicted on the Russians in Manchuria, alleged that the Franco-English agreement had injured her interests, and called for an international congress on the question of Morocco. William II made a threatening speech after he had landed at Tangiers. Morocco was only the pretext for intimidating and

coercing France. Delcassé, who favored resisting these pretensions, was disavowed by his colleagues and had to resign on June 6, 1905. Thus, within seven years of Fashoda, the danger of war again appeared, this time from the German side. Another nine years, and the war was to come. The diplomatic precautions which France was taking against it were interpreted by the Germans as a reason for complaining that they were encircled and therefore a reason for increasing their armies. At the Conference of Algésiras, which decided the Moroccan affair in favor of France, almost all the powers were leagued against the Germans; they remained isolated with Austria. From that time, Germany was to refuse all conferences and when the great day had arrived would make war inevitable. However, humiliating as it had been, the recoil of 1905 and the sacrifice of Delcassé had not been useless. At that moment, Russia, the ally of France, was powerless. France herself was weakened by long discord. The army was not ready and morale was not good. The postponement obtained perhaps saved her from complete disaster.

Henceforth, up to the day of mobilization, France lived under the threat of Germany. The system of the armed peace, that is to say, competition in armaments, which had become more and more fierce ever since the founding of German unity, was leading Europe towards catastrophe. Germany, with an excessive population and large industries, was forced to seek outlets and territory. This desire acted as much upon the socialist masses as upon the general staffs. In order to avoid war it was not sufficient that France should accept the loss of Alsace-Lorraine as an accomplished fact, and that she should limit her military efforts to the maintaining of a merely defensive army. That she was doing this was indicated by the fact that the time of service had been reduced to two years. The illusion of the French democracy was that it would preserve peace because it was itself pacific. Nevertheless, it became impossible to ignore the extent of the danger. The parties of the Left, who had been victorious in all the elections and who had eliminated in turn the members of the former Right as well as the old Left

Center itself, were split by a new division. The Bloc was divided both on the internal and the external policy. Socialism had become bold and its influence on parliament was out of proportion to its real strength in the country. It aroused continual agitation among the workmen as well as the government employees. In foreign affairs, through its adhesion to the Internationale, and through its cosmopolitan doctrines, it leaned towards an entente with Germany; an impossible entente since every concession made by France was followed by new demands by the government at Berlin. On this ground, however, the socialists found some support among those who, without distinction of origin, thought, as Thiers had thought at the time of the alarm in 1875, that it was necessary to come to an agreement with Germany, and, instead of organizing alliances, to give her a pledge of the pacific sentiment of France. Joseph Caillaux, who was to incarnate this idea at the head of the radical-socialist party, was the son of a conservative of the Sixteenth of May. It was the Jacobin school with Clemenceau, in the republican party, who opposed this tendency and who in 1908 first entered into conflict with Jaurès, the leader of the Extreme Left. Thus, under the appearance of unity, while the immense majority in parliament were proclaiming that there were no true republicans except the republicans of the Left, there was a schism. While the most extreme doctrines were being professed officially, a new moderate party was forming in secret. We even see a former socialist, Aristide Briand, who had become prime minister, stopping the most dangerous strikes, such as that of the railroad, and after having realized the separation of Church and State, talking of "Pacification," as Spuller in 1894 had talked of the "New Spirit."

Germany, in the meantime, daily more determined upon war, did not cease to seek a quarrel with France. The object was always Morocco where France was extending her protectorate. In 1908 there was a new alarm in connection with an incident which had arisen at Casablanca, and which the Clemenceau ministry settled through arbitration. In 1911 there was a recurrence of the same thing; a German ship took up its position

before Agadir of the southern Moroccan coast, and the government of Berlin after this manifestation of force, signified its desire to obtain a "compensation." Joseph Caillaux, who then directed the government, came to terms. The compensation was accorded to Germany from the French possessions in the Congo. For Germany it was not only a diplomatic success but a real advantage. The German press turned these acquisitions to ridicule and complained that the great German Empire had been tricked.

Two lessons were learned from the Agadir episode. Germany found out that Morocco was a poor *casus belli* because France, threatened, kept her alliance with Russia and her entente with England, while the Germans would not even be followed by Austria on such a pretext as Morocco. The other lesson was for France; her concessions only served to convince Germany of the weakness of the French, and made her more bellicose. Both lessons bore fruit. Germany ceased to interest herself in Morocco and directed her attention to affairs in the east where the Turkish revolutions of 1908 and the accession of the Young Nationalist Liberals to positions of power in old Turkey had put in motion in the Balkans and along the Danube the new nationalities whose claims were threatening the composite Empire of Austria Hungary. In France the Agadir incident brought the most nationalistic of the men of the Left to power. Raymond Poincaré, a republican from Lorraine, who did not accept the formula of Thiers, the policy of "forgetting," whence had risen the party who favored an alliance with Germany, became prime minister in January, 1912. Almost always on the margin of political life there had been in literature, in the press, and in the intellectual world generally a continuous movement against the neglect of the national ideal. The name of Maurice Barrès will ever remain attached to this movement. The nationalist doctrine, affirmed and conquered during the Dreyfus case, served now as a sort of revival, just as in the time of General Boulanger it had led to the Russian alliance. Similarly, in the midst of the electoral triumphs of the Republic which was no longer contested in the political as-

semblies, the criticism of the democracy by Charles Maurras and his school, produced an antithesis which led the broader minded of the republicans to recognize the utility of an opposing doctrine. This had formerly been proclaimed by Gambetta but had not existed for a long time. Following these discussions, Marcel Sembat, a deputy of the Extreme Left, wrote a curious pamphlet whose name would not have been thought of fifteen years earlier, "Make a king, but if you cannot, make peace." At the same time the essential principle of democracy, universal suffrage, was becoming strangely altered, and a persistent campaign for proportional representation, that is to say, for the right of minorities, was gaining adherents and was going to change the physiognomy of political life which up to that time had been founded upon the rigid majority system.

The two years which preceded the war were filled with signs which escaped the crowd, but in which observers found warnings. In 1912, in the first Balkan war, the Turks were conquered by a coalition of Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians. The following year the members of this coalition were fighting over the spoils and the Bulgarians were punished for their aggression. As a result, Bulgaria and Turkey were to have an account to settle and were to become allies of Germany. These events were followed with interest by Russia. They alarmed the two German powers by menacing Austria and gave them the desire to checkmate the Slavs. The opportunity which Germany was looking for began to take form, and a troubled atmosphere overspread Europe. In January, 1913, Raymond Poincaré had been elected president of the Republic in place of Armand Fallières, and under his influence France became vigilant. Louis Barthou, a former moderate, called by Poincaré to the ministry, was successful in getting the Chambers to accept a return to the three-year military service necessary for reënforsing the army of the first line. Both publicly and in secret symptoms and information multiplied. They showed that Germany was marching towards war; the imperial government had just levied an extraordinary tax of one billion in order to increase its material and effectives. In the meantime in France

the unpopular three-year law brought the radical socialists back to power and they endeavored to reconstitute the Left Bloc against the moderates. On the eve of the war, in the general depression spread by a threat, which one felt but could not define, the conflict of the two tendencies of the republican party became more acute. Joseph Caillaux, again prime minister, attacked and was attacked. Aristide Briand denounced this "plutocratic demagogue." During this campaign, Madame Caillaux shot and killed Gaston Calmette, editor of the *Figaro*, and this murder recalled that of Victor Noir, a few months before the War of 1870. It was the crime which precedes and announces the greater crimes. That at Sarajevo, which was to serve as pretext for the war, followed soon after. Signs of blood were everywhere.

When on June 28, 1914, the archduke, heir to the throne of Austria Hungary, was assassinated with his wife in the little village of Sarajevo, by some Slav conspirators, the mass of the French people were very far from believing that there would be war. In the April elections, the new Bloc of the Left had carried the day. A Ribot ministry which favored the three-year law, had been overturned on the very day that it had presented itself before the Chamber, and it was to a recently converted socialist, René Viviani, that President Poincaré had to turn in order to attempt to maintain the military organization which had just been reconstituted. The French democracy, indifferent to distant events, lived in such quietude that it hardly noticed the ultimatum of Austria to Serbia. The masses did not see the consequences of this any more than they had of the "incident" of Sarajevo. At bottom they believed war was impossible, the phenomenon of another age which progress had abolished. It imagined that even if William II and the Prussian officers wanted it, the German people would not follow them. Ten days later, the most terrible war of modern times broke upon them.

CHAPTER XXII

WAR AND PEACE—WORKS AND DAYS

IF, in the years which preceded 1914, anything seemed to guarantee peace, it was that the vanquished of 1871 never thought of taking their revenge. Moreover, Germany was so strong that no one thought of attacking her. Ordinarily, the victor has no desire to put his victory in question, but Germany wanted war. She had a surplus of men; as in the early days of her history, she was driven to invade her neighbors. In the meantime, in order that she should not have to fight all Europe alone, and in order that she should keep at least Austria as ally, it was necessary that war should come on some pretext which touched Austria's rather than Germany's interests. This was just the opportunity which the conflict between Austria and Serbia offered Germany. Thus it was from the distant regions of Europe, as in the seventeenth century after White Mountain, and in the nineteenth, after Sadowa, that war came to seek out the French.

France so little suspected what was going to happen that President Poincaré and his prime minister, Viviani, were paying a ceremonial visit to the Czar when the Austrian ultimatum was drawn up in agreement with Germany, in such terms that no one thought that Serbia would accept them. This ultimatum was sent to Belgrade on July twenty-third, at the moment when Poincaré and Viviani were leaving St. Petersburg. At Paris, the German ambassador immediately warned France that any intervention whatsoever in this affair would have "incalculable" consequences. France and the friendly powers intervened only to advise Serbia to yield; and the Serbian response was the acceptance of every point save one which was to

be left to arbitration. But Austria was resolved to crush Serbia and put an end to the Slavic peril which threatened to split up the empire. Germany was determined to have war. Both powers refused the European conference which England proposed. The Hague Tribunal was likewise declined. The international institutions through which the world for twenty years had hoped to avert the peril which was approaching, did not count for anything. Two days after the sending of the ultimatum Austria declared war on Serbia. Within the space of a week the mechanism of the alliance was brought into play and one part of Europe threw itself at the other. All that had been repressed with difficulty since 1871 exploded at once. Everything served to increase the massacre instead of stopping it. The military forces which had accumulated through the system of the armed peace, all the wealth and resources created by long years of work and civilization, were like fuel to the flames. The equilibrium of the diplomatic systems, the interdependence of interests and the very immensity of the catastrophe which such a shock would produce, everything that the world had thought was calculated to prevent the great conflict, proved unavailing. The very obstacles fed it. Neither democracy nor international socialism offered any hindrance. The democratic war of people against people was only "more terrible," as Mirabeau had formerly predicted, and no one could stop it by the means which had limited the wars of former times.

As early as July fifteenth, Germany's determination had made turning back impossible for everybody. The mobilization of some led to that of others. Austria having mobilized all her forces, Russia mobilized hers in turn. In this legitimate measure of precaution Germany found the pretext that she was seeking. On August first she declared war against Russia and summoned France to announce her intentions. As the French government contented itself by replying that France would do what her interests demanded, the German government pretended that France had attacked her. The government of the Republic could not escape its destiny and there was something tragic in the efforts of the last hour. President Poincaré had written in

vain to King George to warn him that a word from England pronounced in time could still turn Germany aside. England had a parliament, and liberal and pacifist ministers, and would not intervene until the moment when Belgium was invaded. France was obliged in her turn to mobilize on August second. The government was still reassuring the people and telling them that "mobilization was not war." Viviani ordered the French troops to withdraw ten kilometers from the frontier in order to prove that the French were not the aggressors. But it was impossible to refuse to fight. If France had declared her neutrality, disavowed the Russian alliance, Germany would have demanded that she give up Toul and Verdun. She would have defeated Russia and then held France completely in her power. France had to defend herself or accept the yoke.

The French people understood. Mobilization well prepared by the staff office took place not only with order but with confidence. Germany had counted upon French decadence. She thought that the war would be a signal for a revolution which was even reported in the countries of central Europe. She was mistaken. The assassination of the socialist leader, Jaurès, on the evening of July thirty-first had not caused the slightest trouble. The nation was united for defense. What it did not know was how insufficient her material preparation for the war was, and to what carnage she was going. The troops were still wearing their old *pantalon rouge*, red trousers, a veritable target. Her 75's were a formidable weapon but they were powerless against the superiority of the German heavy artillery. Years of negligence and of lack of foresight were paid for by the lives of thousands upon thousands of Frenchmen.

Anger against the aggressor had at one fell swoop swept away many illusions. What sustained the confidence of the French this time was the feeling that they were not alone as they had been in 1870. They knew the Germans were strong and numerous. But Russia was a reservoir of men. And new allies were continually joining forces with France. On the third of August Germany declared war on France. The day before, violating her treaties, she summoned Belgium to allow

her armies free passage; but Belgium immediately decided to defend herself. This decision obliged England, who was still hesitating, to intervene because she had promised in 1839 to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium and also because it was a law of history that she would not tolerate that a great European power should gain possession of the mouth of the Scheldt. The solution which had been found for the old problem of the Low Countries under the reign of Louis-Philippe, proved salutary for France. Not only was Belgium, which had become a nation, at her side in this great war, but she had drawn the whole British Empire into it; and when England enters a European conflict, history has shown that she does not withdraw until she is victorious.

France, Russia, Belgium, England, this "Entente," already so vast, seemed more than capable of holding its own against Germany and Austria and of defeating them. Italy, faithful to the agreement which she had signed in 1902, hastened to inform France that she would remain neutral, thus freeing the latter from deep anxiety about her Alpine frontier. The only support which Germany was to find was that of Turkey and Bulgaria, a by no means negligible support because it complicated and prolonged the struggle, but it was insufficient to give her the victory after her surprise blow had failed. What France never suspected in 1914 was that she would need many other allies to put an end to the great military empire; so many allies that she was one day to be a slave to them and from them new difficulties were to arise.

In truth she had escaped a frightful disaster by a chance which immediately seemed like a miracle. Germany had thought that France would crumble morally and politically under the shock and she was mistaken; her aggression had produced that phenomenon of the "sacred union." But there was no less unity in Germany and on August fourth, in both parliaments, at Berlin as well as at Paris the socialists themselves had approved everything. With the consent of all Germany, an engine of war such as the world has seldom seen was launched against France.

Even the least confident of the French were surprised by the rapidity of the invasion. When they finally understood the military force of Germany they thought there would be several battles of doubtful outcome near the frontiers and far from Paris. After the necessary time for putting enormous armies in march, operations properly so-called began on August seventeenth. By the twenty-second, the French and English who had gone to the help of Belgium were forced to fall back on Charleroi and Mons. The Germans were entering French territory *en masse*, in the space of a few days were occupying the north of France, and were opening the way to Paris while the Allies were beating a retreat. France, whose nerves the government was handling gently, only learned of the situation by one of those laconic communications with which it had to be content in view of the general interest of the country. "From the Somme to the Vosges," said the dispatch. It revealed what had been kept hidden—invasion, the terrible thing that the people had seen three times in the last century. And the Somme was soon to become the Marne. Some German advance guards had appeared within a few kilometers of Paris. The government, in order to avoid being shut up and besieged as in 1870, had left for Bordeaux. It was at this moment that the unhopedor event occurred which saved everything.

The battle of the Marne has been much discussed. History will say that Joffre won it because he alone would have been responsible if he had lost it. General Galliéni was without doubt the first to see the nature of the maneuver that should be tried against Von Kluck's army which had advanced too quickly. Joffre, with an astounding coolness which had not left him since Charleroi, had the merit to understand the situation and instead of continuing the retreat, to send the command to all the French forces to advance. It was one of the finest military recoveries that history has ever seen, and Germany was disconcerted by it. The gigantic battle of the Marne which extended from the immediate vicinity of Paris as far as the Moselle, lasted from the sixth until the thirteenth of September and ended in the defeat and general retreat of the

enemy. Paris was saved. The invasion had been stopped. The Germans had proposed to put France *hors de combat* in six weeks and then to turn immediately against Russia. This plan had failed. In Germany a few clairvoyant men began to understand that the war was lost.

It was still far from being won by the French. After the battle of the Marne, France believed that her victory was complete, and that her territory would be delivered as after Valmy. Her armies, fatigued by their retreat and then by their prodigious efforts, and deprived of the munitions which they should have had, could not prevent the Germans from establishing themselves on a new line, reaching from the Oise to the Argonne. By the seventeenth of September the front was stabilized and trenches were dug facing each other. Then began a continuous and terribly murderous sort of siege warfare. The Germans tried vainly to resume the offensive and again to surround the Anglo-French armies, passing this time through maritime Flanders, through the regions of the canals and dunes where so many of the old wars of the Low Countries had taken place. Here, unheard-of feats of arms took place, like that at Dixmude. Inundation helped to bar the route to the Germans. In the beginning of November, after the battle of the Yser, they were forced to realize that they could not pass, but the Allies had only just prevented it.

There was fighting and would be fighting for a long time to come from the borders of the North Sea to the Caucasus, from the Baltic to the banks of the Suez canal, Turkey having joined the camp of the enemy. The war was developing and feeding on itself. It was prolonged by the very equilibrium of the belligerents; Germany finding in her preparation in time of peace and in her patient organization sufficient resources to balance the Allies' superiority in numbers. The war was also prolonged because Germany could not ask for peace without admitting her check while the Allies had been fortifying themselves against their own weaknesses. On the fourth of September at the very moment that the battle of the Marne was taking place, they had signed the Pact of London by which they

agreed not to conclude a separate peace. Still more than this contract, the situation itself guaranteed that no matter what happened, England at least would not give up the struggle. Save for a small corner of her territory, Belgium was occupied by the Germans; Antwerp and Ostend were in their hands. Never would England, who had intervened as soon as Belgian neutrality had been violated, concede to Germany what for centuries she had not conceded to France. Belgium thus became what she had so often been in history: the point around which the policy of Europe was organized and upon which peace and war depended. As for France, with her richest territory also invaded and occupied, while hostilities were being carried on within her borders it would not have been possible, even had she wished to do so, to withdraw from the engagement of September fourth. The armies of England had entered her country to fight at her side, and their effectives, so feeble at first, were increasing. England who had protested against conscription was to end by resorting to it. Her efforts corresponded to her tenacity and the destiny of France was one with hers. It is none the less true that the struggle was taking place on French soil, and that France was suffering its ravages, that the Germans were pillaging and destroying the occupied regions and maltreating the inhabitants. It was a frightful calamity, without example since the time of the barbaric invasions, and the effects of which will long be felt. In the meantime it was also the French soldiers who had to make the heaviest sacrifices and who were found wherever there was danger.

The war governed and directed everything. Germany herself, after having provoked it, was a slave to it. "Until victory, until the end" became the watchword on both sides of the trenches. In France, a few months earlier, those like Déroulède who still talked of the lost provinces, passed for dangerous fanatics. The retaking of Alsace-Lorraine was, however, the "war aim" which without discussion France immediately assigned herself, so naturally that it seemed she had never ceased to think of it.

The goal was far ahead and France would have many dangers

to encounter before she attained it. And first of all it was necessary to drive out the enemy and put an end to the hateful trenches, the exhausting subterranean warfare in which men perished daily in minor actions. The year 1915 passed in fruitless efforts to pierce the German front. In March a first offensive failed in Champagne and a second in September succeeded no better. Another, after a fortunate beginning which made the Allies overconfident, failed in Artois in May and June. At this juncture, Italy renouncing her neutrality, entered the Entente; France had still another ally but the war was spreading in Europe like a conflagration. In October the Bulgarians joined with Germany. Turkey had already cut the French communications with Russia. In the Dardanelles at Gallipoli, by land and by sea, the English and French were trying vainly to open up a way through. Thanks to Bulgaria, Germany and Austria were able to crush Serbia and form a continuous line as far as Asia Minor. France and England discussed for a long time the question as to whether it was best to abandon the Orient to Germany, altogether, before they decided to undertake the expedition of Salonika, proposed by France and opposed by England. It was not only a new military effort which would be imposed upon them. They had to consider a revision of the map of Europe and promise Greece, whom the Allies needed and who was uncertain, an extension of territory. Her king, Constantine, the brother-in-law of William II, was leaning toward Germany. Thus the extension of the war into the eastern part of Europe complicated things still more. And, what was more serious, it was in this year, 1915, while Germany was repelling the assaults in Artois and in Champagne, that she, overturning her original plan, dealt a violent blow at Russia and took possession of Poland. In its turn the Russian front became immobilized and was far removed. The alliance with this vast empire of 120 million subjects, which had given so much hope, rendered a great service at the beginning of the campaign. Without the Russian army in 1914, the German invasion might have submerged France. But in 1915 Russia could no longer menace Germany. There was reason to fear,

when one considered her history, that she would make a separate peace. In order to hold her, France and England went so far as to offer her Constantinople which they had never dreamed of doing before. Nothing shows more clearly than this overturning of the great political traditions, the peril to which the Allies felt themselves exposed.

This peril was great in 1916. Reassured on the side of Russia, the Germans turned with fresh troops upon France. They in their turn wished to pierce the front and they had chosen Verdun in order to attract the great part of the French army, defeat it, and force the French to sue for peace. The taking of Verdun would have had an immense effect in Europe. The name of this old city immediately became a symbol. The fate of the war was attached to it and that is why in France both the military leaders and the government decided to resist at any cost. The battles which were fought there and which lasted nearly six months were the most formidable in history. Through the continual deluge of artillery fire, by the fury of the assaults, this corner of France, from February until August, 1916, was an inferno. Hundreds of thousands of men fought there, and there again the French sacrificed themselves *en masse*.

This check to the Germans, which cost them dearly, compelled them to change their methods. Their "peace offensives" began. In possession of strong positions everywhere, they hoped to put an end to the Allies through fatigue and so to withdraw from the war with the advantage on their side. The intervention of Roumania at the end of August, 1916, was a new diversion which in addition to the resistance at Verdun and to a vigorous "reply to Verdun" launched by the Allies on the Somme, revived the hope of the Entente. However, Roumania was crushed in a few weeks while a new difficulty was arising in Greece which the French had to patrol and disarm after the treasonable massacre of some French soldiers in the Zappeion at Athens. Within less than a century after the Greek war of independence when France passionately supported the Greek fight for liberty, this ambush was her reward.

Thus the war went on, renewing itself unceasingly, destroying human lives and swallowing up the accumulated wealth of several generations. As an effect of these monstrous happenings, many things began to give way in Europe. Lassitude, demoralization, and revolt, the phenomena upon which Germany was counting, and which she was trying to produce, began to manifest themselves among the Allies before they did in Germany. In Russia, the weak point of the Entente, the event watched for by Germany took place; the revolution by overturning Nicholas II deprived France of an ally who, in spite of the uncertainties of his character, had remained faithful to her. And when the control of the Czar disappeared, Russia sank into chaos. The revolution, still nationalistic at first, by March, 1917, was spreading indiscipline and was rapidly breaking up the Russian army. It thus ceased to count for the Entente even before the Bolsheviks, having seized the power, signed peace with Germany. In spite of all that was done in the countries of the Allies to represent the events in Russia under favorable colors, they had their echo even in France. Mutinies broke out in the army. At the same time, there awakened in internal politics a spirit which since 1914 seemed to have disappeared. The days of the "sacred union" and of zeal against the invasion were receding. Personal rivalries had appeared again in parliament. Unstable ministries succeeded each other. Under weak, irresolute men the government vacillated. A "defeatist" propaganda was doing its work and the minister of the interior, Malvy, was publicly accused of favoring it. The prime minister, Painlevé, wished to prosecute the accuser, Léon Daudet, on the pretext of a plot against the government. In reality the two tendencies which had been clashing for forty years appeared again. If France was to conduct the war to a victorious conclusion, something more than a firm government to react against this giving-way was needed. It was necessary that this government should be exercised by those who had no leaning towards Germany. The situation itself called to the government, with Clemenceau, the Jacobin tradition of public safety, the radical tradition which had determined the war to

the last ditch in 1871 and then the opposition to the "policy of forgetting." In November, 1917, Clemenceau became prime minister with this program within and without: "My policy is war (*"Je fais la guerre"*). He immediately prosecuted the disgraceful cases of treason and dealt a blow at their head by accusing Joseph Caillaux of having relations with the enemy and of plotting against the safety of the state. As for Malvy, Clemenceau, in the presence of the Senate, accused him of compromising the interests of which he had been put in charge, and the former minister of the interior asked himself to be brought before the High Court which condemned him to banishment. Clemenceau and the men of his generation had been nourished in the history of the French Revolution. In his present action there was a much softened memory of the Terror.

It was time that some impulse be given to France. The brilliant effort of 1914 could not alone sustain her, and even if Germany likewise was weary, she was entirely in the hands of the new military leaders whom the war had brought forward. No longer having to occupy themselves with the Russian front, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were preparing a last violent offensive in France before the new and un hoped-for aid which was coming to the Entente could be made effective. In her furious attempts to break through the blockade in which she was held by the English fleet, Germany, by her unrestricted submarine warfare, had provoked the United States and had made even far-away America herself feel the danger of a German victory. The Americans threw their weight into the balance at the moment of Russia's defection and their number came just in time to replace, in the minds of the French, the lost weight. By intervening almost at the last hour, with entirely fresh forces, the United States was to contribute to the fall of Germany. They were to demoralize her above all by taking away her hope of conquering. But, although President Wilson declared war on April 2, 1917, the United States would not be in position to take part in the struggle before many long months. An intact America was to arrive at the end of the war in an exhausted Europe and President Wilson was to be master

of the peace, as France had been under Richelieu, by not intervening until the last period of the Thirty Years' War. Only President Wilson did not understand European questions. Although belligerents, the United States made a point of calling themselves the associates, and not the allies of the Entente, and their government held itself ready to play the rôle of arbitrator or mediator which it had already several times attempted to assume. On the eve of victory one could begin to see the difficulties of peace arising.

But before she was conquered Germany was to prove that she could still be formidable. In 1918, as in 1914, she played and lost. As in 1914 also, she came near succeeding. If, until that time, she had held her own against so many adversaries, it was above all to her political and military organization that she owed it. After that it was to the faults of the Allies who had not understood how to unite their efforts. They had many leaders; time and again they had allowed themselves to be attacked one by one, while the entire enemy coalition was conducted by the German general staff. In France there was an isolated British front; on March 21, 1918, Ludendorff attacked it and drove it back. An entire English army was retreating and the Germans might well think that they were opening a new road to Paris. Bombarded in the daytime by mysterious long-distance cannon, and at night by airplane, the French government held itself ready as in 1914, to leave the capital. In the midst of this peril, it was again the French soldiers who were sacrificed and who stopped the rush. The common danger which had become as grave as on the first days of invasion, at least brought about what nothing else had hitherto accomplished: a French general, Foch, finally received entire control of the Allied armies. From that time on, the war had direction and method. A battle of more than seven months was beginning which was to be the last and which the general in chief was determined not to lose. Stopped everywhere after some passing successes due to surprise attacks, before Amiens and Compiègne, in Flanders and on the Chemin-des-Dames, the

Germans had returned as far as the Marne and in July were there defeated a second time. This was the moment that Foch had foreseen and for which he had been preparing in order that this second victory of the Marne should not stop short as the first had done. He passed to the offensive and without giving the enemy time to breathe, pursued and harassed him, obliging him at each step to yield a little of the territory which had been conquered and occupied for four years.

On November 11, 1918, an armistice, "generous to the point of imprudence," was accorded to the German army, saved it from complete disaster and permitted it to recross the Rhine without having capitulated. Judging that Germany was conquered, that French soil was freed and that he did not have the right to continue the frightful carnage any longer, Foch yielded to the advice of the Allied governments. In the East, Bulgaria and Turkey had first given way. Austria was going to pieces and Germany herself was a prey to disorder. The Hapsburg and Hohenzollern thrones as well as those of all the German sovereigns, were falling one after the other. The power which had made Europe tremble and against which twenty-seven nations had been leagued together, had been stricken to earth. The Germans left France and Belgium in haste as William II had left Germany. This was one of those falls into nothingness and chaos, after a period of grandeur, of which the German Empire and its dynasties have left so many examples in history.

It seemed as though the victory of the Allies could not be more complete. It remained to take advantage of it. The relief of France after the armistice of November eleventh, which put an end to more than four years of slaughter and anguish, was inexpressible. However, nearly 1,500,000 men had perished, ten departments had been ravished, the fantastic sum of more than two hundred billions, an amount that one would have hardly believed could be realized, had been swallowed up. For the moment no one took account of the upheaval which the war had wrought and which would change the conditions of existence in the country. The French people thought that everything

was going to be happy and easy, when other painful days were just beginning.

The establishment of peace was at first deceiving. A victory which had cost so dearly seemed to promise the French ample compensations. But a victory won by so many did not leave her hands free. Experience had taught that preliminaries of peace should be imposed upon the enemy in the days immediately following the armistice. This precaution, which victors had never before failed to take, was neglected. But the Allies had agreed upon nothing. An agreement which fixed the part of each after the victory had been signed in 1916. The defection of Russia, and still more, the intervention of the United States had made this a dead letter. The French program was reduced to an imprecise formula: "Restitutions, reparations, guaranties." As for President Wilson, he had announced a program in fourteen points, a little more detailed but almost as vague, and one which would demand much work and discussion before it could be applied to the European realities. Moreover, the common danger having disappeared, each of the Allies returned to their personal interests, the English preoccupied with the sea and the French with their security on the continent. It was not only in the midst of a confusion of ideas, but in a conflict of traditions and interests that the Conference of Paris was to elaborate a series of treaties which changed the entire aspect of Europe determining the ruin of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and reviving states which had disappeared, like Poland and Bohemia, rebaptized Czechoslovakia. Other states received such considerable additions that they were more than doubled; such was the case with Serbia, which had become Yugoslavia. For the most part these transformations had taken place at the expense of the Empire of the Hapsburgs, which had been destroyed and dismembered, while Germany, preserving her unity, restored, besides the Polish provinces, only what she had taken from Denmark, in 1864, and from France, in 1871. Under no conditions would the Allies consent to allow France other frontiers than those of 1815. Sedan was effaced but not Waterloo. During the stormy dis-

cussions of the Paris Conference, it became plain that henceforth England, having annihilated the German naval power, would distrust France more than Germany.

And France was going to find herself face to face with Germany in regulating one of the most important and most difficult matters that had yet arisen. The treaty said that Germany was to repair the immense ruins that she had left in France. Neither ready money nor indemnity fixed once for all was demanded of her, but some billions whose total amount was to be fixed at some later date. The occupation of the left bank of the Rhine was to be the pledge of the payments as well as a protection for the countries of the West until the day when Germany, having disarmed as the terms of the treaty compelled her to do, and having given proof of her good intentions, should enter the League of Nations conceived by President Wilson to maintain peace and harmony among the nations. This was somewhat similar to the Holy Alliance which France had entered shortly after 1815 and which was conceived by the Czar Alexander. Such were the broad lines of the peace concluded at Versailles, June 28, 1919, on the anniversary of the crime at Sarajevo, in that same Gallery of Mirrors where on January 18, 1871, the German Empire had been proclaimed. Two obscure delegates of the new German Republic signed with the representatives of the twenty-seven nations from all parts of the world who had taken part in the struggle, many in an honorary way. Other treaties on the same model were signed in different places in the neighborhood of Paris, with what remained of Austria, that is to say a small republic which was forbidden to reunite with Germany; and with Hungary and Bulgaria, while Turkey rejected the conditions which were imposed upon her.

After a war which had been fought by many peoples came a peace which involved the interests of many peoples. It was a mixture of diverse conceptions, of the principle of equilibrium and of nationalities, a peace which postponed many questions until later and which would still have to be interpreted and applied. In France, especially, critics were not lacking. As for Germany, in spite of her crumbled grandeur and the disorder

which had followed the fall of the Hohenzollerns, she was not resigned to submit to the consequences of her defeat. She was already protesting against the treaty of Versailles and France's great task was to be to impose its execution upon her, impeded rather than aided by her former allies. In a transformed world, where from being the conquered one she had become victorious, France was to find again the permanent laws of her history; between England and Germany, she was still compelled to make her way.

Since 1914 there had been no elections in France. Universal suffrage had not been consulted. The Chamber was the same one which had been appointed in protest against the three-year military service, but which, under the stress of necessity, had voted all the measures of the levy *en masse*, had first accepted the "sacred union," and then, after signs of weakness, followed Clemenceau, who had bolstered it up, to the bitter end. Its term had expired before the war was finished and had been prolonged because, as was said, a good half of the electors were mobilized, but which meant in reality that the government did not wish to resort to a plebiscite on the question of war or peace. The electors were not even allowed to express themselves on the treaty of Versailles. The treaty had already been ratified when the elections of November 16, 1919, took place. For the first time the old voting by *arrondissement* was abandoned and the system of proportional representation was applied with a few remaining limitations. At this juncture, a revolutionary movement which, starting in Russia, was spreading over Germany, alarmed the peaceable masses of the French people. The menace of a veritable socialism which would confiscate property, joined with the discontent against the parties who had been so greatly deceived before the war, brought an entirely new majority into power. It was not that France had changed so much; a change of a few hundred thousand votes was sufficient to give the victory to the moderates and conservatives who were united on the lists of the national Bloc. Clemenceau and the Jacobin school had contributed to this success by conducting the war to a victorious conclusion and in discrediting,

together with Malvy and Caillaux, one whole section of the Left. Only, the new Chamber, tending toward the Right, did not take kindly to the Jacobin spirit. It also represented the disappointment which the peace had caused, the imperfections of which were beginning to be felt. Clemenceau, a candidate for president, was not elected, and Paul Deschanel who had promised an end of anticlericalism and a resumption of diplomatic relations with the Holy See, succeeded Poincaré. Thus Clemenceau and his collaborators were removed from power. The men who had drawn up the treaty of Versailles were not to be the men to apply it. The country had taken account of their faults and they were to take account of those of their successors.

To reap the greatest advantages possible from a treaty "weightier in promises than in realities" was, during the first six months of 1920, the policy of Alexander Millerand, the former socialist who had so frightened the bourgeoisie when he had entered the ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau, and who now had become the leader of the conservative national Bloc. But to get any benefit from the treaty, to realize it, it was necessary to interpret it also and it immediately appeared that England did not interpret it as the French did. Thereupon the Entente was dissolved. The United States, whose government had impressed on the peace the mark of its theoretic views, had disavowed President Wilson, had refused to ratify the act of Versailles and had concluded a separate peace with Germany. In England the idea was growing that it would be well to treat Germany as France after 1815 had been treated by the British government. In place of finding the English at her side to compel Germany to hold to her engagements, France had now to resist her in order not to lose the fruit of her victory or had to yield for fear of breaking with her. In the search for a solution which should satisfy every one, repeated conferences revealed the discord among the victorious peoples; this encouraged the Germans and injured France's credit. This was the state of affairs when in August, 1920, Poland was invaded by the Russians. Thus Europe, in the new organization which

had grown out of the treaties, was not guaranteed against the risk of war and it was from Communist Russia that this risk was now coming. A still more serious thing was that neither among the new allied powers nor among the new states which owed their life to them was there any country except France who showed itself disposed to save the Polish Republic from a new partition. Millerand, having taken the initiative to send aid to Poland under General Weygand, the red army was repelled after having reached the very suburbs of Warsaw. This event showed the fragility of the new Europe which was in no way pacified in the East where Turkey still continued to refuse to accept the conditions of the victors. After the sudden peril which had appeared in Poland, the success of the decision taken by Millerand made him popular and almost immediately he succeeded President Deschanel, who was obliged through illness to resign his position. He died soon after.

Alexander Millerand in entering upon his duties as president of the Republic had announced his intention of playing an active rôle, of assuring thereby the continuity of French policy and of not remaining, as had his predecessors since Marshal MacMahon, in the attitude of a witness or an arbitrator. For the first time in many years the idea of revising the constitution of 1875 was revived. The new president used the prerogative which he had asked for, when in 1922 he parted with Aristide Briand, whom he had chosen the year before as his prime minister. Briand, also trying to carry out the treaty of Versailles and to carry it out in accord with the Allies, had made greater and greater concessions to the English point of view. At the conference at Cannes Lloyd George had been on the point of obtaining what he was looking for, a sort of agreement between the victors and the conquered Germans, with the participation of Germany herself. The protest of the Chambers and of public opinion determined Millerand to recall Briand from Cannes and the prime minister resigned without having been overturned by a parliamentary vote.

Opposed to the policy of concessions which he had been attacking in the press, Raymond Poincaré was naturally disig-

nated to take over the government. For him, the treaty of Versailles, which he could have wished to be better, was inviolable. Such as it was, however, it had to be applied without suffering new amputations and without reducing France's credit which had not been helped by the postponements, attenuations and delays which had successively been accorded Germany. France then returned to the integral execution of the treaty, through force of necessity, all other means having failed. In the meantime the Germans, alleging disorder in their finances, suspended their payments one by one. After so many experiments which had failed, there remained only one system to try, that of pledges. There had already been talk of the Ruhr Basin, one of the richest mining and industrial regions of Germany. The repeated and willful failure of Germany to meet her engagements having been proved by a Reparations Commission, the French government in concert with Belgium decided in accordance with the provisions of the treaty to occupy the Ruhr. On January 11, 1923, without striking a blow, the French troops entered Essen. Thus the treaty of peace, in its own right had ended nothing. It still demanded new efforts on the part of France and her account with Germany was far from being settled. The work continued with the days and the days of the nations are long.

We are now coming to the point where this history is to end. In proportion as we approach the time in which we are living, the broad lines escape us. They will reveal themselves only in their results, which are still lacking. It is probable that the occupation of the Ruhr will be the culminating point from whence future events will flow. What has France been seeking since peace was concluded? Security, guaranties against a possible German revenge. She has also sought the reparations which were promised to her, which she has not had and without which the establishing of her prosperity is uncertain. In this task she has met with the resistance of Germany and she has been hindered by England. The two foreign forces against which France, through the course of centuries, has had so often to defend her independence, or between whom she has had

to fend her way, are in a certain measure, again united against her. France declared that she would not leave the Ruhr or the left bank of the Rhine as long as Germany had not fulfilled her engagements. It remains to be seen whether external pressure or a change of position within, will not make her renounce this resolution. At present we cannot say. All is hidden in the future.

All that one can discern in the light of the most recent events, is that the peace, in not holding to its promises, has left France in the strange position of a victorious but wounded country. France has at her command, for a time which is impossible to calculate, the greatest military force in Europe. But she has no navy and she possesses a vast colonial domain—increased still more by the addition of Syria—which she would be incapable of defending. Her entire history teaches that this is a dangerous position.

Deprived of her reparations on which she had counted, which have not been paid and which may never be paid, France is, in spite of her victory, a people which has been invaded and devastated. The wrong, which Germany intentionally did her, remains, and she is in this respect as though she had been conquered. By her own endeavors, by her own saving, France has already restored a large part of her ruins. But the work is not finished. It has already required considerable capital which, added to the enormous expenses of the war, form a colossal debt whose exact evaluation is difficult because of her return to the system of paper money. Financial difficulties, when they are serious, become political difficulties; we saw this at the end of the Revolution. The question of taxes, when their imposition is very heavy, is formidable because it provokes protests and favors demagoguery. This is a situation which has presented itself more than once in French history. A weak government is tempted by the too facile expedient of assignats, which bring ruin. On the other hand, to count upon reasonable and voluntary sacrifice on the part of a whole nation, is running a big risk. After the experience of past centuries, one may well ask himself if the question of money will not be for some time to

come at the base of all politics and if, both within and without, French policy will not depend upon it and finally if the government will not tend to reënforce itself and break away from the rules of the parliamentary democracy in order to withdraw the measures of public safety from general discussion. At the moment that this history ends, the Republic has already arrived at a régime of arbitrary decrees, and it is not sure that this will be sufficient. Let but a majority reject or overturn this régime, a remodeling of the Napoleonic Empire, and it will be necessary to abandon the regular finances and to run the risk of great disorder or else, in the name of public safety, deny the rights of the majority.

We can see almost everywhere in Europe, in the countries devastated by the war, that the governments have lost their foothold. The old world is in a state which much resembles chaos. There is an extreme confusion of ideas. Full powers, dictatorships, these are words which no longer terrify and which seem natural, in spite of the fact that everywhere we see posted the names of a Republic or Democracy. Out of the vast destruction which the war and its following revolutions have caused, no one can say what is being brought forth and what is provisional and what is lasting. Only when we compare France with the other countries, and when we consider the heights and depths of her history, we see she is not the worst sufferer. Exposed to tribulations, often menaced in her very existence—she had been so most terribly, in 1914—she has never been subject to those weakenings or long eclipses from which so many other nations have suffered. Her social structure remains solid and well balanced. The middle classes, her great strength, always renew themselves in a short time. After all her convulsions, often more violent than elsewhere, she quickly returns to order and authority for which she has a natural taste and instinct. . . . If one had not this confidence, it would not be worth while to have children.

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